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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

INFORMATION

May 10, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

RICHARD H. SOLOMON

SUBJECT:

Chinese Politics a Month After Teng
Hsiao-p'ing's Demise: Central Authority
Continues to Dissipate; The Soviets Wait
Hopefully on the Sidelines, Waving to
Their "Friends"

One month after the purging of Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Peking's political scene shows no signs of returning to "normal". Anomalies in the public appearance pattern of senior leaders suggests continuing tensions and uncertainties of role among the central elite. Cadres are grumbling privately -- and to foreigners -- about Chairman Mao's willful behavior in purging Teng; and the military has been put on heightened alert against "counter-revolutionary" acts. In sum, China's domestic politics show every sign of suffering from a serious dissipation of central authority, continuing factional tension within the Politburo, and the prospect for further trouble.

Regarding foreign policy, on the one hand Peking has pursued actively its efforts to undercut the Soviet presence around the world, as was indicated by the re-establishment of ambassadorial level contacts with the Indians in mid-April, and the signing on April 21 of a military assistance agreement with Egypt during the visit of Vice President Mubarak. At the same time, the unprecedented explosion outside the Soviet Embassy on April 29, in combination with heightened propaganda noises from Moscow just preceding the explosion, suggests some counterplay on the issue of easing Sino-Soviet tensions -- or at least active Chinese efforts to forestall Soviet efforts to play on their internal instability.

Regarding relations with the US, the Chinese responded to the departure for Peking of our new Liaison Office Chief Thomas Gates by returning ☐ Huang Chen to Washington, thus meticulously maintaining equivalence in the levels of representation in our respective capitals.

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

MR # 10-043-#17

State v 9/26/02; CIA etc 5/12/10

By dal NARA Date 7/12/10

SECRET - GDS

Chinese media gave special notice to three positive public statements by President Ford on US-PRC relations in an April 16 article in one of their Hong Kong papers, but at the same time took the unprecedented step of publicly criticizing US foreign policy in an April 21 attack on the "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine". They also made a low-key protest to us on May 2 regarding routine US naval aircraft surveillance of two of their ocean research vessels operating for the first time near the Fiji Islands.

The Dissipation of Domestic Political Discipline

[redacted] the April 5 demonstrations just prior to Teng Hsiao-p'ing's downfall were well planned and widely organized within Peking's governmental bureaucracy, and were paralleled by demonstrations in other Chinese cities. [redacted] cadre hosting foreign visitors urged them to go to Tien An Men Square on April 5 where, they were told, they "would see something interesting happen".

The decisive action of the leadership on April 7 in purging Teng and elevating Hua Kuo-feng permanently to the Premiership thus has the quality of an effort by Mao and other leaders at the center to prevent a widespread and violent mass confrontation over the question of a successor to Chou En-lai. This impression is reenforced by the series of counter-rallies which were organized throughout the country following Teng's ouster. Two weeks of rather manic demonstrations and propaganda activities in support of the Central Committee's decision to purge Teng and elevate Hua, in which the military played a highly visible role, seemed designed to submerge broad support for Teng (or at least dampen widespread public doubts generated by the unexpected removal of the Vice Premier, and cope with growing unease among the cadre about a re-radicalization of the political scene and the possibility of a widespread purge).

In the three weeks following Teng's ouster, the "leftist" elements within the leadership who led the attack on the Vice Premier dropped from public sight, presumably to lower their profile and minimize a popular reaction against them. At the same time, leaders on the right identified with Teng (such as Vice Premiers Li Hsien-nien and Chen Yung-kuei) and centrist officials (such as Chi Teng-kuei and, of course, Premier Hua) maintained active public appearances, evidently to reassure the public that Teng's purge would not be followed by a widespread elimination of his followers. This pattern was reenforced by the appearance on



April 17 of Marshall Yeh Chien-ying, who had been absent from public view for three months (since mid-January) [redacted]

[redacted] Yeh has not been directly identified as Defense Minister since his reappearance, however.

On April 26 Peking's political mood took a sharp turn to the left with a large rally held in honor of the military "heroes" who had suppressed the demonstrations three weeks earlier. The rally marked the return to public view of all those identified as the Party's radical faction: Mao's wife Chiang Ching, the young Wang Hung-wen, ideologue Yao Wen-yuan, and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao. Moderate leaders Yeh Chien-ying, Li Hsien-nien, and Chu Teh were notable by their absence. The rally also marked the onset of harsher media polemics hinting at the need to broaden the attack on Teng by rooting out his followers. A series of People's Daily and Red Flag articles of late April and early May stressed the fact that the April 5 "counter-revolutionary" political incident at Tien An Men Square was "neither isolated nor accidental" and that it was necessary to "detect in depth all counter-revolutionary activities, and resolutely suppress all counter-revolutionaries". At the same time, [redacted] the Party leadership had established a "rumor suppression and investigation headquarters" to cope with the problem of identifying those who had organized the widespread demonstration in support of Teng, and who continued to spread divisive propaganda throughout the country -- such as a purported last will of deceased Premier Chou En-lai.

Mao's Authority Sharply Declines

Paralleling the widespread signs of leadership instability and conflict over the past month has been a remarkable series of indications that the prestige of Chairman Mao has declined sharply in the wake of the purging of Teng Hsiao-p'ing. [redacted]

[redacted] in which the Chairman is characterized as a senile old man who is nepotistically trying to insure the continuation of his dynasty by promoting the fortunes of his wife. The cadre assert that Mao no longer inspires confidence in China, that he is as selfish as the late Chou En-lai was selfless, and that China might be better off if the Chairman stepped down from power. Chiang Ching is characterized as a "neurotic old woman".

