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NOD863

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 075749

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ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 R

DRAFTED BY KJENKINS/MT
 APPROVED BY H-KEMPTON JENKINS
 NSC - GEN. SCOWCROFT
 L - MR. LEIGH
 DOD - MR. FRYKLUND
 WH - MR. WOLTHIUS
 EA - MR. HABIB
 M - MR. EAGLEBURGER (SUBS)
 S/S - MR. ORTIZ

101654

O 032156Z APR 75 ZFF4
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 075749

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, OREF, (ALBERT, CARL)(RHODES, JOHN)

SUBJECT: CAMBODIA

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM JOHN MARSH,
 WHITE HOUSE, TO REPS. ALBERT AND RHODES ASAP:

2. BEGIN MESSAGE: THE PRESIDENT HAS AUTHORIZED OUR
 AMBASSADOR IN PHNOM PENH TO BEGIN EVALUATION OF THE AMERI-
 CAN STAFF UNDER OUR ESTABLISHED EVACUATION PLANS. PHASE
 ONE WILL BEGIN IMMEDIATELY AND WILL REDUCE DOWN TO A BARE
 MINIMUM ESSENTIAL STAFF THOSE AMERICANS REMAINING. IT
 WILL UTILIZE FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT AND THE CIVILIAN AIRPORT.

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HR 5/14/01





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MOST US CITIZENS, SOME THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS, AND SOME KHMER WILL BE LIFTED OUT UNDER PHASE ONE.

3. SHOULD IT BECOME ESSENTIAL--BECAUSE OF SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN PHNOM PENH--TO REMOVE THE REMAINING MINIMUM STAFF, THIS WILL BE DONE. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THIS FINAL STEP COULD REQUIRE, IN EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES, THE USE OF HELICOPTERS AND LIMITED NUMBER OF MARINE SECURITY FORCES TO SECURE LANDING ZONES.

4. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS INFORMATION BE HELD IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE TO PREVENT ANY PUBLICITY THAT COULD JEOPARDIZE THE LIVES OF THE REMAINING AMERICANS IN PHNOM PENH. END MESSAGE.

5. PLEASE CONFIRM WHEN MESSAGE HAS BEEN DELIVERED. KISSINGER

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 076346

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ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 R

DRAFTED BY EA:RHMILLER:AOA

APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY (PER SECTO 2)

EA-MR. HABIB

S/P-MR. LORD

S/S- FORTIZ

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O 041557Z APR 75 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 076346

NODIS

CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS:PFOR, CB, CH, US

SUBJECT: REQUEST FROM SIHANOUK

REF: PEKING 581

YOU SHOULD TAKE NO FURTHER INITIATIVE TO MEET WITH PHUNG,
BUT YOU SHOULD KEEP THE CHANNEL OPEN IF HE SEEKS ANOTHER
MEETING WITH HOLDRIDGE. IN THE LATTER EVENT YOU SHOULD
SEEK IMMEDIATE INSTRUCTIONS. INGERSOLL

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PAGE 01 STATE 076758

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ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 R

DRAFTED BY EA:RHMILLER:AOA

APPROVED BY EA:P.C.HABIB

S- MR. BREMER

NSC - GENERAL SCOWCROFT

S/S- FORTIZ

S/P - WINSTON LORD

123516

O 042039Z APR 75 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USLO PEKING NIACT IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 076758

NODIS

CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR ,CB,

SUBJECT: REQUEST FROM SIHANOUK

REF: PEKING'S 603 AND 613

WE HAVE SEEN REUTER'S TICKER QUOTING YOU AS SAYING, "THERE HAVE BEEN NO EFFORTS ON MY PART TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION AT ALL." IN VIEW OF THE MESSAGE THAT HOLDRIDGE CONVEYED TO PHUNG (STATE 71721), WE BELIEVE YOU SHOULD RESPOND TO ANY FURTHERPRESS QUERIES BY SAYING THAT YOU HAVE NO FURTHER COMMENT. FOR OUR PART HERE, WE WILL SAY WE HAVE NO COMMENT ON SUCH STORIES. INGERSOLL

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 9.5

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR, NARA, DATE 5/14/01

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NOD420

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ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 R

DRAFTED BY EA:JJHELBLE/SB

APPROVED BY EA - MR. MILLER

S/P - MR. LORD

S - MR. EAGLEBURGER

S/S - JPMOFFAT

027265

O 072040Z APR 75 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USLO PEKING NIACT IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 078362

NODIS

CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, CB, US

SUBJECT: SIHANOUK'S BREACH OF CONFIDENCE

REF: PEKING 625

WE SHARE YOUR DISTRESS AT SIHANOUK'S LACK OF DISCRETION IN HANDLING YOUR LETTER. BELIEVE NO PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED, HOWEVER, TO RAP HIS KNUCKLES, AND YOU SHOULD NOT DO SO. INGERSOLL

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 8.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY NR, MRA, DATE 5/14/01





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NOD930

PAGE 01 STATE 082877

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ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 R

DRAFTED BY EA - MR. HABIB:CB
APPROVED BY EA - MR. HABIB
S/S - MR. ORTIZ
NSC:GEN SCOWCROFT
NSC:GEN. SCOWCROFT

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USLO PEKING FLASH

~~SECRET~~ STATE 082877

EXDIS DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, CB

SUBJECT: CONTACT WITH SIHANOUK

1. AS YOU KNOW WE STILL HAVE NO WORD WHETHER SIHANOUK IS READY TO RETURN TOPHNOmpENH. YOU SHOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH PHUNG AND PASS THE MESSAGE THAT IF SIHANOUK RETURNS TO PHNOM PENH WE WOULD APPRECIATE SOME WORD FROM HIM AS TO HOW TO COMMUNICATE WITH HIM WHILE HE IS THERE.

