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Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 7574

PAGE 01 PEKING 01258 081129Z

41  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

087607

R 080845Z JUL 75  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4010  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 1258

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OREP (PERCY, CHARLES) CH  
SUBJECT: SENATOR PERCY TRAVEL

REF: MOSCOW 9256

MR. BUSH HAS RECEIVED A TELEGRAM FROM SENATOR PERCY IN MOSCOW INFORMING HIM DELEGATION CONSISTING OF PERCY, CHURCH, PELL, STEVENSON, JAVITS, FINDLEY, MCCLOSKEY PLUS WIVES AND MARK PERCY AND CARLA JAVITS WILL ARRIVE IN PRC ON AUGUST 3. IF IT DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH ARRANGEMENTS ALREADY MADE BY THE DEPARTMENT, PLEASE PASS TO SENATORY PERCY'S OFFICE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM MR. BUSH:

BEGIN MESSAGE: DELIGHTED TO GET YOUR MISSIVE FROM MOSCOW. IT WILL BE GREAT TO SEE YOU AGAIN. WE WANT TO OFFER ANY ASSISTANCE TO YOU WE CAN. IN THE PAST USLO HAS ASSIGNED A CHINESE SPEAKING ESCORT OFFICER TO VISITING HIGH-LEVEL GROUPS AND WE WOULD CERTAINLY BE HAPPY TO DO SO IN YOUR CASE. I THINK YOU WOULD FIND IT USEFUL. LET US KNOW YOUR PLEASURE. ALL THE BEST. GEORGE BUSH. END OF MESSAGE.  
BUSH



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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 5808

PAGE 01 PEKING 01476 080851Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O R 080808Z AUG 75  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4183  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 1476

EXDIS

NOFORN DISSEM

E.O. 116521 XGDS-2  
TAGS: PFOR CB  
SUBJECT: SIHANOUK'S TRAVEL PLANS

1. AFP PEKING IS FILING STORY THIS AFTERNOON (AUGUST 8) SAYING SIHANOUK HAS BEEN INVITED BY THE RED KHMER AUTHORITIES TO RETURN TO PHNOM PENH BUT HAS NOT YET GIVEN A POSITIVE REPLY. THIEUNN PRASITH FROM THE CAMBODIAN EMBASSY IN PEKING (IN CHARGE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE INTERIOR AND EXTERIOR) IS SAID TO HAVE VISITED PYONGYANG ON JULY 18 TO CONVEY THE INVITATION OF THE PHNOM PENH AUTHORITIES FOR SIHANOUK, MONIQUE AND PEN NOUTH AND HIS WIFE TO RETURN TO CAMBODIA AT ANY TIME CONVENIENT AFTER AUGUST 1. SARIN CHAAK REPORTEDLY ACCOMPANIED PRASITH ON HIS VISIT. ACCORDING TO THE STORY, SIHANOUK PLANS TO GO TO TIENSIN AROUND AUGUST 20 FOR A BRIEF MEDICAL CHECKUP AND THEN RETURN TO PEKING TO DECIDE WHETHER TO ACCEPT THE INVITATION. IF SIHANOUK DOES RETURN TO PHNOM PENH, HE WILL DO SO FOR A SHORT VISIT IN THE FIRST PART OF SEPTEMBER.

2. BEGIN XGDS-2, NOFORN DISSEM. AFP CORRESPONDENT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES *709/27/02*  
BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *2/5/03* ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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PAGE 02 PEKING 01476 080851Z

TOLD USLO OFFICER THAT SOURCE OF STORY IS A CAMBODIAN CLOSE TO SIHANOUK WHO WAS IN ON THE DISCUSSION IN PYONGYANG. SOURCE RETURNED BRIEFLY TO PEKING. SOURCE ALSO SAID--BUT AFP IS NOT FILING--THAT IN FACT SIHANOUK IS VERY FRIGHTENED. SINCE THE INVITATION DID NOT INCLUDE MEMBERS OF HIS ENTOURAGE OTHER THAN PEN NOUTH, SIHANOUK FEARS THE KHMER ROUGE MAY ARREST HIM ON ARRIVAL IN PHNOM PENH. THIS IS THE SECOND OR THIRD INVITATION SIHANOUK HAS RECEIVED FROM THE KHMER ROUGE. HE NO LONGER CAN USE HIS SICK MOTHER AS AN EXCUSE FOR NOT RETURNING AND KNOWS THAT THE BIG MOMENT OF DECISION HAS COME. SIHANOUK, REPORTEDLY, DOES NOT PLAN TO DECIDE UNTIL AFTER HE CAN TALK THE SITUATION OVER WITH CHOU EN-LAI IN PEKING AND PERHAPS RECEIVE SOME CHINESE GUARANTEE FOR HIS SAFETY.

3. AFP'S SOURCE FURTHER SAID THAT WHEN THE INVITATION ARRIVED, SIHANOUK TOOK A POLL OF HIS CABINET TO SEE HOW MANY OF HIS FOLLOWERS WANTED TO RETURN TO CAMBODIA. NOT ONE VOTED FOR RETURN. SIHANOUK HIMSELF IS SAID TO BELIEVE THAT THE REGIME IN PHNOM PENH IS "FASCIST" AND IS NOW HOPING THEIR EXCESSES WILL CAUSE THEM TO FALL FROM POWER. THE SIHANOUKISTS OPENLY REFER TO THE KHMER ROUGE AS THE "ENEMY". SIHANOUK IS ALSO SAID TO BE UNHAPPY BECAUSE KHIEU SAMPHAN HAS BROKEN THE PACT AGREED TO EARLIER IN PEKING WHICH CALLED FOR KHIEU SAMPHAN TO RUN INTERNAL AFFAIRS ONLY, LEAVING FOREIGN RELATIONS TO SIHANOUK.

4. AFP CORRESPONDENT SAID THE RECENT RUMORS THAT SIHANOUK PLANNED TO RETURN TO CAMBODIA STEMMED FROM STATEMENTS BY THE CAMBODIAN AMBASSADOR IN PEKING TO TWO OTHER DIPLOMATS ON JULY 19. APPARENTLY, THE KHMER ROUGE (HE SAYS THE AMBASSADOR AND REST OF THE CAMBODIAN EMBASSY STAFF HERE ARE KHMER ROUGE) ASSUMED SIHANOUK WOULD ACCEPT THE INVITATION THEY HAD TENDERED EARLIER.

5. BOTH THE INFORMATION IN PARAS 2 AND 3 NOT FILED BY AFP AND THESE SOURCES ARE VERY SENSITIVE. PLEASE PROTECT. END XGDS-2, NOFORN DISSEM.

RUSH

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TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 5433

PAGE 01 PEKING 01556 160252Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O 160241Z AUG 75  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4249

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 1556

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OREP (PERCY, CHARLES H)  
SUBJECT: SENATOR PERCY'S VIEWS ON THE SUMMIT AGENDA

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS ALSO TO SCOTT COHEN OR NADINE JACOBSEN  
IN SENATOR PERCY'S OFFICE

REF: PEKING 1540

1. SENATOR PERCY, IN THE COURSE OF DICTATING HIS RECOLLECTIOT  
ON HIS AUGUST 6 LUNCHEON CONVERSATION WITH VICE PREMIER TENG  
HSIAO-PING, ALSO RECORDED THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL VIEWS ABOUT THE  
AGENDA FOR PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT TO CHINA. IN THE TRANSCRIPT THIS  
NOTE FOLLOWS TENG'S STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE AGENDA WILL  
BE UP TO THE PRESIDENT (REFTEL).

2. BEGIN TEXT. I GAINED THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT THE CHINESE FEEL  
THERE IS (UNDERLINE IS) A SUBSTANTIVE AGENDA THAT CAN BE MADE UP.  
THEY'RE GOING TO BE EXTREMELY DESIROUS OF QUESTIONING THE PRESIDENT  
ABOUT THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE, ABOUT NATO FORCE LEVELS IN  
EUROPE, PARTICULARLY UNITED STATES FORCES THERE. THEY'RE GOING  
TO BE CONCERNED AND WILL ASK QUESTIONS ABOUT GREECE, TURKEY AND  
PORTUGAL. THEY FEEL THAT THE SUBJECT OF FORMOSA, WHICH MAY OR  
MAY NOT COME UP, CERTAINLY SHOULD BE NO BARRIER WHATSOEVER TO THE  
SUCCESS OF THIS CON-  
FERENCE. THEY FEEL, AS A MATTER OF FACT, THAT  
EVEN IF THE CONFERENCE IS NOT SUBSTANTIVE AND IF IT DOES NOT DEAL  
WITH PRESSING ISSUES AND IF NO COMMUNIQUE IS EVEN ISSUED THAT WILL

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*Handwritten: KFE 5/14/01*

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PAGE 02 PEKING 01556 160252Z

SHOW CONCRETE PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN SOLVED, THE VERY FACT THAT THE CONFERENCE IS HELD AT ALL WILL BE OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO THE. OBVIOUSLY WHO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE WILL BE MEETING WITH AND THE FORMAT AND AGENDA SHOULD BE WELL ESTABLISHED IN ADVANCE. END TEXT.

BUSH

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PAGE 02 PEKING 01615 01 OF 03 220943Z

CHIAO: IF I AM TO BE SPECIFIC, THERE ARE MANY QUESTIONS ON WHICH WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE UNITED STATES' ACTIONS. WE KNOW WHICH COUNTRY WANTS TO ESTABLISH HEGEMONY. ON QUESTIONS OF FOOD GRAIN, DOES THE UNITED STATES INTEND TO HELP THAT POWER?

BYRD: MANY OF US REGRET THE 1972 DEAL, BUT THAT WAS NOT AN ACT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, WHICH DID NOT EVEN KNOW HOW MUCH GRAIN PRIVATE DEALERS HAD SOLD, THE DEALERS THEMSELVES DID NOT KNOW THE TOTAL. IN OTHER WORDS, THE RIGHT HAND DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE LEFT HAND WAS DOING AND MUCH MORE WAS SOLD THAN OUR GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE APPROVED. PRICES HELD UP AND WE STILL FEEL IT. NOW THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS MONITORING THE SALES AND REQUIRES THE DEALERS TO REPORT THEIR CONTRACTS. SECRETARY BUTZ HAS PLACED A LID ON CONTRACTS UNTIL WE CAN SEE WHAT OUR CROPS ARE. DON'T THINK WE WILL FALL INTO THIS BOX AGAIN WITH OUR EYES OPEN.

CHIAO: AS FAR AS WE CAN TELL, THIS NOT ONLY INVOLVES THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, BUT ALSO AFFECTS THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL MARKET. MANY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES HAVE SUFFERED GREAT LOSSES FROM THE RISING PRICE. I WOULD APPRECIATE BEING INFORMED OF YOUR VIEWS.

BYRD: FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED STATES MUST FIRST TAKE CARE OF THE AMERICAN MARKET

THEN SELL TO ITS OLD CUSTOMERS, AND IF ANY IF LEFT WE WILL SELL IT TO THE USSR.

A MOMENT AGO YOU SAID THAT YOU UNDERSTOOD THE NECESSITY FOR FORCEFUL US ACTION TO PREVENT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET HEGEMONY IN MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD SUCH AS OUR ACTION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN TO ESTABLISH A BASE IN DIEGO GARCIA TO KEEP THE USSR FROM MOVING IN. IS THIS CORRECT.

CHIAO: THIS HAS A BEARING ON ALL THESE QUESTIONS. OF COURSE, I'M RELUCTANT TO CRITICIZE YOU AT THE OUTSET OF OUR TALKS.

BYRD. I DON'T THINK YOU HAVE BEEN SPECIFIC ABOUT WHAT MORE POWERFUL ACT BY THE UNITED STATES YOU MEANT. WOULD YOU ENLIGHTEN THE DELEGATION?



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PAGE 03 PEKING 01615 01 OF 03 220943Z

CHIAO: LET US GO TO ANOTHER SUBJECT. THIS HAS BEEN TAKEN UP HERE WITH MR. BUSH. I HAVE EXPLAINED DIEGO GARCIA TO OUR AMERICAN FRIENDS AS WELL AS THE QUESTION OF EUROPE. ALL OF THESE QUESTIONS, I PRESUME THAT YOU KNOW WE HAVE ALREADY STATED OUR VIEWS.

BYRD: WE KNOW THAT YOU DO NOT APPROVE FOREIGN BASES. BUT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES YOU WOULD NOT DISAPPROVE THE US BASE IN DIEGO GARCIA.

CHIAO: THIS IS VERY SPECIFIC. WE DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH SENATOR JACKSON AT GREAT LENGTH. I WILL REPEAT AGAIN WHAT I SAID. FIRST, WE DON'T APPROVE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY BASES ON THE SOIL OF ANY COUNTRY. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE REALISTIC AND MUST TAKE A REALISTIC VIEW IN THIS CASE. IN THE LAST TEN YEARS THE SOVIET EXPANSION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN HAS FAR SURPASSED THE UNITED STATES THERE. IT HAS ESTABLISHED DISGUISED BASES AND DOES IT QUIETLY, WHEREAS THE UNITED STATES MUST DO EVERYTHING IN PUBLIC. IN MY VIEW, THE UNITED STATES HAS LAGGED BEHIND THE USSR IN THE LAST TEN YEARS. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE USSR MAINTAINS A LARGE NUMBER OF COVERT BASES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, IT WOULD NOT BE FAIR TO EXCLUDE THE UNITED STATES. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS



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PAGE 02 PEKING 01815 02 OF 03 221030Z

BYRD: AND MIGHT I ADD, WHAT CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE CAN YOUR COUNTRY PLAY IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND STABILITY?