[redacted]

[REDACTED]

Another curious anomaly in the Chairman's position has been the non-participation in the three most recent Mao meetings with foreigners of Nancy Tang, who has been consistently in attendance at these sessions for the past four years. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

We are unable to account for this shift in appearance pattern but assume that it reflects some sensitivity on the question of direct access to Mao.

If we were to summarize China's internal situation at this time, the evidence suggests that the divisiveness within the central leadership is now paralleled by an increasingly sullen and potentially explosive public mood, as China's population reacts with disbelief and unease to the unsettling changes in the Party leadership. Dissipation of Mao's authority is producing paralysis at the lower levels of the bureaucracy, which in turn is reinforcing incidents of local factionalism and loss of public discipline which [REDACTED] [REDACTED] have been quite widespread in the past six weeks. Mao himself is reported to be concerned about this situation. [REDACTED] the Chairman recently sent a letter to senior Party leaders warning them of the possibility of a "reactionary coup attempt" following his death.

The key to whether this nasty public mood will lead to widespread disorder is a function of the future course of the leadership struggle. Continuing pressure by the radicals for a broadening of the purge is likely to heighten the strains at the center and throughout the society; and the death of Mao could very well provide the catalyst for a major blood-letting. The role of the military remains critical in this situation, and the unstable appearance patterns of Marshall Yeh Chien-ying (still, as far as we know, China's Defense Minister, but not formally identified as such) and Chen Hsi-lien (whose position as Commander of the Peking Military Region is also obscure) indicate that the military itself remains divided. The army is thus likely to play a critical, swing-role as the instability in the political leadership plays itself out.

The Soviets "Wave" Expectantly Over the Border

The unprecedented April 29 explosion at the Soviet Embassy in Peking, which reportedly killed two PLA security guards and one or more Chinese who carried the bomb, could be -- as China's authorities claim -- simply the work of a "mad counter-revolutionary". At the same time it also seems quite likely that the incident is a reflection of Peking's reaction to Soviet efforts to play on their domestic political instability through propaganda activities.




Two weeks before the explosion, Moscow's Chinese-language "Radio Peace and Progress" concluded an unusual five-article series of commentaries on the efforts of Mao's wife to "usurp" the throne of political leadership in China. Madame Chiang was characterized in the commentaries as an ambitious prostitute who was trying to manipulate her senile husband and take over Party leadership. The Russian broadcasts compared Chiang Ching to the last Empress Dowager, who was "the incarnation of debauchery, cruelty and evil". It is conceivable that the Madame, outraged by this Soviet effort to play on the anti-Chiang Ching sentiment which so clearly surfaced during the May 5 demonstrations, decided to send the Russians a message.

An alternative, but not necessarily contradictory, accounting for the explosion is related to an April 28 Pravda commentary under the authoritative pseudonym of I. Alexandrov which attacked Mao for "stubbornly trying to impose on the Chinese people the view of the USSR as China's enemy". The article went on to imply that Moscow would continue to hold out the prospect of improved Sino-Soviet relations to any reasonable Chinese leader who should succeed the Chairman.

It could be that the Soviets have tried actively to capitalize on the instability within the Chinese leadership by presenting some new proposal for settlement of the border issue, or in some other way maneuvering to crystallize the anti-Mao/Chiang Ching sentiment which has been so unprecedentedly visible in China over the past month. In this context, the explosion at the Soviet Embassy could be the work of those in the Chinese leadership who wish to forestall any possible movement toward Sino-Soviet political discussions and hope to sustain a high level of tension in the relationship.

US-PRC Relations: Continuity, but Criticism

Since the ouster of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, PRC authorities have gone to considerable length to communicate to us the view that there will be no shift in China's foreign policy as a result of the shake-up within the leadership.



At the same time, Peking appears to have been pleased by a number of positive Presidential statements in early April stressing continuity in the US commitment to seek normalized relations with the PRC. The Hong Kong Wen Hui Pao, a PRC-owned newspaper, printed a commentary on April 16 entitled "Ford Attaches Importance to Sino-US Relations".

Quoting from President Ford's statements of April 10, 13, and 14, the paper asserted that three positive Presidential comments on US-PRC relations three days in close succession was "something seldom heard before". The commentary concluded that, "Today, when so-called US-Soviet detente is cooling off and US-Soviet relations are gradually deteriorating, Ford's words and deeds concerning China are worthy of attention."

At the same time, on April 21 NCNA began a series of articles indirectly critical of the so-called "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine" as representing a US sell-out of Western Europe's security in the interest of preventing a Soviet-American confrontation over Europe. As well, on May 2 the PRC Liaison Office made a low-key representation to the State Department criticizing American naval aircraft surveillance of two Chinese hydrological ships which are conducting ocean surveys for the first time near the Fiji Islands.

Comment

Chairman Mao's prestige within China is probably at its lowest ebb since the failure of his Great Leap Forward agricultural experiment in the early 1960s. The present mood among Party cadre and the populace seems quite ugly. If Mao were to die shortly, and/or the senior leadership continues to tear itself apart in the succession struggle, we could very well see China return to the kind of domestic turmoil which was at its worst during the Cultural Revolution years of 1967 and 1968. One cannot rule out the possibility of military-backed coup attempts, or of a "de-Maoification" campaign after the Chairman dies (unless he can pull some major achievement out of his cap to rebuild his sagging prestige).

This situation holds two major points of concern for the US: First, it seems increasingly uncertain that after our fall elections we will be dealing with a government in Peking which has sufficient authority to be flexible and accommodating of our needs should we seek to complete the normalization process. Secondly, Moscow must be getting increasingly itchy as it watches the turmoil which is tearing apart China's elite. Thus far the Soviets appear to be responding to the situation by trying to play on the anti-Mao/Chiang Ching sentiment through propaganda measures, and perhaps by way of diplomatic ploys which we do not see. We should heighten our attention, however, to the possibility of the Russians playing more actively on the Chinese succession crisis, if not by military means then at least by more active political maneuvering.

