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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ACTION

October 2, 1976

*Dismissed with  
President*

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT  
FROM: WILLIAM GLEYSTEN *WJ*  
SUBJECT: Current State of Play in China, Foreign  
Policy Implications

The President may be interested in our latest assessment of the China picture before he leaves for California.

We might have made it more exciting by engaging in speculation about the outcome of the present power struggle, but frankly, we think the evidence is too thin to warrant that.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/93, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY *WJ*, NARA, DATE *5/11/01*



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Leadership Struggle in China, Impact on Foreign Policy

Summary

There is no sign that the ruling Party Politburo or its elite Standing Committee has moved away from the careful balance of political forces or from the public themes of unity and continuity of policy which have been the centerpieces of PRC pronouncements for the last month.

Nonetheless, a number of signs point to contention within the succession leadership over policy and power as well as to confusion and speculation among lower level officials and the populace at large. Most Chinese seem to feel the "moderates" will dominate in the end with crucial assistance from the military.

There are reports of some breakdown in social order in a number of areas but nothing which would suggest that serious turmoil is about to erupt.

Although the strident line on forceful liberation of Taiwan has receded into the background, increased Chinese concern about U. S. post-election attitudes towards normalization of relations, and particularly about our ties with Taiwan, are reflected in private conversations and some media commentary. Overall, however, Peking is still sending out clear signals that China is committed to continuing improvement of relations with the United States and hostility towards the Soviet Union.

Unity and Continuity on the Surface, Struggle Underneath

As expected, the succession leadership in China has maintained a very careful balance of "moderate" (i. e., pragmatic) and "radical" (i. e., ideologue) forces, with neither side yet able to overpower the other.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*  
SW 9/26/02

NSC MEMO, 11/24/99, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *2/3/03*

Considerable effort has been devoted to giving a public impression that the essentially irreconcilable factions are working in an atmosphere of unity. At the same time, domestic and foreign audiences alike are being reassured about continuity of policy in the post-Mao period.

Nonetheless, there is growing evidence that behind this facade, the power struggle of the last year is continuing. This is seen both in negative signs such as the absence of any but the blandest statements emanating from the center and in positive ways such as continued sharply divergent positions taken by known mouthpieces of the different factions. Provincial leaders throughout China, lacking firm guidance from Peking, have also emphasized ideology or practicality as suits their individual taste. In the absence of an overwhelming authority like Mao to keep the struggle within bounds, we expect that it will intensify over the coming months.

#### Uncertainty Among the People

We have numerous reports, apparently reflecting the same scantiness of information available to outsiders, of restiveness among the people and speculation by peasants and officials alike about the probable shape of the future leadership and the nature of its policies. Many people seem to think there will be an extended period of struggle, but that in the end the "moderates" will win out. They attribute this to the relatively small number of "radicals" (i. e., ideologues) and to the fact that the military will play a decisive role on the side of conservatism. As for Mao's successor, most Chinese seem to agree there will either be some sort of gimmickry (e. g., leave the Chairman's post vacant and work the power relationships around it) or that the Chairmanship will go to a person who is to be given significantly less power. This mood of uncertainty may well explain why the authorities have felt constrained to issue warnings about spreading rumors and have taken stern measures against those who engage in "anti-social" activity.

#### Foreign Policy

We would anticipate that, as there may be adjustments in domestic policy, there may also be some shifting in China's international priorities. But, the indicators emerging from Peking at the moment are almost unanimous in pointing to continuity in foreign policy in general and specifically as regards hostility towards the Soviet Union and a desire to complete the normalization process and improve relations with the United States.



The Chinese haughtily rejected Soviet Party condolences on Mao's death and have responded to the relative stand-down in Soviet anti-Chinese polemics with a virtual tirade of anti-Soviet articles and reiteration of pledges to resist Soviet revisionism. Only three days after Gromyko's UN speech holding out the prospect of normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, Peking's National Day editorial called for "struggle against modern revisionism with the Soviet revisionist renegade clique at the core."

This hard-line posture may reflect some firm decision by the successors. More likely, however, it has been adopted to set the issue aside and also avoid any vulnerability to charges of being soft on Soviet communism. That the hard line is not immutable has already been suggested in two intelligence reports on views of senior Chinese diplomats, one of whom related future PRC policy towards the USSR to the fate of the US-PRC normalization process.

There is continuing emphasis on carrying out Chairman Mao's "revolutionary line in foreign affairs" which has been a code phrase to encompass the opening with the United States. Premier Hua Kuo-feng reiterated to Schlesinger that the US-PRC relationship had the imprimatur of the ultimate authority, emphasizing it was Mao's personal decision to improve relations with the United States. Despite the continuation of Peking's barely disguised vendetta against Secretary Kissinger because of his identification with improved US-Soviet relations, the overall thrust of Chinese policy towards the United States is reflected in the favorable treatment accorded your condolence messages and statement. The Chinese cited in full your references to Mao's role in initiating the normalization process and your commitment to complete it.

While not necessarily influenced by Mao's death, the hard line on forceful liberation of Taiwan which surfaced around the time of Senator Scott's trip to China in July has not been repeated recently. But the basic position that liberation of Taiwan is an internal matter of no concern to us is unchanged, and distress over a perceived American drift towards a two-Chinas or one China-two governments position continues to be expressed with some frequency. A senior PRC diplomat in New York spoke of this recently, citing your use of the term "Mainland China" as evidence. Others, as you know, have referred to the Republican platform and to Governor Carter's statements as signs that no matter who wins in November normalization is in trouble. Peking's concern even has gone to the point that the Chinese Ambassador in Tokyo, apparently acting under instructions, asked Japanese Foreign Minister Kosaka to sound out the U.S. on our intentions towards normalization, particularly about the timing.

