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MEMORANDUM

1582-X

la

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

SECRET

March 13, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:	GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:	RICHARD H. SOLOMON
SUBJECT:	A Reply to George Bush

George Bush sent you a backchannel message yesterday (Tab B) calling your attention to a discussion he had with Zambian Foreign Minister Mwanga, who called at USLO on March 11. Ambassador Bush notes that Mwanga will be visiting Washington with Zambia's President Kaunda in the middle of next month.

Ambassador Bush requests that the President, Secretary, or yourself mention to Foreign Minister Mwanga how much George Bush appreciated his coming to call on him at USLO.

I have checked with Hal Horan, who is aware of the communication, and he indicates that he feels that the "thank you" would be most appropriately done by the Secretary. He plans to work something into Dr. Kissinger's talking points for his meetings with President Kaunda and his Foreign Minister.

I have prepared, at Tab A, a brief note of reply from you to Ambassador Bush.

Recommendation:

That you approve the cable to Ambassador Bush at Tab A.

BY_


Approve D

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, SEC. 9.5 NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

KR , NARA, DATE 5/9/01

-SECRET XGDS (5b(3))



THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

Set Room has FABA



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Retyped - 3/17/75 Gen. Scowcroft/feb .1d

ACTION 1582-X

SECRET

VIA VOYAGER CHANNEL

TO:

AMBASSADOR GEORGE BUSH USLO PEKING

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT THE WHITE HOUSE

1. I appreciated your message of March 12, in which you reported the Zambian Foreign Minister's call on you at USLO.


2. We will see that the Secretary thanks Mr. Mwanga for his thoughfulness in dropping by to see you.

3. We will be sending out Jim Lilley's replacement by the end of this month. I will notify Huang Chen in advance as we did in Jim's case.

4. Warm regards.

-SECRET

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 Atate Sept Review 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES TO 9/2/02 DECLASSIFIED NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES LIR , NARA, DATE 2/3/03 BY



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TO THE WHITE HOUSE. FM USLO PEKING

SECRET/SENSITIVE VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS

PEKING 074

243

TO: BRENT SCONCROFT

FROM: GEORGE SUSH

THROUGH CHEROKEF CHANNELS WE ARE REPORTING TODAY ON A VISIT THAT FORMIN MHANGA OF ZAMBIA AND I HAD AT USLO RESIDENCE MARCH 11.

MWANGA WILL BE VISITING THE STATES WHEN ZAHBIATS CHIEF OF STATE RUANDA VISITS PRES. FORD.

I HOULD APPRECIATE IT VERY MUCH IF THE SECRETARY OR YOU OR THE PRESIDENT COULD MENTION TO MWANGA HOW MUCH I APPRECIATED HIS COMING TO CALL ON ME AT USIO. THISTS RATHER UNPRECEDENTED AND THE VISIT MITH ITS REFERENCE TO CHOU EN LAY WAS VERY PRO-DUCTIVE. I THINK A PERSONAL MENTION LIKE THIS MILL BE DEEPLY APPRECIATED BY MWANGA, WILL SHOW HIGH LEVEL HOME FOONT INTEREST IN HIS COURTERY, AND WILL RESULT IN MORE PRODUCTIVE VISITS IN FUTURE. I KNW MWANGA WELL AT UN. HE IS AN ARTICULATE OPPONENT AND A FRIEND. MANY THANKS.

WARM PEGARDS.

BT

E.O. 12853, GEO. 3.5 STATE DEFT. OUIDELINES BY______, NARA, DATE 5/9/01

SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, RODMAN NOT SENT TO HAK

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

ACTION March 25, 1975

1829-X

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Approve

BY_

AR

___, NARA, DATE 5/9/01

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

W. R. SMYSER

SUBJECT:

Message from You to George Bush

In accordance with Brent Scowcroft's instructions, I have drafted the attached message from you to Bush (Tab A) in return for Bush's report (Tab B) about Prince Sihanouk's desire to get in touch with us.

This approach has been coordinated with Phil Habib, who is preparing an implementing message to John Dean. RECOMMENDATION:

Disapirove

That you approve the attached message for Bush (Tab A).

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY - XGDS



VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS

-TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

March 25, 1975

FOR: GEORGE BUSH

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

Please arrange to call on Prince Sihanouk in conjunction with the matter you described in Peking 077.

You should inform the Prince that we will do what we can to arrange the release for transmittal to him of these materials.

You should also tell the Prince that if he has any message for Washington, you would be glad to transmit it.

Like yourself, we are uncertain whether Sihanouk is motivated by a desire to preserve Khmer cultural records at a time when he fears a destructive battle or whether he wishes to establish a contact. Whichever it is, we wish to appear responsive and see where it leads us.