CHIAO: SINCE YOU ASK ME, IT WOULD NOT BE RIGHT IF I WERE NOT CANDID. IN OUR VIEW, IN ORDER TO PROMOTE PEACE IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE UN COMMAND BE DISSOLVED AND ALL FOREIGN TROOPS WITHDRAWN TO GIVE THE KOREAN PEOPLE A CHANCE TO SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES; WHAT IS THE ROLE FOR THE UNITED STATES? IF THE UNITED STATES WOULD ACT AS I SUGGESTED, IT WOULD BE A GREAT MOVE FOR PEACE AND STABILITY. CHINA WAS DIFFERENT. IN 1958 THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS WITHDREW AND NORTH KOREA HAS ONLY ITS OWN TROOPS. CHINA HAS ALWAYS SUPPORTED A PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA AND THIS IS THE ROLE WE SHOULD PLAY.

NUNN: I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE ROLE OF THE USSR IN SOUTH EAST ASIA SINCE THE UNITED STATES IS NO LONGER THERE. YOU KNOW MORE THAN WE DO ABOUT WHAT IS GOING ON IN INDOCHINA, PARTICULARLY CAMBODIA. WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA? WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AMONG VIETNAM, CAMBODIA, BURMA, THAILAND AND MALAYSIA? WHAT ARE THE CHANCES FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE FUTURE?

CHIAO: I AGREE ON THIS POINT. OUR NORTHERN FRIENDS ARE TRYING BY HOOK OR CROOK TO INSERT THEMSELVES IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD WHEN THE US LEAVES. WHETHER THEY WILL SUCCEED OR NOT IS ANOTHER QUESTION, HOWEVER. WE DON'T QUITE BELIEVE IN THE VACUUM THEORY, WHICH IS A WORD IN YOUR POLITICAL LANGUAGE. THAT IS THAT WHEN ONE BIG POWER WITHDRAWS ANOTHER BIG POWER MUST FILL THE VACUUM. WHAT ABOUT THE PEOPLE OF THE REGION? AS YOU SAID, SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE INDOCHINESE PEOPLE AS WE KNOW THEM ARE BRAVE PEOPLE WITH VERY HIGH SELF-RESPECT. NOW THAT THE INDOCHINA WAR, IN WHICH THE US INVOLVED ITSELF, HAS ENDED, WE HOPE YOU WILL IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THESE COUNTRIES. IT WOULD BE A BENEFICIAL THING TO DO. IT IS A PITY THAT YOU HAVE NOT MADE A DECISION. NORTH VIETNAM AND SOUTH VIETNAM HAVE APPLIED FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES HAS VETOED IT. WHAT IS THE REASON? I DON'T SEE ANY REASON AT ALL. THIS ACT CAN ONLY MAINTAIN THE HOSTILITY OF THE INDOCHINESE.

BYRD: MR. MINISTER, YOU INDICATED THAT THE USSR WILL TRY BY HOOK OR BY CROOK TO MOVE INTO AN AREA. WHAT ABOUT THAILAND, IF NORTH VIETNAM WITH THE HELP OF THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD ATTEMPT TO TAKE OVER THE AREA?

CHIAO: I DON'T QUITE BELIEVE THAT. RECENTLY WE HAVE HAD USEFUL CONTACTS WITH OUR THAI FRIENDS. POLITICAL LOGIS IS NOT SO SIMPLE

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PAGE 03 PEKING 01615 02 OF 03 221030Z

AS SAYING THE US IS OUT AND, THEREFORE, THE USSR IS IN, THE PEOPLE THERE WILL FILL THE VACUUM.

DERWINSKI: A MAJOR PROBLEM OF THE LAST 30 YEARS HAS BEEN THE SOVIET CONTROL OVER THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. WILL THE RECENT HELSINKI CONFERENCE HELP THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES OR WAS THE CONFERENCE A DIPLOMATIC VICTORY FOR THE USSR?

CHIAO: OUR VIEWS ON THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE ARE KNOWN TO ALL OUR FRIENDS. NOW THIS HAS COME TO A CULMINATION IN HELSINKI. YOUR PRESIDENT AND YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES MADE NO FUNDAMENTAL COMMITMENTS. OUR VIEW IS MORE THOROUGH. WE SAY THAT THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT IS A MERE SCRAP OF PAPER AND NOT WORTH PAYING ATTENTION TO. IT HAS MADE NO CHANGE IN THE STATUS QUO IN EUROPE. IF PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT IT MEANS A NEW ERA OF DETENTE AND THEY BELIEVE SOVIET PROPAGANDA, THEN IT WAS A GREAT DEFEAT.

DERWINSKI: WHAT IF MARSHAL TITO SHOULD LEAVE THE SCENE? WHAT IS YOUR VIEW OF WHAT MIGHT BE SOVIET INTENTIONS TOWARDS YUGOSLAVIA IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES?

CHIAO: I CAN ONLY GIVE YOU OUR ASSESSMENT ACCORDING TO OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION. GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET UNION, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WILL USE ALL KINDS OF PRESSURE TO CONTROL YUGOSLAVIA. BUT IT WILL NOT BE EASY GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE AND OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES IN PARTICULAR. IF THE USSR EXERCISES DIRECT CONTROL IT IS ONE THING; IF THE CONTROL IS INDIRECT IT IS ANOTHER.

BLACK: WHAT SHOULD BE THE GENERAL STANCE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, AND PARTICULARLY IN ASIA?

CHIAO: THIS QUESTION WAS ANSWERED IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE AND WE HAVE COMMON GROUND ON THIS POINT. THAT IS, WE OPPOSE ANY EFFORT TO ESTABLISH HEGEMONY IN THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC REGION. THE US HAS RELATIONS WITH MANY ASIAN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY WITH JAPAN. WE HOPE THESE GOOD RELATIONS WILL CONTINUE AND IT IS IMPORTANT THAT IT BE AN EQUAL PARTNERSHIP.

PEARSON: YOU TALK ABOUT COMMON GROUND. WE SHARE ONE ENVIRONMENT AND THE NECESSITY THAT THERE SHALL NEVER BE ANOTHER NUCLEAR WAR IN THIS WORLD. MAYBE WE, AS THE ONLY COUNTRY WHICH HAS EVER DROPPED A NUCLEAR WEAPON, ARE TOO SENSITIVE. WHILE WE APPLAUD YOUR TECHNICAL EFFORTS IN DEVELOPING A NUCLEAR WEAPON, WE WORRY ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES. I WOULD ASK WHEN DO YOU SEE A TIME WHEN YOU MIGHT ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT AND ASSOCIATE YOURSELVES WITH THE

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PAGE 01 PEKING 01643 261157Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4325  
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 1643

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR OEXC CH US  
SUBJECT: US-PRC EXCHANGES

REF: A. STATE 200904 (NOTAL) B. PEKING 1642

1. TWO EVENTS, FIRST THE CHINESE TURNDOWN OF A VISA FOR CONGEN HONG KONG OFFICER BOCK TO ACCOMPANY THE SOLID STATE PHYSICS DELEGATION SPONSORED BY THE CSC, AND NOW THE CHINESE MOVE REPORTED IN REF A TO EXCLUDE THE MAYOR OF SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO FROM THE US MAYORS DELEGATION SPONSORED BY THE NCUSCR, APPEAR TO US TO OFFER A MOST TIMELY OPPORTUNITY FOR A SHOW OF SOLIDARITY IN RESISTING CHINESE INTERFERENCE IN OUR --THE DEPARTMENT'S AND THE US PRIVATE COMMITTEES'--INTERNAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE FACILITATED EXCHANGE PROGRAM. THE OPPORTUNITY WILL BE PARTICULARLY TIMELY IF, AS WE EXPECT, THE CHINESE PROVE UNRESPONSIVE TO USLO'S DEMARCHE, NOW SCHEDULED FOR THURSDAY, CONCERNING THE USG'S TRAVEL PROBLEMS WITH THE PRC.

2. BEFORE THE RECEIPT OF REF A, WE HAD UNDER CONSIDERATION URGING THE DEPARTMENT TO TRY ITS BEST TO PERSUADE THE CSC TO POSTPONE THE VISIT OF THE SOLID STATE PHYSICS DELEGATION IF THE CHINESE MAINTAIN THEIR REFUSAL OF A VISA FOR BOCK. WE REALIZED THE FEASIBILITY MIGHT BE SLIGHT, JUST AS WE REALIZE THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE US PRIVATE COMMITTEES, IN TOTAL CONTRAST TO THEIR PRC COUNTERPARTS, HAS AT TIMES BEEN A MAJOR SOFT SPOT IN THE AMERICAN SIDE'S ABILITY TO CONDUCT THE FACILITATED EXCHANGES WITH THE CHINESE UTEANY#REAL



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PAGE 02 PEKING 01643 261157Z

BASIS OF EQUALITY AND MUTUAL BENEFIT. BUT, WE WERE GOING TO ARGUE, AND WE DO NOW, THAT IT IS IN NEITHER THE SHORT NOR THE LONG TERM INTEREST OF THE US, AS WE TRY TO CONTINUE THE PROCESS OF INSTITUTIONALIZING THE US-PRC RELATIONSHIP, TO GIVE CHINESE OFFICIALS AT ALL LEVELS THE IMPRESSION THAT THE AMERICAN SIDE'S INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS MAKE IT SAFE TO TAKE LIGHTLY USG DEMARCHES SUCH AS THE SYSTEMATIC ONE NOW IN THE OFFING.

4. WHATEVER THE CSC'S ATTITUDE MAY HAVE BEEN BEFORE TOWARD THE EVENTUALITY OF A CONTINUED CHINESE TURNFOMFWBF BOCKZF#WE WOULD HOPE THE CHINESE STANCE ON THE PUERTO RICAN MAYOR, ALBEIT AFFECTING ITS SISTER COMMITTEE, WOULD LEAVE THE CSC IN NO DOUBT THAT THIS IS THE TIME IF EVER THERE WAS ONE FOR THE THREE OF US--THE TWO COMMITTEES AND THE USG--TO STAND TOGETHER.

5. THOUGH WE DO NOT THINK THE PRC'S ACTION TOWARD THE MAYORS GROUP WILL COME UP IN THE THURSDAY MEETING WITH LIN PING, WE WILL WANT TO BE PREPARED WITH TALKING POINTS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING THESE, AS WELL AS ANY OTHER REVISED GUIDANCE FOR THIS MEETING, BY COB AUGUST 27 OUR TIME. BUSH

NOTE BY OC/T: \* AS RECEIVED, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW

THIS MESSAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-11-01 BY 60322 UCBAW

1980 08-11-01 100-00 200-00 4000 M

SECTION 22-00

70

TYPE OF MESSAGE 07002 507005





Department of State

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 9039

PAGE 01 PEKING 01773 170729Z

21  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W

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R 170547Z SEP 75  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4427  
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 1773

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PINT CH  
SUBJECT: CHOU EN-LAI'S HEALTH

1. ACCORDING TO ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR GAVRILESCU--  
REPORTED TO US BY HIS DCM DOROBANTU--PREMIER CHOU  
EN-LAI'S HEALTH HAS DETERIORATED QUITE NOTICEABLY OVER  
THE SUMMER. GAVRILESCU, WHO HAS PROBABLY SEEN MORE OF  
CHOU THAN ANY OTHER AMBASSADOR IN PEKING, NOTED THE  
DECLINE IN CHOU'S APPEARANCE FROM THE TIME HE SAW HIM  
IN MAY TO HIS RECENT MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 7. DOROBANTU  
RELATED THE STORY TO US IN A GRAVE TONE AND ILLUSTRATED  
EXTENT OF CHOU'S DECLINE BY MOVING HIS HAND FROM A  
RELATIVELY HIGH TO A VERY LOW POSITION.

2. COMMENT: WE DOUBT ROMANIANS WOULD EXAGGERATE  
DECLINE IN CHOU'S HEALTH. GAVRILESCU'S IMPRESSION  
TENDS TO CONFIRM THAT CHOU IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY  
FEEBLE.  
THAYER



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/5/03  
*State Dept Review*  
*TD 9/27/02*

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Department of State TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 9802

PAGE 01 PEKING 01800 220315Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W  
----- 060112

O R 220300Z SEP 75  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4449  
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 1800

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFDR CH  
SUBJECT: TENG HSIAO-PING ON SECRETARY'S VISIT

1. UK EMBASSY HAS NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO BRIEF US FULLY ON FORMER PM HEATH'S MEETINGS WITH MAO AND TENG.
2. HOWEVER, UK EMBASSY DCM FENN, WHO WAS PRESENT AT MEETING WITH VICE PREMIER, HAS CONFIRMED BY PHONE PRESS REPORTS THAT TENG DID TELL HEATH THAT SECRETARY DEFINITELY COMING IN OCTOBER. FENN STATES THAT TENG, DESPITE CONFUSION AMONG PRESS, DID NOT/NOT SAY WHEN IN OCTOBER.
3. DCM ALSO TELLS US TENG SAID CHOU WAS TOO ILL TO SEE HEATH.
4. ACTION REQUESTED: GUIDANCE FOR REPLY TO PRESS INQUIRIES HERE ABOUT SECRETARY'S VISIT. THAYER

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES *TD 9/27/02*  
BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *2/5/03*



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R 220910Z SEP 75  
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INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 1800

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PINR PGOV CH  
SUBJECT: HEATH SEPT 21 MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN

REF: PEKING 1800

1. BRITISH EMBASSY DCM FENN, WHILE NOT AT LIBERTY TO DIVULGE CONTENT OF ONE-HOUR HEATH-MAO DISCUSSION, HAS PASSED US HEATH'S AND AMBASSADOR YOUDE'S IMPRESSION OF MAO'S HEALTH.

