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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

R 190800Z AUG 74  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2262  
BT

CONTROL: 4 8 3 0 Q

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 1416

recd: 19, Aug

NODIS

4:46 A.M.

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, OVIP, CH  
SUBJECT: TRAVEL OF CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO PRC

REF: STATE 178601

1. USLO NOMINATES BRUNSON AND NANCY MCKINLEY TO ESCORT CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION. THEY TENTATIVELY PLAN MEET AIRCRAFT AT SHANGHAI, AS ANDERSONS DID WHEN GOVERNORS CAME.
2. USLO CONSIDERED DEPARTMENT'S SUGGESTION THAT A CHINESE-SPEAKING OFFICER AND ANOTHER OFFICER'S CHINESE-SPEAKING WIFE BE ASSIGNED THIS DUTY, BUT DECIDED IT MIGHT BE BEST NOT TO MAKE THE EXTRA DEMAND ON CHINESE HOTEL SPACE AND FACILITIES WHICH SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD DEMAND, SINCE GROUP ALREADY FAIRLY HEAVY WITH STAFFERS.
3. PLEASE LET US KNOW ASAP WHEN PRCLO GIVES GO-AHEAD FOR TRIP SO THAT USLO CAN INITIATE DISCUSSIONS WITH MFA ON DETAILS LIKE FLIGHT INFORMATION BEST HANDLED FROM THIS END.

BRUCE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#R5714101



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 5834Q

Recd: Aug 22, 1974  
5:28 AM

R 220900Z AUG 74  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2273  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 1439

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OVIP, CH  
SUBJECT: TRAVEL OF CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO PRC

REF: (A) STATE 181996  
STATE 181996 (B) PEKING 709

1. IN PRE-TRIP BRIEFINGS FOR MEMBERS OF UPCOMING CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION, DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO DRAW UPON THE POINTS MADE IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF REFTEL 8, WHICH CONTAINED USLO'S RECOMMENDATIONS -- ALL EQUALLY VALID FOR THE CODEL-- ON HOW BEST TO PREPARE THE U.S. GOVERNORS FOR THE KINDS OF HANDLING THEY COULD EXPECT FROM THEIR CHINESE HOSTS. IT OCCURS TO US THAT THE CONGRESSIONAL GROUP, CONSCIOUS OF BEING THE FIRST OFFICIAL USG DELEGATION SINCE THE CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATIONS AND AWARE THAT SENATOR JACKSON SAW PREMIER CHOU JUST LAST MONTH (AS DID MAGNUSON GROUP LAST YEAR), MAY BE EXPECTING A RECEPTION AT THAT LEVEL. IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT TO FORESTALL POSSIBLE DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE PREMIER IS A SICK MAN, AND HAS RECENTLY TURNED OVER TO HIS SUBORDINATES MOST OF HIS PROTOCOL DUTIES, INCLUDING GREETING VISITORS.

2. WE ASSUME THAT THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS WILL BE THE CODEL'S OFFICIAL HOST.

3. PLEASE LET US KNOW WHETHER CODEL AIRCRAFT PLANS STOP AT MCCORD AFB. IF SO, USLO MAY WISH TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENT FOR LOADING A MODEST AMOUNT OF FROZEN FOOD THERE.

BRUCE



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

R 270625Z AUG 74  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2298  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ PEKING 1468

CONTROL: 7 0 1 5 Q

Recd : 27, Aug  
4:11 A.M.

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3 DATE OF DOWNGRADING IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE  
TAGS: PFOR ECON CH US  
SUBJECT: SCOPE OF BRIEFINGS FOR CODEL FULBRIGHT

1. TWO SUBJECTS LIKELY TO ARISE IN CODEL FULBRIGHT'S DISCUSSIONS WITH CHINESE, GIVEN THE AUTHORITATIVE POSITION OF SOME CODEL MEMBERS IN CONGRESSIONAL FOREIGN POLICY DELIBERATIONS, ARE MFN TREATMENT FOR CHINA AND SENATOR JACKSON'S NORMALIZATION PROPOSAL BASED ON INTERCHANGE BETWEEN USLO IN PEKING AND EMBASSY ON TAIWAN. WE WOULD THEREFORE APPRECIATE HEARING FROM DEPARTMENT AS TO DEPTH OF TREATMENT WE SHOULD GIVE THESE SUBJECTS DURING ANY BRIEFINGS WHICH CODEL MAY REQUEST FROM USLO. SPECIFICALLY WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER WE MAY:

A) DESCRIBE ASSETS-CLAIMS SITUATION AS IT NOW RESTS SINCE HOLDRIDGE-LIN P'ING MEETING OF JUNE 14 IN EVENT THAT CODEL MEMBERS BRING UP THIS SITUATION AND ITS POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON MFN; AND

B) REFER TO LIKELY PRC REJECTION OF USLO-EMBASSY SWITCH, AS INDICATED BY STATEMENTS BY PRC LEADERS TO EFFECT THAT IN NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH PRC THE U.S. SHOULD FOLLOW PATTERN SET BY JAPANESE IN MAINTAINING RESIDUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH TAIWAN.

2. GUIDANCE WOULD ALSO BE APPRECIATED ON ANY OTHER SUBJECTS WHICH WASHINGTON CONSIDERS SENSITIVE.

BRUCE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 5/14/01

~~SECRET~~





## Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

Z 010415Z SEP 74  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 2308  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ PEKING 1501

CONTROL: 0001Q  
RECD: 1 SEP 74  
0051 AM

NODIS CHEROKEE

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM DAVID BRUCE

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS:  
SUBJECT:

REF: STATE 192385

BEGIN QUOTE. MY DEAR HENRY: I GREATLY APPRECIATE THE KIND THOUGHTS EXPRESSED BY THE PRESIDENT AND YOUR OWN WARM PERSONAL MESSAGE.

I THINK IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE WISE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO ANNOUNCE THE NAMING OF GEORGE BUSH AS MY SUCCESSOR AT THE SAME TIME THAT HE MAKES OTHER DIPLOMATIC CHANGES. THE CHINESE WOULD, I BELIEVE, FEEL AGGRIEVED IF REPRESENTATION TO THEM WAS NOT PROVIDED FOR AT THE SAMETIME AS OTHER SHIFTS WERE TAKING PLACE IN IMPORTANT POSTS.

I AM HAPPY THAT GEORGE BUSH WILL TAKE OVER THE PEKING OFFICE. IT IS AN ADMIRABLE APPOINTMENT FOR WHICH HE IS EMINENTLY QUALIFIED. HIS EXPERIENCE AND PRESTIGE WILL BE EVERYWHERE RECOGNIZED.

I SHOULD LIKE TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS.

AS FAR AS VANGIE AND MYSELF ARE CONCERNED THE TIME OF OUR DEPARTURE IS INCONSEQUENTIAL. NO QUESTION WHATEVER OF PERSONAL CONVENIENCE IS INVOLVED. WE BOTH FEEL PRIVILEGED TO HAVE HAD WHAT HAS BEEN AN UNUSUAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN DIPLOMACY TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS FASCINATING UNFOLDING OF A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SYSTEM UNIQUE IN HISTORY. WE WILL ALWAYS BE GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR THIS.