Warm regards.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES BY_______, NARA, DATE <u>5/9/01</u>

GERA



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TO THE WHITE HOUSE FM USLO PEKING

TO PSECRET/SENSITIVE VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS

PEKING 077 RE: PEKING 076 TO: SECRETARY KISSINGER EYES ONLY FROM: GEORGE BUSH SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM PRINCE SIMANOUK

1. FRENCH ANBASSADDR ANRNAUD CALLED ON ME TODAY IN PART TO INTRODUCE HINSELF BUT ALSO IN PART FOR THE MORE SUBSTANTIVE PURPOSE F TURNING OVER TO ME FOR DELIVERY TO MASHINGTON A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM PRINCE SIMAMOUK. THE MESSAGE ESSENTIALLY WAS AN APPEAL BY SIMAMOUK TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ASSTSTANCE IN GETTING LONG OF TO RELEASE FOR TRANSMITTAL TO SIMAMOUK THE FILMS AND CULTURAL RECORDS INCUT CANSODIA PHICH THE PRINCE HAD MADE BEFORE THE 1972 COMPANY TO THE PRESIDENT OF PHICE HAD MADE BEFORE THE SIMATERIALS ILL PRESERVED FOR POSTERITY. IN MAKING THIS APPEAL, SIMAMUK RECALLED THE HELP WHICH PRESIDENT NIXON HAD PROVIDED IN ARRA GING FOR THE TRAVEL OF SIMAMOUK'S MOTHER OUT OF PHNOM PENH SO SHE COULD JOIN HIM IN PEKING.

2. READS TOLD E THAT SIMA OUK'S MESSAGE HAS BROUGHT TO HIM BY SIMANOUK'S CHEF DU CABINET, PHENG PENG CHEN, WHO ALSO BROUGHT ALONG SOME SAMPLES OF SIMANOUK'S PHONOGRAMP RECORDS FOR TRANSMITTAL TO THE PRESIDENT AS EXAMPLES OF THE PRINCE'S CULTER CONTRIBUTIONS. AFTER PASSING ON THESE MATERIALS, PHENG THE TIKE TO CHEES MALO, THE FRE CH OCH AND AN EXPERIENCED CARDIA HAVE THO PURPOSES: 1) PRESERVATION OF THE FILMS ANDC CULTURAL RECORDS JUST AS SIMANOUK HAD SAID, AND 2) POSSIBLY OPENING UP A QUIET CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATIONS.

3. ARMAND FURTHER VOLUNTEERED THAT SIHANDUK HAD "PUT A WEAPON IN YOUR (E.E. THE U. S.) HANDS," SUGGESTING THAT SIHANDUK WOULD LOOK RIDICULOUS IN THE EYES OF THE HORLD IF HE APPEARED TO BE

HAK, SCONCROFT, MCFARLANE, RODMAN

RODMAN RODMAN RODMAN E.O. 12353, SEC. 3.5 STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES BY HR, NARA, DATE STATO TOR: 084/15:01Z DTG: 251030Z MAR 75

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******* TOP SECRET ******* COPY

MORRYING ABOUT HIS FILMS AT A TIME WHEN SO MUCH HUMAN SUFFERING Has taking place.

4. WE IN USLO OF COURSE OD NOT KNOW QUITE WHAT TO MAKE OF ALL THIS. BUT IT ODES APPEAR THAT SIMANOUS MAY IN FACT BE TRYING TO DREW UP A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATIONS. THE MESSAGE AND THE RECORDS WILL BE FORWARDED TO YOU IN THE POUCH LEAVING PEKING MARCH 25.

5. MARH REGARDS. BT

PS 138277

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OF 12 TOR:084/15:012 . DTG:2510302 MAR 75

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE

April 29, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

RICHARD H. SOLOMON

SUBJECT:

An Evaluation of Kim Il-song's Visit to Peking

Kim Il-song's week-long visit to the PRC ended on April 26 with the publication of a Sino-North Korean joint communique. The visit, which by all outward appearances was a successful demonstration of PRC-DPRK friendship, seemed to shift Kim from a rather militant initial posture to a united front position on diplomatic efforts to achieve the reunification of Korea by "independent and peaceful means."

One senses that Kim's visit may have traded off PRC unwillingness to support Pyongyang in more aggressive tactics to reunify the Peninsula in return for greater Chinese military and economic aid, and more vigorous diplomatic backing -- as at the UNGA this coming fall. The communique emphasized that "completely identical views were reached on all the questions discussed" between the Chinese and North Korean leaders. Our sense is, however, that the dangers of the North Koreans seeking to take advantage of the psychological momentum created by the Communist successes in Indochina has not been ended by the Peking visit. Indeed, one can make an argument -- which we sketch below -that the dangers of some limited provocative action by the North Koreans against the South may have increased, despite clear indications of Chinese aloofness from some of Kim Il-song's more militant public rhetoric.