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7

One would like to think that a PRC under heightened Soviet pressure might be more accommodating of our political needs regarding normalization if we tried to complete the process. It is increasingly uncertain, however, whether Mao's prestige will be behind whoever sits on the other side of the green baize table (if, indeed, Peking is able to field a negotiator with any authority); and our own public and the Congress may develop serious doubts that the U. S. should pay the price for normal relations with a China that is, once again, showing a penchant for periods of political chaos.

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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INITIAL ACTION 0

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SUBJECT: Chinese Politics - LA

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012784

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
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CREATION DATE 05/10/1976

VOLUME 4 pages

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FOLDER TITLE People's Republic of China (13)

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MEMO FOR PRES. ()

REPLY FOR ()

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ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()


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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

May 21, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: RICHARD H. SOLOMON *PAS* *B*
SUBJECT: Congressional Trip to China

On the basis of my recent discussions with you and Max Friedersdorf (and having coordinated with State), I called in Shen Jo-yun and Yang Hsu-chiang of the PRC Liaison Office today to raise with them our preferred timing for a Congressional visit to China later this summer.

Recalling for the Chinese that in early February we had been told that while the spring recess would not be a convenient time for a Congressional trip but that any other period later in the year would be all right, I said that we were continuing to receive expressions of interest from the Hill for a trip during the summer months. We now wished to propose a 10-day to two-week visit beginning at the end of August and running into early September.

The Chinese asked a few specific questions: They wondered if we had specific dates, a list of names, or other details. I indicated that until we had agreement with them on a general time-frame, we didn't know precisely which individuals would be free to travel during this period. We assumed, however, that Senators who would not be running for office would find it particularly convenient to visit China at that time. I indicated that members of Senator Sparkman's Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in particular, were expressing interest in a trip.

The Chinese said that they would study the matter and report back to us. They expressed some concern about the possibility of an overlap between the time we were proposing and the anticipated visit to China of Senator Mansfield. I inquired whether they had specific dates for the Mansfield trip. They replied "no".

Les Janka sat in with me on the meeting to provide continuity on subsequent planning for this visit, if necessary.

cc: Max Friedersdorf
Les Janka



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NUMBER
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	
5/21	5/21	5/21	5/21	18	7602995

INITIAL ACTION O

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SCOWCROFT X _____ SECDEF _____ LOU NO FORM NODIS
HYLAND _____ DCI _____ X REF _____ C EYES ONLY EXDIS
DAVIS _____ STATE EXSEC _____ S CODEWORD
OTHER SOLOMON _____ TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: TIMING of Congressional trip to China at end of August

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INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION					REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION	CONCURRENCE	COORDINATE	INFO			
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STAFF SECRETARY						MEMO FOR PRES.
CONGRESSIONAL				X		REPLY FOR _____
ECONOMIC						APPROPRIATE ACTION.
EUR/CANADA/OCEANS						MEMO _____ TO _____
FAR EAST/PRC						RECOMMENDATIONS.
INTELLIGENCE						JOINT MEMO.
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NSC PLANNING						CONCURRENCE.
PROGRAM ANALYSIS						DUE DATE: _____
SCIENTIFIC						COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
SUB-SAH/AFRICA/UN						<u>INDEX - NAMES</u>
<u>FRIEDERSDORF</u>				X		

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	STATUS	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	DUE	CY TO
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Report

CREATION DATE 06/1976

VOLUME 4 pages

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FOLDER TITLE People's Republic of China (13)

DATE WITHDRAWN 05/07/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

June 10, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: RICHARD H. SOLOMON *RS*
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with David Dean,
Deputy Chief of our Peking Liaison Office *BC*

You have agreed to meet with David Dean, the new Deputy Chief of our Liaison Office in Peking, on Friday, June 11, at 11 a.m. The call should take 10-15 minutes. Dean's new position has just been approved by Secretary Kissinger, and he (Dean) plans to depart for Peking next Tuesday.

Your meeting with Dean will be a useful way of reinforcing the ground rules for our dealings with the Chinese which you tried to get across to Ambassador Gates during your meeting with him on April 26. We have recently learned from some of the junior staff of USLO who are in town on home leave that Mr. Gates may be finding his new position a bit confining, and wishes to pursue a number of policies more actively than circumstances warrant at this time. I am told by State that it has only been through the intervention of some of the Department officers around Gates that the Ambassador has been dissuaded from trying to establish an informal dialogue with Chinese officials on an issue such as normalization.

The Chinese seem to understand the situation and have in their own way tried to keep their dealings with Mr. Gates at a low key. Vice Foreign Minister Wang Hai-jung (Mao's grandniece) gave Gates an arrival banquet on May 22, and the Chinese indicated that the young and diffident Miss Wang (rather than a more senior official) would be Ambassador Gates' counterpart. Moreover, Wang, in her welcoming toast, replayed to Gates some of the Chinese concern with his insensitive comments on US-PRC relations which he had made during his Senate confirmation hearings -- and for which Han Hsu criticized him before his departure. Thus, the Chinese appear to want to keep him at some distance. (While the Ambassador finally had a session with Premier Hua Kuo-feng on June 10, which will undercut press speculation that he is being "snubbed" by the Chinese, we doubt that the low frequency of official contacts in Peking will change very much for some months, and Mr. Gates is likely to become increasingly frustrated with his new role.)

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HR 5/10/01



Given the above situation, and in view of the fact that Gates did not read into the record of the past official discussions with the Chinese in a systematic way, Mr. Dean can play an important role in keeping things at the Liaison Office on even keel until the time is ripe for renewed activity in our dealings with the Chinese.