I BELIEVE HOWEVER IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE FOR ME TO LINGER ON HERE ANY LONGER THAN SEEMS EXPEDIENT. I REALIZE THAT BECAUSE OF GEORGE'S PRESENT DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS IT MAY NOT BE PRACTICABLE FOR HIM TO ADAPT HIS SCHEDULE TO WHAT I PROPOSE. IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO DO SO I THINK THAT AS SOON AS FEASIBLE AFTER THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS HE SHOULD BE SWORN IN AS CHIEF OF U.S.L.O.

~~SECRET~~

HR 5/14/01

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# Department of State

~~SECRET~~

## TELEGRAM

PAGE -2- -PEKING 1501, SEP 1

SINCE THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL NOR FOR THE PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS TO THE PRC, ONCE HE HAS ASSUMED OFFICE THERE ARE CERTAIN ACTIVITIES IN WHICH IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE FOR HIM TO ENGAGE.

IF THE PROPOSED MEETING OF AMERICAN AMBASSADORS CONVENES IN HONG KONG THE LATTER PART OF NOVEMBER AND HE COULD ATTEND IT THAT WOULD AFFORD HIM A DESIRABLE CHANCE TO MEET OUR CHIEFS OF MISSION IN THIS REGION.

MOREOVER IT WOULD BE A TREMENDOUS ADVANTAGE FOR HIM TO BE HERE AT LEAST FOR A SHORT TIME BEFORE YOU COME TO CHINA TOWARD THE END OF THIS YEAR OR EARLY NEXT YEAR. TO BE PRESENT DURING YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH TOP CHINESE OFFICIALS WOULD IN MY OPINION PROVIDE THE MOST VALUABLE BACKGROUND IMAGINABLE FOR HIS FUTURE OPERATIONS. IT CERTAINLY WAS TRUE IN MY CASE.

IF THERE IS MERIT IN THESE SUGGESTIONS AND IF THERE ARE NO IMPEDIMENTS TO THEIR ACCEPTANCE I WOULD FURTHER PROPOSE THAT MY RESIGNATION BE MADE EFFECTIVE AS OF NOVEMBER FIRST 1974 OR EARLIER IS THE PRESIDENT AND YOU DEEMED THAT PREFERABLE. THIS WOULD AVOID THE INEVITABLE CRITICISM OF THE FOREIGN AND GOVERNMENTAL WORLD AGAINST A LAME DUCK SITUATION, AND IT WOULD BE CONSIDERED MORE NORMAL BY THE CHINESE AND OTHER FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS THAN A PROLONGATION OF MY TENURE.

IN THAT EVENT THE EXTRAORDINARILY COMPETENT JOHN HOLDRIDGE WOULD ASSURE THE CONTINUITY OF OUR POLICIES.

VANGIE JOINS ME IN WARMEST REGARDS TO NANCY AND YOU. DAVID  
BRUCE. END QUOTE.

BRUCE



~~SECRET~~

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Department of State

# TELEGRAM

RECD: 2 SEP 10:45PM

CONTROL: 0 1 0 80

O 030205Z SEP 74  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2329  
BT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PEKING 1503

NOD 1 S

E.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: OREP, CH  
SUBJECT: CODEL, PRC

FOR GRIMES FROM BUFFALO

1. AIRCRAFT 86970 RETURNING WASHINGTON SEPT 4 ETA 1210 RPT 1210.  
WILL CLEAR IN ELMONDORF.
2. MEMBERS OF CODEL HAVE PERSONAL ITEMS OBTAINED GUAM  
ABOARD. SGT. ELKINS INSTRUCTED LEAVE ITEMS WITH L. COL.  
THOMAS AT ANDREWS FOR PICK-UP BY DEPT OF STATE AND TO DELIVER  
TO CAPITOL HILL.

BRUCE



1941

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

O 050455Z SEP 74  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2347  
BT  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 1527

CONTROL: 0 6 7 2 Q

Recd 05, Sept  
01:06 A.M.

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR OREP CH  
SUBJECT: TENG HSIAO-P'ING ON CHOU'S HEALTH

1. CODEL FULBRIGHT MET WITH VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-P'ING FOR TWO HOURS FRIDAY MORNING. AN ACCOUNT OF HIS GENERAL REMARKS FOLLOWS BY SEPTEL. IN ADVANCE OF THAT, HOWEVER, BELIEVE DEPARTMENT MIGHT WISH TO KNOW OF TENG'S REMARKS ON PREMIER CHOU, QUOTED IN FULL BELOW.

2. AT THE END OF HIS WELCOMING STATEMENT TO THE DELEGATION, TENG SAID: "IF PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI WERE NOT ILL, I'M SURE HE WOULD HAVE MET WITH YOU." FULBRIGHT EXPRESSED HIS REGRET THAT CHOU WAS NOT IN GOOD HEALTH AND HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT A MEETING WITH HIM WAS UNLIKELY. "YES," CONTINUED TENG, "SENATOR JACKSON MET BRIEFLY WITH PREMIER CHOU IN THE HOSPITAL, BUT HIS ILLNESS IS NOW GRAVER, SO IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO RECEIVE YOU EVEN IN THE HOSPITAL."

BRUCE

~~SECRET~~

HR 514/01



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TELEGRAM

R 060415Z SEP 74  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2357  
BT

CONTROL: 0967Q

RECD: 6 SEP 74

00:26AM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PEKING 1539

NODIS CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: APER (BRUCE, DAVID)

SUBJECT: RETURN FROM PEKING TO WASHINGTON

1. IN CONNECTION WITH MY DEPARTURE FROM PEKING, I RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THE FOLLOWING PROPOSALS.

2. I SHOULD LIKE IF THERE IS NO OBJECTION FOR MY WIFE AND MYSELF TO BE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL VIA THE ATLANTIC (BY AIR FRANCE TO PARIS ON SATURDAY, OCTOBER 5), THUS AVOIDING THE FORTY HOUR OR LONGER DELAY OF PROCEEDING VIA HONG KONG. I WOULD EXPECT US TO ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON ABOUT OCTOBER 12. THEREAFTER, I WOULD BE AVAILABLE, IF IT WERE SO DESIRED, FOR CONSULTATION AT THE DEPARTMENT FROM OCTOBER 14 TO OCTOBER 31. MY RESIGNATION BECOMES EFFECTIVE ON NOVEMBER FIRST.

3. IF THE ABOVE IS SATISFACTORY, I WOULD APPRECIATE A REPLY AT DEPARTMENT'S EARLIEST CONVENIENCE.

4. IF APPROVED IN PRINCIPLE, I SHALL THEN APPLY FOR INCREASES PROBABLY FOR BOTH U/B AND EXCESS BAGGAGE.

BRUCE



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TELEGRAM

R 290330Z OCT 74

FM USLO PEKING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2615

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 1862

Control: 8240Q

Recd: Oct 28, 1974

10:59 PM

NODIS/ CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON MEETING WITH CHU CH'UAN-HSIEN

1. IN ADDITION TO INFORMATION IN PEKING 1835, THE FOLLOWING SUBSTANTIVE INTERCHANGES TOOK PLACE DURING MY OCTOBER 23 CALL ON MFA PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT ACTING DIRECTOR CHU CH'UAN-HSIEN.