2. EMBASSY PHNOM PENH PRESENTLY PLANS TO EVACUATE AT APPROXIMATELY 9 A.M. APRIL 12 PHNOM PENH TIME. YOU SHOULD INFORM PHUNG OF THIS 2 HOURS BEFORE EVACUATION IS TO BEGIN. TELL HIM THAT WE WOULD HOPE TO STILL BE ABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH LEADERSHIP IN PHNOM PENH IF NEEDED. KISSINGER

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR, NARA, DATE 5/14/01

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APPROVED BY EA: PCHABIG

S/B: REW0005

SILPBREMER

Z 121731Z APR 75 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USLO PEKING FLASH

~~SECRET~~ STATE 084138

NODIS

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFDR, CB, US

SUBJECT: SIHANDUK

REF: PEKING 6871

1. YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO NO COMMENT ON THE STORY
AS WE ARE HERE.

2. NOTHING SIHANDUK HAS DONE SURPRISES US AND WE WILL
JUST LET HIM PLAY HIS HAND WITHOUT ANY INCLINATION TO
RESPOND, CLARIFY OR PURSUE. KISSINGER

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ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 /001 R

DRAFTED BY NSC:RSOLOMON:MHS
APPROVED BY EA:PCHABIB
EA:WHGLEYSTEN
EA/PRCM:OVARMSTRONG
S/S:MR. KUCHEL
EUR/CAN:DKRUSE

091751

P 101821Z MAY 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USLO PEKING PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ STATE 109675

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3

MR# 10-046-#25

State Rev. 9/24/02, FBI-Ltr 6/9/11

By dal NARA, Date 9/9/11

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH, US, CA

SUBJECT: GOC EXPULSION OF PRC EMBASSY OFFICER

REF: PEKING 888

FOR BUSH FROM HABIB

1. WE APPRECIATE YOUR CONTINUING CONCERN ABOUT MANNER IN WHICH CANADIAN EXPULSION OF KUO CHING-AN, AND ITS LINKAGE TO US ARREST OF PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WOMAN, MAY AFFECT YOUR MISSION.

2. AT THIS POINT USG AGENCIES ARE CONTINUING TO INVESTIGATE THE CASE. THERE MAY BE INDICTMENT OF THE WOMAN ON THE MISDEMEANOR CHARGE OF BRINGING INTO THE U.S. FUNDS IN EXCESS OF HER DECLARATION, BUT THIS ACTION MAY BE DELAYED AS THE FBI PURSUES ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE SECURITY ASPECTS

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OF THE CASE. WE SHOULD HAVE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THIS SITUATION BY THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK AND WILL ADVISE YOU ASAP. FOR THE MOMENT, IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE MATTER AND FACT THAT STATE DEPT. CONTACT WITH GOC ON THIS SUBJECT HAS BEEN LIMITED SO FAR TO DISCUSSION REPORTED STATE 103812, YOU SHOULD LIMIT YOUR DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION WITH AMBASSADOR SMALL.

3. AS THE LEGAL OPTIONS IN THIS CASE ARE CLARIFIED, WE WILL PROBABLY CONSULT WITH OTTAWA TO COORDINATE ANY PUBLIC SURFACING OF THE MATTER SO AS TO MINIMIZE POSSIBLE ADVERSE IMPACT ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH PEKING. IN PARTICULAR, WE WILL TRY TO MAKE CERTAIN IT REMAINS CLEAR THAT THE CANADIANS EXPELLED KUO AT THEIR OWN INITIATIVE AND NOT IN RESPONSE TO URGING OF THE USG. KISSINGER



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DRAFTED BY NSCIRSOLOMON:MHS

APPROVED BY EA/PCHABIB

S/P:HLORD

S: AADAMS

S/S:JLHOGANSON

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O 110120Z MAY 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 100704

NODIS

E.O. 116521 GOS

TAGS: PFOR, CH

SUBJECT: TOUR D'HORIZON WITH HUANG CHEN

1. SECRETARY CALLED IN PRC LIAISON OFFICE CHIEF HUANG CHEN ON MAY 9 FOR HOUR-LONG TOUR D'HORIZON OF POST-INDUCHINA DEVELOPMENTS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ORIENTATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE COMING PERIOD. HUANG HAD BEEN GIVEN A WEEK'S NOTIFICATION OF THE SESSION IN HOPES OF HIS GETTING NEW GUIDANCE FROM PEKING WHICH WOULD REFLECT PRC THINKING ON PRESENT AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS.

2. SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT HE HAD READ AN EDITORIAL IN THE PEOPLE'S DAILY OF MAY 8 WHICH OBSERVED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS IN A PERIOD OF STRATEGIC PASSIVITY. HE SAID THAT WHILE THERE WERE MANY POINTS IN THE EDITORIAL HE AGREED WITH, PARTICULARLY THOSE REGARDING THE SOVIET UNION, HE DISAGREED WITH THE VIEW THAT THE U.S. IS IN A STRATEGI-

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CALLY PASSIVE POSITION. HE STRESSED THAT IN MANY RESPECTS WE ARE PSYCHOLOGICALLY STRONGER NOW BECAUSE VIET-NAM ISSUES WILL NOT HAVE TO BE DEBATED EVERY WEEK. HE ADDED THAT THERE IS NO CHANGE IN OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE DANGERS OF HEGEMONY IN THE WORLD AS STRESSED IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE.

3. TURNING TO SPECIFIC ISSUES, THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT REGARDING US-PHC BILATERAL RELATIONS THE ADMINISTRATION FULLY MAINTAINS ITS COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. HE OBSERVED THAT OCCASIONAL STATEMENTS WHICH MAY NOT BE FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THIS ORIENTATION ARE DUE TO INADVERTENCE.

4. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTENTIONS TO MAINTAIN CLOSE RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND WITH SOME OF OUR FRIENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. HE SAID HE BELIEVED WE WOULD NOW SEE MORE ATTENTION TO AN ASIAN SECURITY SYSTEM AS PROPOSED BY THE SOVIETS. THE U.S. DOES NOT FAVOR SUCH A DEVELOPMENT.

5. THE SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT IT WAS UP TO OTHER COUNTRIES TO CONSIDER THEIR VIEWS ABOUT QUOTE: HEGEMONIES WITHIN THEIR OWN REGIONS. UNQUOTE. THE ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT FAVOR SUCH LOCAL HEGEMONISM; THE U.S. WOULD CO-OPERATE IN PREVENTING IT WHERE THERE WAS SOME REASONABLE CHANCE OF SUCCESS, BUT WE WOULD NOT DO OTHER PEOPLE'S WORK FOR THEM.

6. WITH RESPECT TO KOREA, THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES TOLERATE A MILITARY ATTACK ON SOUTH KOREA. SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD INVOLVE THE CERTAINTY OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT. HE ADDED THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT PEACEFUL EVOLUTION ON THE PENINSULA, AND THAT WE REMAIN PREPARED TO DISCUSS APPROACHES TO DISSOLVING THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND AND HOW TO CREATE CONDITIONS FOR CO-EXISTENCE ON THE PENINSULA.