Thus, I believe in your discussion with Mr. Dean you should emphasize the following points:

- While the Administration remains committed to building a strong relationship with the PRC, we are anxious that the China issue remain low key for the next several months so that it does not get caught up in our domestic campaign debates and force people to take public positions which could foreclose future policy options.
- You suspect that Mr. Gates may be finding his role a little less active than he might prefer; but you believe he understands that until the President and Secretary Kissinger feel they can resume momentum on China policy this is a necessary, if difficult, aspect of the current situation. It will be helpful if Mr. Dean can reinforce this view at the Peking Liaison Office.
- We remain concerned about developments in China's own political scene and wish to continuously evaluate this situation as it may affect US-PRC relations. One of the things we look to the Liaison Office for is their reading of this situation.

More detailed talking points for your discussion with Mr. Dean are at Tab A.



TALKING POINTS

- I am delighted to have a chance to meet with you before you depart for Peking. You come with the highest recommendations from the Department, and given the fact that Ambassador Gates has not had personal experience in dealing with the Chinese prior to this assignment, it is all the more important that we have a professional with real experience in dealing with the China issue to complement Ambassador Gates. I understand your own background includes involvement in the Warsaw talks in the early 1960s, as well as senior positions in Taipei and Hong Kong.
- I know the Department has briefed you fully on our overall position regarding the PRC. The President is publicly committed to completing the normalization of relations with Peking, although timing and terms have yet to be worked out. At the same time, President Ford intends to promote the kind of active foreign policy -- particularly regarding the Soviet problem -- which from the beginning has formed the basis of our relationship with Peking. Thus, in your dealings with Chinese officials, you can emphasize both the Administration's commitment to the normalization process as well as its intention to cooperate with the PRC on the range of international questions which remain of common concern. I know that Ambassador Gates, in his meeting with Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, emphasized the President's intention to maintain a strong international role for the United States, particularly on security issues.
- Having said all that, it is obvious we are in a rather delicate period for the next several months as our campaign process plays itself out. The China question is a very tricky one in our domestic debate. We are concerned that the issue not become so visible over the next several months that it forces various people to take rigid public positions which would foreclose future policy alternatives. Thus, we are now in a period where the China issue should be treated in a low-key fashion. I believe the Chinese understand this situation. They have told a number of foreign visitors recently that they are aware that until after our elections there will be no major development in our relationship.
- I suspect that Ambassador Gates may be finding the transition from his very active life in New York to the slower pace of Peking more difficult than he might have expected. I know he understands the need



for a period of somewhat lower-key dealings with the Chinese, but you can reassure him that after the election the momentum in our relationship will pick up and he will find there will be plenty to do. Until then, however, we should remain relaxed.

- I was glad that Ambassador Gates had an opportunity to call on Premier Hua Kuo-feng two days ago. [No reporting cable had been received as of the writing of this memo.] I'm sorry you weren't on the scene when the meeting took place, as it would have given us a chance to draw on your judgment about the personality and position of this new leadership figure. You should know that Ambassador Gates conveyed a letter from the President to Premier Hua Kuo-feng which emphasized the Administration's commitment to further progress in our bilateral relationship as well as to maintain active cooperation on international issues of common concern.
- One issue that concerns us is the evidence of real instability in the leadership in Peking. It appears that the Chinese are now in a very rough period as their succession struggle plays itself out. People seem to be assuming that Chairman Mao will be passing away within the year, which should only compound their present problems. We look to the Liaison Office for its own judgments on the leadership struggle in Peking. I know you looked at these problems for many years from Hong Kong and Taipei; but I think it is particularly helpful to have someone with your experience on the scene in Peking. We look forward to your interpretations, and I know Ambassador Gates will find it very helpful to have someone with your strong background as his Deputy.
- If there is anything we can do to assist you from the White House, please let us know. You should be aware that there is a special White House communication channel which the Liaison Office Chief and his Deputy have used in the past for particularly sensitive communications that they wish to restrict to the President, myself, or Secretary Kissinger, without going through the State bureaucracy.
- I wish you good luck in your assignment.



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NO.
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6/10	6/10	18			7603351

INITIAL ACTION 0

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

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SUBJECT:

*Talkers for Scowcroft mtg w/ Dep Chief
 of US Peking Liaison ofc on 11 Jun*


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INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION					REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
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STAFF SECRETARY						MEMO FOR PRES. _____
CONGRESSIONAL						REPLY FOR _____
ECONOMIC						APPROPRIATE ACTION. _____
EUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS						MEMO _____ TO _____
FAR EAST/ PRC <u>✓</u>						RECOMMENDATIONS. _____
INTELLIGENCE						JOINT MEMO. _____
LATIN AMERICA						REFER TO _____ FOR: _____
MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA						ANY ACTION NECESSARY? _____
NSC PLANNING						CONCURRENCE. _____
PROGRAM ANALYSIS						DUE DATE: _____
SCIENTIFIC						COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN						

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	STATUS	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN)	DUE	CY TO
6/10		Scowcroft	X	Talkers		
6-11		NSC/s	✓	Noted by Scowcroft		

NSC/S DISP INSTR

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PPC

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

June 14, 1976

TO: DICK SOLOMON

FROM: BUD McFARLANE *Bud*

Bill has reviewed the attached and agrees with your identification of a potential for catastrophe. He is concerned, however, that we may not be getting to the fundamental problem. He would appreciate your rethinking the memo to Ellsworth and casting it as a request for an explanation of current procedures for scheduling and approving reconnaissance flights in sensitive areas, noting in the process the two recent protests.

Many thanks.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

MR 01-161, #27, at dept. 12/11/01

del NARA, Date 2/20/02

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

June 10, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

RICHARD H. SOLOMON

SUBJECT:

Contacting Defense on the Matter of Ocean
Surveillance Activities in the Pacific

You will recall that the PRC Liaison Office protested to us twice -- on May 3 and May 17 -- about our surveillance of several of their ships which were operating for the first time in the South Pacific. There was also a recent protest in North Korean broadcast propaganda about similar US surveillance overflights of a North Korean merchant ship in the Sea of Japan in early May.