2. THEY FOUND MAO FRAIL AND HIS SPEECH IMPEDED BUT "VERY MUCH ON THE BALL," FENN SAID, AND "EXTREMELY LUCID". FENN SAID IT WOULD BE WHOLLY WRONG, AT LEAST ON BASIS OF THAT HOUR'S MEETING, TO CALL MAO SENILE. THAYER

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12058, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES *TD 9/27/02*  
BY He, NARA, DATE 2/5/03



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R 240438Z SEP 75  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4466  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 PEKING 1819

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CORRECTED COPY (TEXT)

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR CH UK  
SUBJECT: TENG-HEATH CONVERSATION SEPT 20

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
MR # 10-042-1236  
State dept. rev 5/6/10  
By dal NARA, Date 6/24/10

REF: PEKING 1813 (NOTAL), 1808 (NOTAL); STATE 226534

SUMMARY: IN NEARLY THREE-HOUR MEETING SEPT 20 WITH FORMER BRITISH PRIME MINISTER HEATH, VICE PREMIER TENG LAID HEAVY STRESS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND SOVIET THREAT. TENG TOLD HEATH HE WOULD PROBE US ATTITUDE ON THIS DURING DR. KISSINGER'S VISIT IN OCTOBER. TENG DISPLAYED SATISFACTION WITH SINO-US RELATIONS, FINDING THEM "NORMAL, CONSIDERING THE CIRCUMSTANCES," REITERATED THREE CONDITIONS FOR NORMALIZATION AND, WHILE RESERVING ON ULTIMATE MEANS OF LIBERATION OF TAIWAN, INDICATED CHINESE WOULD BE PATIENT. TENG DISCOUNTED POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT WITH TAIWAN. TENG DID NOT ARGUE WITH HEATH'S ASSUMPTION THAT PRC IS MORE CONCERNED NOW THAN LAST YEAR OVER SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. HE SHOWED CONFIDENCE IN LONG-TERM OUTCOME IN SEA, BUT DESCRIBED CONTINUING SOVIET AIM AS BEING TO COUNTER US POWER IN WESTERN PACIFIC/ INDIAN OCEAN AREA. TENG REITERATED AVERSION TO FOREIGN



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DEBT, CONFIRMED INTENTION DEVELOP OIL EXPORTS AND SAID MOVEMENT TO CONCLUDE SINO-JAPANESE PEACE TREATY DEPENDS ON JAPANESE. TENG DID NOT DISCUSS PRC INTERNAL POLITICAL MATTERS BUT HE STRESSED MECHANIZATION OF AGRICULTURE AS PRIORITY TARGET, SAID PRC WOULD NOT BE BUYING GRAIN. END SUMMARY

1. UK EMBASSY DCM FENN HAS SUMMARIZED FOR US CONTENT OF FORMER UK PRIME MINISTER HEATH'S NEARLY THREE-HOUR MEETING SEPTEMBER 20 WITH VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING. IN DOING SO, HE ASKED US TO PROTECT SOURCE CAREFULLY, EMPHASIZING HIS EMBASSY'S DELICATE POSITION IN HANDLING HEATH'S "PRIVATE" MEETING, NOTWITHSTANDING HEATH'S SUBSEQUENT COMMENTS TO PRESS.

2. EUROPEAN SECURITY AND US COMMITMENT. (A) TENG, NOT SURPRISINGLY IN LIGHT OF HEATH'S OWN PREDILECTIONS, LAID HEAVY STRESS ON CHINESE CONCERN WITH EUROPEAN SECURITY AND US CONSTANCY. HEATH OPENED SUBSTANTIVE EXCHANGE BY WELCOMING CHINESE APPOINTMENT OF EC ENVOY. HE REFERRED TO HELSINKI AGREEMENT AS ONE-SIDED. THIS SPURRED TENG TO STRONG DENUNCIATION OF CSCE, CHARACTERIZING IT AS COVERING SOVIET EXPANSIONIST AIMS, ETC., BUT TENG NOTED APPROVINGLY THAT OTHERS ALSO (INCLUDING HEATH) WERE MAKING "COOL-HEADED" JUDGMENTS ON HELSINKI. IN THIS CONTEXT, TENG TOLD HEATH HE INTENDED TO ASK DR. KISSINGER, WHO WOULD BE VISITING CHINA IN OCTOBER, THE "TRUE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES" TOWARD EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE SOVIETS.

(B) TENG THEN VOLUNTEERED TO HEATH THAT PRC ATTACHES MORE IMPORTANCE TO US ATTITUDE TOWARD EUROPE (IMPLYING, BUT NOT STATING OUTRIGHT, MORE IMPORTANT THAN US ATTITUDE TOWARD OTHER AREAS (INCLUDING CHINA)). HEATH ASSURED TENG THAT US ANXIOUS FOR A STRONG EUROPE BUT FOUND IT DISCONCERTING NOW THAT EC-9 WERE SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE. IT IS TAKING USG A LITTLE TIME, HEATH SAID, TO GET USED TO THIS PHENOMENON. TENG COMMENTED THAT MOST AMERICANS, HE FELT, KNOW "IN THEIR HEARTS" THE



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TRUTH ABOUT SOVIET UNION. THE US DEFEAT IN INDO-CHINA, TENG TOLD HEATH, COULD BE GOOD FOR THE UNITED STATES IF THE US DRAWS CORRECT CONCLUSION THAT IT COULD NOT BE EVERYWHERE AT ONCE, THAT THIS IS BEYOND US POWER. TENG SAID US SHOULD FOCUS ENERGIES ON EUROPE AND FOR THIS A RELATIONSHIP OF REAL EQUALITY (PRESUMABLY BETWEEN EUROPE AND US) IS ESSENTIAL.

3. SINO-US RELATIONS.

(A) RELATIONS "NORMAL". TENG WENT ON TO SAY, STIMULATED BY HEATH, THAT SINO-US RELATIONS ARE NOW "NORMAL, CONSIDERING THE CIRCUMSTANCES." TENG EXPLAINED THAT GIVEN CERTAIN FACTORS, MAINLY TAIWAN, RELATIONS WITH THE US ARE AS MUST BE EXPECTED. BOTH SIDES, TENG SAID, ARE WORKING TO MAKE THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE EFFECTIVE AND TO SEEK THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS IN THAT SPIRIT; BUT THE PROCESS WOULD TAKE TIME. HEATH ASKED IF TENG EXPECTED PROGRESS DURING DR. KISSINGER'S VISIT. TENG REPLIED: "YOU WON'T BE SURPRISED TO HEAR THAT THIS DEPENDS ON THE UNITED STATES."

(B) TAIWAN: IN RETURNING TO SINO-US RELATIONS AT LATER STAGE IN CONVERSATION, TENG REITERATED FOR HEATH THREE CHINESE CONDITIONS FOR NORMALIZATION (TREATY, TROOPS, RELATIONS). IN RESPONSE TO HEATH'S QUESTION, TENG DISCOUNTED SOVIET THREAT RELATING TO TAIWAN, NOTING THAT, AFTER ALL, PEOPLE IN TAIWAN ARE CHINESE. AS TO WHETHER OR NOT REUNIFICATION WOULD BE BY PEACEFUL MEANS, TENG REPLIED THAT ANY SETTLEMENT WAS ENTIRELY A DOMESTIC MATTER AND THE METHOD THUS ONLY AN INTERNAL AFFAIR. TENG SAID HE HOPED THAT RESOLUTION "COULD BE PEACEFUL" AND THAT "CHINA WOULD WORK HARD FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OVER A RELATIVELY LONG PERIOD." PATIENCE, TENG CONCLUDED, IS A CHINESE CHARACTERISTIC.

4. PROSPECTS FOR WAR AND PEACE. TENG TOLD HEATH FLATLY THAT "WAR IS INEVITABLE" (BUT, HE REMARKED LATER, WORLD WAR WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE NUCLEAR).



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HE JUSTIFIED THIS STATEMENT BY CITING WEAPONS BUILD UP, STATING THAT EXPANSION OF SOVIET ARMS BESPEAKS SOVIET INTENTIONS. HE ADDED THAT "RESPONSIBILITY (FOR WAR OR PEACE) LIES ON THE SUPERPOWERS." HEATH AGREED WITH MUCH OF THIS, NOTING THAT SOVIET OBJECTIVES REMAIN UNCHANGED, ALTHOUGH USSR NOW EMPLOYING PRINCIPALLY POLITICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY MEANS. WAR DANGER LIES MAINLY IN MISCALCULATION RATHER THAN BY DESIGN, HEATH TOLD TENG, ADDING AS EXAMPLE THAT POST-TITO SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA CONTAINS SUCH RISKS. (COMMENT: TENG INDICATED AGREEMENT WITH THIS POINT, WE UNDERSTAND, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE, CONTRARY TO SOME LOCAL CORRESPONDENTS' INFERENCE THAT YUGOSLAVIA WAS DISCUSSED IN ANY DETAIL.)



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ACTION EA-06

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R 080920Z OCT 75  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4527  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 1900

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F.O. 11652:HSGDS TAGS PINT CH  
SUBJECT: CHOU EN-LAI'S HEALTH

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/5/03  
*State Dept Review TD 9/27/02*

REF: HONG KONG 11917 (NOTAL)

1. SOVIET AMBASSADOR TITSTIKOV TOLD ME OCTOBER 6 THAT CHOU EN-LAI WAS OPERATED ON SOMETIME BETWEEN SEPT 20 AND SEPT 23. TOLSTIKOV APPEARED TOTALLY CONFIDENT OF HIS INFORMATION BUT HE COULD NOT, OR WOULD NOT, ADD ANYTHING ABOUT THE NATURE OR OUTCOME OF THE OPERATION.
2. YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTRY NUMBER TWO LAZAR MOSJOV-- VISITING THE PRC AS PART OF BIJEDIC'S ENTOURAGE--TOLD ME THE NEXT DAY THAT HE BELIEVED CHOU HAD HAD A VERY SERIOUS OPERATION AND THAT HIS CONDITION WAS FATAL. WHEN I PRESSED HIM ON THIS, HE ADMITTED THAT THE CHINESE HAD NOT TOLD HIM THIS ALTHOUGH THEY HAD SAID CHOU WAS IN THE HOSPITAL AND REQUIRED SERIOUS MEDICAL ATTENTION.
3. LOCAL PRESS SOURCES TELL US JAPANESE CORRESPONDENT'S STORY (PERHAPS THE SOURCE OF THE BELGRADE REPORT CITED REFTEL) THAT BIJEDIC HAD MET WITH CHOU



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WAS ERRONEOUS. AS OF MID-AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 8,  
BIJEDIC HAD NOT SEEN EITHER CHOU OR MAO ALTHOUGH THE  
YUGOSLAVS ARE CONFIDENT THAT A MEETING WITH MAO  
WILL TAKE PLACE BEFORE BIJEDIC LEAVES CHINA.  
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DEPUTY CHIEF, SAID HE WOULD PHONE DC NEXT WEEK ABOUT GETTING TOGETHER. ON MORNING JUNE 28 SAYSANA, IDENTIFYING HIMSELF ONLY AS "A FRIEND", PHONED DC AT OFFICE AND ASKED IF HE COULD VISIT HIM AT HIS APARTMENT THAT AFTERNOON. DC, WHO IS LEAVING POST SHORTLY ON TRANSFER, EXPLAINED DIFFICULTY OF ARRANGING A MEETING ON EITHER THE 28TH OR 29TH AND SUGGESTED PHONING HIMSELF OR POLCOUNS AT OFFICE ON THE 30TH. WE EXPECT SAYSANA WILL FOLLOW UP ON THE 30TH WITH ANOTHER CALL TO DC. WE EXPECT AT THAT TIME TO ARRANGE A DISCREET MEETING TO FIND OUT PRECISELY WHAT SAYSANA HAS ON HIS MIND.

3. WE ARE OF COURSE FAMILIAR WITH DEPARTMENT'S JANUARY 4, 1972 STATEMENT OF POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING REQUESTS FOR ASYLUM AND WITH 2 FAM PROVISIONS. IF THERE IS ANY OTHER GUIDANCE WE SHOULD HAVE BEFORE MEETING WITH SAYSANA, REQUEST THIS BY OUR OOB JUNE 30. GATES



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MRS. SCOTT  
AMBASSADOR GATES, CHIEF, USLO  
ROBERT BARNETT, DIRECTOR, ASIA SOCIETY  
RICHARD QUICK, ADMINISTRATIVE ASST TO SEN. SCOTT  
TERENCE SHEA, DEPT. OF STATE  
CHARLES W. FREEMAN, JR., DEPT. OF STATE  
DONALD KEYSER, USLO (NOTETAKER)

RECORD OF CONVERSATION:

CHIAO KUAN-HUA: IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE TO SEE YOU AGAIN. IT HAS ALREADY BEEN FOUR YEARS SINCE OUR LAST MEETING.

SENATOR SCOTT: IT HAS BEEN TOO LONG. BUT I HAVE BEEN SO BUSY. AND WE HAVE HAD SO MANY CRISES.

CHIAO: THAT IS ONE OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRESENT-DAY WORLD.

SCOTT: THE LIFE OF A POLITICIAN IS ALWAYS COMPLICATED. MAY I SAY THAT THE CHIEF OF USLO, AMBASSADOR GATES, IS A LONG-TIME PERSONAL FRIEND OF MINE. HE IS FROM MY STATE, MY CITY, AND MY NEIGHBORHOOD IN PHILADELPHIA. AT ONE TIME HE WAS ALSO MY CAMPAIGN MANAGER.

CHIAO: THAT IS VERY GOOD. HE MUST HAVE GIVEN YOU GOOD ADVICE.