7. REGARDING THE MIDDLE EAST, THE SECRETARY SAID WE SEE TWO MAIN DANGERS: ONE IS POSSIBLE SOVIET DOMINATION; THE OTHER IS DIPLOMATIC STAGNATION. HE REVIEWED AMERICAN EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE IN THE AREA

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AND SAID THAT WE WERE DETERMINED TO PERSEVERE IN OUR ROLE.

8. WITH RESPECT TO EUROPE AND NATO, THE SECRETARY COMMENTED ON THE PRESIDENT'S FORTHCOMING TRIP TO EUROPE AND HIS EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN RELATIONS WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES. HE STATED THERE WOULD BE NO WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS ANYWHERE EXCEPT THAILAND AND TAIWAN DURING REMAINDER OF THIS ADMINISTRATION, AND PARTICULARLY NOT FROM EUROPE.

9. THE SECRETARY THEN REVIEWED AMERICAN EFFORTS IN THE GULF STATES AND SOUTH ASIA. HE NOTED THAT BOTH PEKING AND WASHINGTON RELATIONS WITH NEW DELHI HAD COOLED SOMEWHAT OF LATE. HE SAID THAT AS THE U.S. AND PRC PURSUE PARALLEL OBJECTIVES IN THEIR FOREIGN POLICIES, WE SHOULD AVOID

PERIPHERAL CONFRONTATIONS.

10. THE SECRETARY QUESTIONED AMBASSADOR HUANG ABOUT POSSIBLE CHINESE VIEWS ON TIMING, TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION, AND POSSIBLE RESULTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S ANTICIPATED TRIP TO PEKING LATER THIS YEAR. HUANG FAILED TO OFFER ANY SUGGESTIONS, SAID THE PRESIDENT WAS WELCOME ANY TIME, AND ASKED FOR OUR VIEWS. THE SECRETARY THEN INDICATED THAT OUR ORIGINAL THOUGHT HAD BEEN OF A TRIP SOME TIME BETWEEN MID-NOVEMBER AND THE FIRST WEEK OF DECEMBER. HE INDICATED OUR INTENTION TO WORK OUT A COMMUNIQUE SUBSTANTIALLY IN ADVANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. HE IRONICALLY INVITED THE PRC FOREIGN MINISTER TO WASHINGTON FOR THIS PURPOSE AND WHEN HE GOT THE STANDARD RESPONSE, THE SECRETARY INDICATED THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY AGREE TO A PRIOR TRIP OF HIS OWN.

11. AMBASSADOR HUANG RESPONDED TO THE SECRETARY'S DISCUSSION BY REITERATING WHAT HE TERMED THE PRINCIPLED POSITIONS WHICH THE PRC HAS CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED IN ITS FOREIGN POLICY AND THAT CHAIRMAN MAO HAD EXPRESSED TO US. HE NOTED THAT THESE POSITIONS ARE EXPRESSED IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. HUANG OBSERVED THAT NOW THAT THE U.S. HAS DISENGAGED FROM VIET-NAM IT SHOULD LEARN CORRECT LESSONS FROM THIS EXPERIENCE. HE STATED THE PRC'S CONSISTENT POSITION OF RESOLUTE SUPPORT FOR THE KOREAN PEOPLE IN THEIR

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EFFORTS TO REUNIFY THEIR COUNTRY BY QUOTE INDEPENDENT AND PEACEFUL MEANS. UNQUOTE. HE COMMENTED THAT FROM THE PRC POINT OF VIEW, THE SOUTH KOREANS HAD MADE REPEATED PROVOCATIONS AGAINST THE NORTH. THE SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT WE WOULD PREVENT ANY SOUTH KOREAN ATTACKS ON THE NORTH, BUT THAT IF A WAR STARTED ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA IT WOULD BE CLEAR ON WHICH SIDE OF THE LINE THE TROOPS WERE AND THAT THE U.S. WOULD TAKE ACTIONS ACCORDINGLY. THE SECRETARY WAS VERY FIRM ON OUR WARNINGS AGAINST MILITARY ACTION, WHILE REMAINING OPEN ON PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE.

12. IN CONCLUSION, THE SECRETARY REVIEWED HIS, AND THE PRESIDENT'S EUROPEAN TRAVEL PLANS.

13. COMMENT: DESPITE OUR EFFORTS TO DRAW OUT THE PRC SIDE ON ANY SUBSTANTIVE INSIGHTS INTO THEIR FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATION, HUANG GAVE NO INDICATION OF ANY NEW INSTRUCTION FROM PEKING. HE REPEATED STANDARD PRC POLICY POSITIONS. THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THREE POINTS IN THIS PRESENTATION: THAT THE US WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY A STRONG ROLE IN THE WORLD AND THAT INDEED OUR POSTURE WILL BE PARTICULARLY FORCEFUL IN THE WAKE OF INDOCHINA; THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S ORIENTATION TOWARD DEVELOPMENT OF U.S.-

PRC BILATERAL RELATIONS REMAINS UNCHANGED; AND THAT WE WILL NOT TOLERATE ANY MILITARY ACTION BY NORTH KOREA AGAINST THE SOUTH. HE ALSO OBLIQUELY GOT ACROSS THAT WE WERE LOOKING FOR MORE CHINESE COOPERATION--OR AT LEAST LESS UNHELPFULNESS--ON THIRD COUNTRY ISSUES. KISSINGER

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DRAFTED BY EA/PHCMIOVARMSTRONGIMFR
APPROVED BY DI KSINGERSOLL
KAIJOZURHELLEN
S/S: KRUCHEL

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USLO PEKING NIACT IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 11652:GDS