The State Department has sent you a memorandum (Tab B) expressing concern that the people at CINCPACFLT who run such surveillance flights are insensitive to the political ramifications of their activities. State indicates that they have no desire to hamstring legitimate intelligence activities, but that they would like to see some enhanced political judgment injected into surveillance missions. They recommend that the NSC direct the Department of Defense to devise a procedure which would sensitize the relevant military command to exercise particular discretion in the surveillance of PRC vessels.

State has in mind DOD developing adequate internal clearances and reporting procedures, but also hopes that arrangements can be made so that the State Department will be promptly informed of situations in which PRC vessels will be subjected to intensive or repeated surveillance coverage. State, and we at NSC, also are concerned about the North Korean protest, not because we wish to show any sensitivity to it, but because we believe (in the tradition of the Pueblo and EC 121 incidents) that if we are not careful Pyongyang might take some military action against our surveillance aircraft to justify their continuing charges that the US is threatening their security.

In the wake of last month's PRC protests, Phil Habib had ISA report to him on exactly what had happened in the surveillance of the Chinese ships.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8

~~SECRET~~ - XGDS-2

MR 01-161, #28, dt. dept. ltr 12/11/01

By del NARA, Date 2/20/03

Defense emphasized in their post-mortem analysis that their aircraft had acted strictly according to rules of procedure. They denied that they had in any way "harassed" the PRC vessels, and assert that they are proceeding on ground rules which are acceptable according to international law. State is reasonably confident that Defense is not whitewashing their surveillance activities, but one is never fully certain in such cases.

We believe, along with State, that it would be useful to sensitize Defense to the political ramifications of these necessary surveillance activities. Per my recent discussion with you, I have drafted a memorandum from you to Assistant Secretary Ellsworth requesting that Defense propose, on the basis of their post-mortem review of the surveillance activity, reporting and clearance procedures which will heighten awareness in the Pacific Command of the political implication of their reconnaissance activities. Defense is unlikely to want to inhibit their freedom of action through tightened procedures (especially by agreeing to clear such missions with State), but at least the exercise of having them think through present arrangements will sensitize them to the problem.

Concurrence: Robert Rosenberg

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab A.

6c

A



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

~~SECRET~~

ME 01-161 #39. 12/11/01

By del NARA, Date 2/20/03

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable Robert Ellsworth
Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Ocean Surveillance Activities in the Pacific

You are aware of two diplomatic protests registered in May to the State Department by officials of the Liaison Office of the People's Republic of China concerning ocean surveillance of two PRC oceanographic ships by U.S. aircraft. ~~The ships were operating for the first time last month~~ near the Fiji Islands. [I understand you provided the State Department with a post-mortem analysis of the Defense Department's surveillance activities in this instance. The North Koreans also protested in broadcast propaganda our surveillance of one of their merchant ships in the Sea of Japan during this period.]

We have no interest in inhibiting our legitimate surveillance efforts in the Pacific, although I am somewhat concerned that these activities might lead to political or military problems, which could be minimized with somewhat greater sensitivity on the part of those carrying out surveillance flights. In the case of the PRC, for example, it would be unfortunate if we gave Chinese military officials -- unfamiliar with such activities, and highly sensitive to them -- grounds for pressuring those political leaders who support normalization with the U.S. In the case of North Korea, my concern is that Pyongyang might take some hostile action against our aircraft (as they did in the past instances of the Pueblo and an EC 121 flight) in order to justify their claim that the U.S. is menacing North Korean security.

^{Thus}
~~For the above reasons~~, I would appreciate your reviewing the procedures under which these Pacific Ocean surveillance activities are controlled within the Department, and the surveillance flight rules themselves, and

~~SECRET~~

revelation *any*
recommending to me ~~possible~~ changes in the Department's internal briefing, clearance, and reporting procedures, or possible coordination procedures with the Department of State, which would both sensitize those carrying out surveillance missions regarding the political ramifications of their activities, and minimize the possibilities of an incident resulting from unnecessarily aggressive surveilling procedures. I would appreciate a response containing your suggestions by July ~~15~~ *15*.

Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

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B





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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May 14, 1976

EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: U.S. Surveillance of PRC Vessels

On May 3, the PRC Liaison Office protested to the State Department about the surveillance of PRC "oceanographic survey" vessels in the South Pacific by U.S. Navy reconnaissance aircraft (attachment 1). We rejected that protest on May 11 on the grounds that the U.S. activities in question did not violate international norms (attachment 2). In a somewhat different context, the North Koreans have publicly protested in their propaganda a similar surveillance overflight involving a Navy P-3 and a North Korean merchant ship in the Sea of Japan.

We recognize, on the one hand, that USG intelligence interest in these PRC vessels was high, not only because of their unusual location in the South Pacific but also because of some indications that there may have been a PRC nuclear-powered submarine in the area. On the other hand, we are concerned that a vigorous, close-in surveillance was authorized by individuals who would not be sensitive to the delicacy of our relations with the PRC. Surveillance of PRC vessels is authorized by CINCPACFLT, without referral to Washington, on the basis of guidelines which are applicable to vessels of other countries, presumably including the Soviet Union.

While we do not want to hamstring legitimate intelligence activities, we believe present procedures should be improved to provide more assurance that the sensitivity of our relationship with the PRC will be taken into account in future reconnaissance activities.