2. I MADE CLEAR THAT, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF LOCAL CUSTOM AND WHAT THE PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT THOUGHT SUITABLE, I WANTED TO HAVE AS MUCH CONTACT AS POSSIBLE WITH CHINESE OFFICIALS ON ALL LEVELS. I EMPHASIZED MY BELIEF THAT AN EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS ON A WIDE RANGE OF SUBJECTS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A BETTERING OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, IN THIS CONNECTION, I PUT FORWARD THE OFFER TO HOLD STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL BRIEFINGS FOR A VERY RESTRICTED GROUP OF HIGHER-LEVEL CHINESE OFFICIALS ON CURRENT TRENDS AND PERSONALITIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS, A SUBJECT WITH WHICH I AM INTIMATELY FAMILIAR, OR OTHER TOPICS WHICH MIGHT INTEREST CHINESE LEADERS. I ASKED CHU TO RELAY TO VICE-MINISTER CH'IAO KUAN-HUA MY HOPE THAT THE VICE-MINISTER WOULD NOT FEEL OBLIGED TO ORGANIZE ANY LAVISH FORMAL ENTERTAINMENT FOR ME, SINCE I HAD RECENTLY SEEN THE VICE-MINISTER IN NEW YORK, BUT SAID I LOOKED FORWARD TO A QUIET GET-TOGETHER WHERE A MORE PRIVATE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE.

3. I REITERATED MY OPINION THAT FRANKNESS WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE PRC AND CALLED UPON THE PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT TO FREELY CRITICIZE OR COMMENT ON ANY LIAISON OFFICE PRACTICES WHICH IT FELT SHOULD BE CORRECTED. LASTLY I TOLD MR. CHU THAT A HIGH REGARD DR. KISSINGER HAD FOR THE CHINESE PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT.

4. IN REPLY, MR. CHU SAID HE WOULD REPORT TO VICE-MINISTER CH'IAO THE DETAILS OF OUR CONVERSATION AND WOULD ARRANGE A PROGRAM OF INITIAL CALLS AND OTHER PROTOCOLAIRE ACTIVITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY WISHES AND UNDER THE OVERALL GUIDANCE OF THE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER.

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HR 5/14/01

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*Department of State*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**TELEGRAM**

-2- Peking 1862

5. NOTE: EVERYONE IN DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY COMMENTS TO ME ON THE FRUSTRATION AT NOT HAVING ANY TRULY MEANINGFUL CONTACTS WITH THE PRC OFFICIALS. I FELT THAT THIS INITIAL APPROACH TRYING TO UTILIZE MY POLITICAL PAST IN THE USA MIGHT WORK -- PROBABLY NOT BUT WORTH A TRY.

BUSH



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



## Department of State

~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM

0 020530Z NOV 74  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2645

CONTROL: 420Q

RECD: 2 NOV 74 1:41 AM

BT

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 1895

MODIS/CHEROKEE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*

STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES TD 9/27/02

BY 142, NARA, DATE 2/5/03

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2

TAGS: PFOR CH

SUBJECT: DINNER MEETING WITH CH'IAO KUAN HUA

1. THE EVENING WAS INFORMAL AND VERY RELAXED, CH'IAO OPENING HIS TUNIC AT THE END OF THE MEAL, LEANING BACK, ASKING ME IF I MINDED IF HE DIDN'T GIVE FORMAL TOAST BUT THAT SINCE THIS WAS INFORMAL EVENING HE WOULD LIKE TO SAY JUST A FEW WORDS SEATED. HIS TOAST WAS SHORT, WARM, AND FRIENDLY. THERE WAS A VERY PLEASANT ATMOSPHERE WITH SOME CHANCE TO DISCUSS SUBSTANCE.


2. THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS WERE DISCUSSED. OIL: HE RAISED IT AGAIN. I OPENED BY SAYING THAT I WAS EMBARRASSED I DIDN'T HAVE THE SAUDI ARABIA IMPORTS TO THE U.S. ON THE TIP OF MY TONGUE LAST MEETING BUT THAT I HAD GOTTEN THEM FOR HIM, ALONG WITH SOME OTHER IMPORT FIGURES INTO THE U.S. I SAID I DON'T WANT TO DWELL ON OIL AT A LOVELY DINNER LIKE THIS. HE SAID IT IS AN IMPORTANT SUBJECT AND WE SHOULD DISCUSS IT. I THEN REVIEWED THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE SECRETARY'S UN SPEECH AND AGAIN EXPRESSED OUR PRESIDENT'S TOTAL DETERMINATION TO CUT 1 MILLION BBL/DAY OF IMPORTED OIL. CH'IAO ASKED ME TO TRANSLATE THIS INTO TONS PER YEAR WHICH I DID. WE DID NOT GET INTO THE PRICING SITUATION AGAIN.

3. WE TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON KABAT MEETING, WITH HIM EXPRESSING NO PRO VIEW AND MY SAYING IT WAS PREMATURE TO ASSESS THE SITUATION. THE SECRETARY WOULD BRIEF HIM FULLY ON THIS MATTER AND, FURTHER, THE SECRETARY HAD ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO HIM THAT SECRETARY WOULD BE GOING TO THE AREA NOV 6-9. THERE WAS COMMENT BY THE VICE MINISTER ABOUT THE AMOUNT OF THE SECRETARY'S TRAVEL.

4. AT DINNER CH'IAO RAISED THE QUESTION OF JAPAN, ASKING IF WE WERE CONCERNED. I TOLD HIM WE FELT THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP WOULD GO ON AS SCHEDULED. CH'IAO MADE A REFERENCE TO THE NEED FOR COUNTRIES TO DO ALL THEY COULD TO SUPPORT TANAKA. HE SAID THAT THE TRIP BY PRES FORD WOULD HELP AND THAT PERHAPS THERE WERE

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# Department of State

~~SECRET~~

# TELEGRAM

-2- PEKING 1895 NOV 2

OTHER THINGS WE DO AS WELL. HE DESCRIBED THE PROBLEMS IN JAPAN AS COMING FROM THE RIGHT AND THE LEFT, STATING THAT AT TIMES THEY WERE BOTH JUST AS BAD. HE MADE CLEAR THAT THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN JAPAN WAS USSR ORIENTED. HIS COMMENTS LEFT THE DISTINCT AND CLEAR IMPRESSIONS THAT PRC LIKED NEITHER THE LEFT NOR THE FUKUDA DOMINATED RIGHT. (WE NOW HAVE HAD TWO MEETINGS AND CH'IAO HAS RAISED TANAKA'S SITUATION BOTH TIMES.) NO MENTION OF PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO S. KOREA OR USSR.