TAUB: IFOR, CH, CB


SUBJECT: CAMBODIAN SEIZURE OF U.S. MERCHANT VESSEL

1. DEPUTY SECRETARY INGERSOLL CALLED IN HUANG CHEN MONDAY AFTERNOON, MAY 12, TO REQUEST PRC ASSISTANCE IN PASSING MESSAGE TO CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES REGARDING CAMBODIAN SEIZURE OF A US MERCHANT SHIP. INGERSOLL FIRST READ STATEMENT ISSUED TODAY BY THE WHITE HOUSE (SEE BELOW) AND THEN SAID WE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF THE CHINESE WOULD PASS A MESSAGE TO THE CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES. BEFORE HE COULD READ THE MESSAGE, HUANG CHEN INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT THE GRUNK IS AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN STATE, THAT HE WOULD NOT TRANSMIT ANY MESSAGE FOR US, THAT IF WE HAVE ANY MESSAGE FOR THE CAMBODIANS, WE SHOULD USE OTHER CHANNELS. HE ALMOST BELLIGERENTLY MAINTAINED THAT POSITION, DESPITE OUR STATEMENTS THAT WE HAD NO DIRECT CHANNELS TO THE AUTHORITIES IN CAMBODIA, THAT MATTER WAS URGENT, AND THAT WE THOUGHT US-PRC RELATIONSHIP WAS SUCH THAT CHINESE WOULD BE WILLING TO ASSIST IN TRANSMITTING

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MESSAGE. NEAR END OF CONVERSATION HE SAID THAT IF THIS WAS ONLY SUBJECT INGERSOLL WISHED TO DISCUSS, HE WOULD SAY GOODBYE. INGERSOLL ASKED IF HE WOULD LISTEN TO THE MESSAGE WE WISHED TO PASS TO CAMBODIANS AND REPORT IT TO

HIS GOVT. HUANG CHEN REITERATED THAT "THIS IS YOUR MATTER, IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH US."

2. HUANG CHEN WILL OF COURSE REPORT TO HIS GOVT. IN PEKING, AND WE ASSUME CHINESE WILL INFORM CAMBODIANS OF OUR APPROACH AND THEIR REACTION.

3. YOU SHOULD URGENTLY DELIVER MESSAGE IN PARAGRAPH 4 TO PRC MFA AS WELL AS TO GRUNK. THERE SHOULD BE NO PERSONAL CONTACT BEYOND DELIVERY IN EITHER CASE AND DELIVERY SHOULD BE BY SOMEONE OTHER THAN BUSH. MESSAGES SHOULD BE WRITTEN, NOT DELIVERED ORALLY.

4. BEGIN TEXT. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES REQUESTS THAT YOU PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE URGENTLY TO THE AUTHORITIES IN PHNOM PENH.

BEGIN QUOTE.

NAVAL FORCES CONTROLLED BY THE CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE SEIZED AN AMERICAN MERCHANT VESSEL, THE SS MAYAGUEZ, THIS MORNING IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS IN THE GULF OF THAILAND. WE UNDERSTAND THE SHIP AND CREW HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO THE PORT OF KUMPUNG SOM.

THIS IS AN ACT OF INTERNATIONAL PIRACY. THE VESSEL WAS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND REPRESENTED NO DANGER TO THE AUTHORITIES IN CAMBODIA OR TO ANYBODY ELSE.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DEMANDS THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE VESSEL AND OF THE FULL CREW. IF THAT RELEASE DOES NOT IMMEDIATELY TAKE PLACE, THE AUTHORITIES IN PHNOM PENH WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONSEQUENCES. END QUOTE

5. STATEMENT MAY 12 BY WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

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BEGIN TEXT. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT A CAMBODIAN NAVAL VESSEL HAS SEIZED AN AMERICAN MERCHANT SHIP ON THE HIGH SEAS AND FORCED IT TO THE PORT OF KOMPONG SUM. THE PRESIDENT HAS MET WITH THE NSC. HE CONSIDERS THIS SEIZURE AN ACT OF PIRACY. HE HAS INSTRUCTED THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO DEMAND THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE SHIP. FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD HAVE THE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. END TEXT

6. ALTHOUGH PRESS IS BEGINNING TO SPECULATE THAT HUANG CHEN CALL WAS RELATED TO SHIP SEIZURE, WE ARE NOT CONFIRMING THAT WAS THE SUBJECT. INGERSOLL

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DRAFTED BY EA/PRCM:OVARSTRONG:MFR
APPROVED BY EA PHILIP C. HABIB
S/P:WLOD (DRAFT)
NSC:RSOLOMON (DRAFT)
EA:WHGLEESTEEN, JR.
S/S:REWOODS

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R 170132Z MAY 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USLO PEKING

~~SECRET~~ STATE 115817

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH

SUBJECT: TOURD'HORIZON WITH HUANG CHEN

REF: PEKING 916

FOR BUSH FROM HABIB

1. WE UNDERSTAND YOUR POINT. IF CH'IAO KUAN-HUA COMES TO THE UN, THE SECRETARY WILL VERY LIKELY HAVE A SESSION WITH HIM AS IN THE PAST, AND THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP WOULD CERTAINLY BE DISCUSSED. HOWEVER, DEPENDING ON HOW OUR OWN THINKING ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT DEVELOPS, WE DOUBT THAT CONVERSATIONS IN NEW YORK WOULD SUFFICE. CH'IAO WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO BRING WITH HIM SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY AND WOULD NOT HAVE THE FAST ACCESS TO HIGHER-LEVEL GUIDANCE WHICH IS POSSIBLE IN PEKING. ALSO, A NEW YORK DISCUSSION - EVEN SEVERAL SESSIONS - WOULD NOT PROVIDE ENOUGH PROTECTED

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
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TIME TO GAME PLAN THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP IN DETAIL.

2. NEVERTHELESS, WE'LL KEEP OUR OPTIONS OPEN AND WILL LET
YOU KNOW AS THINKING BACK HERE CRYSTALIZES FURTHER. KISSINGER

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S/P - MR. LORU

NSC - SOLOMON

S - MR. BARBIAN

S/S FOTZ

O 040132Z JUL 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE

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~~SECRET~~ STATE 158648

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH, TW, US

SUBJECT: CONVERSATIONS WITH PROFESSOR C.P. LI

REF: PEKING 1201

1. WE MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR ALERT REPORTS (REFTEL AND MESSAGE THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS) ON YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH C.F. LI. HIS MESSAGE ABOUT PRESIDENT FORD'S BEING WELCOME IN PEKING REGARDLESS OF PROGRESS ON THE TAIWAN QUESTION PARALLELS OTHER COMMENTS TO THIS EFFECT. HIS SUGGESTION ABOUT A PRC STATEMENT "FOR DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION" REGARDING PEACEFUL UNIFICATION WITH TAIWAN WOULD BE NOTHING MORE THAN HIS OWN IDEA. BUT IT MIGHT REFLECT ONE WAY THE PRC WOULD BE WILLING TO MEET OUR PROBLEM AND, IF SO, MIGHT BE WORTH EXPLORING IN CONTEXT OF OTHER ISSUES. WE DO NOT, HOWEVER, WISH TO ENCOURAGE LI INTO ROLE OF AN INTERMEDIARY.