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XGDS-2

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8

MR 01-62, #30; at ltr, 11/5/02

by dal NARA Date 12/6/02




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-2-

It may be inadvisable to establish different guidelines for the surveillance of PRC vessels, particularly since the Chinese--like the Soviets--may over time become inured to international reconnaissance practice. However, we recommend that the National Security Council direct the Department of Defense to devise a procedure that would sensitize concerned military commands to the need for particular care and discretion in the surveillance of PRC vessels. We have in mind ensuring adequate levels of clearance and reporting procedures. As a minimum, we believe that the State Department should be promptly informed of situations in which PRC vessels will be subjected to intensive or repeated surveillance coverage, such as that protested by PRCLCLO on May 3.

While we do not have the same political sensitivity about surveillance of North Korean ships, the Department also believes that it would be useful to institute procedures similar to those recommended for PRC surveillance flights. This would assure adequate control and early information in the event of untoward incidents.


George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. State 107559
2. State 117055

SECRET





Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 107559 TOSEC 110653

67

ORIGIN EA-09

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MC-02 ACDA-07 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /078 R

DRAFTED BY EA/PRCM:PGSMITH:SJB
APPROVED BY EA:WHGLEYSTEN
EA/PRCM - MR. ARMSTRONG (DRAFT)
EA/ANP - MR. SQUIRE (DRAFT)
S/S-O:AWOTTO

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USLO PEKING
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CINCPAC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 107559 TOSEC 110653

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MOPS, PFOR, CH, US

SUBJECT: PROLO PROTESTS "BUZZING" OF PRC VESSELS IN
SOUTH PACIFIC BY U.S. NAVAL RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT

1. AT HIS REQUEST, PROLO COUNSELOR TSIENT TA-YUNG CALLED
ON DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY GLEYSTEN MAY 2 TO DELIVER
PROTEST. FOLLOWING IS NEAR-VERBATIM TEXT OF TSIENT'S
STATEMENT:

A. TWO CIVILIAN OCEANOGRAPHIC VESSELS, THE HSIANG-YANG-
HUNG NO. 5 AND THE HSIANG-YANG-HUNG NO. 11, UNDER THE
AUTHORITY OF THE STATE BUREAU OF OCEANOGRAPHY, HAVE BEEN
ENGAGED IN HYDROGRAPHIC AND METEOROLOGICAL SURVEY AND

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.0

CONFIDENTIAL

MR 01-162 #31; dt-let 11/5/02

del NARA Date 12/6/02





Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 STATE 107559 TOSEC 110653

RESEARCH WORK IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN. ON APRIL 25 AT NOON, AS THE VESSELS WERE TRAVERSING THE HIGH SEAS AT AN APPROXIMATE POSITION OF 120 16' 48" SOUTH/1790 39' 30" EAST, U.S. NAVY RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT FLYING AT LOW ALTITUDE REPEATEDLY CIRCLED AND HARASSED THE VESSELS, HINDERING AND MEANACING THEIR NORMAL OPERATIONS. ON THE MORNINGS OF APRIL 29 AND MAY 1, U.S. RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT AGAIN CIRCLED AND HARASSED THE VESSELS.

3. THESE TRUCULENT ACTS OF THE U.S. AIRCRAFT VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL NORMS OF NAVIGATION ON THE HIGH SEAS, AND CONSTITUTED AN UNFRIENDLY ACT TOWARD CHINA. WE ASK THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE IMMEDIATE MEASURES AGAINST A RECURRENCE.

2. GLEYSTEEEN RESPONDED THAT WE WOULD INVESTIGATE. IF ANYTHING WAS DONE WHICH WAS WRONG, THEN WE WOULD TAKE THE APPROPRIATE STEPS. HE ADDED THIS WAS THE FIRST WE HAD HEARD OF THE EPISODE.

3. DEPARTMENT IS IN PROCESS OF SEEKING THE FACTS ON THE ALLEGED INCIDENT.

4. FOP CANBERRA: A FEW HOURS BEFORE TSIEN CAME IN, AUSTRALIAN EMBOFF INFORMED US THAT CHINESE HAD MADE SIMILAR PROTEST (BUT CITING DIFFERENT LOCATION AND DATES) TO GOA. EMBOFF ASKED HOW WE HANDLED SUCH PROTESTS, NOTING THAT CANBERRA MESSAGE TO EMBASSY STATED NO RAAF PLANES WERE INVOLVED IN SURVEILLANCE. WE SAID WE COULD THINK OF NO ANALAGOUS PROTEST TO US IN THE PAST, BUT HAVE NOW INFORMED EMBOFF OF ABOVE PROTEST AND AGREED TO KEEP IN TOUCH. SISCO

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Department of State TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 3568

PAGE 01 STATE 117055

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ORIGIN EA-09

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-04 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00 INR-07

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DRAFTED BY EA/PRCM:PGSMITH:CED
APPROVED BY EA:WHGLEYSTEN, JR.
EA/PRCM - MR. ARMSTRONG
EA/ANP - MR. SQUIRE (SUBSTANCE)
EA/RA - MR. FINCH (SUBSTANCE)
PM/ISO - MR. SCOTT (SUBSTANCE)

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R 130250Z MAY 76
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AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
SECDEF
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ORA/CINCPACFLT

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 117055

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR CH US

SUBJECT: US RESPONSE TO PRC "BUZZING" PROTEST

REF: STATE 107559 DTG 040131Z MAY 76

1. ON MAY 11, EA DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY GLEYSTEN CALLED IN PRCLO COUNSELOR TSIEN TA-YUNG TO RESPOND TO THE PRC'S MAY 3 PROTEST OF ALLEGED HARASSMENT OF PRC OCEANOGRAPHIC VESSELS IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC BY US RECONNAISSANCE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 STATE 117055

AIRCRAFT.

2. GLEYSTEN MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- FOLLOWING YOUR STATEMENT TO US ON MAY 3, 1976, WE INVESTIGATED WHETHER US PATROL PLANES WERE IN THE VICINITY OF THE PRC VESSELS HSAING-YANG-HUNG NO 5 AND HSIANG-YANG-HUNG NO. 11.