5. I RAISED THE QUESTION OF WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE, ASKING FOR THE PRC POSITION. HE REPLIED THAT "THIS WAS DIFFICULT TO SAY" (IN EFFECT, DODGING THE ISSUE), AND LAUNCHED INTO A DISCUSSION OF CHINA'S OWN AGRICULTURAL SITUATION. HE REFERRED TO THE RECENT VISIT OF US AGRONOMISTS AND POINTED OUT THAT THEY HAD SPOKEN HIGHLY OF PRC AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES. HE ADDED THAT PRC EXPORTED RICE TO SEVERAL COUNTRIES, MENTIONING SRI LANKA PARTICULARLY. AFTER ESTABLISHING THAT CHINA'S PRODUCTION IN AGRICULTURE WAS RUNNING AHEAD OF EARLIER ESTIMATES, HE REFERRED TO NY TIMES INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND RESTON. BOTH HOLDRIDGE AND I HAD READ THE INTERVIEW BUT NEITHER OF US RECALLED ANY REFERENCE CRITICAL OF PRC'S AGRICULTURE, BUT CH'IAO RAISED MATTER ONE MORE TIME SAYING THAT THE SECRETARY HAD CRITICIZED CHINA, INCORRECTLY, FOR IMPORTING GRAIN AND IN THIS HAD PUT CHINA ON A PAR WITH THE USSR. MATTER WAS RAISED NOT IN ANGER BUT MORE IN THE VIEN "PEOPLE SEEM TO MISUNDERSTAND OUR AGRICULTURAL CAPABILITIES". HE THEN CAME BACK TO MY ORIGINAL QUESTION OF THE WFC, EVIDENTLY JUDGING THAT HE COULD NOT AVOID DISCUSSING IT ENTIRELY. I GAVE HIM OUR LITANY OF INCREASING PRODUCTION, AVOIDING MASSIVE NEW BUREAUCRACIES, HELPING THE VERY NEEDY BUT THROUGH RESEARCH AND HELPING TO INCREASE PRODUCTION AND GETTING AWAY FROM HAND OUT. VICE-MINISTER CONCURRED WITH THIS APPROACH, SAYING THAT THIS WAS ALSO CHINA'S POSITION. I RAISED SIDE POINT THAT USA GOES TO THESE CONFERENCES DETERMINED TO HELP UNSELFISHLY AND THAT SOMEHOW WE ALWAYS COME IN FOR CRITICISM THAT IN MY JUDGEMENT IS UNFAIR. CH'IAO COMMENTED SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVELY, I FELT, THAT "EVERYONE RECEIVES CRITICISM." (HE CLEARLY THOUGHT I WAS REFERRING TO THE POSSIBILITY OF CHINESE CRITICISM OF THE U.S. AT THE WFC, ALTHOUGH I WAS SPEAKING IN MORE GENERAL TERMS.) CH'IAO MENTIONED THE NECESSITY OF OUR HELPING FAMINE STRICKEN LANDS BUT, WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY CONCURRENCE ON EACH POINT, SEEMED AGAIN IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH OUR VIEWS.

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# Department of State

~~SECRET~~

# TELEGRAM

-3- PEKING 1895 NOV 2

6. I TOLD CH'IAO THAT WE HAD JUST ATTENDED OUR FIRST NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION, THE ALGERIAN. HE INDICATED THAT WAS FINE, THAT WAS WHAT HUANG CHEN HAD BEEN DOING "WITH COUNTRIES FRIENDLY TO US" IN USA. HE THEN ASKED IF THIS MEANT WE WOULD BE GOING TO STATE BANQUETS. HE TOLD ME THAT WHEN USLO OPENED THEY HAD INVITED US REPS TO STATE BANQUETS, THAT WE HAD ACCEPTED AND THEN REGRETTED. I TOLD HIM THAT DECISION ON ATTENDING NATIONAL DAYS WAS MADE HERE SIMPLY TO EXPAND OUR CONTACTS, THAT THE DECISION HAD NOT BEEN MADE WITH REFERENCE TO ANYTHING OTHER THAN NATIONAL DAY RECEPTIONS, AND THAT IF THERE WAS TO BE A CHANGE ON STATE FUNCTIONS I WOULD WANT TO REFER THE MATTER TO WASHINGTON. HE MADE SOME REFERENCES TO "BECAUSE OF OUR SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT (NOT FULL EMBASSY) YOU MIGHT NOT HAVE A VERY GOOD SEAT". I TOLD HIM I DIDN'T CARE WHERE I SAY, BUT THAT I DIDN'T WANT TO BE PUSHING OUR WAY INTO OCCASIONS NORMALLY RESERVED FOR THOSE WITH FULL STATUS. ALMOST AS IF HE HAD ISSUED US AN INVITATION HE REPLIED "FINE, JUST LET US KNOW OF YOUR DECISION IN THIS MATTER".

7. IN AN EFFORT TO PRESERVE THE WARMTH OF THE EVENING AND NOT TO RUIN IT BY DRAGGING THE EVENING OUT, I SUGGESTED AT A RELATIVELY EARLY HOUR 9:30PM THAT WE SHOULD PUSH ON. CH'IAO BEAMED. ON THE WAY TO THE DOOR I THANKED HIM PROFUSELY FOR A VERY SPECIAL EVENING. CH'IAO REPLIED. "WE WANTED TO HAVE A NICE BANQUET FOR YOU ANYWAY, BUT PARTICULARLY WANTED TO DO THIS TO REPAY YOU FOR YOUR HOSPITALITY TO ME AT YOUR MOTHER'S HOME" -- REFERRING TO A SUNDAY LUNCH, VERY INFORMAL, IN GREENWICH CONN. THAT I GAVE FOR HIM IN 1972.

BUSH

BT

#1895

~~SECRET~~





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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

O 030600Z NOV 74  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2647  
BT

Control: 740Q  
Recd: Nov 3, 1974  
1:46 AM

~~SECRET~~

PEKING 1897

NODIS CHEROKEE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept. Review*  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES 9/27/02  
BY KR, NARA, DATE 2/5/03

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR CH IN UR  
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING

1. SUMMARY: I MET FOR ONE AND HALF HOURS MORNING NOVEMBER 2 WITH VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING AT THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE. ALSO PRESENT ON THE CHINESE SIDE WERE VICE FOREIGN MINISTERS CHIAO KUAN-HUA AND WANG HAI-JUNG; LIN PING, TANG WEN-SHENG, CHAO CHI-HUA, AND LIEN CHENG-PAO FROM THE AMERICAN AND OCEANIAN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY; AND CHU CHUAN-HSIEN AND TANG LUNG-PIN FROM PROTOCOL. MISS TANG INTERPRETED. OUR TALKS CONCENTRATED HEAVILY ON AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT, FOOD, AND POPULATION, AND TENG PROVIDED SOME INTERESTING STATISTICS ON THESE SUBJECTS. WE ALSO DISCUSSED INDIA AND THE SECRETARY'S RECENT VISIT TO THE SUBCONTINENT. I ASKED TENG'S VIEWS ON THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT, BUT HE TURNED QUICKLY AWAY FROM THAT TOPIC. TENG RAISED QUESTION OF THE STATE OF U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS AND I ELABORATED ON AMERICAN POLITICAL FACTORS THAT ARGUED STRONGLY FOR SOME CONCRETE SIGNS OF PROGRESS IN OUR RELATIONSHIP AS A RESULT OF THE SECRETARY'S FORTHCOMING VISIT. TENG INQUIRED ABOUT FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON'S HEALTH. I CONCLUDED THE SESSION BY STRESSING THE CONTINUITY OF U.S. POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT FORD. BECAUSE I BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO ADD TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF TENG WITH A VIEW TO THE SECRETARY'S VISIT, I AM REPORTING OUR CONVERSATION IN FULL. WITH ME ON THE AMERICAN SIDE WERE HOLDRIDGE, ANDERSON, AND MCKINLEY. END SUMMARY.