~~SECRET~~

HR 5/14/01





Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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2. ACCORDINGLY, WE REQUEST THAT YOU TAKE NO FURTHER INITIATIVE IN CONTACTS WITH LI. IF HE ASKS ABOUT USG REACTIONS TO HIS REMARKS, YOU SHOULD SIMPLY REPEAT THAT YOU HAVE REPORTED THEM TO WASHINGTON. SISCO

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NOU13

E.O. 11652: XGDS

TAGS: OREP, CH

SUBJECT: BRIEFING OF CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS TO THE
PRC

REF: PEKING 1387

1. SECRETARY GAVE A VERY BROAD-BRUSH BRIEFING. FOLLOWING
ARE HIGHLIGHTS.
2. PRC LEADERS HAVE A HARD-HEADED VIEW OF THE US-PRC
RELATIONSHIP, AND VALUE IT PRIMARILY AS A MEANS OF MAIN-
TAINING A WORLD BALANCE OF POWER TO COUNTER THE SOVIET
UNION. THIS VIEW IS REFLECTED IN THEIR SUPPORT FOR NATO
AND A STRONG US-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP AND THEIR CONCERN THAT
THE SOVIETS WILL INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE
EAST AND OTHER REGIONS IN THE WORLD.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY DK, NARA, DATE 5/14/01





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3. TAIWAN HAS OF COURSE BEEN DISCUSSED BUT IS NOT THE CENTRAL ISSUE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. WE WILL HAVE TO MOVE FURTHER BUT WHETHER IT IS THIS YEAR, NEXT YEAR OR LATER IS NOT CRITICAL. THE CHINESE HAVE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL BE WELCOME REGARDLESS OF THE TAIWAN PROBLEM.

4. THE CHINESE ARE CONCERNED THAT A POWERFUL NORTH VIETNAM WILL DOMINATE SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THAT THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE NEW OPENINGS IN INDOCHINA. AT PRESENT THE SOVIETS HAVE MORE INFLUENCE IN HANOI THAN THE CHINESE, BUT HANOI IS NOT A SOVIET STOGE. THE CHINESE ARE SUPPORTING THE CAMBODIANS, AND DID NOT URGE THE THAIS AND FILIPINOS TO OUST THE U.S.

5. REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUCCESSION CRISIS, WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT WILL HAPPEN AFTER MAO AND CHOU DIE. OUTSIDERS KNOW VERY LITTLE ABOUT THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN CHINA.

6. IN THE CONGRESSMEN'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CHINESE, IT WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL TO MAKE SUGGESTIONS FOR SOLVING THE TAIWAN PROBLEM, BUT STRESSING OUR DESIRE FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WOULD BE USEFUL. THE CHINESE WILL WELCOME ANY COMMENTS ABOUT THE U.S. MAINTAINING A GLOBAL ROLE IN ASIA AND EUROPE. SOME MENTION OF BIPARTISAN CONTINUITY IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY WOULD BE USEFUL. INGERSOLL

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 TO USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 246129

NOOS

E.O. 116521 GDS

TAGS: AFSP, CH

SUBJECT: EXPANDED USLO

REF: A. PEKING 1914, B. PEKING 1915

1. REFTELS ARE USEFUL ADDITIONS TO THE THINKING ON
 STAFFING AND SPACE WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON HERE SINCE YOU
 LEFT. WE HAVE COME OUT ABOUT THE SAME PLACE YOU DO.

2. WE HAVE PREPARED TWO PAPERS FOR THE SECRETARY'S
 BRIEFING BOOK. THE FIRST PAPER SUGGESTS THAT WE TELL THE
 CHINESE THAT WE WANT TO ADD A FEW MORE OFFICERS TO USLO,
 THAT WE NEED MORE SPACE IN ORDER TO DO SO, AND THAT WE HOPE
 THE DSR WILL FIND A WAY TO MEET OUR NEEDS WHEN USLO
 DISCUSSES THE MATTER IN DETAIL. REGARDING STAFF INCREASES,
 WE HAD IN MIND PERHAPS TWO POLITICAL OFFICERS AND ONE
 ECONOMIC OFFICER (IN ADDITION TO AGRICULTURE OFFICER),
 WITH APPROPRIATE INCREASE IN SUPPORT STAFF. THERE WOULD

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HR 5/14/01





Department of State

TELEGRAM

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RE SOME SHIFT OF REPORTING RESPONSIBILITIES FROM HONG KONG TO PEKING. (THERE IS A SEPARATE BRIEFING PAPER ON A MILITARY ATTACHE, MUCH ALONG LINES PARA 5, REF A.) ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT TRIED TO WORK OUT ALL THE DETAILS, WE BELIEVE THIS COULD TAKE PLACE ALMOST AS SOON AS OFFICE

SPACE BECOMES AVAILABLE. THE QUESTION OF COURSE IS WHETHER A REASONABLE SOLUTION TO THE OFFICE SPACE PROBLEM CAN BE FOUND.

3. THE SECOND PAPER DEALS WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF MENTIONING TO THE CHINESE OUR INTEREST IN A SITE FOR A PERMANENT MISSION IN PEKING. THIS HOWEVER WOULD BE A LONGER-RANGE PROCESS. EVEN IF THE CHINESE PROVIDED A SITE IT WOULD TAKE CONSIDERABLE TIME TO DRAW UP PLANS, OBTAIN FUNDS AND CONSTRUCT A COMPLETELY NEW FACILITY, PREFERABLY TO OUR OWN DESIGN. THUS WHILE WE THINK IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO SEE IF THE CHINESE WOULD BE WILLING TO RESERVE A SITE FOR US, IT IS MORE REALISTIC TO FOCUS OUR IMMEDIATE AND CONCRETE PLANNING ON THE GENERAL CONCEPT OUTLINED IN PARA 2 ABOVE.

4. WE HOPE WE CAN DISCUSS THIS EARLY DURING SECRETARY'S VISIT. KISSINGER

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TO USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE

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NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: EFIN, CH

SUBJECT: US/PRC CLAIMS NEGOTIATIONS

FOLLOWING IS A REPEAT OF STATE 209591, DATED OCTOBER 24,
1973, TO PEKING

BEGIN QUOTE:

1. AS MENTIONED SEPTTEL, USLO SHOULD MAKE PRESENTATION TO
APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF MFA ALONG FOLLOWING LINES RE CLAIMS
SETTLEMENT.