-- WE HAVE FOUND THAT A US PATROL PLANE DID CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES IN THE VICINITY OF THESE VESSELS.

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-- THE RECONNAISSANCE PERFORMED BY THE AIRCRAFT WAS ROUTINE; IT DID NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OR PRACTICE; AND IT WAS CONDUCTED WITHOUT HARASSING THE CHINESE VESSELS.

-- AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC AREA ARE A LONG-STANDING PRACTICE, AND THESE ACTIVITIES SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AN UN-FRIENDLY ACT TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

3. GLEYSTEN ADDED THAT WE HAVE TRIED TO INSURE THAT OUR PILOTS UNDERSTAND AND FOLLOW BOTH INTERNATIONAL RULES AND OUR OWN RULES. IF WE FOUND THAT THEY HAD NOT DONE SO, WE WOULD TAKE STEPS TO CORRECT THIS--BUT ACCORDING TO OUR INVESTIGATION, THAT WAS NOT SO IN THIS INSTANCE.

4. IN REPLY, TSIEN REITERATED THE PRC'S PROTEST, REJECTING THE US POSITION. THE CHINESE ATTITUDE WAS FIRM BUT WAS NOT HOSTILE.

5. FOR WELLINGTON: IN THE COURSE OF LOOKING INTO PRC ALLEGATIONS, DEPARTMENT LEARNED THERE HAD BEEN A NEW ZEALAND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA OF THE PRC VESSELS, BUT WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE PRC HAS NOT COMPLAINED TO THE GONZ, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE THEY MISIDENTIFIED THE AIRCRAFT AS AUSTRALIAN.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 STATE 117055

6. FOR CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON: BEFORE CALLING TSIEN IN,
WE INFORMED BOTH AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND EMBASSIES
HERE OF HOW WE INTENDED TO HANDLE THE PROTEST.
KISSINGER

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 121260

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APPROVED BY EA - PCHABIB
EA/PRCM - OVARMSSTRONG
PM/ISO - JSCOTT (DRAFT)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 121260

LIMDIS SECDEF FOR OASD/ISA, CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MOPS, PFOR, CH, US

SUBJECT: PRCLO RENEWS "BUZZING" PROTEST

REF: A) STATE 107559, DTG 040131Z MAY 76,
B) CINCPAC 060449Z MAY 76 (NOTAL),
C) STATE 117055, DTG 130250Z MAY 76

1. ON MAY 17, PRCLO DEPUTY CHIEF HAN HSU CALLED ON EA ASSISTANT SECRETARY HABIB TO RENEW THE PRC'S PROTEST (REF. A). AFTER PLEASANTRIES, HAN SAID THAT HE HAD COME TO DISCUSS THE HARASSMENT BY US AIRCRAFT OF PRC OCEANO-

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.0

CONFIDENTIAL
6

MR 01-162, #32, at ecr 11/5/02

dal NARA Date 12/6/02





Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 121260

GRAPHIC SURVEY VESSELS. HE SAID THAT HABIB WAS PROBABLY AWARE THAT ON MAY 3 COUNSELOR TSJEN OF PRCLO HAD PROTESTED THIS HARASSMENT TO EA DEPUTY GLEYSTEN, AND THAT GLEYSTEN HAD REPLIED TO THAT PROTEST ON MAY 11. THE US SIDE'S MAY 11 REPLY WAS UNACCEPTABLE. THE PACIFIC OCEAN WAS INTERNATIONAL WATERS, NOT THE UNITED STATES' "INTERNAL LAKE." US AIRCRAFT HAD NO RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN RECONNAISSANCE, HARASSING PRC VESSELS ON THE PRETEXT OF SO-CALLED ROUTINE FLIGHTS.

2. HAN SAID THAT WITH REGARD TO ACTIONS OF US AIRCRAFT ON MAY 3 AND 5 IN FURTHER HARASSING THE CHINESE VESSELS, THE CHINESE SIDE COULD NOT BUT POINT OUT THAT SUCH DEEDS BY THE UNITED STATES WERE TYPICAL "POWER LOGIC" AND "HEGEMONIC ACTS." DISREGARDING THE SOLEMN WARNINGS OF THE CHINESE SIDE, THE US HAD REPEATEDLY VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL NORMS OF NAVIGATION ON THE HIGH SEAS, HARASSING AND MENACING THE CHINESE OCEANOGRAPHIC SURVEY VESSELS, HINDERING THEIR NORMAL OPERATIONS. THIS, HE SAID, WAS DIAMETRICALLY INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, AND THE US SIDE MUST BE HELD FULLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY UNFAVORABLE IMPACT WHICH THIS MIGHT HAVE ON SINO-US RELATIONS. ✓

3. IN REPLY, HABIB MADE TWO POINTS:

A. THE CHINESE USE OF THE WORD "HARASS" WAS NOT RELEVANT TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE US RECONNAISSANCE IN QUESTION HAD BEEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH STANDARD PROCEDURES IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. "HARASS" IMPLIES THAT THE VESSELS WERE ENDANGERED, BUT IN NORMAL INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE RECONNAISSANCE WITHOUT HARASSMENT IS ACCEPTABLE. IN THIS CASE, HE ADDED, IT WAS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE CHINESE VESSELS HAD NOT BEEN ENDANGERED.

B. IF THE PRC COULD MAKE CLEAR THE SPECIFIC MANNER IN WHICH THE BEHAVIOR OF OUR AIRCRAFT WAS IN VIOLATION OF THIS INTERNATIONAL NORM, THEN HE WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE THE MATTER INVESTIGATED FURTHER.

4. HABIB CLOSED BY REITERATING THAT, AS GLEYSTEN HAD

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 STATE 121260

SAID EARLIER, OUR RECONNAISSANCE WAS IN NO WAY INTENDED AS AN UNFRIENDLY ACT TOWARD CHINA, BUT ROUTINE RECONNAISSANCE OF THE TYPE USUALLY CONDUCTED IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS.