The joint communique seems intended to highlight Kim Il-song's relationship with Mao. It notes that the two leaders had "a most significant meeting." Chou En-lai's position is downplayed. The document notes that Kim merely had a conversation with the Premier "in an atmosphere of cordiality and friendship." The Shanghai radical leader Yao Wen-yuan, out of the public eye since mid-1974, was notable for being the third ranking participant in the talks.

-CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE XGDS

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 tate Augt Review NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDE: 10-5 TD 9/06/02 BY__________, HARA, D 2/3/03 The two delegations taking part in the talks had significant military representation on both sides, suggesting that security matters and military aid were major topics on the agenda. The North Korean Chief of Staff, it should be noted, was the only other Korean to participate in the Mao-Kim meeting. Representatives of the North Korean army and air force took part in the general discussions, with roughly equivalent military representation on the Chinese side. The fact that PRC Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying did not participate in the talks (although he did preside over a public rally) suggests some Chinese interest in downplaying the military dimension of the visit. One recent CAS report indicates, moreover, that Chairman Mao responded to Kim's interest in adopting more aggressive military tactics to achieve Korean reunification with "extreme reserve." It may be that the communique's expression of "the Chinese people's ... trust in Comrade Kim Il-song'' is a backhanded way of saying that the PRC trusts that the North Korean leader will not violate assurances that he will not resort to provocative military action.

The communique does not carry a <u>direct</u> North Korean statement on the issue of reunifying the Peninsula. Rather, it expresses <u>China's</u> "resolute support" for North Korean policies designed to achieve the "independent and peaceful" reunification of Korea based on various proposals put forward by Kim II-song in the past. The Chinese condemn the Pak Government, which it says is supported and instigated by "U.S. imperialism," for perpetuating the division of Korea, undermining the North-South talks, and heightening the suppression of people in the South. The Chinese also express their support for the Korean position on dissolution of the United Nations Command and the withdrawal of American armed forces from the South. No time limit is given for the U.S. troop withdrawal, however. The PRC statement also "condemns U.S. imperialism" for pursuing a policy of "two Koreas."

The document pulls its punches on the Soviet factor in world affairs. Instead of mentioning the USSR by name, or by the usual Chinese epithet of "social-imperialism," the communique quotes "both sides" as noting that contradictions in the world "between imperialisms" are sharpening. The document then reasserts the standard Chinese line about the inevitability and danger of a new world war.

The rest of the rather lengthy communique has passages in which the Chinese and North Koreans congratulate each other on their respective domestic poilitical and economic successes, express support for the

-GONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE

recent developments in Indochina (in which notably visible reference is given to Prince Sihanouk, with no mention of his various Cambodian allies) and for various other "Third World" struggles in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.

Comment: It is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from the published speech material and other documentation from the Kim visit, or the limited CAS reporting we have received, about the precise intentions of the North Korean leader in making his first visit to Peking since 1961. We assume, at a minimum, that he was testing China's position on a range of international issues in the wake of developments in Indochina. We find it difficult to believe that mere questions of economic assistance, or even military aid, were sufficient to precipitate the trip. The one notable feature of the communique and speeches published in connection with the visit was the strong Chinese adherence to the theme of the reunification of Korea by "independent and peaceful" means. The North Koreans did not directly articulate this theme themselves, suggesting that they were looking for new alternatives -- and that the Chinese wish to hold them to their present course. We think it most likely that the Chinese would have discouraged any North Korean inclination to resort to military action. It remains uncertain, however, how actively they would be willing to restrain Pyongyang in the context of a crisis situation. We believe the Chinese feel quite vulnerable to North Korean (and North Vietnamese) efforts to play the "Third World" or the Soviets against them should they apply pressure in ways highly inconsistent with North Korean (or North Vietnamese) objectives. As PRC Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua told you last fall, Peking pays close attention to the desires of its Korean ally.

We doubt that Kim is now content to merely replay the diplomatic track he pursued (unsuccessfully) in the UNGA last fall. We are concerned that he will follow up his highly visible public contact with the Chinese by adopting a combination of political pressures and limited military action. He might seek to provoke a controlled crisis over the Northwest islands (similar in quality to theTaiwan Strait crisis of 1958) in order to force on what he sees as a hesitant United States the difficult choice of whether or not to back an ally subject to criticism in our media over a marginal territorial issue. His objective would be to drive a wedge between Washington and Seoul, and further undermine the Pak government and the self-confidence of the South Koreans. Kim could then hope that an increasingly rigid and repressive response by the government in Seoul would lead to deepening political turmoil, creating conditions where -- as he noted in his banquet speech on the first days

-CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE

of his Peking visit -- "if revolution takes place in South Korea, we, as one and the same nation, will not just look at it with folded arms but will strongly support the South Korean people."