While there has thus been some softening of the tone of Peking's comments about Taiwan in the last month, there is every indication that the Chinese see the post-election period as a critical juncture in U.S. - PRC relations and are more than a little concerned about the prospects.

1c  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Saturday, Oct 2

No log number assigned -- Secretariat  
closed (pm).

Mary Ann

Bypassed Sat pm - Orig 1  
& 1 cy. Log # obtained  
Monday am.

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12

# NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NUMBER
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	
10	2	10	4	10	760 5532

INITIAL ACTION O

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES X FROM: SECSTATE                      S/S                      UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT  
SCOWCROFT                      SECDEF                      LOU NO FORN NODIS  
HYLAND                      DCI Steysteen X REF                      C EYES ONLY EXDHS  
DAVIS                      STATE EXSEC                      S CODEWORD  
OTHER                      TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: Current State of Play in China Status Report re  
Form Policy implications


DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION					REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	CONCURRENCE	COORDINATE	INFO		
ADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH						MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT. <u>                    </u>
STAFF SECRETARY						MEMO FOR PRES. <u>                    </u>
CONGRESSIONAL						REPLY FOR <u>                    </u>
ECONOMIC						APPROPRIATE ACTION <u>                    </u>
EUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS						MEMO <u>                    </u> TO <u>                    </u>
FAR EAST/ PRC						RECOMMENDATIONS <u>                    </u>
INTELLIGENCE						JOINT MEMO <u>                    </u>
LATIN AMERICA						REFER TO <u>                    </u> FOR: <u>                    </u>
MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA						ANY ACTION NECESSARY? <u>                    </u>
NSC PLANNING						CONCURRENCE <u>                    </u>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS						DUE DATE: <u>                    </u>
SCIENTIFIC						COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS) <u>                    </u>
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN						

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	STATUS	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	DUE	CY TO
10/2		Scowcroft	X	Pres for info	10/5	
10/10		NSC/S	C	Discussed w/ Pres per Scowcroft		

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH <u>                    </u>	NOTIFY <u>                    </u>	 MICROFILM & FILE ROOMS M/F'D <u>                    </u> BY <u>                    </u> OCT 14 1976 NS DY OPEN <u>                    </u> WH SA PP CLOSE <u>                    </u> RA
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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 9, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT  
FROM: MAX FRIEDERSDORF *M. G.*  
SUBJECT: China Trip *B*

All of the Curtis group have been contacted and accepted the President's invitation to visit the People's Republic of China starting November 8, 1976.

The delegation in Protocol order, which the Chinese have requested, include the following:

1. Senator and Mrs. Carl Curtis (R-Neb)  
(delegation chairman)
2. Senator and Mrs. Birch Bayh (D-Ind)  
(delegation deputy chairman)
3. Senator and Mrs. Howard Baker (R-Tenn)
4. Senator and Mrs. Ernest Hollings (D-South Car)
5. Senator and Mrs. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)
6. Senator and Mrs. Bennett Johnston (D-La)

STAFF

Mr. and Mrs. Robert Wolthuis (White House)  
State Dept. or NSC Escort Officer

cc: Jack Marsh  
Bob Wolthuis



## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~ACTION

September 24, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEN

SUBJECT: Congressional Travel to the PRC

We have received word from the PRC Liaison Office (PRCLO) that the CODEL Curtis trip is on for November, with specific dates to be determined by mutual agreement. We have proposed that the delegation plan to arrive in Shanghai November 8 for a two-week stay, exiting from Canton by rail to Hong Kong. PRCLO will be in touch when Peking has responded to these suggestions.

Given the likelihood of a busy Congressional travel schedule after the election, I suggest that Bud McFarlane make tentative arrangements for a plane. He could be in touch with either my office (Romberg) or Cathie DeSibour regarding further details.

You will recall that we deferred decision on Max Friedersdorf's desire to arrange a House delegation to the PRC until after we had firmed up the CODEL Curtis trip. I remain opposed to asking the Chinese to accept another delegation for a number of reasons.

First, the Chinese will presumably turn it down. But even if they did not, the approach would reinforce the impression that we are always beseeching the PRC for favors (leaving them with the feeling that we owe them debts for fulfilling our requests) and it would add to the growing asymmetry in the relationship. All of this increasingly complicates our efforts to negotiate with them on issues across the board.

Moreover, I believe at the present stage in our relationship it would be inappropriate to make this kind of approach.

Cathie DeSibour concurs in recommending against approaching the Chinese at this time on a House delegation but cautions that there will be continuing Congressional pressures for such a trip. State also concurs in recommending against an approach.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/93, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR, DATE 5/11/01

~~SECRET~~

2

RECOMMENDATION:

That you inform Friedersdorf it would be inappropriate for foreign policy reasons to raise another Congressional trip with the Chinese at this time.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE   *B*  

~~SECRET~~





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DOC		RECD			LOG NUMBER
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	
9	24	9	25	09	7605351

INITIAL ACTION O

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

TO: PRES	FROM: SECSTATE	S/S	UNCLAS	LOG IN/OUT
SCOWCROFT <u>X</u>	SECDEF		LOU	NO FORN
HYLAND	DCI <u>GLAYSTEEN</u>	X REF		EYES ONLY
DAVIS	STATE EXSEC		TS	CODEWORD
	OTHER			SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: Congressional Travel to PRC in Nov 1976

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	CONCURRENCE	COORDINATE	INFO
ADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH				
STAFF SECRETARY				
CONGRESSIONAL				
ECONOMIC				
EUR/CANADA/OCEANS				
FAR EAST/PRC				
INTELLIGENCE				
LATIN AMERICA				
MID EAST/NO. AFRICA				
NSC PLANNING				
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				
SCIENTIFIC				
SUB-SAH/AFRICA/UN				