5. HAN RESPONDED BY QUOTING TSIEN'S MAY 3 PROTEST, ALLEGING THAT THE US AIRCRAFT FLEW AT LOW ALTITUDE, CIRCLING REPEATEDLY, HINDERING AND MENACING THE NORMAL NAVIGATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE CHINESE VESSELS. GLEYSTEN HAD SAID THAT THESE WERE NORMAL, ORDINARY RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS. THIS THE PRC COULD NOT ACCEPT.

6. HABIB REPEATED HIS REQUEST FOR SPECIFICS, WHICH HAN AGAIN PARRIED BY QUOTING THE MAY 3 PROTEST. HABIB THEN SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE THE HARASSMENT CHARGE INVESTIGATED. HE HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT THE US AIRCRAFT IN NO WAY INTERFERED WITH THE CHINESE VESSELS. HAN REJOINED THAT THE CHINESE SIDE HAD CLEARLY TOLD THE UNITED STATES ABOUT THIS ON MAY 3, BUT ON MAY 3 AND 5 THE VESSELS WERE AGAIN HARASSED. IN RESPONDING, HABIB SAID THAT HE WISHED TO MAKE ONE THING CLEAR. THE RIGHT TO FLY OVER INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND TO CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE THERE IS PERMITTED UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. THAT RIGHT WAS NOT IN QUESTION. AS TO THE QUESTION OF HARASSMENT OR INTERFERENCE WITH THE NORMAL FUNCTIONING OF THE VESSELS, HE WOULD HAVE TO LOOK INTO IT FURTHER. WHILE NOT AN EXPERT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, HE UNDERSTOOD THAT WHAT WAS NOT PERMITTED WAS THE ENDANGERING OF THE VESSELS, AND HE SAID THAT HE WOULD LOOK AT THE PRC'S PROTEST IN THAT LIGHT.

7. HAN AGAIN REITERATED THE CHINESE PROTEST, POINTING OUT THAT THE US HAD IGNORED THE SOLEMN WARNING OF THE CHINESE SIDE. HABIB REPLIED THAT THESE WERE THE CHINESE CHARGES, BUT THEY HAD NOT BEEN PROVED. THE US WOULD EXAMINE THEM FURTHER. IF THE US AIRCRAFT HAD VIOLATED THE RULES, THEN THEY WOULD BE STOPPED. BUT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT WE HAD COMMITTED AN UNFRIENDLY ACT TOWARD THE PRC. HE THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS A MATTER WHICH COULD BE RESOLVED THROUGH DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 04 STATE 121250

8. HAN REITERATED THE CHINESE CHARGES, AND HABIB CLOSED BY REPEATING THAT THIS WAS NOT OUR UNDERSTANDING, BUT SAID THAT THE US WOULD EXAMINE THE FACTS AGAIN. HE PROMISED TO BE IN TOUCH WITH PRCLO LATER.

9. FOR DOD/ISA: REGARDING LAST SENTENCE REF B, REQUEST DOD QUERY CONCERNED COMMANDS ON WHETHER THE CHINESE VESSELS ON ANY OF THE OCCASIONS CITED BY THE PRC IN THE TWO PROTESTS REACTED IN ANY WAY TO THE SURVEILLANCE, E.G. BY CHANGING SPEED OR COURSE.
KISSINGER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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SUBJECT: *as Surveillance of PRC vessels*



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STAFF SECRETARY						MEMO FOR PRES
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ECONOMIC						APPROPRIATE ACTION
EUR/CANADA/OCEANS						MEMO TO
FAR EAST/PRC						RECOMMENDATIONS
INTELLIGENCE						JOINT MEMO
LATIN AMERICA						REFER TO FOR
MID EAST/NO. AFRICA						ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
NSC PLANNING						CONCURRENCE
PROGRAM ANALYSIS						DUE DATE:
SCIENTIFIC						COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
SUB-SAH/AFRICA/UN						

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	STATUS	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	DUE	CY TO
7/9			C	DBE per Hyland		
This is merely a duplicate profile for record purposes. This has been CRT'd. XXXXXXXXXX Original profile has been either misplaced or for some reason or other, one was never written. L.						

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH	NOTIFY		 JUL 13 1976 IF CRT ID: <i>AK</i> OPEN CLOSE WH SA PP PA
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:			
SPECIAL INDEXING:			
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED <i>Ab</i>			

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012793

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Memorandum
CREATOR'S NAME Thomas J. Barnes
RECEIVER'S NAME Brent Scowcroft

CREATION DATE 06/15/1976
VOLUME 1 page
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COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
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FOLDER TITLE People's Republic of China (13)

DATE WITHDRAWN 05/07/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

SANITIZED 6/02

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With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (C)

MR 01-163, #33; CIA Mr 6/7/02

MEMORANDUM

By dee, NARA, Date 8/1/02
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3466X

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

XGDS -3

INFORMATION

June 15, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES

SUBJECT:

Spratly Islands Issue

Comment

The Chinese, in early 1974, occupied the Paracels farther to the north in the South China Sea. They probably acted at the time to preempt Hanoi's assumption of South Vietnamese control of most of the islands. After the fall of Saigon, the North Vietnamese quickly took over the islands in the Spratlys which the GVN had previously controlled. The Chinese have seemed content to let the Spratly issue lie dormant so long as no claimant was making any major move either to advance his claim or to physically exploit it. Manila's recent actions in strengthening its military positions in the islands, and authorizing oil exploration nearby, have created a dilemma for the Chinese. They probably do not want to be seen to be bullying the Philippines over the issue, nor do they wish to let exploitation of resources in areas they claim go unchallenged.

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

XGDS -3

Filed in Philippines