In view of the Kim visit and its possible implications for some new North Korean provocation, we believe the following steps are in order:

-- Undertake a review of our combined political and military posture on the Peninsula, and with respect to the U.N. Command situation. It will now be much more difficult to undertake the initiatives we sketched for you last month which would reduce the profile of the U.N. Command and modify the American security role on the Peninsula. You may wish to consider a WSAG or SRG session on Korea within a few weeks time.

-- We should consider moves which will signal to the North Koreans our continuing alert posture with regard to military provocations (as perhaps by sending in additional aircraft or naval units, perhaps drawing on assets freed up from Indochina), and relieve some of President Pak's anxieties. At the same time, we should make certain that the ROK and U.N. military adopt a more disciplined and reserved posture to avoid giving the North an incident (such as a repeat of the ROK sinking of a Northern fishing vessel near the Northwest islands two months ago) which it could exploit.

Concurrence: Mr. Smys

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE



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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT INFORMATION

2894-X

-SECRET/SENSITIVE

May 1, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

RICHARD H. SOLOMON

SUBJECT:

Canadian Expulsion of PRC Diplomat May Hold Complications for the U.S.

Canadian and American newspapers on April 28 and 29 carried a story reporting the expulsion from Canada of the press attache of the PRC Embassy, for "security reasons." CIA and FBI reporting indicates that the official was very likely a representative of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party, and had been engaged for some time in funding pro-Maoist Marxist-Lenninist splinter groups in Canada and elsewhere. (We are currently seeking more detailed information on the extent of his activities.)

This expulsion is linked to the United States in the fact that the PRC official had just given the sum of \$77,000 to a naturalized American of Philippine ancestry who teaches at the University of Connecticut. The woman, who was apprehended at the Vermont border by U.S. customs officials, was acting as a courier for an anti-Marcos political group in the Philippines. The customs officials confiscated the woman's money, but she was released and at present is at her home in Storrs, Connecticut. Legal proceedings have not yet been initiated against the woman.

While the Canadians made public the expulsion of the PRC diplomat, they have done so in a very low-key manner, and have not publicly developed any linkage between the Chinese official and the Philippine woman residing in the United States. However, a cable from USLO of April 30 indicates that the Canadians fully informed their Embassy in Peking about the development, including its link to the Philippine-American woman. The Canadians told the entire story to Ambassador Bush.

If the matter of the linkage between the PRC official's expulsion and the arrest of the Philippine woman becomes public, we would face two particular political problems: Peking might assume we were making

-SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 State Dept Review NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES TD 9/26/02 BY JAC, NARA, DATE 2/3/03

the incident public as an embarrassment to them or as a way of calling into question the future of our relationship; and the publication would fuel more active public debate in this country about PRC intentions toward our allies and Chinese diplomatic activities in the United States. (A good case can be made, of course, that there are advantages to exposing the PRC on this type of activity.)

An additional political angle is that there could be some marginal advantage to us in indicating to the Marcos government that we had intercepted these funds and the evidence of PRC efforts to support an anti-government group in the Philippines.

Thus far we have taken steps to urge the Canadians to keep the American element in this situation quiet. We don't know how long we will be successful in this effort. The Washington-based correspondent of the <u>Toronto Globe and Mail</u> has already inquired at the State Department about some American involvement in the expulsion of the Chinese official. He got a "no comment" reply to his initial inquiry. We will also face a decision about whether or not to prosecute the Philippine-American woman, which would certainly reveal the Chinese connection in this matter.

As there are further developments, or issues for decision in this case, we will inform you.



OG NBR DOC RECD INITIAL ACTION O NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE MO DA MO DA HR 0 2 REFERENCE: CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION TO: PRES FROM: KISSINSER, s/s. UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT KISSINGER COLBY, W OTHER. LOU NO FORN NODIS SCOWCROFI SCHLESINGER, J C EYES ONLY EXDIS ST EX SEC CODEWORD DAVIS S SENSITIVE TS INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION ACTION REQUIRED REC ACTION CY ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT ACTION ASGME MEMO FOR PRES STAFF SECRETARY REPLY FOR FAR EAST APPROPRIATE ACTION SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA MEMO TO-MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA RECOMMENDATIONS EUROPE / CANADA + DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL JOINT MEMO . LATIN AMERICA REFER TO. UNITED NATIONS ANY ACTION NECESSAR ECONOMIC CONCURRENCE. SCIENTIFIC DUE DATE: PROGRAM ANALYSIS NSC PLANNING COMMENTS: (NCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCT CONGRESSIONAL OCEANS POLICY INTELLIGENCE SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN): DATE FROM TO CY TO SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS R. INSTR DISPATCH_ MICROFILM & FILE ROMTS: CY ROMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:_ M/F'D_ NOTIFY___ & DATE _____ BY. DISP SPECIAL DISPOSITION: __ CRT ID: SA SF NSC/S CROSS REF W/_ OPEN. HP NS SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: __ FOLDER:_ CLOSE. WH FP PA

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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL .	• •	. National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL		. Memorandum
CREATOR'S NAME		. Gleysteen, Lord, and Solomon . Secretary Kissinger
TITLE		. Your Tour d'Horizon with Huang Chen
CREATION DATE		. 05/08/1975
VOLUME		. 5 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER COLLECTION TITLE		. 032400136 . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER		. 13 . People's Republic of China (5)
DATE WITHDRAWN WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST .		