SCOTT: I ALSO BRING GREETINGS FROM SEN. MANSFIELD. IT IS NO SECRET, I BELIEVE, THAT HE LOOKS FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN THE AUTUMN -- IF THE ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE WORKED OUT.

CHIAO: IS HE IN GOOD HEALTH?

SCOTT: YES, AND HIS WIFE IS ALSO WELL. WE ARE BOTH RETIRING IN ORDER TO HAVE MORE TIME TO SPEND WITH OUR FAMILIES.

CHIAO: YOU AND SEN. MANSFIELD HAVE BEEN VETERAN SOLDIERS IN AMERICAN POLITICS.

SCOTT: YES, WE HAVE SERVED FOR 1/6 OF THE LIFE OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC. FOR 34 YEARS EACH. MANY MEMBERS OF MY PARTY HAVE NOT VISITED THE ASIAN CONTINENT BEFORE. THE CHINESE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN VERY HELPFUL AND FRIENDLY.

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AND WE THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

CHIAO: YES, THE CHINESE AND AMERICAN PEOPLES HAVE MANY POINTS IN COMMON. (THE INTERPRETER HAD RENDERED SEN. SCOTT'S REMARKS AS "THE CHINESE PEOPLE ARE CHARACTERISTICALLY VERY HELPFUL AND FRIENDLY.")

SCOTT: PRESIDENT FORD HAS ASKED ME TO EXTEND HIS PERSONAL GOOD WISHES TO YOU. HE HAS VERY PLEASANT RECOLLECTIONS OF HIS VISIT.

CHIAO: YES, THE FIRST TIME HE CAME AS A CONGRESSMAN AND THE SECOND TIME AS PRESIDENT. LAST YEAR HE HAD A VERY GOOD CONVERSATION WITH CHAIRMAN MAO. PLEASE CONVEY MY GREETINGS TO HIM.

CHIAO: THERE IS AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN GOING ON NOW IN THE UNITED STATES. WE ARE OUTSIDERS AND DO NOT UNDERSTAND EVERYTHING. WHAT ARE THE ELECTION PROSPECTS IN YOUR VIEW?

SCOTT: I CAN ONLY EXPRESS A PERSONAL OPINION, AND WE ARE ALL SUBJECT TO ERROR. AMONG THE REPUBLICANS, THE PRESIDENT IS LIKELY TO BE NOMINATED. IT IS NOT CERTAIN, BUT IT IS MORE LIKELY THAN HIS OPPONENT. I'VE BEEN WRITING POSTCARDS TO DELEGATES FROM PEKING ASKING THEM TO SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT. 1130 DELEGATES ARE NEEDED TO NOMINATE AT KANSAS CITY. MY PERSONAL EXPECTATION IS THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL REACH 1100. REGAN WILL HAVE ABOUT 1085, POSSIBLY 1090. SUCH IS THE PHILOSOPHY OF DELEGATES THAT THERE IS A TENDENCY WHEN ONE CANDIDATE IS WITHIN 20 VOTES FOR DELEGATES TO HURRY TO BE WITH THE WINNER. FORD NEEDS ONE STATE, AND REGAN NEEDS TWO OR MORE STATES TO BE THE NOMINEE. I WILL BE CHAIRMAN OF THE THIRD LARGEST STATE DELEGATION. THERE WILL BE CERTAIN CONTROVERSIES OVER FEATURES OF THE PLATFORM. WE DO NOT EXPECT WIDE VARIATIONS WITH REGARD TO ASIA. AMONG THE DEMOCRATS, CARTER TO THE GREAT SURPRISE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAS GOT THE NOMINATION. HE IS UNKNOWN TO THE REPUBLICANS AND TO THE MAJORITY OF THE DEMOCRATS -- WHO ARE NOW OBLIGED TO SUPPORT HIM. THE TEMPERAMENT OF CARTER IS THAT OF AN EMOTIONAL MAN, AN EVANGELIST, AND THIS HAS STRUCK A RESPONSIVE NOTE WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF AMERICANS. IN THE POLLS CARTER IS AHEAD OF THE PRESIDENT BY A WIDE MARGIN. BUT 3 MONTHS AGO THE PRESIDENT WAS SIMILARLY AHEAD OF CARTER. CARTER HAS NO EXPERIENCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HE IS TAKING ADVICE FROM BRZEZINSKI AND VANCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. GOVERNOR CARTER HAS BEEN ABLE TO SECURE THE NOMINATION WITHOUT

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MAKING POSITIVE STATEMENTS. FROM NOW ON HE MUST MAKE FIRMER STATEMENTS AND WILL THUS BE SUBJECT TO ATTACK FROM PRESIDENT FORD AND HIS SUPPORTERS. IT IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT THE OUTCOME. I THINK THAT THE MARGIN IS LESS THAN THE POLLS WOULD INDICATE. BUT AS OF TODAY THEY STILL FAVOR CARTER. BUT IT CAN CHANGE -- AND I HOPE IT WILL. THERE WAS AN EVEN GREATER CHANGE IN REPUBLICAN SENTIMENT IN 1968. NIXON WAS AHEAD OF SEN. HUMPHREY BY 15 PCNT IN THE POLLS, BUT IN THE ELECTION NIXON WON BY ONLY 1 PCNT. THE ELECTORATE IS SUBJECT TO RAPID CHANGES. WE ARE HOPEFUL OF OVERCOMING THE MOMENTARY LEAD OF CARTER.

CHIAO: THANK YOU FOR YOUR EXPLANATION OF THE SITUATION. THIS IS YOUR INTERNAL AFFAIR.

SCOTT: AS ALWAYS, I'M VERY CANDID WITH YOU. I'M CERTAINLY HELPING THE PRESIDENT. WE BELIEVE HIS PERSONALITY WILL GAIN ADDED SUPPORT FOR HIM.

CHIAO: THERE IS STILL SOME TIME. THERE MAY BE SOME CHANGES. YOUR ELECTION IS ALWAYS TROUBLESOME FOR FOREIGNERS TO OBSERVE. THERE ISN'T MUCH INFORMATION. WHEN AMBASSADOR GATES ASKED ME, I SAID I FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO ANSWER.

FKMB. GATES: I REMEMBER.

SCOTT: THIS WEEK I SAT NEXT TO PRINCE PHILIP AT A WHITE HOUSE DINNER. HE ASKED ME TO EXPLAIN TO HIM OUR ELECTORAL SYSTEM. I FEAR HE STILL DOES NOT UNDERSTAND.

CHIAO: FRANKLY, WE DON'T UNDERSTAND YOUR ELECTORAL PROCESS EITHER.

SCOTT: THEY (I.E. ELECTIONS) DO CREATE A SITUATION WHICH INTERFERES WITH USUAL PROGRESS. SIX MONTHS OUT OF EVERY THREE OR THREE AND A HALF YEARS MAKES PROBLEMS IN FOREIGN POLICY DUE TO CRITICISM FROM ONE SIDE OR ANOTHER.

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CHIAO: I THINK THAT THIS TIME WE HAVE NOTED THAT FOREIGN POLICY IS ONE OF THE THEMES OF THE CAMPAIGN.

SCOTT: YES, BUT FOLLOWING THE ELECTION THERE GENERALLY IS A BROAD CONTINUITY NOTWITHSTANDING SOME OF THE EXAGGERATIONS IN CAMPAIGN RHETORIC. DURING THIS ELECTION YEAR, THE GOOD WILL TOWARDS PEOPLE OF YOUR COUNTRY REMAINS SO, EVEN MORE SO. THERE IS CURIOSITY AND INTEREST ABOUT CHINA. MY MAIL IS FULL OF REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON HOW TO VISIT YOUR COUNTRY. THERE ARE NOT DEBATES ON CHINA POLICY AS WITH OTHERS.

CHIAO: THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE IS IN ACCORD WITH THE INTERESTS OF THE TWO PEOPLES. WHATEVER CHANGES THERE ARE IN THE US INTERNAL SITUATION, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE ARE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE TWO PEOPLES.

SCOTT: I AGREE. WHETHER FORD OR CARTER WINS, THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE PRINCIPLES WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS IMPORTANT GUIDELINES ONCE WE HAVE PASSED THROUGH THE TURBULENT WATERS OF THE CAMPAIGN. CERTAINLY THERE IS A WISH TOWARDS NORMALIZATION; A RECOGNITION THAT SOME DELAYS AND SOME DISAPPOINTMENTS ON BOTH SIDES HAVE OCCURRED EXISTS. THE PRINCIPLES HAVE THE ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR PEOPLE. WE HAVE HEARD NO CAMPAIGN TO ABROGATE OR WITHDRAW FROM THE AGREEMENTS IN PRINCIPLE.

MY PARTY WOULD LIKE TO EXTEND CONDOLENCES ON THE DEATH OF YOUR DISTINGUISHED AND FAMOUS LEADER MR. CHU TEH.

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CHTAO: THANK YOU VERY MUCH. WE ALSO THANK YOUR PRESIDENT FOR HIS CONDOLENCE MESSAGE. YOUR CHIEF OF USLO ALSO TOOK PART IN THE FUNERAL ACTIVITIES.

SCOTT: WE ASKED TO SUBMIT A WREATH ON BEHALF OF THE DELEGATION, BUT WE LEARNED THAT IT WAS TOO LATE AND NOT THE TIME TO DO IT.

COULD YOU COMMENT ON THE IMPACT OF THE LOSS OF GENERAL CHU TEH ON THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENTAL LEADERSHIP AND DUTIES. THERE IS ALWAYS AN IMPACT IN OUR COUNTRY WHEN A MAN AS GREAT AS GENERAL CHU TEH DIES.

CHIAO: MARSHAL CHU TEH'S DEATH WAS A GREAT LOSS TO OUR COUNTRY AND PEOPLE. BUT OUR STATE ADMINISTRATION IS PERSONALLY DECIDED BY CHAIRMAN MAO AND WE HAVE CONSTANTLY CARRIED OUT THIS LINE BOTH AT HOME AND IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. WE MUST TURN GRIEF INTO STRENGTH. THE CHINESE PEOPLE WILL MOVE FIRMLY TO CARRY OUT THESE POLICIES.

SCOTT: HIS LIFE WAS AN EXAMPLE FOR YOU.

CHIAO: YES. WE MUST LEARN FROM HIS MANY FINE QUALITIES. HE FIRMLY CARRIED OUT CHAIRMAN MAO'S LINE. THE CHINESE PEOPLE SHOULD FOLLOW HIS EXAMPLE. BUT CHINA'S SOCIAL SYSTEM IS DIFFERENT FROM YOURS. IN THE NATURAL COURSE OF THINGS SOME LEADERS DIE -- THIS WON'T AFFECT FOREIGN OR DOMESTIC POLICY. IT WON'T AFFECT THE IMPLEMENTATION.

SCOTT: THIS IS SUBSTANTIALLY WHAT I'VE SAID ABOUT OUR SITUATION IN JANUARY. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE DON'T LIKE SHARP CHANGES. WHATEVER THE RHETORIC, THERE IS A TENDENCY TO STAY WITHIN BROADLY ESTABLISHED POSITIONS.

OUR CONGRESSIONAL VISITORS HAVE ALWAYS RETURNED WITH GOOD REPORTS OF HIGHLY AMICABLE MEETINGS AND RELATIONSHIPS. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP COULD BE HELPED BY REMOVAL OF AS MANY MINOR OBSTACLES -- TECHNICALITIES -- AS POSSIBLE. SO MANY AMERICANS WANT TO VISIT CHINA. WHEN I ANNOUNCED MY VISIT, MY MAIL WAS CROWDED WITH LETTERS FROM CONSTITUENTS WHO HAD LEARNED ABOUT CHINA FROM FRIENDS, FROM DOCTORS, FROM PROFESSORS WHO HAD VISITED CHINA.

CHTAO: THEIR DESIRE TO COME AND SEE CHINA IS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE.

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I BELIEVE THAT AFTER NORMALIZATION SUCH EXCHANGES WILL BE MUCH MORE CONVENIENT.

SCOTT: NOT ALL REQUESTS CAN BE FULFILLED. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PHILADELPHIA ZOO WANTED A COUPLE OF PANDAS. AMBASSADOR GATES HAS GIVEN HIS SUPPORT TO THE PHILADELPHIA ZOO. HE UNDERSTANDS WHAT I MEAN. WE OWE YOU A MUSK OX I BELIEVE.

CHIAO: WITH RESPECT TO NORMALIZATION, LAST YEAR WHEN YOUR PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE VISITED WE STATED OUR POSITION MANY TIMES. YOU ARE QUITE CLEAR.

SCOTT: YES, WE ARE QUITE ANXIOUS TO MAKE PROGRESS. WE HAVE EVEN MADE SOME SYMBOLIC MOVES IN THESE TIMES. WE HAVE REMOVED A MINOR PRESENCE FROM QUEMOY AND MATSU. WE ARE SEEKING TO REMOVE ANY INSTANCE WHICH COULD CAUSE PROBLEMS. NO MATTER WHO IS PRESIDENT, WE HAVE A PUBLIC OPINION PROBLEM. FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THE PAST IS THE PAST. WE ARE PREPARING THE MINDS OF THE PEOPLE FOR NORMALIZATION.

CHIAO: YES, WE HAVE DISCUSSED THESE PROBLEMS MANY TIMES WITH RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS IN YOUR GOVERNMENT. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAILURE TO NORMALIZE DOES NOT LIE WITH THE CHINESE SIDE -- IT LIES WITH

US SIDE. WE MUST MAKE A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN RIGHT AND WRONG. THE US SIDE SHOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR FAILURE TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS SO FAR. WE HAVE STATED THIS MANY TIMES. TO PUT IT EVEN MORE EXPLICITLY, THERE ARE THREE POINTS TO BE ACHIEVED: (1) WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM TAIWAN; (2) ABROGATION OF THE DEFENSE TREATY; AND (3) SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN. THIS IS OUR CONSISTENT POSITION. WE ASSUME OUR AMERICAN FRIENDS ARE QUITE CLEAR.