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT. \_\_\_\_\_

MEMO FOR PRES. \_\_\_\_\_

REPLY FOR. \_\_\_\_\_

APPROPRIATE ACTION. \_\_\_\_\_

MEMO \_\_\_\_\_ TO \_\_\_\_\_

RECOMMENDATIONS. \_\_\_\_\_

JOINT MEMO. \_\_\_\_\_

REFER TO \_\_\_\_\_ FOR: \_\_\_\_\_

ANY ACTION NECESSARY? \_\_\_\_\_

CONCURRENCE. \_\_\_\_\_

DUE DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

DATE	FROM	TO	STATUS	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	DUE	CY TO
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9/24		Scowcroft	X	Decision	9/25	
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10/11		<del>NSC</del>	<del>X</del>	Scowcroft disapproved		
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DATE	FROM	TO	STATUS	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	DUE	CY TO
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10/12				Lail Fiedersdorf/Memo		DeSibour
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10/12		GLaysteen	S	Appropriate Action	10/19	
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10/13/76	AR	NSC/SEC	C	Close out		
				Approval of trip given per Fiedersdorf		

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INDEXING: \_\_\_\_\_

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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Bud —

Dole wants this

to day.

H

This is more  
than he can  
absorb



JK 100

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

October 14, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEN *Wp*

SUBJECT: Senator Dole's Request for Update on China

Senator Robert Dole requested that the State Department prepare a brief update of developments in China and their relevance to U.S. - PRC relations. Because of concern both over Hatch Act provisions and charges which have been levelled recently that the President has improperly used the resources of the Executive Branch to bolster his campaign, State referred the request to the White House.

We have prepared the attached briefing paper (Tab A) which gives the current state of play in Peking, comments on possible implications for foreign policy -- including towards the United States, and mentions the problem which public statements on U.S. China-policy have created over the last several months.

The paper is written so you could volunteer it to both Senators Dole and Mondale. In the case of Dole, I also recommend providing a copy of the Q & A we prepared for the President on this subject this morning (Tab B).

RECOMMENDATION:

That you pass the paper at Tab A to Senators Dole and Mondale, and the Q & A at Tab B to Senator Dole.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

HSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY *HR*, NADA DATE *5/11/01*



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Recent Developments in China and Their Impact on U.S. -PRC Relations

Introduction and Summary

Premier (and First Vice Chairman of the Party) Hua Kuo-feng has been selected to replace Mao Tse-tung as Chairman of the ruling Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. There is also strong evidence that the four leading "leftists" in the Chinese hierarchy, including Mao's widow, have been removed from power and are probably under arrest.

Premier Hua and other Chinese leaders have stressed continuity of foreign policy including the opening with the U.S. and hostility towards the Soviet Union.

The harder line on Taiwan which emerged this summer, i. e. stress on forceful "liberation" and some impatience with the pace of U.S. disengagement from Taiwan, has receded. But the emergence of that line, which was largely a reaction to media and other public statements in the United States, was a forceful reminder of Peking's hypersensitivity to U.S. public statements on Taiwan.

Developments in China

Current developments in Peking reflect a leadership struggle in the wake of Mao's death. Although critically important events have already occurred, the struggle may be far from over. The Party Central Committee is currently meeting to formalize the appointment of Premier (and Party First Vice Chairman) Hua Kuo-feng as Chairman, replacing Mao Tse-tung. The Chinese people are being told that Hua's selection to that post, and also to the Chairmanship of the Party's Military Affairs Commission, is in accordance with Mao's expressed wish.

Evidence suggests that prior to his nomination, unexplained events led Hua and other centrist and "moderate" forces, with backing of the Chinese military establishment, to move against the four leading "leftists" in the Chinese hierarchy, including Mao's widow.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5  
NND 6800, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY KJR, NND 6800, DATE 5/11/01



Foreign Policy Implications

Ever since Mao's death, Premier Hua and other PRC officials have stressed the continuity of PRC foreign policy. In various ways they have indicated that this means a continuing desire to move towards normalization of relations with the United States and unabating hostility towards the Soviet Union.

Looking beyond the immediate future and despite the harshness of Chinese polemics against Moscow, it would only be logical to expect some reduction of tension and improvement in state-to-state relations over time.

As far as the U.S. is concerned, the basic strategic interests which led to the opening in 1971/72 remain valid, and it is therefore not surprising that improved U.S.-PRC relations have been endorsed. So far as completion of the normalization process is concerned, the implications of recent developments in Peking are less clear.

The current leadership seems to have backed away from the mid-summer stress on forceful "liberation" of Taiwan and impatience with the pace of U.S. disengagement from the island. Indications are they may revert to the 1971-73 line of "patience" with U.S. efforts to disengage and of the preferability of peaceful "liberation" of the island, even though Peking thinks force will eventually be necessary. But there is no reason to believe that the basic Chinese position on Taiwan has changed, i. e. that it is an internal matter to be dealt with when and how they please, without interference from outsiders.

The stronger Taiwan line of last summer seems clearly to have been designed at least in part to counter growing expressions of sentiment in the United States that we should only move ahead with Peking if it is not at the expense of the security and de facto autonomy of the people on Taiwan -- e. g. as reflected in both Party platforms.



10-14-76  
Q's + A's  
3d  
TAS B

Q: Apparently the Chinese have selected Hua Kuo-feng as new Chairman of the Communist Party and have arrested all of the leading leftists. How do you see these developments affecting U.S. -PRC relations?

A: As you know, there have been no official announcements on any of these matters. But indications are that Premier Hua has been elevated to the Chairmanship of the Party and that the other events to which you refer may have taken place.

Premier Hua and other Chinese officials have stressed continuity of their foreign policy, and I have seen nothing to indicate otherwise. That does not mean that any problems which existed between us formerly have been eliminated. But I believe it means that, just as we are committed to continue toward normalization, the Chinese, too, intend to follow the course of improved relations set out in the Shanghai Communique.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Recent Developments in China and Their Impact on U.S. -PRC RelationsIntroduction and Summary

Premier (and First Vice Chairman of the Party) Hua Kuo-feng has been selected to replace Mao Tse-tung as Chairman of the ruling Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. There is also strong evidence that the four leading "leftists" in the Chinese hierarchy, including Mao's widow, have been removed from power and are probably under arrest.

