

The original documents are located in Box 13, folder “People's Republic of China (9)” of the Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6567

October 1, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK CALKINS

FROM:

for Jeanne W. Davis *WHD*

SUBJECT:

Request for Photos of the President for Bernice Behrens' Delegation to the PRC

In response to your memorandum of September 30 to General Scowcroft, we strongly recommend against providing photos of the President or any other items of the First Family to private organizations visiting the PRC.




6567
Send to Sofman
for ^{quale} staffing
(by back up)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 30, 1975

Memorandum to: General Scowcroft

From: Jack Calkins 

Joann Wilson of the Hartmann staff has been contacted by her friend, Mrs. Bernice Behrens of San Francisco, who is the leader of a delegation of 18 prominent American women who will depart very soon for the Peoples' Republic of China as guests of the PRC government. The trip is being made under the aegis of the American Women for International Understanding, which was founded by Mrs. Behrens some years ago.

Mrs. Behrens requested that she be supplied with 20 copies of a photograph of the President and of the First Family for use by the delegation in making presentations while in China.

We feel this request should receive your approval before we comply as there is a possibility that the delegation has already been equipped with some sort of memento for this purpose by the Department of State or other sources.

Mrs. Behrens requested that we respond by Wednesday, October 1 (her request just came in) because Mrs. Jayne Spain, another member of the group, is departing Washington on Thursday, October 2 for the West Coast to tie in with the others and Mrs. Behrens wanted Mrs. Spain to bring the photographs. Therefore, we would appreciate your guidance ASAP.



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR		INITIAL ACTION O
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR		
9	30	10	1	11	7506567	Larner

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION	TO: PRES	FROM: <i>Calhoun</i>	REFERENCE:	CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
	KISSINGER	COLBY, W	S/S	UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
	SCOWCROFT	SCHLESINGER, J	OTHER	LOU NO FORN NODIS
	DAVIS	ST EX SEC		C EYES ONLY EXDIS
				S CODEWORD
				TS SENSITIVE
SUBJECT: <i>Behrens a member of the Inner Women's fight understanding request to go to family photos to accompany her delegation on their visit to the PRC</i>				

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASMT	INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION		REC C FOR	ACTION REQUIRED	
	ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT	ACTION	INFO.	MEMO FOR HAK	()
	STAFF SECRETARY			MEMO FOR PRES	()
	FAR EAST			REPLY FOR	()
	SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			APPROPRIATE ACTION	()
	MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA			MEMO TO	()
	EUROPE / CANADA			RECOMMENDATIONS	()
	LATIN AMERICA			JOINT MEMO	()
	UNITED NATIONS			REFER TO FOR	()
	ECONOMIC			ANY ACTION NECESSARY?	()
	SCIENTIFIC			CONCURRENCE	()
	PROGRAM ANALYSIS			DUE DATE:	()
	NSC PLANNING			COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)	
	CONGRESSIONAL			<i>Index: Bernie Behrens</i>	
OCEANS POLICY					
INTELLIGENCE					

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS	DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
	10/1				<i>Don't let Memo to Calhoun</i>	

NSC/S DISPATCH INSTR	DISPATCH		<i>Latimer by Lp</i>	BY	OCT 2 1975	CRT ID: <i>MJT</i>	OPEN <i>MJT</i>	CLOSE <i>MJT</i>	SA SF HP NS WH EP PA DY
	CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:								
	NOTIFY								
	SPECIAL DISPOSITION:								
	CROSS REF W/								
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: <i>X</i>		FOLDER:							

MEMORANDUM

6830

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ACTION

October 10, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES *TJB*
SUBJECT: Encouraging Peking-Taipei Negotiations

At Tab A is a memorandum to Secretary Kissinger suggesting an authoritative but unofficial overture to the ROC that would expound the arguments for a related but formally separate approach to ROC and U.S. negotiations with Peking. The memorandum outlines the arguments in favor of this approach and recommends that the Secretary authorize us to develop a scenario for such an approach. It also includes suggested talking points on the subject for use in the Secretary's discussions in Peking.

