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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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NOD179

PAGE 01 STATE 109863

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ORIGIN NODS-00

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APPROVED BY EA: PHILIP C. HABIB

S/S: RKKUCHEL

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TO USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE

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NOD13

EYES ONLY THAYER AND GATES

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH, US

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR GATES' MEETING WITH PREMIER HUA

AS YOU KNOW, IT IS HOPED THAT AMBASSADOR GATES WILL HAVE A SUBSTANTIVE MEETING WITH PREMIER HUA NOT TOO LONG AFTER HIS ARRIVAL. WE HAVE POUCHED (REGISTRY 3065062 IN CLASSIFIED POUCH WHICH LEFT WASHINGTON APRIL 30) PRESIDENT FORD'S LETTER TO HUA INTRODUCING AMBASSADOR GATES. POUCH SHOULD REACH YOU ABOUT MAY 6. IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE IT ABOUT THEN, LET US KNOW.

FOLLOWING IS OUR TENTATIVE SCENARIO FOR OBTAINING MEETING WITH HUA: AMBASSADOR GATES WILL REQUEST COURTESY CALL ON FOREIGN MINISTER CH'IAO THROUGH NORMAL PROCEDURE. IN THAT CALL, HE WILL ATTEMPT TO AVOID A GENERAL TOUR D'HORIZON OF THE TYPE CONTEMPLATED FOR MEETING WITH HUA. HE WILL EXPRESS HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO MEET WITH HUA AND SAY THAT HE HAS A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT FORD TO HUA. IF CH'IAO ASKS THAT LETTER BE GIVEN TO HIM FOR DELIVERY, HE

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BELIEVE THAT AMBASSADOR GATES WILL HAVE TO COMPLY. OTHER-

WISE, IF AMBASSADOR GATES IS GIVEN AN APPOINTMENT WITH HUA, HE WILL SEND THE LETTER THROUGH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY A DAY IN ADVANCE, SO IT CAN BE TRANSLATED AND READ BY HUA BEFORE THE MEETING. IF AMBASSADOR GATES IS NOT GIVEN AN APPOINTMENT WITHIN THREE TO FOUR WEEKS, HE WILL REPORT BACK FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

FOLLOWING ARE APPROVED TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH HUA. THESE WERE REVIEWED BY AMBASSADOR GATES BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE, BUT HE SAID THAT AFTER HE LOOKS THEM OVER AGAIN IN PEKING, HE COULD LET US KNOW IF HE HAD ANY FURTHER THOUGHTS OR NEEDED ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND ON ANY POINTS. WE WILL UPDATE THE TALKING POINTS AS REQUIRED BY DEVELOPMENTS.

BEGIN TEXT TALKING POINTS

1. I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH YOU. I LOOK FORWARD TO MY STAY IN PEKING AND TO WORKING WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT TO PROMOTE THE MUTUAL INTERESTS OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE REGARDING BOTH VARIOUS GLOBAL MATTERS AND OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.
2. PRESIDENT FORD HAS ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO YOU PERSONALLY HIS CONGRATULATIONS AND GOOD WISHES ON YOUR APPOINTMENT AS PREMIER. I WOULD LIKE TO ADD MY OWN CONGRATULATIONS.
3. I BELIEVE YOU HAVE RECEIVED THE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT FORD WHICH I BROUGHT WITH ME, IN WHICH HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT WE COULD EXCHANGE VIEWS ON BOTH INTERNATIONAL MATTERS AND OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.
4. AS PRESIDENT FORD HAD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS ON MANY OF THESE MATTERS DURING HIS VISIT TO PEKING IN DECEMBER, I WILL NOT COVER ALL OF THE SAME GROUND AGAIN. HOWEVER, HE HAS ASKED ME TO REITERATE SEVERAL BASIC POINTS, AS WELL AS TO COMMENT ON SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WORLD.

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5. FOREMOST AMONG THESE IS OUR POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION. BECAUSE OF DIFFERING CIRCUMSTANCES, OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT POLICIES, AND WE RESPECT THE DECISION YOUR COUNTRY HAS MADE REGARDING YOUR POLICY. FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE A DUAL POLICY. WHILE WE WISH TO IMPROVE OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND STABILIZE THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, THE UNITED STATES IS DETERMINED TO RESIST SOVIET EXPANSIONISM--AN OBJECTIVE WHICH OUR TWO COUNTRIES SHARE EVEN IF OUR TACTICS MAY DIFFER.

6. AS YOU MAY KNOW, SOME YEARS AGO I SERVED IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, INCLUDING A PERIOD AS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AND I HAVE MAINTAINED MY INTEREST IN US DEFENSE MATTERS. I CAN THEREFORE SPEAK FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE ABOUT THE DETERMINATION OF THE UNITED STATES TO MAINTAIN A STRONG MILITARY POSTURE. PRESIDENT FORD AND SECRETARY KISSINGER ARE ABSOLUTELY COMMITTED TO THIS GOAL WHICH IS REFLECTED IN THE PRESIDENT'S CURRENT DEFENSE BUDGET. DESPITE SOME OF THE RHETORIC IN OUR ELECTION PROCESS, THE US CLEARLY REMAINS THE NUMBER ONE POWER IN THE WORLD IN TERMS OF MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL POWER. WE INTEND TO REMAIN SO, AND IT APPEARS THAT THE CONGRESS IS NOW INCREASING ITS SUPPORT TO THIS END.

7. WE HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION, AND ON THIS POINT ALSO, THERE IS GROWING AWARENESS AMONG THE AMERICAN PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION'S HEGEMONIC AMBITIONS.

8. AS YOU KNOW FROM YOUR OWN COUNTRY'S EXPERIENCE, IN A COMPLEX AND GLOBAL MATTER SUCH AS THIS ONE, THERE WILL BE OCCASIONAL SETBACKS AS WELL AS SUCCESSES. THE OUTCOME IN ANGOLA WAS SUCH A SETBACK TO OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS. IF WE, TOGETHER WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, HAD BEEN ABLE TO CONTINUE OUR SUPPORT OF THE ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS IN ANGOLA, THE OUTCOME WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT.

9. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO THE SOVIET UNION, BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, THAT WE WILL REACT STRONGLY TO

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FURTHER EFFORTS BY THE SOVIETS TO EXPAND THEIR INFLUENCE BY MILITARY MEANS OR MILITARY PRESSURE WHETHER DIRECTLY OR, AS IN ANGOLA, THROUGH SUPPLY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT OF THE CUBAN TROOPS. WE HAVE ALSO STATED THAT FURTHER SOVIET ACTIONS LIKE THEIR INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA ARE BOUND TO HAVE A SERIOUS EFFECT ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

10. WE HAVE ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT ACCEPT FURTHER CUBAN MILITARY INTERVENTION ABROAD. WE ARE CONCERNED BY THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA AND BY THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY WILL BE USED ELSEWHERE. WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET/CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

11. SECRETARY KISSINGER'S TRIP TO AFRICA WAS DESIGNED TO STRENGTHEN OUR TIES WITH THE AFRICAN NATIONS. WE ARE PURSUING A DUAL-TRACK POLICY OF VIGOROUSLY SUPPORTING MAJORITY RULE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND WARNING AGAINST SOVIET/CUBAN INTERVENTION. OUR OBJECTIVE IS THAT AFRICAN COUNTRIES SOLVE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS FREE OF OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

12. THE FURTHER CHANGE IN EGYPT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS IS A MAJOR FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENT. IT WAS A COURAGEOUS AND STATESMANLIKE MOVE BY PRESIDENT SADAT, AND IS UNDOUBTEDLY VIEWED BY THE SOVIETS AS A MAJOR SETBACK. WE BELIEVE THAT THE RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST WHICH WE HAVE BUILT WITH EGYPT HELPED TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR PRESIDENT SADAT TO TAKE THAT STEP.

13. WE ARE GRATIFIED THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS RESPONDED TO PRESIDENT SADAT'S REQUEST FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT, AND HOPE THAT YOU WILL FIND IT POSSIBLE TO CONTINUE THAT AID. WE ARE PROVIDING SOME TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, AND PRESIDENT SADAT UNDERSTANDS WHY WE CANNOT DO MORE THIS YEAR. WE HOPE TO PROVIDE MORE MILITARY AID IN THE FUTURE.

14. WITH RESPECT TO THE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE, WE ARE QUIETLY CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS WITH THE PARTIES

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CONCERNED TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR FURTHER STEPS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. IT REMAINS A DIFFICULT PROBLEM, AND WE DO NOT EXPECT A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HOWEVER, THE US REMAINS DETERMINED TO HELP MAINTAIN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND REALIZES THE DANGER OF STAGNATION--BOTH IN TERMS OF POSSIBLE CONFLICT AND THE SOVIET ROLE. IT REMAINS OUR PURPOSE TO PREVENT THE SOVIETS FROM INJECTING THEMSELVES INTO THE PROCESS IN A WAY THAT WOULD INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE.

15. ALTHOUGH SYRIA HAS TAKEN A HARDER POSITION THAN EGYPT REGARDING A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL, WE HAVE WELCOMED SYRIA'S EFFORTS TO HELP RESOLVE THE CIVIL STRIFE IN LEBANON. PRESIDENT FORD SENT A SPECIAL EMISSARY, AMBASSADOR BROWN, TO LEBANON TO SUPPORT THOSE EFFORTS. WE THINK PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE AND IN A MANNER THAT HAS REDUCED SOVIET INFLUENCE.

16. OUR RELATIONS WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES REMAINS VERY STRONG. IN ADDITION TO OUR JOINT DEFENSE EFFORTS, THE ALLIANCE IS BEING STRENGTHENED BY UNPRECEDENTED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND COORDINATION.

THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE AND CLOSE TRANS-ATLANTIC TIES ARE PARAMOUNT US INTERESTS AND WILL BE VIGOROUSLY UPHELD.

17. THE SOUTHERN EUROPE SITUATION IS THE MOST TROUBLE-SOME. PORTUGAL IS NOT YET STABLE, BUT THE INFLUENCE OF THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY, AND THEREFORE SOVIET INFLUENCE, HAS BEEN FURTHER REDUCED.

18. REGARDING SPAIN, FRANCO'S DEATH HAS CREATED LESS INSTABILITY THAN SOME EXPECTED. WE HAVE NEGOTIATED A RENEWAL OF OUR AGREEMENT WITH SPAIN ON OUR MILITARY FACILITIES, AND ARE HOPEFUL THAT IT WILL BE RATIFIED BY OUR SENATE.

19. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO OUR EUROPEAN FRIENDS THAT WE WOULD VIEW INCLUSION IN THEIR GOVERNMENTS OF COMMUNIST PARTIES LINKED TO MOSCOW AS SERIOUSLY DETRIMENTAL TO OUR MUTUAL SECURITY INTERESTS.

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20. WE HAVE RECENTLY NEGOTIATED AN OVERALL AGREEMENT WITH TURKEY REGARDING OUR MILITARY FACILITIES THERE AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE, AND ARE NOW NEGOTIATING A SIMILAR AGREEMENT WITH GREECE. BOTH AGREEMENTS WILL REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL, AND THIS MAY TAKE SOME TIME. HOWEVER, THESE DEVELOPMENTS, AND A BETTER PROSPECT FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY, SHOULD STRENGTHEN SIGNIFICANTLY NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK.

21. I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION SEVERAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ASIA. WE HAVE OF COURSE NOTED YOUR RECENT AGREEMENT WITH INDIA TO EXCHANGE AMBASSADORS. WE ASSUME THIS DID NOT PLEASE MOSCOW, BUT WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS ON THIS POINT, AS WELL AS WHETHER YOU EXPECT INDIA TO SUGGEST OTHER STEPS TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH YOUR COUNTRY. WE WOULD ALSO WELCOME YOUR ASSESSMENT OF INDIA'S GESTURES TOWARD PAKISTAN.