Premier Hua and other Chinese leaders have stressed continuity of foreign policy including the opening with the U.S. and hostility towards the Soviet Union.

The harder line on Taiwan which emerged this summer, i.e. stress on forceful "liberation" and some impatience with the pace of U.S. disengagement from Taiwan, has receded. But the emergence of that line, which was largely a reaction to media and other public statements in the United States, was a forceful reminder of Peking's hypersensitivity to U.S. public statements on Taiwan.

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Current developments in Peking reflect a leadership struggle in the wake of Mao's death. Although critically important events have already occurred, the struggle may be far from over. The Party Central Committee is currently meeting to formalize the appointment of Premier (and Party First Vice Chairman) Hua Kuo-feng as Chairman, replacing Mao Tse-tung. The Chinese people are being told that Hua's selection to that post, and also to the Chairmanship of the Party's Military Affairs Commission, is in accordance with Mao's expressed wish.

Evidence suggests that prior to his nomination, unexplained events led Hua and other centrist and "moderate" forces, with backing of the Chinese military establishment, to move against the four leading "leftists" in the Chinese hierarchy, including Mao's widow.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR, NARA, DATE 5/11/01

61/10-15-76



Foreign Policy Implications

Ever since Mao's death, Premier Hua and other PRC officials have stressed the continuity of PRC foreign policy. In various ways they have indicated that this means a continuing desire to move towards normalization of relations with the United States and unabating hostility towards the Soviet Union.

Looking beyond the immediate future and despite the harshness of Chinese polemics against Moscow, it would only be logical to expect some reduction of tension and improvement in state-to-state relations over time.

As far as the U.S. is concerned, the basic strategic interests which led to the opening in 1971/72 remain valid, and it is therefore not surprising that improved U.S. -PRC relations have been endorsed. So far as completion of the normalization process is concerned, the implications of recent developments in Peking are less clear.

The current leadership seems to have backed away from the mid-summer stress on forceful "liberation" of Taiwan and impatience with the pace of U.S. disengagement from the island. Indications are they may revert to the 1971-73 line of "patience" with U.S. efforts to disengage and of the preferability of peaceful "liberation" of the island, even though Peking thinks force will eventually be necessary. But there is no reason to believe that the basic Chinese position on Taiwan has changed, i.e. that it is an internal matter to be dealt with when and how they please, without interference from outsiders.

The stronger Taiwan line of last summer seems clearly to have been designed at least in part to counter growing expressions of sentiment in the United States that we should only move ahead with Peking if it is not at the expense of the security and de facto autonomy of the people on Taiwan -- e.g. as reflected in both Party platforms.





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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## Recent Developments in China and Their Impact on U.S. -PRC Relations

### Introduction and Summary

Although no formal announcements have yet been made, it is clear that Premier (and First Vice Chairman of the Party) Hua Kuo-feng has been selected to replace Mao Tse-tung as Chairman of the ruling Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. There is also strong evidence that the four leading "leftists" in the Chinese hierarchy, including Mao's widow, have been removed from power and are probably under arrest.

Premier Hua and other Chinese leaders have stressed continuity of foreign policy including the opening with the U.S. and hostility towards the Soviet Union.

The harder line on Taiwan which emerged this summer, i. e. stress on forceful "liberation" and some impatience with the pace of U.S. disengagement from Taiwan, has receded. But the emergence of that line, which was largely a reaction to media and other public statements in the United States, was a forceful reminder of Peking's hypersensitivity to U.S. public statements on Taiwan.

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Evidence suggests that prior to his nomination, unexplained events led Hua and other centrist and "moderate" forces, with backing of the Chinese military establishment, to move against the four leading "leftists" in the Chinese hierarchy, including Mao's widow.

No announcements have been made about these developments, and it is possible that none will be made, but they are the subject of widespread

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY KR, NARA, DATE 5/11/01



discussion in China and their validity is suggested by a number of developments including the removal of pictures of the four from Peking bookstores.

### Foreign Policy Implications

Ever since Mao's death, Premier Hua and other PRC officials have stressed the continuity of PRC foreign policy. In various ways they have indicated that this means a continuing desire to move towards normalization of relations with the United States and unabating hostility towards the Soviet Union.

Looking beyond the immediate future and despite the harshness of Chinese polemics against Moscow, it would only be logical to expect some reduction of tension and improvement in state-to-state relations over time.

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### Public Discussion of the Issues

~~The more strident PRC line on Taiwan in mid-summer may in part have been a reflection of new personalities inserted into the picture. But there is strong evidence, including direct statements by the Chinese, that it was primarily to counter growing expressions of sentiment in the United States that we should only move ahead with Peking if it is not at the expense of the security and de facto autonomy of the people on Taiwan -- e.g. as reflected in both Party platforms.~~



*The stronger Taiwan line of last summer seems clearly to have been designed at least in part*

CONFIDENTIAL

3

It is necessary that the Chinese understand that the statements to which they object reflect genuine American concerns. But the events of the summer point up the fact that public statements sometimes do force the Chinese to react in ways which are helpful neither to Taiwan's security interests nor to our own basic strategic interests in continuing to improve relations with the PRC.