2. TENG BADE ME WELCOME AND INVITED ME TO TRAVEL WIDELY IN CHINA, WHERE I WOULD SEE MANY ANCIENT MONUMENTS, EVEN THOUGH THERE MIGHT NOT BE MUCH TO BOAST OF ON THE MODERN PLANE. (THIS SORT OF COURTEOUS SELF-DEPRECACTION SEEMS CHARACTERISTIC OF TENG; HE INTRODUCED HIMSELF TO THE FULBRIGHT CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION AS A COUNTRY BUMPKIN.) I COUNTERED BY POINTING TO GREAT PROGRESS CHINA HAD MADE IN MANY AREAS, PARTICULARLY AGRICULTURE. TENG CONTINUED: "OUR AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT AT PRESENT

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-2- Peking 1897

PROVIDES US ONLY BARELY ENOUGH TO EAT. MOREOVER, OUR TWO COUNTRIES OPERATE ON A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT BASIS. YOU HAVE LARGE AMOUNTS OF ARABLE LAND. IN CHINA THERE ARE 7.5 PERSONS FOR EVERY HECTARE OF ARABLE LAND. THIS WORKS OUT TO ONLY 2 MOU PER PERSON. (A MOU IS A CHINESE MEASURE EQUAL TO ONE THIRD ACRE.) IT HAS TAKEN AN ENORMOUS EFFORT TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF FOOD SUFFICIENCY AND FURTHER GREAT EFFORTS WILL BE REQUIRED IN ACCUMULATING RESERVES. MECHANIZATION ALONE IS NOT THE ANSWER. WE WILL ALWAYS NEED BOTH MECHANIZATION AND INTENSIVE CULTIVATION. PEOPLE SOMETIMES COMPARE CHINESE AGRICULTURE TO EMBROIDERY, AND THEY ARE NOT FAR WRONG."

3. I SAID THE UNITED STATES WAS INCREASINGLY INTERESTED IN PROBLEMS OF WORLD FOOD SUPPLY, AS THE SECRETARY'S ATTENDANCE AT THE WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE IN ROME WOULD MAKE CLEAR. IN THE CONTEXT OF AMERICAN DOMESTIC POLITICS, I DESCRIBED THE ADVERSE PUBLIC REACTION TO THE SOVIET WHEAT DEAL AND THE GROWING THOUGH CONTAINABLE SENTIMENT THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD LOOK OUT FOR ITS OWN INTERESTS FIRST IN THE QUESTION OF FOOD GRAINS.

4. "ON THE PROBLEM OF FOODGRAIN SUPPLY," SAID TENG, "WE PERHAPS DO NOT ENTIRELY AGREE. POPULATION IS ONE ASPECT OF THIS PROBLEM. DO YOU BLAME POPULATION INCREASES FOR THE CURRENT WORLD SHORTAGE OF FOOD?" I REPLIED THAT WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY BOTH TO INCREASE SUPPLIES OF FOOD AND TO CONTROL POPULATION GROWTH. "WE ALSO ADVOCATE BIRTH CONTROL", SAID TENG, "BUT SUCCESS HAS COME MORE SLOWLY IN RURAL AREAS THAN IN THE CITY. ALTHOUGH IN GENERAL WE WANT TO CONTROL THE BIRTH RATE, THERE ARE SOME AREAS, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE MINORITIES IN TIBET, SIN KIANG, INNER MONGOLIA AND SOME OTHER PLACES, WHERE WE WANT TO INCREASE THE POPULATION. SINCE LIBERATION, CHINA'S POPULATION HAS INCREASED BY 60 PER CENT, BUT GOOD GRAIN PRODUCTION HAS INCREASED 1.4 TIMES. IN 1949, CHINA PRODUCED 200 KILOGRAMS OF FOOD GRAINS PER PERSON, AND NEAR STARVATION WAS WIDESPREAD. NOW WE HAVE OVER 300 KILOGRAMS PER PERSON, ABOUT 330 I BELIEVE. THEREFORE, DESPITE POPULATION INCREASE, FOOD PRODUCTION HAS MORE THAN KEPT PACE. IN THE LAST TEN YEARS, ANNUAL POPULATION GROWTH HAS BEEN LESS THAN 2 PER CENT, BUT FOOD PRODUCTION HAS GROWN BY MORE THAN 4 PER CENT. THIS HAS NOT BEEN EASY, BUT THERE IS STILL ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT. OUR DEGREE OF MECHANIZATION IS LOW AND WE HAVE TOO LITTLE CHEMICAL FERTILIZER. FURTHER MECHANIZATION WILL LEAD TO INCREASES IN FOOD PRODUCTION. BUT MECHANIZATION ALONE WILL NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM. INTENSIVE

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# TELEGRAM

-3- Peking 1897

LABOR WILL STILL HAVE TO BE DEVOTED TO WATER CONSERVANCY PROJECTS, TERRACING HILLSIDES, AND EXPANDING EXISTING SMALL FARMING AREAS." I ASKED WHETHER IRRIGATION FROM UNDERGROUND WATER HAD LED TO THE OPENING UP OF FORMERLY UNARABLE LAND. "THIS HAS BEEN EXTENSIVELY PRACTICED IN NORTH CHINA," ANSWERED TENG. "HERE POPULATION IS DENSE AND BOTH SURFACE WATER AND RAINWATER ARE INSUFFICIENT. TO RETAIN WATER WE HAVE CONSTRUCTED SMALL, MEDIUM, AND LARGE RESERVOIRS. WE HAVE ALSO TAPPED UNDERGROUND WATER BY DIGGING WELLS, SOME USING DRILLING EQUIPMENT AND OTHERS BY MEANS OF MANUAL LABOR--ANOTHER MEANS OF ABSORBING LABOR. WE DIG WELLS AT A RATE OF SEVERAL HUNDRED THOUSAND PER YEAR. IN THE PAST, NORTH CHINA HAD TO IMPORT GRAIN FROM THE SOUTH. THIS SITUATION HAS NOW BEEN CHANGED TO SOME EXTENT. FERTILIZER SHORTAGE IS ANOTHER PROBLEM. WE STILL RELY MORE ON ORGANIC THAN CHEMICAL FERTILIZERS. IN FACT, THE NATIONAL AVERAGE CONSUMPTION OF CHEMICAL FERTILIZERS IS ONLY 20 KILOGRAMS PER MOU. IN AMERICA YOU USE MANY TIMES MORE CHEMICALS FERTILIZERS, DO YOU NOT?"