22. WITH RESPECT TO JAPAN, OUR RELATIONS ARE IN VERY GOOD SHAPE AND OUR CONSULTATION HAS NEVER BEEN CLOSER. A TROUBLESOME DEVELOPMENT THERE HAS BEEN THE SO-CALLED LOCKHEED AFFAIR. BUT WE HAVE BEEN WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM, AND WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT IT WILL NOT HAVE A LASTING EFFECT ON OUR CONTINUING CLOSE RELATIONSHIP.

23. IN THAILAND, WE HAVE BEEN REVISING OUR MILITARY PRESENCE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE CHANGED SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND TO MINIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY FOR THOSE UNFRIENDLY TO THE US, INCLUDING THE SOVIETS, TO EXPLOIT

THE SITUATION. HOWEVER, THE DETAILS OF OUR MILITARY RELATIONS WITH THAILAND WILL HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE NEW THAI GOVERNMENT.

24. WE HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATING WITH THE PHILIPPINES REGARDING OUR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT BY RESOLVING SOME OF THE ISSUES THAT HAVE ARISEN WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME, OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PHILIPPINES WILL BE EVEN STRONGER THAN IT IS

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NOW.

25. SOME WEEKS AGO, AS WE INFORMED YOUR GOVERNMENT THROUGH YOUR LIAISON OFFICE IN WASHINGTON, WE MADE A PROPOSAL TO NORTH VIET-NAM TO HOLD TALKS TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. OUR PROPOSAL WAS A SERIOUS ONE. HOWEVER, HANOI'S RESPONSE, BY RESURRECTING THE PARIS AGREEMENT CLAUSE ABOUT ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AFTER HAVING KILLED THE AGREEMENT BY ITS MILITARY ACTION LAST YEAR, SUGGESTS TO US THAT HANOI IS NOT NOW INTERESTED IN IMPROVING RELATIONS. OUR OWN ATTITUDE WILL OF COURSE BE STRONGLY INFLUENCED NOT ONLY BY BILATERAL MATTERS BUT ALSO BY WHETHER NORTH VIET-NAM ACTS WITH RESTRAINT TOWARDS THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS POINT.

26. REGARDING KOREA, OUR PRIMARY CONCERN REMAINS THAT THERE BE NO DEVELOPMENTS WHICH WOULD HEIGHTEN TENSION BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA. WE CONTINUE TO HOPE THAT WAYS CAN BE FOUND OVER TIME TO REDUCE THOSE TENSIONS. IN THE MEANTIME, WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN OUR MILITARY PRESENCE AS WE BELIEVE IT CONTRIBUTES TO STABILITY IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

27. LET ME CONCLUDE WITH A FEW BRIEF REMARKS ABOUT OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

28. IN HIS MESSAGE TO YOU UPON YOUR APPOINTMENT AS PREMIER, AND IN THE LETTER I BROUGHT WITH ME, PRESIDENT FORD REAFFIRMED OUR COMMITMENT TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZING RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. HE HAS ASKED ME TO REITERATE THAT THAT IS OUR FIRM POLICY AND TO SAY THAT HE IS CONFIDENT THAT THROUGH OUR JOINT EFFORTS WE CAN ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE OF FULLY NORMALIZED RELATIONS.

29. WE RESPECT YOUR VIEW THAT UNTIL THAT TIME, THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF SOME ASPECTS OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP MAY NOT BE FEASIBLE. NEVERTHELESS, WE WILL WELCOME ANY SUGGESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE, AT ANY TIME,

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REGARDING WAYS IN WHICH OUR RELATIONSHIP CAN BE
STRENGTHENED IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST.

30. I WILL WELCOME YOUR COMMENTS ON THESE OR OTHER
MATTERS, AS PRESIDENT FORD ASKED ME TO REITERATE THE
IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHES TO CONTINUING THE FRANK EXCHANGE
OF VIEWS ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. SISCO

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APPROVED BY EA:PHILIP C. HABIB

S/P:WORLD

S/S- MR. MOFFAT

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TO USLO PEKING PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ STATE 136269

NODIS

EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR GATES

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH, US

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH HUANG CHEN

1. SECRETARY MET AT HIS REQUEST WITH PROLO CHIEF HUANG CHEN MAY 29, TO REESTABLISH CONTACT AFTER HUANG'S LONG ABSENCE AND TO REVIEW SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS.

2. SECRETARY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE FRIENDLY RECEPTION GIVEN YOU IN PEKING. "I THINK YOU WILL FIND HIM AN EXCELLENT MAN. HE IS A GOOD FRIEND OF MINE AND OF THE PRESIDENT."

3. SECRETARY NOTED THAT DURING THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN SOME CANDIDATES ARE TRYING TO RAISE EMBARRASSING ISSUES ABOUT OUR CHINA POLICY, AND SAID THAT DURING THIS CAMPAIGN PERIOD HE PHRASE OUR STATEMENTS VERY CAREFULLY TO AVOID "UPHEAVALS." HUANG SAID HE UNDERSTANDS THIS. SECRETARY

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LABELED AS INCORRECT THE REPORT THAT HE HAD TOLD GOLDWATER THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT NORMALIZE RELATIONS AFTER THE ELECTIONS. INSTEAD, HE TOLD GOLDWATER THAT "WE HAVE MADE NO CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS." SECRETARY SAID THAT IF ANYTHING COMES UP IN OUR POLITICAL CAMPAIGN THAT RAISES SOME QUESTIONS, PRC SHOULD NOT DRAW CONCLUSIONS WITHOUT CONSULTING US. "WE HAVE CONDUCTED OUR POLICY FOR FIVE YEARS WITH GREAT CARE, AND WILL NOT LET IT FAIL BECAUSE OF TWO MONTHS OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS."

4. DURING DISCUSSION THIS SUBJECT, HUANG SAID, "SO FAR AS THE CHINESE SIDE IS CONCERNED, WE WILL ALWAYS CARRY OUT THE LINE AND POLICY FORMULATED BY CHAIRMAN MAO, NOT ONLY FOR FOREIGN POLICY BUT ALSO DOMESTIC POLICY." SECRETARY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD, AND THAT AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, WE DEAL WITH CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY, NOT DOMESTIC POLICY.