Jay Taylor drafted the memorandum, and I fully concur in it.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you pass the memorandum at Tab A on to Secretary Kissinger and authorize me to provide copies of the memorandum to Win Lord in the State Department.

APPROVE *TJB*

DISAPPROVE _____

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY *UR*, NARA, DATE *2/3/03*



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012758

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Memorandum
CREATOR'S NAME Thomas J. Barnes
RECEIVER'S NAME Secretary Kissinger

CREATION DATE 10/10/1975
VOLUME 4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400140
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER 13
FOLDER TITLE People's Republic of China (9)

DATE WITHDRAWN 05/02/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

exempt 7/27/2004


NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR		INITIAL ACTION O
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR		
10	10	10	11	14	7506830	

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION	TO: PRES _____	FROM: <i>Barnes</i> <u>KISSINGER, H</u>	REFERENCE: _____	CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE	
	KISSINGER _____	COLBY, W _____	S/S _____	UNCLAS	LOG IN/OUT
	SCOWCROFT <u>X</u>	SCHLESINGER, J _____	OTHER _____	LOU	NO FORN NODIS
	DAVIS _____	ST EX SEC _____		C	EYES ONLY EXDIS
SUBJECT: <i>US Govt Encouragement of PRC & Rep of China negotiations</i>					

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT	INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
		ACTION	INFO.		
	ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK(.....)
	STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES(.....)
	FAR EAST <i>Barnes</i>			<i>64</i>	REPLY FOR(.....)
	SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION(.....)
	MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO _____ TO _____(.....)
	EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS(.....)
	LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO(.....)
	UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____(.....)
	ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY?(.....)
	SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE.(.....)
	PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE:
	NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
	CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY					
INTELLIGENCE					

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS	DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
	10/11		Scarf	X	Decision (10/21)	
	10/27		NSC/S	C	DBA Scarf approved recom	



NSC/S DISP INSTR	DISPATCH _____	MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:	
	CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____	M/F'D _____ BY _____	
	NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____		
	SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____		
CROSS REF W/ _____		CRT ID: _____	SA SF
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: <i>yes</i>	FOLDER: _____	OPEN <i>10/11</i>	HP NS
		CLOSE <i>10/27</i>	WH EP
			PD DY

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

URGENT INFORMATION

October 16, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*

SUBJECT: Are There Mutual PRC-U.S. Interests
in Indochina?

The U.S. and China may have few mutual interests in Indochina; therefore, we can probably expect little PRC cooperation in furthering our objectives in this area. Probably neither the Khmer nor the Chinese want us to play any significant role in Cambodia; moreover, the Chinese may be less worried about Hanoi than is generally assumed. Our main concern should be the future of Peking-Hanoi complementary support of the insurgency in Thailand.

Friction Between Hanoi and Peking

Peking-Hanoi relations are certainly cooler now than before the fall of Saigon. This is generally attributed primarily to Sino-Vietnamese competition in Southeast Asia. Actually other factors, not necessarily helpful to us, are probably mainly responsible for this recent chill. In any case, China can handle its problems with Hanoi without any help from us.

The main bone of contention is most likely the continued Vietnamese claims to the Spratleys which first the GVN and now Hanoi have occupied; moreover, Hanoi may still be claiming the Chinese-occupied Paracels. The Chinese also may well resent Hanoi's high-handed treatment of the Khmer for whom the Chinese feel some responsibility. In addition, the victorious North Vietnamese are probably even more insufferable than before -- even towards their allies -- and current demands for Chinese aid may well irritate Peking.

The main question, however, is whether or not China fears Vietnamese hegemony in the area. It has long been assumed by many that China opposes such hegemony because of the USSR's strong influence in North Vietnam which would spread in the wake of Vietnamese conquests in Southeast Asia.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

State Dept Review

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES TO 9/27/02

BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *2/3/03*



This thesis ignores considerable evidence that Peking consistently supported Hanoi's hegemonic goals in Indochina more than did Moscow. Cambodia is a good case in point. After the 1970 coup, Peking supported Hanoi's efforts to build a Khmer political and military apparatus. Moscow, much to Hanoi's displeasure, continued to recognize the Lon Nol government, not the GRUNK.