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

SECRET/SENSITIVE

May 8, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SECRETARY KISSINGER DH/Msta PHILIP HABIB/WILLIAM GLEYSTEEN WINSTON LORD WL/MS fa RICHARD H. SOLOMON

SUBJECT:

Your Tour d'Horizon with Huang Chen on Friday, May 9, 1975, at 5:00 p.m.

You requested this meeting with PRC Liaison Office Chief Huang Chen for a general review of international developments. The Chinese interpreter for this session is likely to be Miss Shen Jo-yun. Mr. Chi has returned to Peking. We mention this in part because Miss Shen's English is not up to Mr. Chi's standard, and hence some of the more eliptical ways of discussing the delicate issues which will be covered in this session may not get through to her. In addition, we have always wondered about Miss Shen's particularly close association with Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing. She (Shen) has not presented herself as open and flexible on political issues, or as sympathetic to the American connection, as Mr. Chi.

The following memorandum has been put together with two purposes in mind. Primarily it is to brief you for your meeting with Huang. However, we also use the tabbed sections on the various topics for discussion to review developments since your November, 1974 visit to Peking, inasmuch as you indicated an interest in covering a wide range of topics with Huang. We are concerned about the length of the memo, but feel it is the best way to bring you up to date for your tour d'horizon.

The Objectives of the Meeting

This will be your first major substantive discussion with a PRC official since your last trip to Peking in November, 1974. In the interim, developments in Indochina and elsewhere have radically transformed the political context within which both we and the Chinese are operating. (We review changes in this context in some detail below.) We see four primary purposes to be served by the meeting:

-SECRET/SENSITIVE

"DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12950, SEC. 3.5 State Supt Review NSC MEMO, 11/24/93, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES TD 9/26/02 BY__________, NARA, DATE 2/3/03

WILL ASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 See WILL PORTIONS EXEMPTED E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (C) mr 04-71. #5. CA 121 919104

-- <u>Global</u>: To project firmness and purposefulness regarding the Administration's foreign policy; a sense of determination to persist in efforts to influence world events in order to attain the primary goals of our foreign policy -- despite the developments in Indochina and our domestic political mood. In this regard, you should outline the state of play and our objectives in various key areas, including: the Soviet factor in world affairs; the President's trip to Europe and our relations with NATO and Japan; prospects for the Middle East and Persian Gulf, etc.

-- <u>Asia:</u> To caution the Chinese about the threat to our shared interests if recent developments in Indochina heighten tensions in other parts of Asia. You should, in particular, indicate concern about possible developments in Korea in the wake of Kim Il-song's visit to Peking. At the same time, you should mention the problems we both now face in stabilizing the region so that the Soviets are impeded in their efforts to seek greater access to Southeast and Northeast Asia. In effect, you should imply possible linkage between Chinese cooperation on thirdcountry issues and further progress in our bilateral relations.

--<u>Bilateral:</u> To further position ourselves for the dialogue in coming months on normalization. Bilateral relations should not comprise a major element in this particular discussion. However, you should obliquely indicate to Huang that the domestic political forces which have been mobilized in the wake of the collapse of the American position in Indochina will not be helpful to the evolution of U.S.- PRC relations. At the same time, you should state that we continue to adhere to the normalization process, and perhaps make some low-key reference to the question of the timing of the President's visit to Peking. You may also wish to indicate an interest in sustaining a visible political relationship over the coming months, as by raising the question of the timing of a Congressional visit to the PRC in the next four months (as was agreed to in principle last November), or by responding to Huang's request that his wife have an opportunity to call on the First Lady.

You should assume that the Chinese are somewhat confused, and perhaps actively disturbed, by apparently contradictory statements on China policy made recently by the President, yourself, and Secretary Schlesinger -- particularly Mr. Ford's statement in his press conference of May 6 that he intends to "reaffirm our commitments to Taiwan." You should not initiate a defensive comment on these apparently contradictory statements, but wait to see whether Huang raises any questions about them. If he does not, at the end of the session you might conclude by

stating that our commitment to normalization is unchanged, and that particular attention should be paid to the President's speech to the Congress of April 10, and your press conference of April 29, as authoritative expressions of our constant position.