5. I MENTIONED NEW DISCOVERIES IN BIRTH CONTROL TECHNOLOGY SUCH AS INJECTIONS WHICH BRING ABOUT TEMPORARY STERILITY WHICH IN THE FUTURE MAY PROVIDE THE ANSWER TO BIRTH CONTROL ADMINISTRATION IN RURAL AREAS. "WE ARE NOT OPPOSED TO SUCH NEW DEVELOPMENTS," SAID TENG, "AND ARE WORKING TO DEVELOP NEW BIRTH CONTROL METHODS OURSELVES. BUT"--AND HERE TENG CAME TO THE POINT OVER WHICH HE EARLIER SAID HE THOUGHT WE DISAGREED--"IF YOU LOOK AT THE CASE OF INDIA YOU WILL SEE THAT EVEN WITH ZERO POPULATION GROWTH THAT COUNTRY WOULD NOT BE CERTAIN OF SOLVING ITS FOOD PROBLEM, DESPITE THE FACT THAT ITS WEATHER, CLIMATE, AND SOIL ARE BETTER THAN OURS. SO THAT IS WHY WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROBLEM OF FOOD GRAIN SUPPLY IS REALLY A QUESTION OF SYSTEM."

6. TURNING TO THE QUESTION OF INDIA AT THIS POINT, I EXPRESSED MY HOPE THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER'S RECENT DISCUSSIONS THERE MIGHT LEAD TO THE REMOVAL OF SOME OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA. ON THIS SUBJECT, TENG HAD THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS: "IN THE PAST, DURING DR. KISSINGER'S PREVIOUS VISITS TO CHINA, WE TOLD HIM WE FAVOR BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA. WE FEEL IT IS BETTER TO HAVE BOTH OF YOU THERE THAN JUST THE SOVIETS ALONE. I NOTICED THAT A DAY OR TWO BEFORE DR. KISSINGER ARRIVED IN INDIA, MRS. GANDHI GAVE HIM A VERY "COURTEOUS" WELCOME. DID YOU READ THAT

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The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it.

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SPEECH?" I ALLOWED THAT THE INDIANS WERE SOMETIMES DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH, RECALLING THE SCATHING CRITICISM WHICH THEY LEVELED AT ME AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN 1971 WHEN THE VOTE FOLLOWING DEBATE ON THE INDO-PAKISTANI WAR WENT AGAINST THEM 104-11. "YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THEM AT THAT TIME WAS, IF ANYTHING, TOO POLITE," SAID TENG. "DESPITE EVERYTHING YOU DID THEY CARRIED OUT THEIR PLAN TO DISMEMBER PAKISTAN." I ENQUIRED WHAT OPTIONS HE THOUGHT WE HAD AT THAT TIME. "I HAVEN'T REALLY THOUGHT OUT AN ALTERNATIVE," REPLIED TENG, "BUT YOU KNOW INDIA HAS ITS LINE AND YOU KNOW WHO STANDS BEHIND THEM. ON THE SUBJECT OF INDIA'S FOOD PROBLEMS, I REMEMBER A TALK I HAD WITH THE BRITISH MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN NEW YORK THIS YEAR. I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT MRS. GANDHI SHOULD BE CLEVER ENOUGH TO SEE THAT SHE WOULD SAVE A LOT OF FOOD BY RELEASING THE 90,000 PRISONERS OF WAR AND GIVING THE GRAIN TO FEED DISASTER VICTIMS. BUT YOU KNOW, WITH ALL ITS PROBLEMS, INDIA STILL WANTS THE ATOMIC BOMB, IT STILL WANTS TO ANNEX SIKKIM, IT STILL WANTS TO BE THE DOMINANT POWER THROUGHOUT SOUTH ASIA. AT PRESENT INDIA HAS DESIGNS ON BHUTAN AND WANTS TO PUT THAT COUNTRY IN ITS POCKET." I POINTED OUT THAT THE STRONG STANCE OF BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA IN 1971 HAD PROBABLY PREVENTED FURTHER INDIAN MILITARY ACTION AGAINST WESTERN PAKISTAN, AND I SAID THE SECRETARY DURING HIS VISIT WOULD DISCUSS AT LENGTH THE OTHER QUESTIONS WHICH TENG HAD RAISED.

7. AT THIS POINT I ATTEMPTED TO REDIRECT THE CONVERSATION BY ASKING TENG'S VIEWS ON THE MILITARY SITUATION IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOVIET THREAT, HOPING TO PROBE A BIT ON REPORTED SHIFTS IN CHINESE STRATEGIC PLANNING. "WE HAVE HAD A LOT TO SAY ON THIS QUESTION IN THE PAST," REPLIED TENG. "WE STRESS THE NEED FOR CAUTION VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS. I WENT INTO THIS AT LENGTH WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION. THE SOVIETS WILL NOT STOP. WHERE CAN YOU REALLY SEE EVIDENCE OF DETENTE? IN THE MID EAST? IN THE PERSIAN GULF? IN THE MEDITERRANEAN? IN SOUTH ASIA? IN THE PACIFIC? AND AS FOR INDIA, THEIR EVENTUAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE OF NO CONSEQUENCE AND WE FEEL THEY POST NO MILITARY THREAT TO CHINA. THE ONLY AVENUE OF ATTACK LIES ACROSS TIBET, WHICH HAS A VAST LAND AREA AND EXTREMELY THIN AIR. I REMEMBER PASSING THROUGH A CORNER OF TIBET ON THE LONG MARCH. YOU SIMPLY CANNOT GET USED TO THE THIN AIR. IN CLIMBING EVERY STEP IS A TRIAL. SO WE ARE NOT CONCERNED ABOUT AN ATTACK ON US. INDIA'S MAIN THREAT IS AGAINST ITS NEIGHBORS IN SOUTH ASIA. BUT THE POLICY WHICH MRS. GANDHI INHERITED FROM HER FATHER WILL EVENTUALLY BOOMERANG ON THEM."

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-5- Peking 1897

INDIANS. SO THERE'S NO POINT IN HELPING THEM."

8. "COMING BACK TO FOOD," TENG CONTINUED, MOST AFRICAN COUNTRIES, THE ARAB WORLD, AND QUITE A FEW ASIAN NATIONS DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT FOOD. BUT WHY CAN'T THEY GROW IT? AS WE HAVE TOLD MANY AFRICAN LEADERS, THEIR PROBLEM IS NOT CLIMATE. WHY SHOULD THEY RELY ON EXPORTING NATIONS TO SOLVE THEIR FOOD PROBLEMS. EVERY NATION HAS TO GROW ITS OWN GRAIN, AND THAT IS OUR ADVICE TO SHORTAGE NATIONS. IN TEN YEARS, WITH THE RIGHT METHODS, THESE COUNTRIES COULD SOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS. AFRICA IS NOT OVERPOPULATED, IT IS UNDERPOPULATED. THERE ARE OF COURSE PARTS OF AFRICA WHICH LACK RAIN, BUT OVERALL THE CONDITIONS ARE EXCELLENT."