5. ON AFRICA, SECRETARY SAID WE ARE NOT GOING TO PERMIT ANOTHER ANGOLA TO DEVELOP AND THAT IF THERE IS ANOTHER SOVIET-SUPPORTED MILITARY ADVENTURE, WE WILL DO SOMETHING. HE EXPLAINED THAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO ORGANIZE VARIOUS AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO INCREASE THEIR CAPABILITIES. SECDEF WILL GO TO ZAIRE IN JULY TO DISCUSS MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND WE ARE WORKING CLOSELY WITH ZAMBIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES. LATER IN CONVERSATION SECRETARY MENTIONED THAT WHEN HE GOES TO EUROPE FOR OECD MEETING END OF JUNE, HE PLANS TO MEET WITH BLACK AFRICAN LEADERS AND MAYBE SOUTH AFRICAN LEADERS TO HELP BRING MAJORITY RULE TO RHODESIA.

6. HUANG SAID U.S. SHOULD LEARN A LESSON FROM ANGOLA, AND IN RESPONSE TO SECRETARY'S "WHAT LESSON?", SAID "THE FACT THAT THE MILITARY SITUATION IN ANGOLA DEVELOPED TO THE POINT IT DID IS INSEPARABLE FROM U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIETS. U.S. POLICY ABETTED THE SOVIET EFFORTS." SECRETARY SAID WE DISCUSSED OUR ANGOLA POLICY IN PEKING (DURING PRESIDENT'S VISIT) AND THAT WE WOULD HAVE DEFEATED SOVIETS IN ANGOLA IF CONGRESS HAD NOT STOPPED OUR ASSISTANCE.

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7. SECRETARY CALLED NATO MEETING BEST IN MANY YEARS. IT TOOK DECISIONS ON STRENGTHENING OF DEFENSE AND ON CLOSE COORDINATION OF POLICIES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION ON A WORLDWIDE BASIS. HUANG COMMENTED THAT PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT EUROPEANS NOW HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET THREAT, BUT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOT CHANGE THEIR POLICY OF DIVIDING AND WEAKENING EUROPE, WITH MILITARY STRENGTH AS ITS BACKING AND DETENTE AS THE SMOKESCREEN. SECRETARY MENTIONED OUR OPPOSITION TO INCLUSIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES IN GOVERNMENT, AND SAID WE WILL NOT LET THE SOVIETS SUCCEED IN THEIR POLICY OF DIVIDING AND WEAKENING EUROPE.

8. SECRETARY EXPLAINED THAT THE TURKEY-GREECE PROBLEM IS COMPLICATED BY THE DOMESTIC SITUATION IN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND BY THE PROBLEM OF MAKARIOS ON CYPRUS. HOWEVER, THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE PRACTICALLY AGREED ON A SOLUTION AND WILL PROBABLY MOVE TO THE SOLUTION THIS YEAR.

9. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, HUANG SAID HE DID NOT YET KNOW IF FOREIGN MINISTER CH'IAO WILL COME TO THE UNGA, BUT THAT HE PROBABLY WILL. SECRETARY SAID HE WILL BE DELIGHTED TO REVIEW MATTERS WITH CH'IAO. KISSINGER

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DRAFTED BY EA/PRCM:OVARMSTRONG:MFR
APPROVED BY EA:PHILIP C. HABIB
S/P:WLOD (DRAFT)
O/S - MR. ORTIZ

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TO USLO PEKING PRIORITY

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFDR, CH, US

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR GATES' MEETING WITH PREMIER HUA

REF: STATE 109863

1. FOLLOWING CHANGES SHOULD BE MADE IN REFTEL. PARA REFERENCES ARE TO NUMBERED TALKING POINTS.

2. SUBSTITUTE FOR PARA 11.

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S TRIP TO AFRICA WAS DESIGNED IN PART TO FULFILL THIS OBJECTIVE BY AVERTING AN INCREASE IN SOVIET INVOLVEMENT AND INFLUENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH AFRICAN LEADERS, THE SECRETARY AND THEY WERE IN AGREEMENT THAT DIRECT SOVIET-CUBAN MILITARY INTERVENTION WAS NOT IN THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE IN THE AREA. THE SECRETARY'S PUBLIC STRESS ON AFRICAN SOLUTIONS AND AFRICAN UNITY WAS DESIGNED TO UNDERLINE THIS POINT. THE AFRICANS SAID THEY WISH TO SOLVE THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*

STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES *SW 9/26/02*

BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/4/03

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THEMSELVES. THIS IS THE US VIEW AS WELL. IN THIS REGARD, THE US INITIATIVES ON THE RHODESIA PROBLEM ARE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT SINCE THEY CAN HELP CONTRIBUTE TO A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM AND PRECLUDE CONDITIONS

WHICH WOULD BE TO THE SOVIETS' ADVANTAGE. AS SECRETARY KISSINGER RECENTLY INFORMED AMBASSADOR HUANG CHEN, WHEN HE IS IN EUROPE LATER THIS MONTH, HE PLANS TO TALK WITH BLACK AFRICAN LEADERS AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA TO HELP FIND A WAY TO ACHIEVE EARLY MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA.

3. INSERT BETWEEN PARAS 11 AND 12:

IT IS ENCOURAGING TO NOTE THE CUBAN INTENTION TO REDUCE THEIR PRESENCE IN ANGOLA, AS INDICATED IN CASTRO'S LETTER TO SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER PALME ABOUT WHICH THE LATTER INFORMED SECRETARY KISSINGER LAST MONTH. THIS REFLECTS OUR FIRM EFFORTS BOTH IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS. HOWEVER, IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW RAPID AND COMPLETE THIS WITHDRAWAL WILL BE AND WE PLAN TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE ISSUE.

4. IN VIEW OF FLUID LEBANON SITUATION, DELETE PARA 15.

5. INSERT BETWEEN PARAS 16 AND 17.

THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN OSLO DEMONSTRATED A JOINT DETERMINATION AMONG THE ALLIES TO MAINTAIN DEFENSES AND VIGILANCE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. THE SECRETARY REAFFIRMED THE US COMMITMENTS IN THIS REGARD, AND THERE WAS SOLID SUPPORT AND COHESION AT THE MEETING.