A. SECRETARY WOULD BE PREPARED DURING VISIT TO
PEKING TO FORMALIZE PRIVATE CLAIMS/BLOCKED
ASSETS SETTLEMENT ON BASIS OF DRAFT PRESENTED TO PRC
THROUGH PARIS LAST MARCH 21 RPT 21. SETTLEMENT WOULD
REMOVE FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL OBSTACLE TO TRADE AND PAVE WAY
FOR FURTHER NORMALIZATION OF US-PRC TRADE RELATIONS IN WIDE
VARIETY OF AREAS, INCLUDING MANY WHICH WOULD HELP PRC
IMPROVE TRADE AND PAYMENTS BALANCE WITH U.S., E.G., TRADE

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STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR, NARA, DATE 5/14/01



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EXHIBIT IN U.S., SHIPPING, ETC.

B. WHILE WE ARE NOT SUGGESTING OVERALL DISCUSSION THIS SUBJECT BEFORE SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL, ONE POINT MAY WARRANT PRELIMINARY CLARIFICATION. INFORMAL DISCUSSION ON NUMBER OF OCCASIONS WITH PRC OFFICIALS HAS LED US TO CONCLUSION THAT PRC MAY NOT BE ENTIRELY CLEAR ABOUT U.S. POSITION ON BONDHOLDERS' CLAIMS.

C. WE RAISED BONDHOLDERS' CLAIMS ISSUE IN PARIS ONLY TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE CONSIDERED THIS A MATTER NOT RPT NOT DEALT WITH BY PRIVATE CLAIMS/BLOCKED ASSETS AGREEMENT WHICH NEITHER SIDE HAS TO ADDRESS AT THIS TIME. BONDHOLDERS' CLAIMS DATE FROM BEFORE 1949 WHEREAS CLAIMS BEING SETTLED ARE POST-1949. WE DID NOT INTEND TO IMPLY THAT WE WERE URGING PRC TO TAKE ANY PRESENT ACTION WITH REGARD TO BONDS OR THAT WE BELIEVED THAT, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, BONDHOLDERS IN U.S. WERE LIKELY TO HINDER TRADE DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN PRC AND U.S.

3. WE DO NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE THAT BONDHOLDERS' CLAIMS ARE LIKELY TO PROVE A SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLE TO TRADE. SINCE DEFAULTING ON PAYMENT OF CHINESE GOV'T BONDS (WHICH IT CONTINUES TO RECOGNIZE AS VALID LEGAL OBLIGATION) TAIWAN HAS CONTINUED TO TRADE WITH U.S. WITHOUT HARASSMENT FROM BONDHOLDERS. MOREOVER, DEFAULTED OR REPUDIATED BONDS HAVE NOT NOTABLY HINDERED OUR COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS WITH A NUMBER OF OTHER COUNTRIES, SUCH AS THE USSR, POLAND, ROMANIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA. ONE REASON ATTACHMENT HAS NOT BEEN A PRACTICAL DANGER HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE EXPENSE TO CLAIMANT COUPLED WITH LOW LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS.

E. WE TRADITIONALLY LEAVE DEFAULTED BOND CLAIMS TO BE NEGOTIATED BETWEEN GOVERNMENT CONCERNED AND FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS' PROTECTIVE COUNCIL (PRIVATE ORGANIZATION REPRESENTING INTERESTS OF ALL U.S. BONDHOLDERS). WE DO NOT RPT NOT ESPOUSE CLAIMS BASED ON DEFAULTED BONDS AT INTERGOVERNMENTAL LEVEL. WE HAVE TAKEN NO POSITION ON WHETHER OR NOT GOVERNMENT OF PRC IS LEGALLY

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 STATE 248454

OBLIGATED TO PAY THESE BONDS.

F. NOT ONLY WOULD WE NOT RPT NOT ENCOURAGE AN EFFORT BY BONDHOLDERS TO ATTACH CHINESE PROPERTY, WE WOULD SEEK ACTIVELY TO DISCOURAGE SUCH AN ATTEMPT. IN ANY EVENT, WE HAVE NO INFORMATION TO SUGGEST BONDHOLDERS THINKING ALONG LINES OF ATTACHMENT, AND, IN VIEW OF CONSIDERATIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE, DOUBT THEY WOULD ATTEMPT IT.

G. WE HOPE THAT PRC UNDERSTANDS WE DO NOT RPT NOT WISH TO INCLUDE BONDHOLDERS' CLAIMS IN PRESENT CLAIMS SETTLEMENT BECAUSE TO DO SO WOULD BE CONTRARY TO OUR SETTLEMENT BECAUSE TO DO SO WOULD BE CONTRARY TO OUR PRACTICE AND WOULD RAISE MANY UNNECESSARY PROBLEMS OF LEGAL AND PRACTICAL NATURE.

H. (AT YOUR DISCRETION) IF BOND CLAIMS WERE INCLUDED IN THE CLAIMS/ASSETS SETTLEMENT, IT WOULD IMPLY THAT THE PRC ACCEPTS LIABILITY FOR EVEN LARGER AMOUNT OF THESE BONDS HELD BY NON-AMERICANS, AND OTHER BONDS.

I. IF PRC HAS ANY OTHER TECHNICAL PROBLEMS WITH CLAIMS SETTLEMENT AS PROPOSED, WE HOPE THAT IT WILL LET US KNOW BEFORE SECRETARY'S TRIP SO THAT WE MAY BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THEM.