SCOTT: YES, THERE EXISTS AN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION ON THE AGREEMENTS OF 1954. IT WILL BE WISE FROM THE US SIDE TO ENSURE THAT AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION WILL NOT REGARD AS ABANDONMENT THE ABROGATION OF THE EARLIER TREATY. THERE IS MORE WILL IN THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT THAN AWARENESS IN PUBLIC OPINION THAT AT SOME POINT THERE MUST BE SOLUTIONS NOT BASED ON THE 1954 UNDERTAKINGS.

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BARNETT: YES, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WILL HAVE TO BELIEVE THAT ABROGATION OF THE 1954 TREATY IS NOT AN ACT OF BETRAYAL BUT A CONSTRUCTIVE MOVE FOR PEACE.

CHIAO: TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM EVEN MORE CONCRETELY LET US TRACE BACK. AT LIBERATION IN 1949 AND AFTERWARDS IN 1950, AMERICAN SECRETARY OF STATE ACHESON DECLARED TO THE WORLD THAT TAIWAN IS THE INTERNAL AFFAIR OF CHINA AND THAT THE US WOULD NOT INTERFERE. LATER ON YOU CONCLUDED THE TREATY. WE UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION, BUT AT THE OUTSET WE REGARDED YOUR POSITION AS ILLEGAL. IN 1955 THE TWO SIDES BEGAN TALKS ON THE ISSUE OF TAIWAN. THESE LASTED UNTIL (1971 SUPPLIED BY TANG WEN-SHENG). OUR POSITION HAS BEEN CONSISTENT. NO FOREIGN COUNTRY HAS A RIGHT TO INTERFERE IN THE AFFAIRS OF CHINA AND ONE OF ITS PROVINCES. THIS HISTORY STARTED IN 1949.

SCOTT: YOU WERE HERE WHEN YOUR ESTEEMED PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI GAVE THE SAME HISTORICAL OUTLINE. WE UNDERSTAND YOUR VIEWS ENTIRELY. OUR PROBLEM IS THE INTERNAL PROBLEM OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION. THE MORE EVIDENCE WE HAVE TO ASSURE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT THERE IS BUT ONE CHINA -- AND THAT THIS CAN BE WORKED OUT WITHOUT MILITARY ACTION ON EITHER SIDE -- THEN IT BECOMES EASIER TO EXPLAIN TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT A SOLUTION IS UNLIKELY TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY MILITARY ACTION. AND THEY ARE LESS LIKELY TO OPPOSE THE POLICY. I SPEAK FOR MYSELF, NOT THE PRESIDENT. IT IS A PROBLEM, WITHOUT WISHING TO INTRUDE IN YOUR INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THE NEED IS FOR US TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOLUTION IS A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.



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CHIAO: IN PRINCIPLE THIS IS SELF-CONTRADICTION. ON THE ONE HAND YOU RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS ONLY 1 CHINA AND THAT TAIWAN IS A PART OF CHINA. ON THE OTHER HAND YOU ASK CHINA TO DO THIS AND THAT. ISN'T THAT AN INTERFERENCE IN CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

SCOTT: I WAS TALKING ALONG DIFFERENT LINES -- HOW TO MOLD PUBLIC OPINION. WHEN I RETURN MY FIRST SPEECH WILL BE TO THE OVERSEAS PRESS CLUB. HOW TO MOLD PUBLIC OPINION IS THE IMPORTANT THING, AND HOW SOLUTIONS ARE FOUND -- THEY MUST BE PEACEFUL. THE U.S. DOESN'T SEEK TO INTERFERE IN CHINA'S DOMESTIC SITUATION. CONDITIONING OF PUBLIC OPINION (IN THE U.S.) CAN HELP US CHANGE THE SITUATION EXISTING SINCE 1954. I BELIEVE THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE U.S. POSITION IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. BUT THIS IS ARGUABLE ON THE CHINESE SIDE; THE WORDING IS A LITTLE DIFFERENT ON YOUR SIDE.

CHIAO: I SEE THAT MR. FREEMAN IS SMILING. ON THE ISSUE OF TAIWAN IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, IT IS STATED THAT "ALL CHINESE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE CHINA." WE THINK YOUR PRESENT ATTITUDE DOES NOT CONFORM TO YOUR ORIGINAL ATTITUDE OF RECOGNIZING ONLY ONE CHINA. YOU WANT US TO DO THIS OR THAT WITH REGARD TO TAIWAN. THIS DOES NOT CONFORM.

SCOTT: WE HAVE NO RIGHT TO SAY "DO THIS OR THAT." BUT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR OUR SIDE TO PUT THINGS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

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CHIAO: THIS IS AN OLD PROBLEM. WE CAN REITERATE CHINA'S CONSISTENT POSITION AND ITS CONDITIONS FOR NORMALIZATION. THE U.S. SIDE SHOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FAILURE TO REALIZE NORMALIZATION. IF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS DIFFICULTIES WE WON'T PRESS YOU, BUT IT IS AN ISSUE OF RIGHT AND WRONG. CAN WE SHIFT TO ANOTHER SUBJECT?

SCOTT: PERHAPS YOU HAVE READ ARTICLES BY MR. BARNETT ON VARIOUS FORMULAS FOR EVOLUTION. (TANG WEN-SHENG NODS AFFIRMATIVELY; OTHERS DO NOT SEEM FAMILIAR WITH ARTICLES.) WE WILL BE GLAD TO DISCUSS ANY SUBJECT. MR. BARNETT HAS WRITTEN FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAGAZINE, ALSO FOR WORLDVIEW. I THINK WE CAN MAKE THESE AVAILABLE TO YOU. THESE ARE THE VIEWS OF A PRIVATE CITIZEN, OF COURSE, BUT MR. BENNETT IS ALSO THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASIA SOCIETY.

CHIAO: IS MR. BARNETT FROM BROOKINGS?

BARNETT: NO, THAT IS MY BROTHER AT BROOKINGS.

CHIAO: ARE YOUR VIEWS THE SAME?

BARNETT: MY VIEWS ARE SIMILAR TO HIS IN MANY RESPECTS.

CHIAO: WE WILL BE INTERESTED IN READING THEM. (CHIAO FIRST MISUNDERSTANDS AND THINKS THAT THERE IS A LARGE GAP BETWEEN THE VIEWS OF THE BARNETT BROTHERS. TANG WEN-SHENG CLARIFIES, SAYING "I WAS JUST SAYING THAT A CONSIDERABLE GAP STILL EXISTS BETWEEN US" -- I.E. CHINA AND THE U.S.)

SCOTT: THAT MAY BE SO, BUT HE WAS BORN IN SHANGHAI AND YOU WERE BORN IN BROOKLYN.

CHIAO: NEVERTHELESS THERE IS STILL A DISTANCE. WHAT ABOUT EUROPE AND THE WORLD AS A WHOLE. WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS?

SCOTT: THAT IS A LARGE PACKAGE. IF I CAN VENTURE SOME VIEWS AND REACTIONS. I BELIEVE THAT THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT IS STILL TO A STRONG AMERICAN PRESENCE AND COMMITMENT TO EUROPE. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT NATO. SEN. HUMPHREY AND I RECENTLY VISITED SEVERAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND

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ASSURED THEM THAT THIS IS SO. SEN. HUMPHREY AND I BELONG TO DIFFERENT SO WE ARE BIPARTISAN. WE DO NOT FAVOR A WEAKENING OF OUR PRESENCE IN BERLIN OR ON THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE. WE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN THE RECENT MEETING OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES. WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS? DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE MEETING WAS USEFUL OR COUNTERPRODUCTIVE? YOU KNOW THAT MY VIEWS AND THE VIEWS OF SENATOR MANSFIELD ARE DIFFERENT IN SOME RESPECTS; ONE OF THEM IS ON MAINTAINING OUR POSITION IN EUROPE. I BELIEVE IN KEEPING A SUBSTANTIAL TROOP COMMITMENT. SENATOR MANSFIELD CALLED FOR A 10 PCT REDUCTION. HIS PROPOSAL WAS DEFEATED BY A VOTE OF 53-39. HIS VIEWS ARE IN THE MINORITY AND HE HAS NOW DROPPED HIS PROPOSAL. WITH REGARD TO ITALY, WE HAVE TO WAIT FOR THE COMPOSITION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT. WE ARE UNABLE TO DECIDE OUR POLICY UNTIL THE GOVERNMENT IS CONSTITUTED. UNLESS IT IS EVIDENT THAT THEY ARE ACTING ON THE ORDERS OF ANOTHER POWER, THERE WILL BE NO CHANGE IN OUR POLICY. GENERALLY, WE FAVOR STRENGTH IN EUROPE. THIS WILL LIKELY NOT BE AN ISSUE. PRESIDENT FORD, GOVERNOR REAGAN, AND GOVERNOR CARTER ALL AGREE ON THIS.

CHIAO: MY IMPRESS FROM THE LAST TIME SEN. MANSFIELD AND I MET AND TALKED WAS THAT HE ALSO FAVORED WITHDRAWAL OF FAMILY DEPENDENTS AND LOGISTICAL PERSONNEL.

SCOTT: YES, PLUS 100,000 SOLDIERS. BUT HE HAS LOST ON THIS QUESTION. THERE HAS BEEN ONE VERY IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT. CONGRESS HAS CHANGED ITS

ATTITUDE ABOUT ARBITRARILY CHANGING THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR A STRONG BUDGET FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. AMBASSADOR GATES REMEMBERS THAT DURING THE 1950S AND 1960S THE CONGRESS USED TO CUT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSED DEFENSE BUDGET BY 5 PCT OR EVEN 10 PCT. PRIOR TO THIS YEAR THERE WERE CUTS OF \$4-7 BILLION. BUT THIS YEAR 99.4 PCT OF THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST WAS APPROVED. THE CONGRESS HAS DECIDED THAT THE PRESIDENT KNOWS BEST ABOUT NATIONAL DEFENSE AND IT FAVORS A STRONG NATIONAL DEFENSE.

CHIAO: WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION MANY TIMES IN THE PAST WITH AMERICAN FRIENDS. WE FAVOR A TRULY EQUAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. BOTH SIDES HAVE A NEED. BUT THE NATURE OF THE ARRANGEMENT IS YOUR AFFAIR.

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SCOTT: WOULD YOU CARE TO COMMENT ON THE MEETING OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES? HOW DOES IT IMPACT ON ASIA? WAS IT A GOOD THING OR NOT? HOW DO YOU VIEW THE INCREASING INDEPENDENCE OF SOME COUNTRIES?

CHIAO: WE HAVE ALWAYS HAD A FEELING ON THIS ISSUE -- THAT YOU ARE TOO NERVOUS ON THE ITALY SITUATION. AT LEAST THE MEETING OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES HAS PROVED THAT. I SHOULD NOT REGARD THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ITALY AS A REVISIONIST PARTY, AS A FIFTH COLUMN FOR THE SOVIET UNION. THE MEETING OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES HAS PROVED TH IS.  
I CAN'T SEE ANY GREATER USE OF IMPACT OF THE MEETING. THE BATON OF THE SOVIET UNION WAS LESS AND LESS EFFECTIVE.

SCOTT: YES, MR. BREZHNEV SEEMED LESS INVOLVED IN WRITING THE MEETING'S COMMUNIQUE. THIS IS MY PRIVATE CITIZEN'S VIEW.

CHIAO: WE THINK THAT ALTHOUGH THE CONFERENCE HAS HELD, THERE WILL BE NO NEW EFFECT ON THE SOVIET EXPANSION POLICY. THIS IS THE BIGGEST PROBLEM CONCERNING EUROPE.

SCOTT: WE ARE ANXIOUS TO KEEP TALKS GOING -- BUT CONCERNED THAT THERE BE AN EQUALITY OF RESULT.



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CHIAO: IT IS TRULY A PROBLEM -- AS TO HOW TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

LAST YEAR AT ABOUT THIS TIME, AT THE END OF JULY AND IN EARLY AUGUST, THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE WAS HELD. AT THAT TIME WE REGARDED THE CONFERENCE A REFLECTION OF MUNICH THINKING. OUR VIEW WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION ACHIEVED FROM THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE A RECOGNITION OF ITS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE. I'M NOT CLEAR ON WHAT YOU GOT. PEOPLE CAN SEE IT MORE CLEARLY ONE YEAR LATER.

SCOTT: THERE WAS SOME FEELING THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS MORE ANXIOUS THAN THE U.S. FOR THE CONFERENCE. THERE IS NOW GROWING CRITICISM IN THE U.S. THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS PAID NO ATTENTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS. WHICH WAS AN ISSUE IN THE CONFERENCE.

WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO ASEAN'S FORMULA AS A MEANS OF IMPROVING COMMUNICATION? HOW DOES THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA REGARD ASEAN? IS IT USEFUL IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASIA?

BARNETT: WHAT ABOUT THE ZONE OF PEACE, FREEDOM AND NEUTRALITY, WHICH IS THE BASIC ASEAN PRINCIPLE?

SCOTT: YOU HAVE PUT IT MUCH BETTER THAN I STATED IT.

CHIAO: THERE IS A GENERAL TREND FOR THE FIVE ASEAN COUNTRIES TO ESTABLISH A ZONE OF PEACE, FREEDOM AND NEUTRALITY. OUR POSITION IS TO

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SCOTT: WELL, I'VE DONE MY DUTY (E.E. TO BARNETT). IF I HADN'T MENTIONED THE CONFERENCE I WOULD HAVE LOST A FRIEND. I'D LIKE TO ADD THAT WE WOULD WELCOME CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT IN TRADE RELATIONS.