6. DELETE LAST SENTENCE PARA 21, AND INSERT FOLLOWING BETWEEN PARAS 21 AND 22: WE NOTED THAT PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO'S VISIT SERVED TO REAFFIRM THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND YOUR COUNTRY. WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR ASSESSMENT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS.

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7. REVISE PARA 23 TO READ: AT THE REQUEST OF THE THAI GOVERNMENT, WE ARE WITHDRAWING OUR MILITARY PRESENCE TO MINIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY FOR THOSE UNFRIENDLY TO THE US, INCLUDING THE SOVIETS, TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION. THE DETAILS OF ANY RESIDUAL US FACILITIES IN THAILAND ARE BEING NEGOTIATED WITH THE THAI GOVERNMENT.

8. IN PARA 24, REVISE SECOND SENTENCE TO READ: WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT WE CAN RESOLVE SOME ISSUES WHICH HAVE ARISEN WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME AND THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PHILIPPINES WILL REMAIN STRONG. ROBINSON

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EA - MR. GLEYSTEEN

S/P - MR. LORD

S/S- FVORTIZ

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TO USLO PEKING PRIORITY

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR CH US

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR GATES' MEETING WITH HUA KUO-FENG

REF: PEKING 1055

CONCUR YOUR PROPOSAL TO SHARE HUA'S COMMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES WITH AUSTRALIANS, NEW ZEALANDERS AND BRITISH, AND HIS COMMENTS ON SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS WITH JAPANESE. HOWEVER, INFO SHOULD BE PROVIDED IN GENERALIZED TERMS, PERHAPS ORALLY, RATHER THAN AS COPY OF VERBATIM RECORD.
KISSINGER

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES *State Dept Review*

BY hrc, NARA, DATE 7/4/03

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SW 9/26/02



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PAGE 01 STATE 156062 TOSEC 170147

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TO USLO PEKING PRIORITY

INFO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 156062 TOSEC 170147

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FOR AMBASSADOR GATES ONLY FROM SCOWCROFT AND HABIB

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: OREP (SCOTT, HUGH) PFOR, CH, US

SUBJECT: SENATOR SCOTT'S VISIT

REF: PEKING 1119 (BEING REPEATED TO SECRETARY)

1. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEEN AWARE FOR SOME TIME OF SENATE MINORITY LEADER HUGH SCOTT'S PLANS TO VISIT PRC THIS SUMMER, ALTHOUGH ALL ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRIP WERE WORKED OUT DIRECTLY BETWEEN THE SENATOR AND THE CHINESE WITH NO USG INVOLVEMENT.

2. AS IN CASE OF PREVIOUS CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS, WHITE HOUSE MAY MAKE SPECIAL AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE TO TRANSPORT SCOTT PARTY TO AND FROM THE PRC, AT REQUEST OF SCOTT, WHO PRESUMABLY WANTED HIS VISIT TO HAVE A PRESIDENTIAL BLESSING, PRESIDENT SENT SCOTT FOLLOWING

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR, NAPA, DATE 5/14/01

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Department of State

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PAGE 02 STATE 156062 TOSEC 170147

LETTER DATED JUNE 9:

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR HUGH:

ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY IS OUR NEW AND IMPROVED RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL TO THE PURSUIT OF THAT POLICY IF YOU COULD UNDERTAKE A VISIT TO CHINA IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

AS SENATE MINORITY LEADER YOUR PRESENCE IN CHINA WOULD UNDERSCORE THE STRONG SUPPORT THAT THE SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS ENJOYS IN THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH AS WELL AS AMONG THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. MOREOVER, IN VIEW OF THE CHANGING CHINESE LEADERSHIP IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO ME TO HAVE YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT STATUS OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF NORMALIZATION TO THE GENERAL SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST. YOUR ON-THE-SPOT UNDERSTANDING OF THIS RELATIONSHIP WILL CERTAINLY BE OF GREAT VALUE IN THE CONSIDERATION OF ANY FUTURE QUESTIONS REGARDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS WHICH MAY COME BEFORE THE SENATE.

IN THE EVENT YOU UNDERTAKE THIS VISIT, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WILL BE PLEASED TO DO WHAT IT CAN TO FACILITATE YOUR JOURNEY.

END TEXT.

3. SENATOR PUBLICLY DISCLOSED HIS TRIP IN SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON US-CHINA TRADE JUNE 14. WIRE SERVICES SUBSEQUENTLY CARRIED A NUMBER OF STORIES STATING THAT SCOTT WAS UNDERTAKING SPECIAL MISSION AT THE REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT TO LOOK INTO THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN CHINA. WE ASSUME THESE STORIES TRACE BACK TO BRIEFINGS BY SCOTT'S OFFICE BASED ON THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER.

4. TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE AT THIS TIME, SCOTT WILL

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PAGE 03 STATE 156062 TOSEC 170147

NOT BE CARRYING ANY SPECIAL LETTERS OR MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP. HE HAS NOT BEEN ENTRUSTED WITH ANY NEGOTIATING RESPONSIBILITIES ON NORMALIZATION ISSUES. WE DOUBT THAT THE AURA OF A PRESIDENTIAL MISSION SURROUNDING SCOTT'S TRIP WILL PROVIDE THE CHINESE WITH MUCH ADDITIONAL LEVERAGE TO EXPLOIT THE VISIT FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES. THE CHINESE KNOW THAT THEY DEALT DIRECTLY WITH SCOTT IN ARRANGING THE TRIP, AND THEY WILL PROBABLY HANDLE HIS VISIT IN THE SAME WAY AS OTHER CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS.

5. WE WILL BE PROVIDING YOU IN SEPTELS WITH ADDITIONAL DETAILS CONCERNING SCOTT'S TRIP AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE.
ROBINSON

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PAGE 01 STATE 171072

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TO USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 171072

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FOR AMBASSADOR GATES FROM ARMSTRONG

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OREP (SCOTT, HUGH) PFOR, CH, US

SUBJECT: SENATOR SCOTT'S VISIT

REF: STATE 156062

1. REGARDING OUR CONVERSATION IN PEKING, I HAVE CHECKED AGAIN, AND THERE HAVE BEEN NO DEVELOPMENTS (INCLUDING A BREAKFAST WHICH SCOTT HAD WITH THE SECRETARY) WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE SCOTT TO GET INTO NEGOTIATING-TYPE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CHINESE.