2. (FYI: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS REFERRED TO ABOVE INCLUDE REDUCING AMOUNT OF MONEY AVAILABLE FOR PRO RATA COMPENSATION OF OUR CLAIMANTS AND POSSIBLE RESULTING PROBLEMS WITH BOTH CLAIMANTS AND CONGRESS. THERE IS ALSO SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT ISSUE, I.E., PRC SETTLEMENT OF BONDS WITH U.S. WOULD CONSTITUTE U.S. AND PRC RECOGNITION OF PRC AS LEGITIMATE SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT TO ROC ON CHINA MAINLAND AT TIME WHEN U.S. CONTINUED TO RECOGNIZE ROC, RESULTING IN CLEAR TWO CHINAS SITUATION.) IN THIS CONNECTION WE NOTE ALSO THAT BONDHOLDERS' CLAIMS HAVE NOT HINDERED PRC TRADE WITH THIRD COUNTRIES, EVEN THOSE THAT RECOGNIZE PRC AS SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT TO ROC. KISSINGER

END QUOTE. INGERSOLL

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USLQ PEKING IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 248459

NODIS

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: CPRS, CH

SUBJECT: US/PRC CLAIMS SETTLEMENT

FOLLOWING IS A REPEAT OF STATE 050887, NODIS, TO PARIS
DATED MARCH 20, 1973:

QUOTE: 1. YOU SHOULD SEEK EARLY MEETING TO DELIVER TO THE
PRC THE FOLLOWING MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT CON-
CERNING A SETTLEMENT OF U.S. PRIVATE CLAIMS AND PRC BLOCKED
ASSETS DELIVERED TO AMEMBASSY ON MARCH 12:

BEGIN TEXT:

"THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCEPTS THE REVISED DRAFT
EXCHANGE OF LETTERS PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING CHANGE IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF
THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI, WHICH IS
NECESSARY TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT RELATES
TO ALL CHINESE ASSETS WHICH ARE BLOCKED BY THE FOREIGN
ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF THE TREASURY:

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HR 5/14/01





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THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER SHOULD READ:

"TO THIS END, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, ACTING FOR AND IN BEHALF OF ITS NATIONALS, ALSO RENOUNCES ALL RIGHTS, TITLE AND INTEREST IN PROPERTIES AND ASSETS LOCATED IN THE UNITED STATES, OR LOCATED ELSEWHERE SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION AND CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, IN WHICH DESIGNATED NATIONALS OR SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA HAVE A CLAIM OR INTEREST THEREIN, AND ASSIGNS ALL CLAIMS RELATING TO SUCH PROPERTIES AND ASSETS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES."

AN IDENTICAL CHANGE WOULD, OF COURSE, BE MADE IN THE COMPARABLE QUOTED PORTION OF PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT NIXON. END TEXT.

2. AT THE SAME TIME AS THIS MESSAGE IS DELIVERED TO THE PRC, REQUEST YOU MAKE ORAL PRESENTATION ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

WE TRUST THE PRC UNDERSTANDS THAT THE DRAFT EXCHANGE OF LETTERS SETTling US-PRC CLAIMS DOES NOT INCLUDE CLAIMS AGAINST THE PRC BASED UPON DEFAULTED CHINESE GOVERNMENT TREASURY NOTES, RAILWAY LOANS, PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT BONDS, AND OTHER BONDED INDEBTEDNESS ISSUED BY PREDECESSOR CHINESE GOVERNMENTS PRIOR TO OCTOBER 1, 1949. YOU SHOULD STATE THAT, WHILE IT IS WELL SETTLED UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW THAT SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENTS ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OBLIGATIONS CONTRACTED BY THEIR PREDECESSORS, WE DO NOT WISH AT PRESENT TO ADDRESS THIS POINT. THE USG WILL FOLLOW ITS TRADITIONAL POLICY AND PRACTICE AND NOT ESPOUSE CLAIMS OF ITS NATIONALS AGAINST THE PRC FOR DEFAULTED BONDS AND WILL CONSIDER THE MATTER ONE FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE AMERICAN BONDHOLDERS OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES AND THE FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED. FYI "DESIGNATED NATIONAL" MEANS AN INDIVIDUAL, CORPORATION OR OTHER ENTITY WHOSE ASSETS HAVE BEEN BLOCKED; "SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONAL" MEANS THE

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PRC AND ANY AGENCY OR INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF OR ANY
PERSON ACTING THEREFOR WHOSE ASSETS HAVE BEEN BLOCKED. END
FYI. END QUOTE. INGERSOLL

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APPROVED BY EA:WHOLEYSTEEN, JR.
S/P - MR. LORD
S/S - MR. ORTIZ

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TO 081933Z DEC 75 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USLO PEKING RIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY TAIPEI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: HVIP (HABIB, PHILIP C.)

SUBJECT: HABIB TRAVEL TO TAIWAN

REF: PEKING 2366

AMEMBASSY SEOUL FOR HABIB

1. BY THE TIME YOUR REQUEST FOR INSTRUCTIONS WAS RECEIVED, WE THOUGHT TAIPEI HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED TO INFORM THE GROC AND TO RESPOND TO PRESS INQUIRIES. SINCE THEN WE HAVE DISCOVERED A FOUL-UP DELAYING NOTIFICATIONS IN TAIWAN.
2. THUS IF YOU HAVE NOT YET SEEN ANY PRESS REFERENCES IN PEKING TO HABIB'S TRAVEL TO TAIWAN, SUGGEST THAT YOU GET IN TOUCH WITH LIN PING OR NANCY YANG. STATE YOU ARE NOT AWARE WHETHER BUSH INFORMED THEM OF HABIB'S INTENTION TO INCLUDE TAIPEI IN HIS TRAVEL PLANS BUT IN ANY EVENT BUSH INTENDED TO DO SO. KISSINGER



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EA - MR. HABIB (DRAFT)

ARA - MR. RYAN (DRAFT)

AF/C - MR. ANDREW (DRAFT)

S/P - MR. LORD

S/S-O: MR. JOHNSON

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INFO AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN PRIORITY

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NO013

E.O. 11652: XGDS 3

TAGS: PFOR, CH, AD, CU, GY

SUBJECT: CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA: CUBAN USE OF
GUYANESE FACILITIES

1. CUBAN AIRCRAFT FERRYING MILITARY SUPPLIES AND PERSONNEL FOR USE IN ANGOLA HAVE FOR OVER TWO MONTHS USED BARBADOS AS A REFUELING STOP. IT NOW APPEARS THAT, UNDER PRESSURE FROM US AND PRESS EXPOSURE, BARBADOS WILL REFUSE FURTHER USE OF ITS FACILITIES FOR THIS PURPOSE. TRINIDAD HAS ALREADY PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED THAT CUBAN AIR LIFT TO ANGOLA MAY NOT RPT NOT USE TRINIDAD FACILITIES. WE ASSUME GOC IS CASTING ABOUT FOR AN ALTERNATIVE REFUELING STOP, AND MOST LIKELY CANDIDATE IS MARXIST GOVERNMENT OF GUYANA.