9. I POINTED TO THE DIFFICULTIES MOST AFRICAN NATIONS FACED BECAUSE OF HIGHER OIL PRICES. "IT IS TRUE THEY HAVE BEEN HARD HIT," TENG SAID, "BUT ALL OTHER PRICES ARE RISING TOO, WHICH ADDS TO THEIR DIFFICULTIES. WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING THIS QUESTION AND VICE MINISTER CHIAO RAISED IT IN NEW YORK. A SOLUTION WILL HAVE TO BE FOUND, BUT THESE NATIONS HAD PROBLEMS EVEN BEFORE OIL PRICES WENT UP."

10. AT THIS POINT TENG REFERRED TO U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS. "AS FOR THE TWO OF US, THERE HAS BEEN SOME TALK ABOUT A COOLING OFF IN OUR RELATIONS. THIS IS NOT OUR VIEW. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAS BEEN NORMAL. UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO HAVE RAPID DEVELOPMENT. PROGRESS CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED STEP BY STEP. WHEN I MET DR. KISSINGER IN NEW YORK, I TOLD HIM OUR POLICY HAD NOT CHANGED. HE SAID THE SAME THING ABOUT AMERICAN POLICY. IF IT WERE OTHERWISE, I'M SURE YOU WOULD NOT HAVE COME."

11. I AGREED WITH TENG ON THAT POINT. AFTER AFFIRMING MY BELIEF IN THE BASIC GOOD HEALTH OF THE POLICY, I NEVERTHELESS WENT ON TO EXPLAIN WHY I FELT IT ESSENTIAL THAT SOME POSITIVE, CONCRETE SIGNS OF PROGRESS RESULT FROM THE SECRETARY'S VISIT. TO DATE, I SAID, THE POLICY OF IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE PRC HAD BEEN IMMUNE FROM THE EPIDEMIC OF ACID HYPERCRITICISM WHICH HAD TOUCHED NEARLY EVERY POLICY, ORGANIZATION, AND LEADING FIGURE IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE. BUT IF THE CHINA POLICY SHOULD EVEN

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-6- Peking 1897

APPEAR TO HAVE LOST ITS VIGOR, QUESTIONING VOICES MIGHT SOON BE RAISED. IN LISTING SOME OF THE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE CHINA POLICY I STRUCK A GLANCING BLOW AT THE CHINESE PRACTICE OF COUPLING US WITH THE SOVIETS IN THEIR PUBLIC BLASTS, SAYING BETTER-INFORMED AMERICANS CAN SEE GREAT COMMONALITY IN THE U.S. AND CHINESE APPROACHES TO HEGEMONY SINCE, WHATEVER PROPAGANDA THERE MIGHT BE TO THE CONTRARY, WE DO NOT SEEK TO IMPOSE OUR WILL ON OTHER COUNTRIES. TENG DID NOT PICK UP ON THIS.

12. IN REPLY TO MY CALL FOR PROGRESS RESULTING FROM THE SECRETARY'S VISIT, TENG HAD THIS TO SAY: "WE ARE CERTAIN THAT OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH DR. KISSINGER WILL BE HELPFUL. THE ESSENTIAL THING IS THAT BOTH SIDES DESIRE TO MOVE FORWARD ALONG THE LINES OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. WITH THIS IN MIND THERE WILL ALWAYS BE THE POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS ON SOME ISSUES. BUT IF CONDITIONS ARE NOT RIGHT, WE ARE PREPARED TO GO SLOWLY AND WAIT. TRADE IS AN AREA WHERE RAPID PROGRESS HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. SINCE THE SIGNING OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, THE TOTAL VOLUME OF TRADE HAS GROWN TO A POINT WHERE IT EXCEEDS ANY EUROPEAN COUNTRY'S. TAIWAN ON THE OTHER HAND SEEMS TO BE AN ISSUE WHERE AT PRESENT IT IS NOT EASY FOR YOU TO TAKE ANY FURTHER STEP. OUR GREATEST CONCERN IS WITH OVERALL GLOBAL POLICY."

13. TENG ASKED IF I HAD NEWS OF FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON'S HEALTH, REFERRED TO THE CABLE WHICH PREMIER CHOU HAD SENT, AND ASKED ME TO CONVEY THE SYMPATHY OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT TO MR. NIXON.

14. I CONCLUDED THE MEETING BY GIVING TENG MY PERSONAL ASSURANCES THAT PRESIDENT FORD WAS A MAN WITH WHOM THE CHINESE COULD DEAL FRANKLY AND FREELY AND I EXPRESSED MY CONVICTION THAT PRESIDENT FORD WOULD APPROACH THE PRC IN A SPIRIT OF DETERMINATION TO CARRY OUT AND BUILD UPON THE PRESENT POLICY. TENG NOTED THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT HAD STRESSED CONTINUITY IN POLICY IN HIS EARLY STATEMENTS.

15. COMMENT: THE CONSISTENT EMPHASIS IN TENG'S REMARKS ON U.S.-PRC RELATIONS WAS ON PATIENCE AND A MEASURED PACE IN FURTHER STEPS TOWARD NORMALIZATION. HE TOOK THE INITIATIVE IN RAISING THE SUBJECT AND WAS MORE EMPHATIC THAN OTHER SENIOR CHINESE LEADERS HAVE BEEN WITH RECENT HIGH LEVEL U.S. DELEGATIONS THAT CHINA IS IN NO HURRY AND UNDERSTANDS THAT FOR THE U.S. THE TAIWAN QUESTION IS VERY COMPLEX. THERE WAS NO HINT, AS THERE HAS



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Peking 1897

BEEN IN THE PAST, THAT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF U.S.-PRC TRADE OR CULTURAL EXCHANGES WILL DEPEND ON PROGRESS IN THE NORMALIZATION OF POLITICAL RELATIONS. I DID NOT PICK UP ON HIS TAIWAN REFERENCE LEAVING THAT SUBJECT IN TOTAL FOR SECRETARY'S VISIT.