2. DEPT. OFFICERS TOLD FREEMAN AND BARNETT THAT SCOTT SHOULD INDICATE TO CHINESE THAT HE WANTS YOU TO ATTEND HIS MEETINGS WITH RANKING OFFICIALS IN PEKING. YOU MAY WISH TO MENTION THIS POINT TO SCOTT (OR HAVE SOMEONE REMIND FREEMAN) UPON THEIR ARRIVAL. KISSINGER

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TO USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE

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CHEROKEE, FOR AMBASSADORGATES FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, CH, US

SUBJECT: CHANG CHUN-CHIAO'S MEETING WITH SENATOR SCOTT

REF: PEKING 1283, PEKING 1288, PEKING 1293

1. I APPRECIATED YOUR RAPID AND FULL REPORTING ON SENATOR SCOTT'S MEETING WITH VICE PREMIER CHANG CHUN-CHIAO JULY 13 AND YOUR PROMPT ANALYSIS. I WANT YOU TO HAVE OUR OWN INITIAL REACTION TO THIS DEVELOPMENT.

2. IN TERMS OF BASIC PRINCIPLES, CHANG NEITHER CHANGED NOR ADDED TO THE CHINESE POSITION ON TAIWAN AND US-PRC RELATIONS. HE EXPLICITLY STATED THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD CONTINUE TO ACT IN ACCORD WITH THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE AND AFFIRMED CHINESE WILLINGNESS TO DO SO. CHANG'S REFERENCE TO THE THREE POINTS IN THE SO-CALLED JAPAN

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES *SW 9/26/02*
BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/4/03



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PAGE 02

STATE 177799

FORMULA WAS SIMPLY THE REITERATION OF A POSITION THAT THE CHINESE HAVE PRESENTED TO US ON A VARIETY OF OCCASIONS GOING BACK TO MY VISIT TO PEKING IN NOVEMBER 1974. ON THE CRUCIAL QUESTION OF A "PEACEFUL SOLUTION" TO THE TAIWAN QUESTION, NOT ONLY DO THE US AND CHINESE POSITIONS DIFFER IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, BUT NONE OF THE TOP CHINESE LEADERS, INCLUDING CHOU, MAO, AND TENG, HAS EVER LIFTED THE THREAT THAT THE TAIWAN PROBLEM WOULD ULTIMATELY HAVE TO

BE RESOLVED BY MILITARY MEANS. WHILE THEIR FORMULATIONS VARY, ON MORE THAN ON OCCASION, INCLUDING STATEMENTS AT THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE LEVEL, THEY HAVE REFERRED TO THE MILITARY LIBERATION OF TAIWAN AS PROBABLY INEVITABLE. THEY HAVE NEVER, HOWEVER, ADVANCED ANY PRECISE TIME FRAME IN WHICH THIS WOULD TAKE PLACE, AND WE NOTE THAT CHANG TOO DID NOT IMPLY THAT THERE WAS ANY DEADLINE FOR SETTLEMENT OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE. HE ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT THE CHINESE POSITION ON TAIWAN REMAINS UNCHANGED. MOREOVER, FOR ALL HIS DISDAIN ABOUT THE US--E.G. ON ANGOLA--CHANG REMINDED SCOTT THAT IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA WE HAVE MANY POINTS IN COMMON.

3. ON BALANCE, WHILE WE DO NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT CHANG'S OUTBURST REPRESENTS A HARDENING OF PRC ATTITUDES, BOTH CHANG AND CH'IAO WOULD NOT HAVE GONE AS FAR AS THEY DID IF SCOTT HAD NOT CONFRONTED THEM SO DIRECTLY ON TAIWAN AND PERSISTED IN ARGUING SO STUBBORNLY. (I PERSONALLY ADVISED SCOTT THAT HE SHOULD NOT PRESS THE CHINESE ON THIS SENSITIVE ISSUE.) PARTICULARLY AFTER READING THE FULL TRANSCRIPT OF SCOTT'S MEETING WITH CH'IAO THE DAY BEFORE, WE ARE STRUCK BY THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE CHINESE MAY HAVE FELT THEY WERE BEING PRESSED ON THE "PEACEFUL LIBERATION" ISSUE. SCOTT'S OWN EFFORTS BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR PEKING TO PLAY UP THE IMPORTANCE OF HIS MISSION AND TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS A PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY MAY WELL HAVE REINFORCED THESE CONSIDERATIONS IN CHINESE MINDS. IT WAS A PARTICULARLY TOUGH WEEK FOR THE CHINESE ON THE TAIWAN ISSUE IN VIEW OF THE OLYMPICS IMBROGLIO AND MIYAZAWA'S STATEMENTS ON US-PRC RELATIONS. MOREOVER, CHANG'S REACTION TO SCOTT MUST BE SEEN AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S

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PAGE 03

STATE 177799

EXPLICIT STATEMENTS THAT NORMALIZATION WILL NOT BE COMPLETED THIS YEAR AS WELL AS AN INCREASE IN PUBLIC COMMENTARY IN THE US REGARDING THE IMPORTANCE OF ENSURING TAIWAN'S SECURITY.

4. CHANG HAS LONG HAD THE REPUTATION OF BEING CLOSE TO THE IDEOLOGICAL LEFT, BUT THE PICTURE OF HIM THAT EMERGES IN THE FLESH IS EVEN MORE ABRASIVE, MILITANT, AND POLEMICAL THAN WE HAD IMAGINED. (WE FOUND YOUR OBSERVATIONS ON HIS Demeanor VERY PERCEPTIVE.) EVEN THOUGH WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT DOMESTIC ISSUES AND POWER RIVALRIES LIE AT THE ROOT OF THE DIVISIONS WITHIN PEKING'S CURRENT LEADERSHIP, CHANG'S PERFORMANCE GIVES US INSIGHT INTO THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS THAT A GREATER LEFTIST ROLE IN THE LEADERSHIP COULD HAVE ON CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY. IF CHANG'S STAR IS IN FACT RISING, WE MAY FIND OURSELVES DEALING INCREASINGLY WITH A MAN WHOSE STYLE

AND MANNERISMS DO NOT SIT WELL WITH AMERICANS AND WHO SEEMS REMARKABLY UNCONCERNED ABOUT ESTABLISHING PERSONAL RAPPORT WITH HIS GUESTS, AS YOU SO ACCURATELY POINTED OUT.