Why China Supports the Khmer

As it turned out, Hanoi seems to have constructed a kind of Khmer Frankenstein's monster which turned against its North Vietnamese creators. The Chinese would probably prefer not to get involved in this Vietnamese-Khmer dispute; however, the Khmer urgently needed help which they would not ask of the Soviets, whom they still distrust, or the Vietnamese who are hardly in a position to help, even if relations were better. This left the Chinese; moreover, a strong affinity for the Chinese has understandably developed among Khmer leaders. The Chinese also probably feel certain moral and political obligations to the Khmer whose government they officially hosted for five years. In addition, Peking is no doubt critical of the high-handed way in which Hanoi has treated the Khmer (e.g., seizure of Cambodian islands).

Soviet Influence in Hanoi

All of this has little to do with fear of Soviet influence moving in on Hanoi's coattails. It is true that the Chinese have privately expressed concern about growing Soviet influence in Hanoi. This may well be simply part of Peking's persistent campaign to warn Asians and others against Soviet designs in Asia. The Chinese are well aware that many in Asia and elsewhere are convinced of Soviet influence in Hanoi and want to capitalize on this. At the same time, China is firing a shot across Hanoi's bow to be doubly sure the Soviets do not gain any special advantages in Indochina -- specifically base rights. On the other hand, Peking should know the Vietnamese well enough to realize the latter are not going to limit their own independence of action and -- even more important -- risk Chinese animosity by granting the Soviets concessions which Peking would perceive as a threat.

In fact, the putative Soviet influence in Hanoi has so far not been manifested in any way which significantly threatens Chinese interests, for example:

-- Hanoi has not given the Soviets bases or base rights.

-- Hanoi has not supported the Soviet campaign for an Asian Collective Security Conference, which China opposes.



-- Hanoi has not supported Soviet efforts to convene an international conference of Communist Parties, which China also opposes.

If Moscow does have much influence in Hanoi, it is hard to see what the Soviets are getting out of it, other than denying China the political and ideological advantage of being Hanoi's principal supporter. (Hanoi, on the other hand, clearly does not want to be too dependent on either of her two major allies.)

U. S. Role in Cambodia

As far as Cambodia is concerned, the Khmer probably do not need or want our help in confronting the Vietnamese; therefore, China is not likely to be interested in a U. S. role in Cambodia. On the other hand, China is promoting Cambodia's international prestige and acceptability -- needed to overcome widespread reports of Khmer Communist excesses -- and in this context would promote U. S. -Khmer contacts such as the Habib-Sarin Chhak meeting in New York. It is highly unlikely that the Chinese would go beyond facilitating cosmetic exchanges between the Khmer and us.

The Future of Peking-Hanoi Roles in the Thai Insurgency

Our real and immediate problem in Southeast Asia is Thailand. This will be the touchstone of Chinese intentions in the area. So far, Peking and Hanoi support for the Thai insurgency has been complementary with no reported friction between the two in respect to objectives in Thailand. The Thai Communist Party leadership is based in and controlled by China. China's support has gone mainly to north Thailand, whereas Hanoi has mostly supported the insurgency in the northeast.

If, as has been recently reported, Hanoi ultimately intends to annex a large part of northeast Thailand to Laos, the Chinese reaction will be interesting. Peking has long accepted (or been resigned to) Hanoi's hegemony in Indochina, and actively helped promote it. (In the last year of the war, for example, China provided Hanoi twice as much war materiel as did the USSR.) Whether, on the other hand, China will accept Hanoi's hegemony in a large part of Thailand remains to be seen -- if indeed this is Hanoi's goal.