-- <u>Chinese views</u>: To seek to draw Huang Chen out on PRC perceptions of recent developments and their immediate intentions in the Asian region and elsewhere. In preparing for this discussion he will have received some new substantive guidance from Peking. Conceivably you will be able to gain some insight from him regarding Chinese perspectives on recent developments -- rather than just conducting the kind of monologue that has characterized most of your sessions with Huang.

The Altered Political Context

The rapid erosion of the American presence in Indochina and other developments (e.g., southern NATO and the Middle East) has substantially altered the political climate within which we and the PRC will operate over the coming year. For the U.S. the collapse of friendly governments in Saigon and Phnom Penh has initiated a period of retesting our relationships with other governments in Asis. Inevitably the prospect is one of some further reduction of our ability to project American influence in the region.

Recent developments have also substantially complicated the political context which will affect the normalization process. Domestic critics of normalization will assert the need to hold to all existing security relationships to prevent the further erosion of trust in our intentions and the credibility of our commitments. Friendly foreign governments which still look to the U.S. for security assistance will interpret our actions over the coming months as indicators of how we are reordering our priorities and coping with the gradient constraints on foreign policy.

As far as Peking's reaction to recent devents is concerned, we have received multiple indications from diplomatic **Constitution** that the Chinese hope for a sustained, if consolidated, American role in Asia and the world -- principally in countering the Soviets. As Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua (perhaps posturing somewhat for his audience) told a group of British journalists in late April, "The Communist victory in

Vietnam has unloaded a burden off the back of the United States, and now they can maybe play a more positive role in the Pacific. Certainly, the Soviets will expand anywhere they are able."

For Peking, the stunningly rapid insurgent victories in Vietnam and Cambodia have generated substantial new forces which will require the PRC to play a more active role in the Asian region. The Chinese already face increasingly difficult policy choices between their ideological pretentions, the interests of neighboring allies, the PRC's own national objectives, and the maneuverings of the Soviets. As was most vividly revealed in Kim Il-song's visit to Peking, China's ideological and geographical neighbors are pressing (in the face of an uncertain American presence in the region) to pursue their own interests in ways which cut across Peking's foreign policy objectives. Both Pyongyang and Hanoi have shown considerable skill in influencing Peking through a combination of dealings with the Soviets and cultivation of China's would-be "third world" constituency.

The Chinese are undoubtedly more concerned than ever now about the Russians finding openings in areas on their immediate periphery. This might come about through diplomatic maneuvering, as Hanoi, Bangkok, and other states in the region seek greater security and political flexibility through balanced big-power pressures. It might also come about as a result of the development of new areas of instability -- as seems most likely in Korea. By all evidence, Peking continues to see its interests served by further developing its relationship with the U.S. and does not desire to push the American presence totally out of Asia. The Chinese do, however, seem to look toward further consolidation of our military presence, limited perhaps to Japan, Okinawa, and Guam.

Our problem, in this regard, is how to develop a positive working relationship with the Chinese on regional issues of mutual concern (as should be the case, in particular, in Korea). We are increasingly faced with a situation where the Chinese expect our help in areas of high concern to them where their ability to act is limited (as in their repeated requests for aid to Pakistan, their diplomatic support for your negotiating efforts in the Middle East, and -- most generally -- their encouragement of our efforts to counter the Soviets) while they remain aloof and generally uncooperative in areas central to their security (as in Indochina and Korea).

While one can explain away this situation in terms of the complicated game Peking must play in maneuvering between the interests of its small peripheral neighbors and Soviet pressures, it nonetheless creates a situation where people increasingly ask, "What are we getting out of our relationship with the PRC?" In short, the Chinese must understand (as perhaps they do) that the domestic political consensus which thus far has supported normalization is changing -- and with it the prospects for developing the kind of a relationship which would enhance the security of both the PRC and the U.S.

Specific Areas for Discussion

At the following tabs are brief summaries of recent developments in the specific areas we believe you should cover in the discussion. The summaries are followed by suggestive talking points. We present the various topics roughly in the order we think they should be raised. As noted above, we believe bilateral issues should be downplayed, and left for the end of the discussion, although some low-key clarification of the President's May 6 press conference remarks on Taiwan is in order.

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

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WITHDRAWAL ID 012743

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL .		National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL	 •	Summary
CREATOR'S NAME		Gleysteen, Lord, and Solomon Secretary Kissinger
TITLE		
CREATION DATE	 •	05/08/1975
VOLUME		3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER COLLECTION TITLE		032400136 NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
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DATE WITHDRAWN		

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Indochina

Indochina Background

Minister visited Hanoi for two weeks in early March, just before the all-out North Vietnamese offensive. We do not know what was discussed during this visit. No public announcement was made at its conclusion which would indicate increased Chinese military or economic aid for Hanoi. We are reasonably certain that Peking did not encourage the North Vietnamese to press their military campaign against the South; but at the same time we do not think the Chinese pressured Hanoi to stay its hand. In short, Peking probably adopted a rather passive attitude, feeling that a combination of inaction on our part and the weakness of the Saigon government foreordained a victory for Hanoi, and that the costs to them of overtly objecting to the North Vietnamese offensive were prohibitive in terms of future Chinese influence in Indochina and with "third world" countries.