5. IF CHANG CONTINUES TO BE THE RANKING PRC LEADER WHO MEETS WITH US DELEGATIONS, OR IF OTHER CHINESE DEALING WITH AMERICANS BEGIN TO ECHO HIS REMARKS ON THIS OCCASION, WE CAN ANTICIPATE THAT THIS WILL HAVE A CUMULATIVELY NEGATIVE IMPACT ON CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES REGARDING FURTHER NORMALIZATION. ROBINSON

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES *SW 9/26/02*
BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *2/4/03*

TAGS: PFOR, CH, US

SUBJECT: PRC HARD LINE ON TAIWAN

REF: PEKING 1455

1. WE APPRECIATED YOUR ANALYSIS OF THE TOUGH LANGUAGE THE CHINESE ARE NOW USING ON THE TAIWAN QUESTION. WE ARE CONSIDERING THE ADVISABILITY OF RAISING THE MATTER WITH THE CHINESE ALONG THE LINES YOU SUGGESTED.

2. YOU SHOULD ALSO BE AWARE OF FOLLOWING BACKGROUND CONCERNING GELB STORY THAT APPEARED IN NY TIMES AUGUST 3. STORY RESULTED FROM CONVERSATION THAT SEVERAL US CORRESPONDENTS HAD WITH PROLO COUNSELOR HSIEN CHI-MEI APPROXIMATELY THREE WEEKS AGO DURING WHICH HSIEN INSISTED THAT THE ONLY WAY CHINA COULD "LIBERATE" TAIWAN IS THROUGH MILITARY FORCE. HSIEN, WHEN PRESSED, CLAIMED THAT THE PRC POSITION HAS ALWAYS BEEN THAT TAIWAN'S LIBERATION WOULD

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PAGE 02

STATE 196799

HAVE TO BE BY MILITARY MEANS. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION, HsIEH SAID HE PRESUMED THE PRC POSITION ON MILITARY LIBERATION HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO USG. CORRESPONDENTS RECEIVED IMPRESSION THAT HsIEH'S TRANSPARENT PURPOSE IN

MEETING WITH THEM WAS TO CONVEY THE MESSAGE ON MILITARY LIBERATION. WHEN INFORMED THAT GELB INTENDED TO PUBLISH A STORY BASED ON HsIEH'S COMMENTS, HsIEH READILY AGREED ON CONDITION THAT GELB WOULD NOT IDENTIFY OFFICIAL CHINESE AS THE SOURCE.

HABIB

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STATE 252896

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: ESTC, CH, US

SUBJECT: CDC SEISMIC COMPUTER

REF: STATE 251328

1. WE WILL TRY TO INFORM YOU OF THE FINAL DECISION ON THE CDC COMPUTER SALE IN TIME FOR YOU TO CONVEY IT TO CDC REPS IN PEKING MORNING OCTOBER 14 YOUR TIME, PRIOR TO CDC'S MEETING WITH TECHIMPORT.

2. HOWEVER, IF YOU HAVE NOT RECEIVED NECESSARY INFORMATION FROM US BY THE TIME CDC REPS CONTACT YOU AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL OCTOBER 13 IN PEKING, YOU SHOULD ENCOURAGE THEM TO ARRANGE 24-HOUR POSTPONEMENT OF TECHIMPORT MEETING.

ROBINSON

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/4/03

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PINR, MARR, TW, CH

SUBJECT: FORCE REDUCTIONS ON TAIWAN - PRESS GUIDANCE

REFERENCE: (A) CINCPAC 112055Z, OCT. 76

(B) TAIPEI 6967

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO DOWNPLAY THE FORCE REDUCTIONS TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE ONCE THEY BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE. IN KEEPING WITH THIS, YOU SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02

STATE 259926

ISSUE ANY STATEMENT OR ANNOUNCEMENT ON SUBJECT. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE IN EVENT PRESS RAISES ISSUE. ADDRESSEES SHOULD NOT GO BEYOND THIS IN RESPONDING TO QUERIES. UNANTICIPATED QUESTIONS SHOULD BE REFERRED TO WASHINGTON FOR REPLY.

2. Q. ARE US FORCES ON TAIWAN BEING FURTHER REDUCED?

A. YES. AS HAS BEEN STATED MANY TIMES, REDUCTION OF FORCES ON TAIWAN IS AN ONGOING PROCESS. AS YOU KNOW, SIZEABLE REDUCTIONS HAVE BEEN MADE OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS (FROM 10,000 TO SLIGHTLY OVER 2,000 AT PRESENT).

3. Q. HOW MANY PERSONNEL WILL BE WITHDRAWN?

A. I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO COMMENT ON THIS.

4. Q. WHAT UNITS WILL BE INVOLVED?

A. I ALSO CANNOT COMMENT ON THIS.

5. Q. ARE THE REDUCTIONS BEING CARRIED OUT UNDER THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE?

A. WHILE THE REDUCTIONS INVOLVE MANPOWER AND BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS, THEY ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE.

6. Q. ARE THE REDUCTIONS BEING CARRIED OUT AS A RESULT OF PRC PRESSURES OR NEGOTIATIONS WITH PEKING?

A. NO. THE DISPOSITION OF US FORCES IN EAST ASIA, INCLUDING TAIWAN, IS DETERMINED BY THE UNITED STATES WITH REFERENCE TO OUR INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, POLICY INTERESTS AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS. ROBINSON



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E.O. 11652: XGDS 3

TAGS: ESTC US CH

SUBJECT: HUMMEL/HAN H3U CONVERSATION ON CDC COMPUTER CASE

1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY HUMMEL CALLED IN PROLO DEPUTY CHIEF HAN H3U OCTOBER 14 TO CONVEY US DECISION ON CDC COMPUTER CASE. HUMMEL READ PREPARED TALKING POINTS AS FOLLOWS:

-- YOU WILL RECALL THAT WHEN THE PRESIDENT WAS IN PEKING LAST DECEMBER, BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY INDICATED OUR WILLINGNESS TO BE HELPFUL IN FINDING WAYS TO HANDLE CERTAIN SPECIAL TRADE MATTERS, SUCH AS THE SALE OF COMPUTERS, IN THE LIGHT OF OUR VARIOUS LAWS AND REGULATIONS.