CHIAO: THIS IS A GOOD DESIRE, BUT I'M NOT TOO CLEAR ON CONCRETE PROBLEMS.

SCOTT: NEITHER AM I.

CHIAO: OUR FOREIGN TRADE MINISTRY FRIENDS POSSIBLY ARE BETTER ACQUAINTED WITH THE CONCRETE SITUATION.

SCOTT: MAY I ASK WHETHER IT IS PROPER TO LET ANY OF OUR GUESTS ASK QUESTIONS?

CHIAO: YES, PLEASE.

BARNETT: I'D LIKE TO ASK ONE QUESTION REGARDING MEMBERSHIP OF ASEAN. THERE ARE THOSE FAVORING TAKING IN VIETNAM. OTHERS WOULD LIKE TO DELAY. HOW DOES CHINA FEEL ABOUT THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE ASEAN ZONE TO INCLUDE VIETNAM.

CHIAO: THIS IS A PROBLEM BETWEEN ASEAN AND THE 3 INDOCHINESE COUNTRIES. IF THEY AGREE WE HAVE NO OBJECTION.

AMB. GATES: I HAVE NO QUESTIONS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER VERY GRACIOUSLY RECEIVED ME WHEN I ARRIVED. IF WE HAVE ANY QUESTIONS AFTERWARDS WE WILL DISCUSS THEM THEN.

SCOTT: THE AMBASSADOR OBSERVED OUR 200TH BIRTHDAY RECENTLY WITH MANY DECORATIONS. HE IS A DESCENDANT OF THOSE WHO FOUGHT IN THE REVOLUTION. WE ARE REVOLUTIONARIES TOO.

CHIAO: ACTUALLY, IN HISTORY THE U.S. IS AMONG THE EARLIEST NATIONS WHO WAGED A STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE.

SCOTT: THE OLDEST WRITTEN CONSTITUTION IS OURS.



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CHIAO: WHAT ABOUT YOU, MR. FREEMAN? PLEASE USE CHINESE.

FREEMAN: I'M NOW INVOLVED IN INTERNAL QUESTIONS SO TEMPORARILY I WILL NOT SPEAK.

CHIAO: WHEN YOU WERE IN SHANGHAI, MR. FREEMAN, YOU ASKED FOR 24 VOLUMES OF CHINESE HISTORY AND THE COLLECTED WORKS OF LU HSUN FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DID YOU RECEIVE THEM?

FREEMAN: YES, THEY ARE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE LIBRARY. I OFTEN GO THERE TO READ THEM.

SCOTT: THE ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE CHANGSHA EXCAVATIONS THAT YOU GAVE ME I DONATED TO THE PHILADELPHIA MUSEUM. THEY ARE VERY GOOD, MUCH BETTER THAN THE JAPANESE REPRODUCTIONS.

CHIAO: I THINK WE SHOULD CONCLUDE NOW SINCE I AM INVITING YOU TO AN INFORMAL DINNER TONIGHT. WE WILL DISCUSS WITH YOU SOME RECENT ARCHEOLOGICAL FINDS. MR. WANG CHIU-YEH WILL DISCUSS THEM TONIGHT WITH YOU AT DINNER.

SCOTT: I AM VERY GRATEFUL. I AM ALSO GRATEFUL FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER ASKING ME TO SEND A COPY OF MY ART BOOK TO PREMIER CHOU. YOU ASKED ME AT MRS. ENGELHART'S HOME. LET ME CONCLUDE BY SAYING THAT WE ARE VERY MUCH HONORED. SOME OF THE MEMBERS OF MY PARTY NEVER IN THEIR WILDEST DREAMS IMAGINED THAT THEY WOULD SEE CHINA SOME DAY. SOME OF THEM ARE NOW IMPROVING CHINA'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS BY SHOPPING.  
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SUBJECT: SCHLESINGER TALKS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO  
REF: (A) PEKING 1754, (B) PEKING 1761

1. BEGIN INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARY JAMES SCHLESINGER AND "SUBSTANTIVE" MEMBERS OF HIS PARTY (ACCOMPANYING PRESS AND USLO WERE NOT INVITED) TALKED WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA ON THE AFTERNOONS OF SEPTEMBER 7 AND 8 FOR A TOTAL OF FOUR HOURS. A DELEGATION MEMBER PASSED US--IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE--HIS RECOLLECTIONS OF MEETING HIGHLIGHTS. (WE DO NOT YET HAVE MINUTES OF EITHER MEETING. WE HAVE A TENTATIVE OFFER OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS SUBJECT TO FINAL APPROVAL BY SCHLESINGER.) ON TAIWAN, CHIAO EXPOUNDED STANDARD, NONBELLIGEROSE LINE: U.S. MUST FULFILL ALL THREE CONDITIONS FOR NORMALIZATION; LIBERATION OF TAIWAN IS AN INTERNAL CHINESE MATTER; AND THE U.S. OWES A "DEBT" TO THE PRC REGARDING TAIWAN. CHIAO WARNED AGAINST THE DANGER OF A MUNICH-TYPE WESTERN SELLOUT TO THE SOVIET UNION; AFFIRMED THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN ENDURING SINO-SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL SPLIT; AND ADDED A CRYPTIC--AND NOVEL TO US--REFERENCE TO "SOME WESTERN LEADERS" WHO SEEK TO DIVERT SOVIET AGGRESSION TOWARDS THE EAST. CHIAO REITERATED PRINCIPLED CHINESE SUPPORT FOR NORTH KOREAN POSITION ON REUNIFICATION AND HE APPLAUDED THE SUCCESS OF U.S. DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AT THE CLOSE OF THE SECOND SESSION, CHIAO ANNOUNCED THAT THE GROUP WOULD MEET DEFENSE MINISTER AND PARTY VICE CHAIRMAN YEH CHIEH-YING ON SEPTEMBER 10, AND WOULD HAVE A SESSION ON SEPTEMBER 11 WITH ANOTHER TOP LEADER (THE GROUP SPECULATES THAT THIS WILL BE PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG). END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

\*\*\*\*\* W H S R COMMENT \*\*\*\*\*

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2. ON SEPTEMBER 7 SCHLESINGER PARTY HELD THE FIRST OF TWO AFTERNOON SESSIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO. THE TWO-HOUR SESSION WAS LARGELY CONSUMED BY READING OF FORMAL PREPARED STATEMENTS BY THE TWO SIDES. CHIAO'S REMARKS WERE STANDARD FARE, SETTING FORTH THE CHINESE WORLDVIEW, INTRODUCING NO NEW THEMES, AND FAILING TO MENTION EVEN IN PASSING EITHER THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE OR TAIWAN.

3. THE SEPTEMBER 7 EVENING BANQUET HOSTED BY CHIAO (ADDRESSEES WILL HAVE SEEN NCNA COVERAGE) FOLLOWED THE PATTERN SET AT THE NOON WELCOMING BANQUET. CHIAO'S RECITATION OF FAMILIAR PRC POSITIONS IN HIS TOAST WAS LACED WITH THE USUAL METAPHORS. SCHLESINGER ADDRESSED THE POINTS AND THE METAPHORS ONE BY ONE. ("WE AGREE THAT THERE IS GREAT CHAOS UNDER HEAVEN, BUT WE DO NOT CONSIDER THE SITUATION EXCELLENT.")

4. FOLLOWING A MORNING VISIT BY ALL DELEGATION MEMBERS TO HOTBED OF RADICALISM TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY, WHERE THE GROUP HEARD THE CANNED BRIEFING ON TSINGHUA'S ROLE IN SPEARHEADING THE ANTI-TENG CAMPAIGN, THE DELEGATION DIVIDED INTO SUBSTANTIVE AND PRESS CONTINGENTS. THE LATTER TREKKED AROUND SUBURBAN COMMUNES, WHILE THE FORMER REASSEMBLED AT THE GREAT HALL TO CONTINUE THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH CHIAO. AS DURING THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON, THE PARTY WAS SEATED IN NEGOTIATING STYLE, FACING THEIR CHINESE HOSTS ACROSS A LONG TABLE, RATHER THAN IN THE USUAL "RELAXED" MODE: SEMICIRCULAR ARRANGEMENT OF OVERSTUFFED CHAIRS. CHIAO HAD PREPARED NOTES IN FRONT OF HIM, AND SEEMED TO REFER TO THEM FOR SPECIFIC LANGUAGE FROM TIME TO TIME. HIGHLIGHTS OF THAT TWO-HOUR SESSION FOLLOW.

5. TAIWAN. AFTER EMPHASIZING THAT CHINA SEES THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECT OF U.S.-PRC RELATIONS AS CENTRAL, CHIAO MOVED TO BILATERAL MATTERS AND RAISED THE TAIWAN ISSUE--"ALMOST PERFUNCTORILY" ACCORDING TO ONE DELEGATION MEMBER. --CHIAO DECLARED THAT THE U.S. MUST FULFILL ALL THREE COMPONENTS OF THE JAPANESE FORMULA AS A PRECONDITION FOR NORMALIZATION. --HE STRESSED THAT "LIBERATION" OF TAIWAN IS AN INTERNAL CHINESE MATTER, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE. --HE INDICATED THAT THE U.S. "OWES CHINA A DEBT" ON THE TAIWAN ISSUE--HINTING THERE WAS A SPECIFIC COMMITMENT--AND MUST NOT "BACK AWAY" FROM THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. TO THIS SCHLESINGER (WHO HAD MADE A PREFATORY DISCLAIMER OF ANY ABILITY OR INTENT TO SPEAK FOR THE USG) REPLIED THAT HIS PERSONAL UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THE U.S. HAD COMMITTED ITSELF IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE TO A GRADUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES ON TAIWAN "AS TENSIONS IN THE AREA DIMINISHED" AND THAT THE U.S. HAD FULFILLED THIS COMMITMENT. CHIAO DID NOT CHALLENGE THIS.

6. PRC-USSR RELATIONS. CHIAO PRESENTED THE STANDARD HARD LINE ON THE

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SOVIETS: THE PRC HAS PREPARED FOR WAR, WILL ADOPT A STRATEGY OF LURING IN THE INVADERS AND "DROWNING THEM IN PEOPLE'S WAR", AND (QUOTING MAO) FORESEES TEN THOUSAND YEARS OF IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE ADDED THAT "WE MUST TRY TO IMPROVE OUR STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS." WHEN THE INTERPRETER INCORRECTLY RENDERED THIS AS "WE MUST IMPROVE OUR STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS," CHIAO CUT IN FORCEFULLY TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT. CHIAO WARNED ABOUT THE DANGER OF A MUNICH-TYPE SELLOUT TO MOSCOW, AND ALLUDED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A WESTERN DUNQUERQUE. SCHLESINGER REPOSTED THAT THE U.S. HAS MANY NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE SOVIET UNION IS WELL AWARE OF THIS, AND THE KREMLIN LEADERS ARE UNLIKELY TO BE RASH. IN CLOSING, CHIAO REFERRED CRYPTICALLY TO "SOME WESTERN LEADERS WHO SEEK TO TURN THE FOCUS OF SOVIET AGGRESSION TO THE EAST." (COMMENT: IF ACCURATELY QUOTED, THIS LINE IS NEW TO US. OUR SOURCE INDICATED THAT THE ENTIRE U.S. SIDE TOOK THIS AS A BARB DIRECTED AT SECRETARY KISSINGER. SCHLESINGER IMMEDIATELY REBUTTED, DECLARING THAT HE WAS AWARE OF NO ONE IN THE WEST WHO HELD THAT POSITION.)

7. KOREA. CHIAO PASSED LIGHTLY OVER KOREA, MERELY REITERATING CHINESE PRINCIPLED SUPPORT FOR THE "VERY REASONABLE" NORTH KOREAN PROPOSALS FOR REUNIFICATION OF KOREA.

8. MIDDLE EAST. CHIAO TOOK CREDIT FOR SUGGESTING TO UNSPECIFIED U.S. LEADERS THAT WASHINGTON OUGHT TO ADOPT A MORE EVENHANDED APPROACH IN THE MIDDLE EAST, MAINTAINING TIES WITH ISRAEL WHILE SEEKING A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES. WHEN CHIAO COMMENTED APPROVINGLY ON THE SUCCESS OF THAT POLICY, SCHLESINGER OBSERVED THAT CHINA MIGHT ADOPT THE SAME POLICY WITH SIMILAR EFFECT. CHIAO DECLARED THAT "HISTORICAL CIRCUMSTANCES" MADE THAT OPTION IMPOSSIBLE FOR CHINA TO CONSIDER.

9. ADDITIONAL MEETINGS. AT THE CLOSE OF THE SEPTEMBER 8 SESSION, CHIAO ANNOUNCED THAT A SEPTEMBER 10 MEETING HAD BEEN ARRANGED WITH DEFENSE MINISTER AND PARTY VICE CHAIRMAN YEH CHIEN-YING. SEPTEMBER 11 HAS BEEN LEFT OPEN FOR A SESSION WITH "ANOTHER SENIOR OFFICIAL," WHO THE GROUP SPECULATES WILL BE PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG. SINCE THE CHINESE USUALLY ORCHESTRATE OFFICIAL VISITS SO AS TO SAVE THE HIGHEST RANKING LEADER UNTIL THE FINAL DAY, IT SEEMS PLAUSIBLE TO US THAT PREMIER HUA WILL INDEED MEET WITH THE GROUP.