CONFIDENTIAL



38

DOC		RECD			LOG IN/OUT	
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR		
10/14		10/14		16	7605742	

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

INITIAL ACTION O

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES	FROM: SECSTATE	S/S	UNCLAS	LOG IN/OUT
SCOWCROFT	SECDEF		LOW	NO FORN
HYLAND	DCI	X REF	C	EYES ONLY
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
SUBJECT: *Sen Oake Request for update of developments in Lebanon re VP Debate 15 Oct 76*

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION	CONCURRENCE	COORDINATE	INFO		
ADV CYS SCOWCROFT/ WGM					MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
STAFF SECRETARY					MEMO FOR PRES
CONGRESSIONAL					REPLY FOR
ECONOMIC					APPROPRIATE ACTION
EUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS					MEMO TO
FAR EAST/ PRC					RECOMMENDATIONS
INTELLIGENCE					JOINT MEMO
LATIN AMERICA					REFER TO FOR
MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA					ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
NSC PLANNING					CONCURRENCE
PROGRAM ANALYSIS					DUE DATE:
SCIENTIFIC					COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN					

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	STATUS	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	DUE	CY TO
10/14		<i>Scowcroft</i>	X	<i>Decision</i>	10/14	<i>Decision</i>
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# SHANGHAI: JOINT COMMUNIQUE

4

1. Text of Joint Communique - February 27, 1972
2. Text of News Conference held by Dr. Kissinger and Assistant Secretary of State Green - February 27, 1972
3. Text of Statement by Press Secretary Ziegler - February 27, 1972

1. Text of the Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the President's Visit, February 27, 1972

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit.

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be



prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Vietnam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.

The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution—this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries.

The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea." It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence



and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

- progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;
- both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
- neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and
- neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," and "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial.





Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

NOTE: The joint statement was released at Shanghai, People's Republic of China. For a news conference of Dr. Henry Kissinger and Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green and a statement by the White House Press Secretary on the communiqué, see the following two items.



## 2. Shanghai: Joint Communiqué

News Conference of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. - February 27, 1972

MR. ZIEGLER. You have had a chance to read over the communiqué. Dr. Kissinger is here to discuss it with you and take your questions. What Dr. Kissinger says is on the record. Together with Dr. Kissinger is Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green who, as you know, participated in all the meetings with Secretary of State Rogers when he met with the Foreign Minister, and he is here also to discuss the communiqué with you and to take your questions, together with Dr. Kissinger.

We will begin with Dr. Kissinger.

DR. KISSINGER. Let me make a few preliminary observations before we go to your questions. Let me do it in two parts: the process, and there is obviously the communiqué produced, and secondly, what does it mean in general terms. Then I believe that I will be prepared to answer questions.

First, how was the communiqué produced? From the beginning of our contacts with the People's Republic of China, there were some obvious general considerations of

what the outcome of a meeting between the President and the leaders of the People's Republic might be.

During the interim visit there was some exploratory conversation of an outcome in the conventional sense in which both sides tend to state general positions which they afterwards choose to interpret, each in their own way.

It was, therefore, decided early in the meetings on this occasion between the President and Prime Minister that such an approach would make no sense. It would not be worthy of the purposes that were attempted to be served.

It was therefore decided that each side would state its position on issues in a section which it would produce more or less independent of the other. It would not pretend to an agreement which did not exist and which would have to be interpreted away in subsequent implementations. Therefore, the beginning part of the communiqué represents, in effect, a statement by each side of some of its general principles.

On our side, they were deliberately not phrased in a contentious way. While in discussions some of the arguments made by the Chinese side were, of course, rebutted, we did not feel that this was the appropriate vehicle to do so, but rather to state what our positive view was.

For that matter, the Chinese side did not rebut arguments which we made in our section that they did not particularly agree with.



In order to present these two views on an equal basis, it had been decided that in the text issued by the American Government, the U.S. position would be stated first, and in the text to be issued by the Chinese Government, the Chinese version would be stated first.

I mention this only so that you will not be surprised if the Chinese version follows a different sequence from the American version. This is by agreement. Both versions are official and are being put out on the basis of this agreement.

The procedure that was followed here was that issues of general principle were first discussed in the meetings between the President and the Prime Minister. They were then, after they had been explored for some time, transferred to the meetings chaired by the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China. Then, if any additional issues arose, they might be referred back to the meeting of the President and the Prime Minister.

In drafting the communiqué, various sections were produced by various elements of the American side. I played the role of go-between on our side and the Vice Foreign Minister, whose name I despair of ever learning to pronounce, on the Chinese side.

In this manner, as we put together the various paragraphs that were supplied to us on our side by various individuals, if we reached a point at which agreement seemed near or possible, we would then go back to our principals and to the Secretary of State. Through this process, the communiqué was finally achieved.

For example, some of the sessions were quite prolonged. The last few nights the sessions went on until the early hours of the morning with the President. In Peking, the Chinese delegation had a house in the guest complex, and most of the sessions took place in that house. As a paragraph was finished, it would typically go back then to the President who was in the next house, and this went on Friday night until about 5 in the morning.

So much for the process. Let me say something about the content. Obviously neither side would have written this communiqué this way if it had been able to draft it entirely by itself. Therefore, it represented an attempt by two countries that had been out of contact for a long time to find a basis to convey first some immediate understandings, but beyond that, to start a process by which they could bring about a closer relationship over a period of time and by which they could, where interests converged, act in a more nearly parallel fashion and where interests differed, to mitigate the consequences of those disagreements.

So the communiqué ought to be seen in two aspects: first, in terms of the specific principles and conclusions it states, and secondly, in terms of the direction to which it seeks to point. It is on that basis that we are presenting it to the American people and on which the People's Republic is presenting it as well.

Now, this is all that I want to say by way of introduction. I wonder whether Mr. Marshall Green would like to add a few words, and then we will be glad to answer questions.

MR. GREEN. I have just a few words. First of all with regard to the P.R.C. authority with whom Dr. Kissinger was maintaining the discussions, it was Chiao Kuan-hua—just to clarify that point.

I don't think I really have much to add. Our talks under Secretary Rogers on our side, and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei for the People's Republic of China, extended over, I believe, 10 hours all together.