7804 4

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

VIA LDX


November 21, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Visit to the PRC --
Commemorative Gift

We would appreciate having your recommendation on presenting the Chinese with a gift to commemorate the President's trip to the PRC. It is our understanding that a lucite paperweight with a Presidential signature card in English and Chinese was used for President Nixon's visit to China. However, there apparently was some confusion over the gift and the Chinese did not understand that the paperweights were for them. We would like to have your views on the appropriateness of a similar gift being given to the Chinese at the reciprocal dinner and your suggestions as to the design.



Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary



VIA LDX

November 21, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Visit to the PRC --
Commemorative Gift

We would appreciate having your recommendation on presenting the Chinese with a gift to commemorate the President's trip to the PRC. It is our understanding that a lucite paperweight with a Presidential signature card in English and Chinese was used for President Nixon's visit to China. However, there apparently was some confusion over the gift and the Chinese did not understand that the paperweights were for them. We would like to have your views on the appropriateness of a similar gift being given to the Chinese at the reciprocal dinner and your suggestions as to the design.

Joanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

cc: Tom Barnes
Gen. Scowcroft

Maria Downes
Marge Wicklein



THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

ME SENT:

'75 NOV 21 PM 5:37

RECEIVED:

EX NR:

640

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
PAGES: 1

IA _____
STATE ☒ _____
MCC _____
NMCC _____
SA _____

DIA/G _____
DIA/H _____
TREAS _____
NPIC _____
ERDA _____

DESCRIPTION/COMMENT

FROM: Jeanne Davis

TO: George Springsteen
Executive Sec.

NOV 21 17 46 '75



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR		INITIAL ACTION O
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR		
11	21	11	22	9	750 7804	

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION	TO: PRES <u>Springsteen</u>	FROM: KISSINGER, H <u>DAVIS</u>	REFERENCE: <u>CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE</u>
	KISSINGER _____	COLBY, W _____	UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
	SCOWCROFT _____	SCHLESINGER, J _____	LOU NO FORN NODIS
	DAVIS _____	ST EX SEC _____	C EYES ONLY EXDIS
			S CODEWORD
			TS SENSITIVE
SUBJECT: <u>Request for sugg re Commemorative gift for Pres Unit to PRC</u>			

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT	INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
		ACTION	INFO.		
	ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT		X		MEMO FOR HAK _____
	STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES _____
	FAR EAST <u>Barnes</u>		X		REPLY FOR _____
	SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION _____
	MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO _____ TO _____
	EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS _____
	LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO _____
	UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____
	ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? _____
	SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE. _____
	PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE: _____
	NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
	CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY <u>Powens, M</u>		X			
INTELLIGENCE <u>Wickham, M</u>		X			

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS	DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
	11/21				D Davis sgd memo to Springsteen (11/30)	
	01/6				COBE per Braxton	



NSC/S DISP INSTR	DISPATCH _____	MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: M/F <u>JAN 08 1976</u> CRT ID. <u>TH</u> SA SF OPEN <u>MA</u> HP NS CLOSE <u>MA</u> WH EP <u>PA</u> DY
	CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____	
	NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____	
	SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____	
	CROSS REF W/ _____	
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: <u>✓</u> FOLDER: _____		

THE WHITE HOUSE

7905


WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH WOMEN'S ATHLETIC DELEGATION
FROM THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Friday, November 28, 1975

10:30 a.m. (15 minutes)

Rose Garden (or State Dining
Room in case of rain)

From: Brent Scowcroft 

I. PURPOSE

To underline the importance you attach to our relations with the People's Republic of China, and to lend a positive and cordial note to your departure for Peking the next day.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

- A. Background: This is a basketball delegation of 19 women from the PRC. They will be touring the country and playing exhibition matches on their two week visit to the United States. This exchange tour is being organized by the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, a private organization which assists the government in the development of cultural exchanges with the Chinese. The Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW) is assisting the National Committee in promoting this exchange.
- B. Participants: The 19-member basketball team; PRC Liaison Office Deputy Chief Han Hsu; Secretary Kissinger; Brent Scowcroft; Assistant Secretary of State John Richardson; Arthur Rosen, President of the National Committee for U.S.-China Relations; Kay Hutchcraft, Executive Secretary of the AIAW; Peggy Burk, President-elect of the AIAW. (See Tab A for complete list of attendees.)
- C. Press Arrangements: Press photo session. Meeting to be announced.