2. GOC HAS RECENTLY MOVED CLOSE TO CUBA, UNLESS THEY ARE

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*

STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES *SW 9/26/02*

BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *2/4/03*





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DISSEMINATED, WE THINK THERE IS CHANCE GOG MIGHT PERMIT
REFUELING OF CUBAN MILITARY AIRCRAFT DESTINED FOR ANGOLA.

3. REQUEST YOU OUTLINE ABOVE SITUATION TO APPROPRIATE
PRC OFFICIAL, PREFERABLY LIN PING, AND SUGGEST THAT PRC
USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH GOG TO PREVENT POSSIBLE CUBAN USE
OF GOG FACILITIES FOR ANGOLA AIR LIFT. YOU MAY SAY THAT

OUR RELATIONS WITH THAT GOVERNMENT ARE SUCH THAT WE THINK
PRC EFFORT WITH GOG MUCH MORE LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE THAN
OURS. KISSINGER

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TO USLO PEKING PRIORITY

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NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (NIXON, RICHARD M.) US, CH

SUBJECT: VISIT TO PRC OF FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON

REF: (A) PEKING 250, (B) PEKING 251

1. DEPARTMENT CONCURS THAT USLO ACTING CHIEF SHOULD BE AT AIRPORT FOR ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON, AND CAN MAKE COURTESY OFFER OF USLO ASSISTANCE.

2. REGARDING ATTENDANCE AT DINNERS, MEETINGS OR OTHER FUNCTIONS, WE WISH TO LEAVE INITIATIVE ENTIRELY TO THE FORMER PRESIDENT OR CHINESE. (WE DOUBT THEY WILL REQUEST USLO PARTICIPATION.) INGERSOLL

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HR 5/14/01





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NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CHUS

SUBJECT: NOMINATION OF NEW USLO CHIEF

FOR ACTING CHIEF THAYER ONLY

1. THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED TO NOMINATE THOMAS S. GATES, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND CURRENTLY WITH MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST, AS OUR NEW LIAISON CHIEF IN PEKING. LORD PASSED THIS WORD TO THE CHINESE FOR THEIR PRIOR APPROVAL PER PREVIOUS CUSTOM AND AMBASSADOR HAN HSU INFORMED LORD MARCH 6 THAT THE PRC GOVERNMENT AGREES.

2. LORD TOLD THE CHINESE THAT WE EXPECTED TO MAKE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT VERY SOON AND THAT WE WOULD ALERT THEM IN ADVANCE. WE WILL ALERT YOU AS WELL. LORD ADDED THAT GATES WOULD PROCEED TO PEKING AS EXPEDITIOUSLY

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HR 5/14/01

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AS POSSIBLE AND THIS MIGHT BE AS SOON AS EARLY APRIL.

3. THIS IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY AND YOU NEED TAKE
NO ACTION. INGERSOLL



~~SECRET~~

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SUBJECT: DEMAND TO PROLO ON PEOPLE'S DAILY SUPPORT FOR
CAMBODIAN BOMBING CHARGE

1. WITH APPROVAL OF SECRETARY, ARMSTRONG OF EA/PRCM
CALLED IN FIRST SECRETARY SHEN JO-YUN OF PROLO MARCH 9 TO
DELIVER ORAL STATEMENT REGRETTING CHINESE PUBLIC BACKING
FOR CAMBODIAN ALLEGATION THAT US AIRCRAFT BOMBED SIEM
REAP.

2. TEXT OF STATEMENT AS FOLLOWS, QUOTE:

PEOPLE'S DAILY HAS CARRIED A COMMENTARY SUPPORTING THE
CAMBODIAN CHARGE THAT A U.S. AIRCRAFT BOMBED SIEM REAP AND
STATING THAT THE CHINESE PEOPLE "STRONGLY DENOUNCE THE
AGGRESSIVE ACT OF U.S. IMPERIALISM." THE CAMBODIAN CHARGE
IS COMPLETELY FALSE. NOT ONLY DID NO U.S. PLANE BOMB
CAMBODIA WE WOULD HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO REASON FOR DOING SO.

SECRET

HR 5/14/01





Department of State

TELEGRAM

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WE REJECT THAT THE PEOPLE'S DAILY HAS EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE CAMBODIAN CHARGE WITHOUT ASCERTAINING THE FACTS. IF CHINA WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THIS MATTER, WE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED IT TO HAVE CHECKED THE FACTS WITH US.

LAST FALL, IN NEW YORK, FOREIGN MINISTER CH'IAO URGED SECRETARY KISSINGER TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE CAMBODIANS FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN CAMBODIA AND THE UNITED STATES. HE IMMEDIATELY ACCEPTED THE SUGGESTION AND MADE DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE CAMBODIANS TO WHICH THEY HAVE NOT RESPONDED.

WE ARE STILL WILLING TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH CAMBODIA, BUT THE BOMBING CHARGE BY CAMBODIA, AND CHINESE SUPPORT FOR THAT CHARGE, CERTAINLY MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE WHICH WOULD FACILITATE AN IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WITH CAMBODIA. END QUOTE

3. SHE REJECTED OUR COMPLAINT, ASSERTING THAT PEOPLE'S DAILY WOULD SURELY HAVE VERIFIED ITS FACTS BEFORE SUPPORTING THE CAMBODIAN CHARGE. SHE STATED, "BESIDES, YOU KNOW OUR CONSTANT POSITION IS TO SUPPORT THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND TO BUILD A COUNTRY OF NEUTRALITY, PEACE, AND SOVEREIGNTY." SHE ACKNOWLEDGED FOREIGN MINISTER CH'IAO'S SUGGESTION LAST FALL THAT WE EXPLORE BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE CAMBODIANS, BUT SAID THAT THE U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH CAMBODIA "IS UP TO YOU AND CAMBODIA." A BIT OF GIVE-AND-TAKE FOLLOVED, WITH BOTH SIDES ESSENTIALLY RESTATING THEIR POSITIONS.

4. PRCLD WILL UNDOUBTEDLY REPORT OUR STATEMENT TO PEKING, WHICH MAY INSTRUCT PRCLD FORMALLY TO REJECT OUR COMPLAINT (SHEN WAS AD LIBBING), BUT THE CHINESE MAY DECIDE NOT TO PURSUE THE ISSUE WITH US ANY FURTHER. KISSINGER

~~SECRET~~