But it was not just the talks themselves. We had frequent occasion, as you could imagine with all the fine food you have eaten—occasionally waiting to have that fine food to have extensive talks also, and a number of matters could be discussed in that context.

Also, it was not just that, but the Secretary did have a chance to meet on a number of occasions with the Prime Minister. Most recently, coming down on the plane, he had an hour and a half from Peking to Hangchow. And then today the Prime Minister called on him in his hotel room for about 40 minutes.

I would say that the talks and the counterpart meetings were characterized by candor, friendliness, and courtesy and hospitality, as I am sure you have all seen, on the part of our Chinese hosts. There was no pulling of punches, not physically, of course. They were outspoken, no effort to cover up or paper over differences, but to have it out. It is good for the system. I think in so doing one has a much better appreciation of the other person's point of view.

As far as the specifics are concerned, in the talks, I really can't say much more than what already appears in the communiqué itself, although some of the points there may raise questions.

Q. On page 4, in stating that the United States will progressively reduce its forces in military installations on Taiwan, was that decision a result of the discussions here in China?

DR. KISSINGER. No, this is a general statement of our policy which we have enunciated on innumerable occasions in innumerable forums. It says that we maintain the amount of forces that is required by the general situation and not by any abstract determination. It is a statement of our general policy, but not a mutual decision.

Q. Is there any sign now that the conditions would lead to a reduction of the American military force in Taiwan shortly?

DR. KISSINGER. I don't want to speculate on what will be done over a period of time, but if you speak about "shortly," I would not expect that.

Q. Why did not the United States Government reaffirm its treaty commitment to Taiwan, as the President and you have done on numerous occasions?

DR. KISSINGER. Let me take this occasion to deal with that particular aspect, and let me deal with it once, and not answer it in innumerable elliptical forms in which, no doubt, it will be presented.

The particular issue which Mr. Chow raised is, of course, an extraordinarily difficult one to discuss on the territory of a country with which we do not maintain formal diplomatic relations and for which this particular issue is a matter of profound principle.

Let me, therefore, state in response to this and any related question—and let me do it once and not repeat it. We stated our basic position with respect to this issue in the President's world report in which we say that this treaty will be maintained. Nothing has changed in that position.

But I would appreciate it if that would be all that I would be asked to say about it in these circumstances. But the position of the world report stands and has been unaltered.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the possibility is mentioned of the United States sending a representative to Peking from time to time. Is there any likelihood that this process might be reversed and Peking might send a representative to Washington?

DR. KISSINGER. The situation of the two sides is not exactly equal in this respect because in Washington there is a Chinese representation different from that that would be sent under the hypothesis which you mention. However, what we envisage is the establishment of a contact point, to begin with, in which the discussions about the exchanges and trade that are mentioned in the preceding paragraphs will be formally conducted and as soon as this contact point has been established, it will be announced and the visit of a U.S. representative to Peking would take place as the need arises, and as particular issues of great importance need to be discussed. This, however, is not to the exclusion of any other possibility.

Q. What do you mean by "a contact point"?

DR. KISSINGER. For example, there existed for a while, and formally still exists, a forum in Warsaw where U.S. and Chinese officials met—something of this kind. As soon as that is established, which we expect will be in the reasonably near future, we will announce it.

Q. Will that be established in the United States or Canada or some other country?

DR. KISSINGER. I don't expect it to be in the United States, but I don't want to speculate beyond that.

Q. Can we assume that the President and Prime Minister discussed all these differences face-to-face, specifically their differences over Vietnam and the reduction of troops on Taiwan? Were these positions stated openly?

DR. KISSINGER. All differences were discussed by the President and the Prime Minister face to face, candidly and seriously, including those which you mentioned.

Q. Can you point to anything in this document in which the People's Republic of China goes any significant step beyond its position at the time of the first ping pong exchanges?

DR. KISSINGER. Let me say two things: We are not approaching this from the point of view of a scoreboard of

seeing who scored how many points on which issue. At the time of the first ping pong exchange, if I understand the position of the People's Republic of China, it was that some very low-level people-to-people exchanges would occur.

The formalization of exchanges encouraged by the two governments, the opening of trade encouraged by the two governments, the establishment of diplomatic mechanisms for continued contact, the joint statement of some general principles of international relations, the joint statement of some basic approaches to the view of the world with respect to, for example, the section which includes the reference to hegemony—these, I believe, are matters that most of us would have considered unthinkable at the time of the invitation to the ping pong team.

But I would put them on the basis of mutuality rather than of any unilateral movement on the part of the People's Republic of China.

Q. Henry, is this the first time that a President of the United States has formally picked up the language of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence?

DR. KISSINGER. I have to say I am simply not sure. All I would reply, again, would be an answer in the same terms as I did to Mr. Frankel. The question is not who put forward the proposals. The question is: Does it contain principles that we can live by and since we have said we are prepared to apply these principles during the next one on the non-use of force, and since both sides have stated this, it does not really make a crucial difference who put it forward first.

Q. How much progress was there made in advancing the ball, in response to the question asked by George Ball on the trips, "is this necessary?" How much further did we go than in your original discussions with Premier Chou?

DR. KISSINGER. The character of the discussions inevitably is entirely different when the President of the United States talks than when an assistant talks who cannot make any definitive statement. The basic objective of this trip was to set in motion a train of events and an evolution in the policy of our two countries which both sides recognized would be slow at first and present many difficulties and in which a great deal depended on the assessment by each side of the understanding by the other of what was involved in this process and of the assessment by each side of the reliability of the other in being able to pursue this for the amount of time necessary to see it prevail.

In this sense it almost had to be conducted by the heads of the two governments and in this sense I would say that in the depth and seriousness of the discussions it went, obviously, beyond what had been discussed in my view and beyond our expectations.

Q. Did Chairman Mao participate? Did his participation go to the detailed substance of this matter or was it largely philosophical and general?