III. TALKING POINTS

1. I am pleased to welcome Mme. Li Shih-hua (pronounced LEE SHIR-HWA) and the other members of the Chinese National Women's Basketball Team. I am also glad to see the Deputy Director of your Liaison Office here, Mr. Han Hsu (HAN SUE).
2. The sports exchange program between China and the United States is an important part of our efforts to build normal and constructive ties. Such visits improve our mutual understanding and contribute to the spirit of good will that exists between our two countries.
3. Mrs. Ford, Susan and I are looking forward to our trip to your country, which we begin tomorrow morning. While the major purpose of our visit is to hold talks with your leaders, I know we will have a chance to see some of the very interesting historical sites in Peking. I also understand that a sports event has been planned for one evening.
4. We attach the greatest importance to our new relationship with the People's Republic, and I welcome this opportunity to learn more about your country -- which I visited in 1972 -- and to exchange ideas with your leaders. I can tell them that in the area of sports exchanges we are making good progress according to the spirit of the Shanghai Communique.
5. I understand that you will be playing against the Federal City College tonight in an exhibition match at the University of Maryland's Cole Field House. I know you will receive a warm and friendly reception from the American people, and I wish you good luck.
6. I hope you have enjoyed your tour of the White House. Before you leave, let me express appreciation to your host organization, the National Committee on U.S. -China Relations, for its hard work on behalf of exchanges between our two countries. The Committee is making an important contribution to normalizing U.S. -PRC relations. We are proud of the work they are doing.

I also want to thank the officials of the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women for their assistance in promoting this athletic exchange.



Presidential Meeting with a Group of Women Basketball Players from
the People's Republic of China, November 28, 1975 at 10:30 a.m.

PRC National Women's Team

Li Shih-hua
Pu Chen-kuei
Wang Chia-tung
Li Ya-pei
Hsueh Yin-hsien
Hsia Kun
Shan Jui-jung
Lu Hung
Feng Yu-shu
Liu Ke-hsien
Chang Chin-yun
Wang Chiang
Lo Hsueh-lien
Chu Kuei-yin
Li Li-na
Sun Wei-kuo
Chang Li-chun
Sung Chieh
Fu Man-shou

U.S. Government Officials

Secretary Kissinger
Brent Scowcroft
John Richardson, Assistant
Secretary of State
Richard Solomon, NSC

National Committee on U.S.- China Relations

Arne de Keijzer
Peggy Blumenthal
Arthur Rosen
Jan Berris
Carmen Santiago
June Mei
Jay Henderson

Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women

Barbara Reimann
Susan Peplin
Darlene May
Kay Hutchcraft
Peggy Burke

PRC Liaison Office Officials

Han Hsu
Chang Chih-hsiang
Shen Jo-yun





MEMORANDUM

6a
ACTION - 8179

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

DAVID ELLIOTT *D.E.*
BOB HORMATS *mb*
DENIS CLIFT *ED*

SUBJECT:

Manufacture of British
Jet Engines in China

You may remember that two years ago the British were holding preliminary discussions with the PRC concerning the transfer of technology and equipment for manufacturing Rolls Royce Spey 202 engines. This is an after-burning engine with 20,000 pounds thrust which would presumably be used in the Chinese MIG 21's or other supersonic fighters.

At that time, the British Prime Minister sought agreement from the US that we would not block this deal in COCOM. HAK gave an indication to the British that we were not adverse to the deal; however, his position did not constitute a clear statement of approval or disapproval. Subsequently, when the UK tabled this proposal in COCOM, the US (following interagency consideration) and two other countries, entered reservations. The British did not press the question in COCOM, and the matter has been quiescent since then.

Earlier this week, a representative of the British Embassy handed Larry Eagleburger the aide memoire at Tab B, which indicates that Rolls will sign the contract with the Chinese this week. The UK does not plan to submit it for COCOM approval fearing that such approval would be unattainable.