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EXDIS  
E.O. 11652: XGDS

TH  
S: OVIP (SCHLESINGER, JAMES), PFOR, NPH  
SUBJECT: SCHLESINGER PARTY TALKS, PROVINCIAL GRAND TOUR CANCELLED  
REF: PEKING 1776  
ACTION REQUESTED: NOTIFY S OF INFO IN PARA 5.

1. WHEN NEWS OF CHAIRMAN MAO'S DEATH WAS ANNOUNCED, THE SCHLESINGER PARTY WAS OBSERVING A MARKSMANSHIP SHOW BY THE PLA'S 3RD DIVISION ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF PEKING. DESPITE THE SUDDEN INTERRUPTION OF THE INTERNATIONALE AND THE TEARS WELLING UP IN THE EYES OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER, THE PROGRAM WAS CARRIED THROUGH TO COMPLETION. IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS, THE CHINESE ANNOUNCED THE NEWS TO THE AMERICANS INDIVIDUALLY. THE URBAN US DESK DIRECTOR TING YUAN-HUNG, NORMALLY FLUENT IN ENGLISH, COULD ONLY SOB OUT IN CHINESE THAT "CHAIRMAN MAO HAS DIED." OTHER CHINESE OFFICIALS UNASHAMEDLY WEPT.

2. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT THE HOST ORGANIZATION CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (CPIFA) BOWED OUT AS EFFECTIVE HOSTS, DEFERRING TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS PRESENT. AMERICAN AND OCEANIAN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR LIN PING, WHO HAD ACCOMPANIED THE PARTY TO THE PLA UNIT, EXPLAINED THAT "UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES" THE MEETINGS PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED WITH DEFENSE MINISTER YEH AND PREMIER HUA (REFTEL) HAD BEEN CANCELLED. LIN ADDED THAT THE GROUP'S ENTIRE PROVINCIAL TOUR WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE CANCELLED.

3. LIN, CLEARLY SPEAKING WITHOUT GUIDANCE, NOTED THAT FOREIGN DIGNITARIES NOT ALREADY IN CHINA WOULD NOT BE INVITED TO ATTEND THE MEMORIAL CEREMONIES AND SUGGESTED --"ON THE BASIS OF THE PRECEDENTS ESTABLISHED FOR THE CHOU EN-LAI AND CHU TEN FUNERAL OBSERVANCES" -- THAT DR. SCHLESINGER MIGHT WISH TO REOAUIN IN PEKING TO PAY LAST RESPE

\*\*\*\*\* WHSR COMMENT \*\*\*\*\*

SCOWCROFT, HYLAND, LL

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BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *2/5/03*



CTS  
TO CHAIRMAN MAO.

4. DR. SCHLESINGER INDICATED TO THE CHINESE THAT HE WOULD FOLLOW THEIR JUDGMENT AS TO APPROPRIATE ACTIONS. IN THE MEANTIME, THE CRIPA HAS ARRANGED FOR THE DELEGATION TO VISIT THE GREAT WALL ON SEPTEMBER 10.

5. ONE DELEGATION MEMBER HAS CONFIDED TO US THAT DR. SCHLESINGER WILL PROBABLY PLACE A CALL TO SECRETARY KISSINGER IN THE MORNING (APPROXIMATELY 0800 SEPTEMBER 10 LOCAL TIME) TO SOLICIT HIS ADVICE ON AN APPROPRIATE COURSE OF ACTION.

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O P 110414Z SEP 76  
FM USLO PEKING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6348

INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 3709  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1555

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 1800

EXDIS  
R.O. 11682: XG09-3  
TAGS: OVIP (SCHLESINGER, JAMES), PFOR, PINT, CH  
SUBJECT: SCHLESINGER DELEGATION PARTICIPATION IN MAO TSE-TUNG  
FUNERAL OBSERVANCES

1. SUMMARY. THE SCHLESINGER PARTY WAS INVITED SEPTEMBER 10 TO REMAIN IN PEKING THROUGH SEPTEMBER 13 IN ORDER TO VIEW THE REMAINS OF CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG LYING IN STATE ON THAT DAY. (USLO PARTICIPATION, SEPTEL, WILL BE ON THE SAME DATE) A CHINESE MFA OFFICIAL TOLD DR. SCHLESINGER THAT CHAIRMAN MAO HAD PERSONALLY INVITED HIM TO VISIT CHINA AND WAS AWARE OF SCHLESINGER'S PRESENCE IN CHINA JUST PRIOR TO HIS DEATH. END SUMMARY.

2. DURING THE COURSE OF A VISIT SEPTEMBER 10 TO THE GREAT WALL AND MING TOMBS SPECIALLY LAID ON BY THE FOREIGN MINISTRY FOR DR. SCHLESINGER AND THREE MEMBERS OF HIS PARTY, MFA AMERICAN AND OCEANIAN DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR LIN PING EXTENDED AN INVITATION TO THE ENTIRE DELEGATION TO REMAIN IN PEKING THROUGH MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 13. ON THAT DATE THE DELEGATION COULD JOIN FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND OTHER FOREIGNERS PRESENT IN PEKING TO VIEW THE REMAINS OF CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG LYING IN STATE AT THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE. (COMMENT: IT IS INDICATIVE OF THE EXTRAORDINARY COURTESIES EXTENDED DR. SCHLESINGER THAT HE WAS INFORMED OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS PRIOR TO NOTIFICATION OF USLO OR OTHER DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN PEKING.) LIN PING THEN MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE DELEGATION SHOULD PLAN TO DEPART PEKING EARLY THE FOLLOWING MORNING.

3. LIN ALSO REVEALED THAT CHAIRMAN MAO HIMSELF HAD DIRECTED

\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

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STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES *TD 9/27/02*  
BY *ha*, NARA, DATE *2/5/03*



IN 1974 THAT A FORMAL INVITATION TO VISIT CHINA BE EXTENDED TO THEN-DEFENSE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER. (NEITHER DR. SCHLESINGER NOR HIS FORMER STAFF ASSISTANT, A MEMBER OF THE CURRENT DELEGATION, COULD RECALL HAVING RECEIVED SUCH AN INVITATION.) IN A SENSE, LIN CONTINUED, DR. SCHLESINGER WAS CURRENTLY IN CHINA AT THE EXPRESS WISH OF CHAIRMAN MAO, AND CHAIRMAN MAO HAD ACCORDINGLY BEEN APPRISED OF DR. SCHLESINGER'S PRESENCE IN CHINA SHORTLY BEFORE HIS DEATH.

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DE RUMJPG #1843 2591230  
O 151200Z SEP 76 ZFF-4  
FM USLO PEKING

TO USDEL SECRETARY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6378

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 1843

EXDIS  
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR GATES  
E.O. 11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A) PFOR, CH  
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF SCHLESINGER VISIT  
REFS: A) SECTO 27052, B) PEKING 1761, C) PEKING 1776  
D) PEKING 1762, E) PEKING 1800

1. BEGIN INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. THERE FOLLOWS MY PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE SCHLESINGER VISIT (REF A) BASED ON MY PRIVATE ONE-HOUR TALK WITH HIM AT USLO SEPTEMBER 14 (HE CALLED ON ME AT HIS INITIATIVE) AND OUR EARLIER REPORTING ON HIS ACTIVITIES IN PEKING. AFTER MAO'S DEATH THE PARAMOUNT OBJECTIVES IN CHINESE HANDLING OF SCHLESINGER BECAME:  
--TO DEMONSTRATE FOREIGN POLICY CONTINUITY, REINSTATEMENT OF SCHLESINGER'S PROVINCIAL TRIP, INCLUDING THE EXCURSION TO THE SINO-SOVIET FRONTIER, HIGHLIGHTS CONTINUED CHINESE ADHERENCE TO "CHAIRMAN MAO'S REVOLUTIONARY LINE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS" WITH ITS ANTI-SOVIET TILT.  
--TO REPUDIATE IMPLICITLY SPECULATION THAT MAO'S DEATH WOULD PROVE DESTABILIZING.  
REGARDLESS OF WHAT WE MAY OTHERWISE FEEL ABOUT CHINESE HANDLING OF SCHLESINGER, THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARE GENERALLY POSITIVE. EXCLUSION OF USLO FROM THE TALKS SEEMED TO ACCORD WITH SCHLESINGER'S OWN PREFERENCE. CHINESE FAILURE TO INCLUDE USLO IN CHIAO'S WELCOMING BANQUET IS ODD, BUT WE DO NOT YET HAVE ALL THE FACTS THAT PERTAIN. AS FOR SCHLESINGER'S FUNERAL ROLE, WE DO NOT SHARE VIEW OF SOME IN HIS PARTY THAT CHINESE MEANT THIS AS SNUB DIRECTED AT USG.

2. I WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE POTENTIALLY MOST SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS--

\*\*\*\*\*HHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

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STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES TD 9/27/02  
BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *2/5/03*



BOTH SYMBOLIC AND SUBSTANTIVE--OF HIS VISIT ARE YET TO COME: HIS EXCURSION TO THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER AND HIS PROMISED SESSIONS WITH RANKING CHINESE LEADERS INCLUDING PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG. I SHALL SUBMIT A FINAL ASSESSMENT AFTER SCHLESINGER'S DEPARTURE FROM PEKING, PLANNED FOR SEPTEMBER 29. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

3. CHINESE DISPLAY EXTRAORDINARY ESTEEM FOR SCHLESINGER. FROM CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY TRIP ARRANGEMENTS IN THE U.S. TO REINSTATEMENT OF THE TRIP FOLLOWING MAO'S FUNERAL, THE CHINESE HAVE MISSED NO OPPORTUNITY TO CONVEY THEIR HIGH ESTEEM FOR SCHLESINGER:

--THEY CONFIRMED HIS ITINERARY PRIOR TO HIS DELEGATION'S DEPARTURE, AN UNPRECEDENTED BREAK WITH CUSTOMARY CHINESE NEGOTIATING PRACTICE WITH SUCH GROUPS. (SCHLESINGER'S INTER-MEDIARIES WITH THE CHINESE HAD STRESSED THAT PRIOR APPROVAL WAS THE SINE QUA NON OF SCHLESINGER'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE INVITATION.)

--THEY INCLUDED ON THE ITINERARY SENSITIVE AREAS OFTEN REQUEST BUT NEVER PREVIOUSLY GRANTED TO AMERICANS (LHASA, INING, JUHOHAOTE).

--THEY ARRANGED UNUSUALLY HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS, ALLOCATING TO SCHLESINGER TWO AFTERNOONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO (ONE IS THE NORM) AND PLANNING, BEFORE MAO'S DEATH INTERVENED, SESSIONS WITH DEFENSE MINISTER YEH CHIEN-YING AND PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG.

--MEMBERS OF THE PARTY TOLD US THAT FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT OF MAO'S DEATH, FOREIGN MINISTRY AMERICAS AND OCEANIAS DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR LIN PING CONFIDED TO SCHLESINGER THAT CHAIRMAN MAO HAD PERSONALLY ORDERED AN INVITATION EXTENDED TO HINBIN 1974. LIN ADDED THAT MAO WAS INFORMED BEFORE HIS DEATH OF SCHLESINGER'S PRESENCE IN CHINA.

--AFTER CANCELLING THE TOUR AND REMAINING MEETINGS IN PEKING UPON WORD THAT MAO HAD DIED, THE CHINESE REVERSED THEMSELVES, REINSTATED THE WHOLE PROVINCIAL PROGRAM AND HINTED STRONGLY THAT SCHLESINGER ON HIS RETURN TO PEKING WOULD MEET WITH PREMIER HUA AND EITHER DEFENSE MINISTER YEH OR POLITBURO STANDING COMMITTEE MEMBER CHANG CHUN-CHIAO.

4. ON HIS FIRST EVENING IN PEKING SCHLESINGER ASKED THE ACTING CHIEF FOR USLO'S ASSESSMENT OF CHINESE MOTIVES AND EXPECTATIONS FOR HIS VISIT. WE BELIEVE THAT THE RATIONALE IS SELF-EVIDENT: THE CHINESE POSITION ON U.S.-SOVIET DETENTE PARALLELS SCHLESINGER'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND WELL-KNOWN PRIVATE VIEWS ON THE ISSUE. THAT THESE VIEWS WOULD BE AIRED TO CHINESE AND WORLD AUDIENCES WAS A REASONABLE

EXPECTATION; THE POTENT COMBINATION OF HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS, A NOVEL EXCURSION TO TIBET AND TO THE SINO-SOVIET FRONTIER, AND A CORPS OF ACCOMPANYING JOURNALISTS GUARANTEED HEAVY MEDIA PLAY IN THE U.S. AND MANY OTHER COUNTRIES. IN THIS SENSE THE CHINESE CAST SCHLESINGER IN THE FAMILIAR ROLE (E.G. THE FRG'S STRAUSS AND

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FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON) OF PRESTIGIOUS OPPOSITION STATESMAN WHO SHARES A KEY PART OF THE CHINESE WORLDVIEW.

5. WHETHER THE CHINESE SEEK MERELY TO GAIN ATTENTION FOR THEIR VIEWS, TO INFLUENCE AMERICAN ELECTION-YEAR POLITICS, OR TO REGISTER SOME GENERAL DISENCHANTMENT WITH CURRENT ADMINISTRATION FOREIGN POLICIES IS CONJECTURAL. ALL PROBABLY ENTERED INTO INITIAL CHINESE CALCULATIONS TO SOME DEGREE. (POST-MAO CONSIDERATION ARE NOTED IN MY SUMMARY ABOVE.)