DR. KISSINGER. I don't believe that it would be appropriate for me to go into detail about the content of the conversation with Chairman Mao. I may say, however, that Chairman Mao and the President discussed each of the essential categories in a general way and we have every reason to believe that the Prime Minister checked with the Chairman at every step along the way. But it was not just a vague philosophical discussion.

Q. The assertion of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, combined with the statement of respect for one China, could that be construed as meaning that the United States notes the claim of the Government of the People's Republic of China, its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan?

DR. KISSINGER. Our view with respect to Taiwan has been exhaustively stated in that paragraph you refer to and we add nothing to it.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, can you tell us whether there is any timetable under which you are going to undertake to facilitate the contacts and exchanges in the cultural, sports, and journalistic areas?

DR. KISSINGER. There is no precise timetable, Walter, but I think it is correct to say that both sides understand that this will be pursued with some dispatch.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in the light of the statement by the Government of China that the Chinese side said that the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations, does this timetable depend on further progress in the solution of the Taiwan question?

DR. KISSINGER. No. That is independent of the other, though at what point the two would become interdependent again, I cannot judge. But as this is written now, my answer to Walter Cronkite stands on its own feet.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, where the communiqué states, "Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to colude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest," was that a result of your talks about Sino-Soviet tensions or was the Soviet Union involved in the talks? Does this refer to how the United States views the relationship between China and the U.S. and the Soviet Union?

DR. KISSINGER. We have said on many occasions, and I will say it again here, that as far as the United States is concerned, our relationship with the People's Republic of China is not directed against the Soviet Union, and while the People's Republic is well able to speak for itself, and my megalomania has not reached the point where I believe that I can speak for it, I believe that it is clear to us that neither is the policy of the People's Republic of China in its relations with us directed against the Soviet Union.

We are pursuing our policy with the People's Republic of China on the ground that a stable peace in the world is difficult to envisage if 200 million people are excluded

from a dialogue with the most powerful nation in the world and we are conducting our discussions with the People's Republic entirely on the merits of that relationship.

The paragraph on hegemony will arise only if any country should seek it, but we had no particular country in mind when it was being drafted.

Q. In the paragraph referring to the reduction of forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes, is this an exclusive reference to Indochina as the area?

DR. KISSINGER. No. It is a reference to the general area. It is not a reference to any particular part of Asia.

Q. What conditions in that area would keep American troops on Taiwan? What tensions in the area of Taiwan now require the presence of American troops there?

DR. KISSINGER. We are talking about the general state of relationships in Asia and in the world. It is in reference to that that our general decisions on deployments will be made.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the President said in a television interview the beginning of January that he would bring up the question of American prisoners of war in Vietnam when he came to China. Can you tell us if it came up and what the reaction was?

DR. KISSINGER. Obviously, as the communiqué makes clear the issue of Vietnam was discussed and it is also clear that we would not discuss it without mentioning our concern with respect to the prisoners. The position of the People's Republic is as stated in the communiqué that it supports the seven-point proposal made by the Provisional Government—by the PRG, and I think it is a fair characterization of the basic positions.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, there is a paragraph that says "International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force." Since the People's Republic says the difficulty with us on Taiwan is an international issue, does this mean that they have agreed not to use force or the threat of force in settling or solving that?

DR. KISSINGER. The formal position of the People's Republic of China with respect to Taiwan is a matter, of course, of extreme delicacy for us to discuss here at all. Clearly, they do not, as they have stated in their part of the section on Taiwan, consider it an international problem in any normal sense. Clearly, the formal statements with respect to this issue have to be drafted with the various perspectives in mind.

REPORTER. Thank you, gentlemen.

NOTE: White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Nease opened the news conference at 5:50 p.m., local time, at the Industrial Exhibition Center Banquet Hall, Shanghai, People's Republic of China. For the text of the joint communiqué, see the preceding item. For a statement on the communiqué by the White House Press Secretary, see the following item.



## Shanghai: Joint Communiqué

3. Statement by Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to the President, February 27, 1972

President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai have reached agreement on a joint communiqué. This communiqué reflects the position of the United States and the People's Republic of China on various bilateral and international issues which were discussed during President Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China.

The day President Nixon arrived in Peking he met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs. During the President's 7-day visit to the People's Republic of China extensive, frank, and honest discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai. The discussions were held on the normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides.

The two leaders participated in over 15 hours of formal talks. In addition, Secretary of State Rogers and Foreign Minister Che Pang-fei held discussions in the same spirit and participated in about 15 hours of formal discussions.

So the communiqué reflects over 30 hours of formal discussions between the United States and the People's Republic of China. The very fact of the joint communiqué between the two governments is symbolic of the greater understanding produced through the face-to-face discussions that have been held.

It is President Nixon's hope that this historic beginning

to improve communications between the United States and the People's Republic of China will significantly contribute to a more stable structure of peace in the world.

The communiqué honestly reflects the differences that both sides recognize exist and states those areas where both sides found common views and have agreed to take specific steps to further improve their relationship. The communiqué, in stating its general attitude, says, "The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues."

The communiqué goes on to say: "There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations."

NOTE: Press Secretary Ziegler read the statement to reporters at 6:40 p.m., local time, in the Industrial Exhibition Center Langqut Hall, Shanghai, People's Republic of China. As printed above, this item follows the text of the White House press release.

For the text of the joint communiqué and a news conference of Dr. Henry Kissinger and Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green, see the preceding two items.