The British argue that inasmuch as the global strategic balance would not be upset by the Chinese manufacture of jet engines for fighter aircraft, and that the Chinese may be on the threshold of this technology themselves, the £90 million deal is too attractive to pass up.

Our main concern in this situation is its impact on COCOM. This will be the first time that a major COCOM partner has baldly exported significant military hardware and technology to a Communist country, while ignoring its COCOM obligation to seek approval within that framework and to abide

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/GDS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *2/3/03*

State Dept Review
TD 9/27/02



by its findings. This seems to us to have the distinct potential for undermining the viability of COCOM. If the British can export military jet engine manufacturing capability, it is hard to imagine what one would protect through COCOM embargo.

We understand from the staff at DOD that you will be receiving an objection, based on the above arguments, from Clements, who has been made aware of the British intention through Embassy representatives.

It is also worth noting that the failure of COCOM to function effectively may not serve Chinese interests either. Such a breakdown could well lead to Soviet acquisition of advanced technology having important military potential. So while the Chinese security may gain from having Spey engines available to them, in the long run this benefit may be counter-balanced by improvements to Soviet military capability that could flow from the demise of the COCOM embargo system.

Dick Solomon points out that we should take into account the legitimate Chinese interest in improving their defensive capability. If we are successful in denying them a Spey engine manufacturing capacity, we should suggest to the PRC our willingness to explore the possibility of alternatives to meet their needs. Although no acceptable alternative comes immediately to mind, contact with the Chinese might suggest something (perhaps related to lower temperature core technology). You may want to pursue this with HAK upon his return.

The Japanese, who were made aware of the UK action by the British Ambassador in Tokyo, have said that they would like to know the US view before responding. They have also hinted that if the British were allowed to go ahead with this deal, it would be difficult to hold back Japanese manufacturers of military equipment from sales of manufacturing technology.

State is in the process of preparing a note to be delivered tomorrow in London in which the US will "regret" the UK decision to proceed. We think it is very important that we not only express regret, but also explicitly remind the British of their responsibility to submit a case of this type and importance for consideration by the COCOM partners.

We believe it is important to take this position for two reasons: First, there is genuine concern over the impact on COCOM's future effectiveness of the British ignoring it on a deal of this proportion and implications. Second, it will put us in a stronger position to deny acquiescence in the British action, which may be characterised in the US press as putting weapons in the hands of potential adversaries.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

Dick Solomon concurs.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum today to Ingersoll (Tab A), recommending that the US response to the British aide memoire include a strong statement of US concern over the British plans to bypass COCOM in the Spey engine deal.

You also may want to send a back channel to HAK noting your memorandum to Ingersoll.


*Cabled to HAK to
raise with Callaghan.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/GDS



66

A



6c

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: UK Sale of Spey 202 Engine Manufacturing
Capability to PRC

The British have notified the Administration of their intention to proceed, without COCOM approval, with the transfer of Spey 202 jet engine manufacturing technology and equipment to the Peoples Republic of China. I understand that State is preparing a note to be delivered in London expressing regret that the UK has decided to proceed on this basis.

Because the current British approach will have the effect of undermining COCOM, I believe it important that we express serious concern over the UK's failure to observe its obligation under COCOM, and urge them to reconsider their decision and to submit this proposal to COCOM for review.

Brent Scowcroft

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/GDS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*

HSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES *TD 9/27/02*
BY *HR* NARA, DATE *2/3/03*



6d

B



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012762

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Notification
CREATOR'S NAME British Embassy
RECEIVER'S NAME United States Government

CREATION DATE 12/09/1975
VOLUME 3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400140
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER 13
FOLDER TITLE People's Republic of China (9)

DATE WITHDRAWN 05/02/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

64

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		NBR		INITIAL ACTION O
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR		
12	11	12	12	13	160 8179	

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: KISSINGER/H _____ S/S _____