ON THE QUESTION OF FOOD PRODUCTION, THE EMPHASIS OF TENG'S REMARKS WAS ON THE FACT THAT, WHILE CHINA HAS MANAGED TO INCREASE PRODUCTION AND STAY AHEAD OF POPULATION GROWTH THROUGH MASSIVE EFFORTS, IT STILL IS BARELY PRODUCING ENOUGH FOR ITS OWN NEEDS. I ASSUME THIS WAS INTENDED AS A SIGNAL THAT WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT ANY MAJOR CHINESE INPUT INTO WHATEVER SCHEME FOR WORLD FOOD RESERVES MAY COME OUT OF THE ROME CONFERENCE.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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R 050220Z NOV 74  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2656  
BT

CONTROL: 1074Q

RECD : NOV 4, 1974  
10:21 P.M.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 1905

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FOR ACTING SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR SCUL CH  
SUBJECT: APPROACH ON WIRE SERVICES

1. AT A MEETING WITH CHU MU-CHIH, DIRECTOR OF NCNA NOV 4, CHU MENTIONED THAT HE HAD BEEN TO THE U.S. WHERE HE HAD VISITED WITH WES GALLAGHER OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS.
2. THAT GAVE ME A NATURAL OPENING TO RAISE WITH HIM THE QUESTION OF WIFE SERVICE REPRESENTATION IN PRC THAT GALLAGHER PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED WITH SECRETARY AND THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH ME JUST BEFORE I CAME HERE.
2. I TOLD CHU THAT GALLAGHER FELT HE HAD ALMOST REACHED FINAL AGREEMENT WITH CHU MU-CHIH AND ASKED WHERE DOES THE MATTER NOW STAND.
4. CHU MU-CHIH SAID "THAT IS UP TO YOU", CLEARLY REFERRING TO THE TAIWAN QUESTION. HE WAS UNWILLING TO DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER, THOUGH HE DID SAY THERE HAD BEEN MANY U.S. JOURNALISTS IN CHINA. (SEE PEKING SEPTTEL FOR MORE DETAIL.)
5. GIVEN GALLAGHER'S POSITION OF IMPORTANCE IN U.S. AND ASSURANCES HE FELT HE RECEIVED FROM SECRETARY THAT OUR POLICY WAS TO HAVE U.S. NEWSMEN STATIONED IN PEKING, I WOULD LIKE TO REPLY TO A LETTER GALLAGHER HANDED ME AT MY OCT 2 MEETING WITH HIM. SENSITIVITY OF SUBJECT MAKES ME FEEL THIS MATTER BEST HANDLED BY PHONE CALL FROM ARMSTRONG OR HUMMEL TO GALLAGHER READING FOLLOWING MESSAGE:

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-2- PEKING 1905

QUOTE. I QUERIED CHU MU-CHIH ABOUT STATUS OF PROPOSAL TO HAVE U.S. WIRE SERVICES REPRESENTED IN PRC. CHU WAS UNFORTHCOMING EXCEPT HE MADE VERY CLEAR TO ME THAT QUESTION WAS LINKED TO MAJOR POLITICAL PROBLEMS. HE SPOKE WARMLY OF HIS VISIT WITH YOU BUT EVEN WITH SOME DIPLOMATIC PROBING WAS UNWILLING TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER IN ANY MORE DEPTH. WES, THIS CONVERSATION SHOULD BE TREATED WITH GREAT CONFIDENCE. PERHAPS MY MENTIONING MATTER WILL PROVE HELPFUL TO WIRE SERVICES. I HOPE SO. I AM CONVINCED ANY PUBLICITY ON PROBLEM WILL BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. END QUOTE.

6. GALLAGHER IS THOROUGHLY RESPONSIBLE AND IN MY VIEW WILL APPRECIATE RECEIVING THIS MESSAGE; HOWEVER, IF THERE ARE COMPELLING REASONS NOT TO GO THIS COURSE, PERHAPS A SIMPLE PHONE CALL ALONG FOLLOWING LINES WOULD SUFFICE. QUOTE. BUSH ASKED ME TO TELL YOU HAD HAD RAISED WIRE SERVICE MATTER WITH CH MU-CHIH. END QUOTE.

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## Department of State

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TELEGRAM

Control: 1431Q

Received: November 5, 1974 817PM

0 060030Z NOV 74  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2658  
BT  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 1912

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E.O. 11652: GOS  
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, H.) CH  
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S VISIT TO CHINA

REF: STATE 242237

1. WITH SECRETARY'S VISIT TO CHINA NOW JUST OVER THE HORIZON, USLO URGENTLY NEEDS TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS WITH MFA CONCERNING ARRANGEMENTS IN PEKING AND FOR POSSIBLE TRAVEL IN CHINA. EVEN THOUGH SOME OF THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION MAY BE PASSED IN WASHINGTON, WE SHOULD ALSO TRANSMIT TO MFA HERE ASAP.
2. COMPOSITION OF PARTY - WE NEED PROTOCOL LIST OF OFFICIALS AND ACCOMPANYING PERSONNEL WITH USUAL PASSPORT INFORMATION. CHINESE WILL WANT TO KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OUR REQUIREMENTS FOR HOUSING AND TRANSPORTATION. IF INTERNAL TRAVEL IS PLANNED, WILL ENTIRE GROUP ACCOMPANY SECRETARY?
3. AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION - WE SHOULD PASS TO CHINESE USUAL AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION DATA, FUEL REQUIREMENTS, AND PLANNED APPROACH.

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# Department of State

## TELEGRAM

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-2- C O N F I D E N T I A L Peking 1912 November 5, 1974

4. PRESS - IF PRESS WILL ACCOMPANY SECRETARY IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT NAMELIST AND PASSPORT REQUESTS BE INITIATED SOONEST. VISAS FOR PRESS ARE DECIDED ON INDIVIDUAL BASIS AND MAY TAKE SOME TIME. IF TELEVISION CREWS INCLUDED, WE SHOULD INFORM CHINESE OF TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING PLANS TO SHIP FILM IF NECESSARY. PRESS WILL PROBABLY BE HOUSED IN MINDZU HOTEL AS IN PAST, AND CHINESE WILL WANT TO KNOW HOUSING REQUIREMENTS.

5. ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL - USLO NOW HAS FEWER SECURITY PERSONNEL THAN ON SECRETARY'S LAST VISIT, AND IF TWENTY FOUR HOUR COVERAGE OF GUEST HOUSE IS CONTEMPLATED IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO BRING THREE ADDITIONAL SY PERSONNEL WITH THE PARTY. WE WILL ALSO NEED TWO TOY STATE COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL.

6. USLO PLANS TO ASSIGN POL SECTION CHIEF ANDERSON TO GUEST HOUSE AS OVERALL CONTROL OFFICER AND LYNN PASCOE AS PRESS LIAISON OFFICER.

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TELEGRAM

R 080820Z NOV 74  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2681  
BT

CONTROL: 2281Q

RECD: 8 NOV 74 4:22 AM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 1938

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.); CH

SUBJECT: DESIGNATION OF LONDON SUNDAY TIMES CORRESPONDENT AS  
MEMBER OF SECRETARY'S PRESS PARTY DURING PRC VISIT

LONDON SUNDAY TIMES CORRESPONDENT HENRY BRANDON, NOW IN  
PEKING ON ONE-MONTH VISIT TO PRC, HAS BEEN INFORMED BY MFA  
INFORMATION DEPARTMENT THAT HE WILL BE UNABLE TO COVER  
SECRETARY'S VISIT ("IN EVENT THAT SECRETARY COMES TO PEKING")  
UNLESS HE IS SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED AS MEMBER OF  
SECRETARY'S PRESS PARTY. MR. BRANDON REQUESTS THAT THIS  
DESIGNATION BE MADE.

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