6. THE EXCLUSION OF USLO. USLO'S ONLY FORMAL ROLE IN THE SCHLESINGER VISIT HAS BEEN ATTENDANCE BY THE ACTING CHIEF AT A NOON-HOUR WELCOMING BANQUET THE FIRST DAY GIVEN BY THE NOMINAL HOSTS, CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. ACCORDING TO ONE MEMBER OF THE PARTY, THE CHINESE SAID THEY DID NOT PLAN TO INVITE ACTING CHIEF TO CHIAO'S BANQUET THAT EVENING OWING TO THE BANQUET'S ALLEGED "SPECIAL NATURE." WE DOUBT THAT THE VISITORS URGED RECONSIDERATION. USLO WAS NOT INVITED TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS. WE DO NOT KNOW WHEN AND HOW EITHER DECISION WAS REACHED, BUT WE IMAGINE THAT THE CHINESE WELCOMED AND NURTURED SUPPOSITION ON THE PART OF SCHLESINGER AND SOME MEMBERS OF HIS PARTY THAT THESE OCCASIONS WERE LIKELY TO BE MORE CANDID AND PRODUCTIVE SANS USG OFFICIALS.

7. THE SCHLESINGER DELEGATION AND FUNERAL ARRANGEMENTS. WE ARE DISINCLINED TO ATTACH MUCH IMPORTANCE TO SCHLESINGER'S PLACE AMONG FOREIGNERS PAYING LAST RESPECTS TO MAO. --NCNA LISTS THE SCHLESINGER GROUP AMONG OTHER "FOREIGN FRIENDS" INCLUDING AN ALBANIAN METALLURGICAL GROUP, THE PAKISTAN FOREIGN SECRETARY, A VENEZUELAN CULTURAL GROUP, AND ATHLETES FROM JAPAN, TANZANIA, AND EGYPT. --SCHLESINGER IS LISTED LAST BY NCNA AMONG FOREIGNERS SENDING MEMORIAL WREATHS, BEHIND THE VENEZUELAN CULTURAL GROUP, JAPANESE PEASANTS, AND SHIRLEY AND DAVID DUBOIS. ON BALANCE, THE FACT THAT SCHLESINGER SHOOK HANDS WITH PREMIER HUA, VICE CHAIRMAN WANG HUNG-WEN, ET AL. AT THE CEREMONIES SEEMS THE PRODUCT OF AN OVERALL FUNERAL PLAN FOR DEALING WITH DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF FOREIGNERS. USLO WAS IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS WESTERN AND JAPANESE EMBASSIES.

8. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE CHINESE WILL RAISE THE TAIWAN ISSUE WITH SCHLESINGER. SCHLESINGER CONFIRMED TO ME THAT FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO SKINNED OVER IT IN PERFUNCTORY FASHION.  
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Department of State

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ACTION SS-25

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FM USLO PEKING  
TO USDEL SECRETARY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE  
TNFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6378

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 1843

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR GATES

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A) PFOR, CH  
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF SCHLESINGER VISIT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Review*  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES *TD 9/27/02*  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/5/03

REFS: A) SECTO 27052, B) PEKING 1761, C) PEKING 1776  
D) PEKING 1782, E) PEKING 1800

1. BEGIN INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. THERE FOLLOWS MY  
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MY PRIVATE ONE-HOUR TALK WITH HIM AT USLO SEPTEMBER 14 (HE  
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IN CHINESE HANDLING OF SCHLESINGER BECAME:

--TO DEMONSTRATE FOREIGN POLICY CONTINUITY. REINSTATEMENT OF  
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SOVIET FRONTIER, HIGHLIGHTS CONTINUED CHINESE ADHERENCE TO  
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ANTI-SOVIET TILT.

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REGARDLESS OF WHAT WE MAY  
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Department of State

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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARE GENERALLY POSITIVE.

EXCLUSION OF USLO FROM THE TALKS SEEMED TO ACCORD WITH SCHLESINGER'S OWN PREFERENCE. CHINESE FAILURE TO INCLUDE USLO IN CHIAO'S WELCOMING BANQUET IS ODD, BUT WE DO NOT YET HAVE ALL THE FACTS THAT PERTAIN. AS FOR SCHLESINGER'S FUNERAL ROLE, WE DO NOT SHARE VIEW OF SOME IN HIS PARTY THAT CHINESE MEANT THIS AS SNUB DIRECTED AT USG.

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PERSONALLY ORDERED AN INVITATION EXTENDED TO HINBIN 1974. LIN ADDED THAT MAO WAS INFORMED BEFORE HIS DEATH OF SCHLESINGER'S PRESENCE IN CHINA.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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A REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS. WE DO NOT KNOW WHEN AND HOW EITHER DECISION WAS REACHED, BUT WE IMAGINE THAT THE CHINESE WELCOMED AND NURTURED SUPPOSITION ON THE PART OF SCHLESINGER AND SOME MEMBERS OF HIS PARTY THAT THESE OCCASIONS WERE LIKELY TO BE MORE CANDID AND PRODUCTIVE SANS USG OFFICIALS.

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ON BALANCE, THE FACT THAT SCHLESINGER SHOOK HANDS WITH PREMIER HUA, VICE CHAIRMAN WANG HUNG-WEN, ET AL. AT THE CEREMONIES SEEMS THE PRODUCT OF AN OVERALL FUNERAL PLAN FOR DEALING WITH DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF FOREIGNERS. USLO WAS IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS WESTERN AND JAPANESE EMBASSIES.

8. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE CHINESE WILL RAISE THE TAIWAN ISSUE WITH SCHLESINGER. SCHLESINGER CONFIRMED TO ME THAT FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO SKIMMED OVER IT IN PERFUNCTORY FASHION.  
GATES



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ACTION SS-25

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FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6464  
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI  
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES TD 9/27/02

BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/5/03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 1948

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS CINCPAC/POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR OVIP CH US (SCHLESINGER, JAMES)  
SUBJECT: SCHLESINGER MEETING WITH PRC DEFENSE MINISTER YEH CHIEN-YING

1. BEGIN INTORUDCTION AND SUMMARY. FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARY JAMES SCHLESINGER AND FOUR MEMBERS OF HIS DELEGATION MET FOR 2-1/2 HOURS ON THE AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 27 WITH PRC DEFENSE MINISTER AND PARTY VICE CHAIRMAN YEH CHIEN-YING. ACCORDING TO ORAL BRIEFING OF USLO OFFICER BY ONE OF THE DELEGATION MEMBERS, YEH'S PRESENTATION WAS CANDID, NONIDEOLOGICAL, AND NARROWLY FOCUSSED ON MILITARY AFFAIRS; HE SPOKE THROUGHOUT AS A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY MAN, NOT A PARTY LEADER, SETTING OUT FOR DR. SCHLESINGER CHINA'S CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET THREAT AND ITS CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR MILITARY RESPONSE TO ANY SOVIET ATTACK. YEH'S SOLE REFERENCE TO THE US WAS A PERFUNCTORY CLOSING QUESTION ABOUT NOVEMBER ELECTION PROSPECTS; HE MADE NO MENTION OF SINO-US RELATIONS, THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, OR TAIWAN. YEH IMPRESSED DELEGATION MEMBERS AS PHYSICALLY FRAIL BUT MENTALLY SHARP. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

2. THE SOVIET THREAT. YEH LEFT NO DOUBT THAT CHINA REGARDS THE

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SOVIET UNION AS ITS PRIMARY CONTEMPORARY ENEMY. WITHOUT DIRECTLY CHALLENGING THE OFFICIAL LINE SANCTIFIED AT THE AUGUST 1973 PARTY CONGRESS THAT MOSCOW IS "FEINTING TO THE EAST BUT ATTACKING TO THE WEST," YEH SPOKE NOT AT ALL OF SOVIET AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS IN WESTERN EUROPE. HE PROPOSED INSTEAD THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT DARE ATTACK CHINA OUT OF CONCERN FOR THE POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC VULNERABILITY OF ITS REAR. A THRUST AGAINST CHINA, YEH INTIMATED, WOULD LOOSEN THE SOVIET HOLD OVER ITS EASTERN EUROPEAN SATELLITES AND WOULD INVITE A PUNISHING NATO COUNTERATTACK.

3. CONTINGENCIES AND CHINESE STRATEGY. IF DESPITE ALL LOGIC THE USSR DID ATTACK, CHINA WOULD INSTANTLY ADOPT A "PEOPLE'S WAR" STRATEGY. SCHLESINGER QUESTIONED THE FEASIBILITY OF PEOPLE'S WAR, HYPOTHESIZING THAT A THRUST INTO CHINA WAS LESS LIKELY THAN, OR EXAMPLE, A MOVE TO LOP OFF A PIECE OF CHINESE TERRITORY SUCH AS SINKIANG. YEH ALLOWED THAT CHINESE PLANNERS HAD ENVISAGED SUCH A POSSIBILITY, WOULD NOT TOLERATE SUCH A "NIBBLING OPERATION" SUCH AS THE JAPANESE HAD ADOPTED IN THE 1930S, AND WOULD IMMEDIATELY LAUNCH AN "ALL-OUT ATTACK" ON THE USSR. (YEH DID NOT AMPLIFY ON THE FORM SUCH AN ATTACK MIGHT TAKE. HE DID STRESS CHINA'S APPRECIATION OF THE NEED FOR MODERN WEAPONS AT ANOTHER POINT IN THE CONVERSATION, HOWEVER, POINTING TO THE RECENT NUCLEAR TEST AS EVIDENCE OF PROGRESS IN THAT AREA.)

4. SCHLESINGER NOTED THAT SOVIET TANKS WERE NUMEROUS AND FORMIDABLE, SUGGESTED THAT "PEOPLE'S WAR" WOULD BE AN INADEQUATE RESPONSE TO A MASSIVE SOVIET TANK PUSH ACROSS THE BORDER, AND RECOMMENDED THAT THE CHINESE MIGHT PROFIT FROM A STUDY OF THE ISRAELI TANK CAMPAIGN DURING THE 1973 MIDDLE EAST WAR. TERMING SUCH ADVICE "FRIENDLY," YEH RESPONDED THAT CHINA RECOGNIZED ITS WEAKNESSES AND, HAVING THESE IN MIND, HAD ALREADY STUDIED CAREFULLY THE LESSONS OF THAT CAMPAIGN.

5. THE SCHLESINGER DELEGATION MEMBER PRIVATELY EXPRESSED TO USLO OFFICER THE DELEGATION'S SURPRISE AT YEH'S RATHER OFFHAND ASSUMPTION -- PRESUMABLY REFLECTING HIGH-LEVEL ESTIMATES -- THAT THE SOVIETS LACK THE LOGISTICAL WHEREWITHAL TO SUSTAIN A PROTRACTED WAR AGAINST CHINA. WHEN YEH SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED A SOVIET SHORTAGE OF PETROLEUM AND FOOD, SCHLESINGER POINTED OUT THAT THE USSR IS CURRENTLY A NET EXPORTER OF PETROLEUM AND WOULD DOUBTLESS BE "LESS GENEROUS" IN EVENT OF WAR. YEH SEEMED GENUINELY ASTONISHED AT THIS ASSESSMENT, SEEKING FROM SCHLESINGER SOMEWHAT LATER IN THE CONVER-



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SATION A REITERATION OF HNIS VIEW.

6. THE MILITIA. YEH SPOKE BRIEFLY OF THE MILITIA AS ANOTHER INPUT TO PEOPLE'S WAR, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ONE MILLION MEMBERS OF THE MODEL SHANGHAI MILITIA HAD ONLY ONE THOUSAND ARTILLERY PIECES.

7. SINO-US RELATIONS. YEH MADE NO MENTION WHATSOEVER OF BILATERAL SINO-US RELATIONS, TAIWAN (EXCEPT IN THE CONTEXT OF JAPANESE ISLAND STRATEGY DURING WORLD WAR II), OR THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. IN FACT, YEH'S ONLY REFERENCE TO THE US WAS A CLOSING INQUIRY IN THE CHOU EN-LAI STYLE; MORE A FLATTERING DISPLAY OF DETAILED KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE VISITOR'S COUNTRY THAN A QUESTION POSED TO ELICIT USEFUL INFORMATION. NOTING THAT THE US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WOULD BE HELD INNOVEMBER 2 AND THAT CURRENT POLLS SHOWED DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE CARTE R AHEAD IN 30 STATES, YEH ASKED FOR SCHLESINGER'S ASSESSMENT OF THE PROBABLE OUTCOME.

8. STYLE, HEALTH, AND ATMOSPHERICS. THE 77-YEAR-OLD YEH, WHO HAD STOOD ERECT IN PUBLIC VIEW FOR THE ONE HALF HOUR MEMORIAL CEREMONY FO R MAD A WEEK EARLIER, ENTERED THE ROOM SUPPORTED BY AN ATTENDANT, BUT DESPITE HIS EVIDENT PHYSICAL INFIRMITIES YEH CAME ACROSS AS MENTALLY A ACUTE. HE MADE A CURSORY GLANCE AT HIS ONE-PAGE BRIEFING PAPER AFTER SEATING HIMSELF BUT CARRIED ON THE SUBSEQUENT DIALOGUE WITHOUT REFERENCE TO NOTES OR COLLEAGUES PRESENT. SURPRISINGLY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF YANG CHENG-WU OFFERED IDEOLOGICAL INTERJECTIONS RATHER THAN SUBSTANTIVE MILITARY CLARIFICATIONS. (YEH WAS GUILTY OF ONE GLARING BUT INTRIGUING SLIP, MISQUOTING MAO'S DICTUM AS "DIG TUNNELS DEEP, STORE GRAIN EVERYWHERE, AND PREPARE AGAINST WARFARE," YEH WAS HASTILY CORRECTED BY YANG, WHO SUPPLIED THE CORRECT THIRD PHRASE "NEVER SEEK HEGEMONY." ) DEAN