KISSINGER _____ COLBY, W _____ OTHER _____

SCOWCROFT * _____ SCHLESINGER, J _____

DAVIS _____ ST EX SEC _____

REFERENCE: _____ CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE

UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT _____

LOU NO FORN NODIS _____

C EYES ONLY EXDIS _____

S CODEWORD _____

TS SENSITIVE _____


SUBJECT: *Manufacture of British Jet Engines in China*

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO.		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK ()
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES ()
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO TO ()
EUROPE / CANADA		X	X	RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO ()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO FOR: ()
ECONOMIC		X	X	ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
SCIENTIFIC			X	CONCURRENCE ()
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE:
NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				
<i>Solomon</i>		X	X	

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
12/12		SCOWCROFT	X	DECISION (12-18)	
12/15		NSC/S	C	Scowcroft cleared cable to HAK	



NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

CROSS REF W/ _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: *X* FOLDER: _____

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: _____

M/F/D _____ BY _____

DEC 16 1975

CRT ID: _____ SA SF

OPEN _____ HP NS

CLOSE *HAK* _____ WH EP

C PA C

7a

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012763

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Memorandum

CREATOR'S NAME Brent Scowcroft

RECEIVER'S NAME The President

CREATION DATE 12/28/1975

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400140

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 13

FOLDER TITLE People's Republic of China (9)

DATE WITHDRAWN 05/02/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

Sanitized 9/9/04

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

INFORMATION

December 28, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

[REDACTED] the
Charge' of the PRC Liaison Office, Ambassador Han Hsu, made the
following points:

"If the U. S. fails to deter the Soviet Union in Angola,
it would be a signal to the Soviets that the U. S. would
stand aside from Soviet moves to control Third World
countries.

"This would be the beginning of an irreversible course
of eventual Soviet domination over lesser developed
countries.

"If this were indeed the case, the PRC, no longer
convinced of U. S. will and resolve to stem illegal
Soviet advances and to honor its commitment to
other nations, would have to reassess its own state
of relations with the Soviet Union."

Such a strong statement by a high PRC official on future PRC relations
with the Soviet Union is almost unprecedented. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the clear implication was that the PRC might seek an accommo-
dation with the Soviet Union, although Han Hsu's statement left that
open to speculation. One other instance in which a similar
impression had been given by a high Chinese official occurred several
months ago when the PRC Ambassador to the UN, Huang Hua, made a
comment to the effect that there were factions in China that had
cautioned Chairman Mao against the provocative line he was taking
with the Soviet Union.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~



DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 Sec. 2.6
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (C)
9/27/02
mk04-71 #10- CIA 422 9/19/04
del NARA Date 2/20/04

7b
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012764

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Note
RECEIVER'S NAME The President

CREATION DATE 12/1975
VOLUME 1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400140
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER 13
FOLDER TITLE People's Republic of China (9)

DATE WITHDRAWN 05/02/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

sanitized 9/9/04

76

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


Memorandum to Pres —

[REDACTED]

the change of the DRC Liaison
Office made the following points:

1/2/3

DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 Sec. 2.0
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c)
state review 9/27/02
MR 04-71, #11; CIA 22, 9/9/04
del NARA Date 3/20/06



7d
~~SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS~~

December 26, 1975

EYES ONLY FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

TOSCO 26

FROM: JOHN MATHENY

General:

Bill Hyland thought you should see this. I ^{have sent} ~~am endeavoring to get~~ a
copy to Secretary Kissinger.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS



~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

7c

IMM
PRECEDENCE

NODIS
~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~
CLASSIFICATION

FOR COMM CENTER USE ONLY

FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM//TOSCO 2611

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT (VAIL)

INFO:

DEX _____

DAC C44

GPS _____

LDX _____

PAGES 2

TTY _____

CITE _____

DTG: 261901Z Dec 75

RELEASED BY:

GE

TOR: 262400Z

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

TOSCO 26

EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

DELIVER IN SEALED ENVELOPE

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012765

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Memorandum of Conversation
CREATOR'S NAME John Matheny

CREATION DATE 12/24/1975
VOLUME 1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400140
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER 13
FOLDER TITLE People's Republic of China (9)

DATE WITHDRAWN 05/02/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

example 10/4/05