-- SECRETARY KISSINGER ALSO REFERRED TO OUR DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL IN HIS MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR HUANG CHEN ON

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 (State Review)
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES W 9/26/02

BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/4/03

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PAGE 02

STATE 261496

AUGUST 18. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT OUR PROCEDURES CREATE CERTAIN PROBLEMS, BUT THAT WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO MAKE SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS IF WE KNOW WHAT YOU WANT, AND WE MAY BE ABLE TO MAKE EXCEPTIONS.

-- THIS MATTER HAS AGAIN COME TO OUR ATTENTION IN CONNECTION WITH A PENDING SALE TO YOUR COUNTRY OF A COMPUTER SYSTEM MANUFACTURED BY THE CONTROL DATA CORPORATION. THE US-MANUFACTURED COMPUTERS ARE PART OF A SEISMIC OIL EXPLORATION SYSTEM A FRENCH COMPANY WISHES TO SELL TO YOU.

-- WE HAVE CAREFULLY REVIEWED THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THIS SALE WOULD BE CONCLUDED, AND ARE SATISFIED THAT THE SYSTEM WILL BE USED FOR ITS STATED PURPOSE, WHICH IS PETROLEUM EXPLORATION.

-- WE ARE PREPARED TO APPROVE THE SALE IN PRINCIPLE ON AN EXCEPTIONAL BASIS. WE HOPE THAT THE SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS THAT ARE BEING WORKED OUT BETWEEN CONTROL DATA CORPORATION AND TECHIMPORT WILL PROVIDE A SATISFACTORY BASIS FOR CONTINUED COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES ON TRADE MATTERS OF THIS SORT.

-- WE HOPE THAT THE CHINESE SIDE REALIZES THAT THE SALE OF SOPHISTICATED COMPUTER SYSTEMS SUCH AS THIS CONTROL DATA COMPUTER PRESENTS US WITH CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES.

-- AS THE SECRETARY MENTIONED TO AMBASSADOR HUANG CHEN, IN THESE CASES IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE CHINESE SIDE COULD SUPPLEMENT ITS NORMAL HANDLING OF THESE MATTERS THROUGH COMMERCIAL CHANNELS BY INFORMALLY GIVING US SOME ADVANCE NOTICE OF YOUR INTERESTS. WE MIGHT THEN BE ABLE TO HANDLE THE MATTER MORE EFFICIENTLY THAN WAS POSSIBLE IN THE PRESENT CASE, WHICH CAME TO OUR ATTENTION SOMEWHAT BELATEDLY.

2. HAN HSU RESPONDED WITH THE FOLLOWING:

"REGARDING THE MATTER MENTIONED DURING PRESIDENT FORD'S

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STATE 261496

AND SECRETARY KISSINGER'S VISIT TO CHINA AND MENTIONED
BY SECRETARY KISSINGER TO HUANG CHEN ON AUGUST 18, WE
HAVE DECLARED OUR STANDPOINT CLEARLY. IN THIS CASE, IT
MUST BE HANDLED THROUGH COMMERCIAL CHANNELS. IF YOU WANT
TO SELL, OK; IF NOT, OK."
KISSINGER

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PAGE 01

STATE 274198

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ORIGIN NODS-00

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TO USLO PEKING PRIORITY

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NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR GATIS FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY HUMMEL

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, CH, US, CREP (CURTIS, CARL)

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH CODEL CURTIS

1. THE SECRETARY MET FOR OVER AN HOUR WITH MEMBERS OF CODEL CURTIS NOVEMBER 4 (MEMBERS PRESENT INCLUDED SENATOR AND MRS. BAYH, SENATOR AND MRS. YOUNG, SENATOR AND MRS. HOLLINGS, SENATOR AND MRS. JOHNSTON, MRS. STEVENS, MR. AND MRS. WOLTHUIS, AND DICK HART), DURING WHICH HE URGED DELEGATION TO INCLUDE USLO CHIEF AND SEVERAL OF HIS OFFICERS IN PEKING MEETINGS. YOU MAY WISH TO FOLLOW UP ON DELEGATION'S ARRIVAL.

2. IN OTHER RESPECTS, SECRETARY PROVIDED GENERAL REVIEW OF PRC DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS AND BRIEF DISCUSSION OF US-PRC RELATIONS. HE URGED THE DELEGATION TO LEAVE THE TAIWAN ISSUE ALONE IN THEIR MEETINGS WITH THE CHINESE, NOT ONLY BECAUSE CHINESE MAY NOT BE SURE FOR WHOM DELEGATION IS SPEAKING BUT BECAUSE OF IMPLICATIONS FOR NEXT ADMINISTRATION. HE SUGGESTED THAT IF SUBJECT OF NORMAL-

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E.O. 12958, DEC. 31
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 5/14/01



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IZATION AROSE, DELEGATION SHOULD INDICATE SUPPORT BUT NOT IN TERMS OF ANY SPECIFIC FORMULA. HE EXPRESSED HOPE DELEGATION COULD ALSO STRESS ELEMENTS OF CONTINUITY IN US

POLICY IN VIEW OF UNCERTAINTY ABROAD AS TO WHAT NEW ADMINISTRATION MEANS.

3. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT SUBJECTS OF SUPPLYING MILITARY EQUIPMENT OR ENGAGING IN TECHNICAL COOPERATION HAVE NOT BEEN DISCUSSED WITH CHINESE. HE ADDED THAT THERE IS NO PLAN FOR THE SALE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT NOR HAVE THE CHINESE EVER ASKED FOR IT. HE ALSO NOTED POSSIBILITY OF STRONG SOVIET REACTION IF US MOVED IN THIS DIRECTION.

KISSINGER

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