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 20, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BUD McFARLANE

FROM: WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEN *WJG*

SUBJECT: Materials on Post-1949 PRC Foreign Policy

In response to your note concerning Susan Ford's interest in a paper on "Relations between the United States and other regional and world powers and China in the Post Revolutionary Period," I have checked with a number of sources and determined that no such paper exists. The best I can do, I am afraid, is to provide a recommended bibliography on aspects of that very broad subject. This would include:

John Gittings, The World and China, 1922-1972, Harper & Row, 1974

Jay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia, Praeger, 1976

Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, Univ. of Michigan Press, 1975

Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation, Univ. of California Press, 1970

I am also assembling some public materials from State on US-PRC relations (background notes, testimony, etc.). I will send them to you when they arrive. As a supplement, I would suggest Ms. Ford may wish to look at the annual Foreign Policy messages issued during the Nixon years. Each volume contains a section on US-PRC relations. She could also refer to a volume of hearings recently issued by Congressman Lester Wolff's House International Relations Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development on the subject United States-Soviet Union-China: The Great Power Triangle.



## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~INFORMATION  
October 27, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEN

SUBJECT: Leadership Changes in China; Implications  
for the U. S.

Although we would caution against assuming the permanence of new arrangements in Peking, we may have enough of a pause in the turning of the kaleidoscope to try to sort out the pattern.

Hua Kuo-feng may well face further contention and struggle, but he has at least greatly improved his leadership position and purged his "radical" challengers. He has done so more rapidly and decisively than expected, and we seem to be witnessing a catharsis of pent-up animosities which suggests it may be some time before another "leftist" challenge develops. Obviously the military have played a major role and will not forget that they did so. Coping with this military power and the problem of Teng Hsiao-ping are probably Hua's most delicate problems. If the new pattern develops logically, we would expect China's domestic and foreign policies to continue, without abrupt change, toward relatively practical goals, characterized by the slogan of developing China into a modern socialist society by the end of this century. This could bring a more constructive atmosphere into our relations with Peking reminiscent of the 1971-73 period. But the PRC's terms for normalization will not alter significantly, and it is quite possible that dealings with Peking will continue to be difficult because of internal distractions. The most important move for us after the election will be a quiet signal to Hua that we welcome China's affirmation of policy continuity and that we will be preparing ourselves seriously for the next move on normalization.

The following paragraphs speculate at greater length about the impact of Peking's changes.

Domestic Policies

While we may see an effort to assure that China continues along the "socialist path according to the thought of Mao", we expect less

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controversy over adherence to essentially pragmatic economic policies such as greater reliance on material incentives (rather than political exhortation) to boost worker output and greater emphasis on trade. Various elements will seek greater access to Western technology to hasten economic growth and bolster China's strategic position, even though there will be a continuing wariness, even among the military, about overdependence on the outside world.

Political strains within China and competition for economic resources will continue. Provincial or regional requirements will compete with national requirements, and there will be competing priorities of the military and civilian sectors. And finally, there are still large numbers of people in China who are fairly "leftist" in outlook, or whose careers have depended upon beating the "capitalist" or "revisionist" dog and who may wage a limited "rear-guard" struggle.

But overall, these strains may assume the more normal proportions associated with their counterparts in other countries rather than the grotesque political campaign style which has characterized disputes in China for the past quarter century. Indeed, one of the striking features of the elevation of Hua and the purging of the "left" has been not only the smoothness with which it has proceeded thus far, but also the apparent confidence the successful leaders had ahead of time in the popularity of their removal of Chiang Ching and the others. Despite the scheming and planning which must have taken place in the center, the popularity of the turn of events has been evident in the relaxed and genuinely jubilant mood of the people, both in small informal gatherings -- including with Westerners -- and in the organized mass rallies throughout China.

#### Foreign Policies

The Chinese have been at some pains to assure domestic and foreign audiences alike that Chairman Mao's foreign policy line will be adhered to. In various ways this has been shown to mean continued hostility towards the Soviet Union and commitment to improved relations with the United States. While this has generally evoked a sense of visceral satisfaction in the West, where "moderate" has been equated with "rational" and "good", and while in fact we should find Chinese actions more predictable than if the "leftists" had won out, it is far from clear that our own bilateral problems with China will be more easily resolved or that there will not be some eventual improvement in Sino-Soviet state-to-state relations.



Sino-Soviet Relations - Despite the initial hostility being displayed toward the Soviets, some shift in Sino-Soviet relations may emerge over the next few months. The degree of tension prevailing between China and the Soviet Union over the last seven or eight years has been dangerously high with unpredictable consequences for our own interests. On that basis alone, we should not be perturbed by a lowering of the level of tension and hostility. We should also accept the reality that each of the parties in a triangular relationship, such as ours with Moscow and Peking, will try to gain whatever leverage it can with each of the other two parties and there will often be little the third party can do to influence ties between the other two. In any event, recognizing the depth of hostility between the Chinese and the Soviets, we should not become so fearful of improvement in Sino-Soviet ties that we are panicked into making unnecessary or unwise concessions to either of them in hopes of forestalling a new "alliance". Indeed, we should get the message across to the Chinese -- and Soviets -- that we are relaxed about it.

Sino-US Relations - We may find the Chinese tending to revert to the tone which prevailed between mid-1971 and 1973. That is, there may be a willingness on Peking's part to make soothing noises about trying all peaceful means to liberate Taiwan before resorting to force and about patience over the length of time such "liberation" might take. But the basic line on Taiwan and about the conditions for full normalization of US-PRC relations has never changed, and there is no reason to think it will now. Peking will still insist that we break all official ties with Taiwan, abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty, and withdraw all military forces and installations from Taiwan. The issue of military sales to Taiwan after normalization will remain one of great delicacy and fraught with potential hazards.

We have a number of ideas as to how we might proceed to test Peking's limited flexibility, and we will present these to you after the election. For the moment, I believe that we should try to avoid making statements or taking actions which could unnecessarily complicate the process. We should be prepared fairly promptly to give Hua a positive signal but we should avoid steps which could be characterized as unseemly in their haste to woo the new Chinese leadership.





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INITIAL ACTION O

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
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Changes in China - Implication  
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