At the same time, we have received multiple indications from diplomatic reporting that Peking's relations with Hanoi are rather strained. North Vietnamese officials have expressed bitterness in diplomatic contacts about the Chinese takeover of the Paracel Islands in early 1974, and about limited PRC military and economic assistance--which they contrast with generous Soviet support. Peking now faces a difficult situation in Indochina. PRC leaders are probably concerned that continuing Vietnamese expansion into Laos and Cambodia, pressure on Thailand, and encouragement of instability elsewhere in the region will impinge on Chinese influence and give Moscow new openings in Southeast Asia.

Since the fall of Saigon, Peking has clearly signalled its interest in a stabilization of the current situation. Its message of congratulations to the Vietnamese stressed the division between the DRV and the successful insurgents in the south, who were said to face the difficult tasks of "carrying through their national and democratic revolution." This was a way of saying that the Chinese do not want Hanoi to rapidly incorporate the south into the DRV. As well, Peking has downplayed recent developments in Indochina as being a defeat for the U.S.

In Cambodia, Peking was unwilling to facilitate a negotiated resolution of the conflict, and failed to respond to your diplomatic initiatives of December

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and January. The Chinese have sought to build up Sihanouk's position in the wake of the collapse of the Lon Nol government without any apparent success. We believe they will try to sustain a position for the Prince in order to limit Hanoi's influence (as well as that of the Soviets) and limit the spill-over effect into Laos and Thailand.

In discussing Indochina developments, you should stress, (a) our mutual interest in seeing the current situation stabilized, so as to limit Soviet opportunities in the region, (b) our desire to go beyond "Vietnam" to the central issues in our foreign policy, yet the fact that domestic political forces stimulated by recent developments will complicate this effort, and (c) your interest in PRC views on recent developments.

Indochina Talking Points:

-- We recognize that developments in Vietnam and Cambodia have complicated our foreign policy tasks, but we are determined to continue playing a strong international role and remain confident that we can do so.

-- We assume that we share an interest in seeing the evolution of independent states in Indochina. What do you see as the prospects for the Provisional Revolutionary Government in Vietnam? It is our impression that Hanoi has particularly warm feelings for Moscow at this time. What degree of access to Vietnam do you think Hanoi will give the Russians?

-- We are concerned that Hanoi is now in the process of overthrowing the coalition arrangement in Laos. This will raise questions in many people's minds about the value of agreements signed with communist

governments.

-- We frankly were disturbed that in our efforts to see a negotiated resolution of the situation in Cambodia you did not even give us the courtesy of a reply to our contacts of December and January. We believe, as you seem to, that Sihanouk should play a role in the new government in Phnom Penh, and that Cambodia should not fall under Hanoi's control. What do you think are the prospects for Sihanouk being anything more than a figurehead?

Korea

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Korea Background:

Kim II-song visited Peking for a week in mid-April, the first time he has been to China since the PRC and DPRK signed a security and friendship treaty in 1961. While we have no hard evidence that Kim came to China seeking support for military action against South Korea, it seems likely that he was reviewing his options in the wake of developments in Indochina.

During the week of Kim's visit, the harshness of the North Korean leader's public comments seemed to wane a bit, while the Chinese held to a position of support for the "independent and peaceful" reunification of Korea. The final communique reiterated this line, while also suggesting PRC support for a high-gear diplomatic effort to support North Korean objectives of gaining a U.N. General Assembly resolution in the fall calling for the dissolution of the U.N. Command and withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. The communique characterized the DPRK as "the sole legal sovereign state of the Korean nation." Chinese unease about Kim's intentions was suggested, however, in the communique phrase about "the Chinese people's high respect for and trust in Comrade Kim Il-song" -- suggesting an effort to salve the North Korean leader's vanity even as they expressed concern that he not violate assurances about not doing something rash.

Since Kim's return to Pyongyang, rumors have circulated in the Peking diplomatic corps that the North Korean leader will also visit Moscow and various Eastern European capitals. These rumors have failed to materialize thus far, however, generating speculation that Kim may have found the Soviets unresponsive to his probing for new options.

The Chinese never responded to our efforts last fall to get diplomatic motion into an effort to terminate the U.N. Command while leaving the armistice intact. PRC leaders have indicated to you their intention to follow Pyongyang's lead on this issue, and we do not anticipate any change in this position in the coming months. Indeed, in view of Kim's highprofile visit to Peking, we assume that the Chinese are now locked into a diplomatic strategy with Pyongyang.

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Korea Talking Points:

-- Your friend Kim Il-song seems to be getting restless in the wake of developments in Indochina. We appreciate China's support for peaceful efforts to reunify Korea, but we are not so sure that Mr. Kim is interested in peaceful approaches to this question. Is your trust in him well founded? He has sought to present others with <u>faits</u> accompli before.

-- The North Koreans should be under no illusion that if they resort to military provocations they will meet with anything but a harsh response from the United States.

-- We totally reject the statement in your joint communique with Pyongyang that the U.S. has sought to "sabotage the North-South talks." We believe that quiet, step-by-step negotiated efforts to build confidence between the two Koreas is the only way to achieve the "independent and peaceful reunification of Korea." Frankly, we are concerned about the lack of response from the Chinese side to our efforts of last fall to make quiet but constructive efforts to resolve the U.N. Command issue. We remain open to any suggestions your side might have.

-- I must frankly say that high-pressure political tactics in the U.N. on the Korea issue will only make it much more difficult for us to readjust our position in Korea. Such tactics are bound to heighten tension between Seoul and Pyongyang. It looks to us as if the North Koreans are trying to create the same combination of political and military pressures which they saw operating in Indochina. How can they be considered the "sole legitimate government" of Korea?

-- I would only add that if tensions in Korea rise during this fall, or if there is a noisy debate at the U.N. with active Chinese support, it can only complicate our bilateral dealings.

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Soviet Union

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Soviet Union Background:

The Chinese will have noted continued Soviet interest in detente despite the trade setback and our own recent foreign policy difficulties. They should also have noticed the sterner tone of remarks by the President and yourself concerning detente in recent statements. They know we consulted with the Russians concerning evacuation and a possible political solution in the waning days of the Vietnam debacle. (We did not go to the Chinese at all after their lack of cooperation on Cambodia.)

Peking may be uneasy about the full upcoming agenda with Moscow, particularly in contrast with our bare slate with Peking (e.g., the Brezhnev summit, SALT II. CSCE, Middle East collaboration, etc.). Note: Your meeting with Gromyko will be announced on Monday, May 12. You should alert the Chinese in this meeting and explain what will be discussed.

In the past, we have consistently used a heavy anti-Soviet tone in our dealings with the Chinese. While you want to reassure th Ambassador that we will be particularly firm with Moscow during this troubled period, there may be some advantage in leaving the Chinese somewhat uneasy about our Soviet connection.

The Russian negotiator in the Sino-Soviet border talks recently returned home after three fruitless months in Peking. Both sides have been cynical about the stalemate, now in its sixth year.

Soviet Talking Points:

-- The President and I have made it very clear in recent statements that we will not allow Moscow to seek advantages as a

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result of recent international events.

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-- As you know, Brezhnev's trip has been delayed until September. We are aiming to complete a SALT II agreement by then, but are encountering the usual Soviet haggling in negotiations.

-- I am meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko during my forthcoming European trip. This will take place in Vienna on May 19-20. (Preview what will take place.)

-- We met informally a couple of weeks ago in London with some of our allies as well as the Soviets on the question of exporting nuclear materials. We will reconvene in June. The purpose is to dampen the prospects for non-proliferation. We have assumed your government would not be interested in such an exercise even though we do not believe proliferation is in your interest (e.g., India, Taiwan, South Korea).

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Europe

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Europe Background:

Our relations with Europe (as well as Japan) have remained in basically good shape, but the Chinese will be worried about the weakening of NATO which has taken place in Portugal and Greece/ Turkey. We have announced the NATO summit meeting at the end of this month, which will follow your visit to CENTO, OECD, and the IEA. The President will also visit Italy and Spain. We are on the home stretch of CSCE and are considering tabling new initiatives in MBFR. There have been several West European visitors to Peking lately, Belgian Prime Minister Tindeman and the EEC's Soames being the most recent.

Europe Taling Points:

-- Our relations with Western Europe are probably better than at any time during the past six years. There is closer consultation and collaboration.

-- At the same time there are obviously serious problems along the southern flank of NATO. (Explain our attitude toward Portugal and Spain.) We are working intensively with Congress to try and relaunch military assistance to Turkey.

-- The President's trip to Europe and the NATO summit meeting will reaffirm our solidarity as well as give an opportunity to discuss privately the problems on the southern flank of the alliance.

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-- I believe the Mansfield Resolution on withdrawing troops from Europe is effectively dead, at least for this session of Congress.

-- The dreary CSCE exercise is in its terminal phase. The Soviets are anxious for a summit this summer and are making some marginal concessions. We are under no illusions about the real significance of any documents that might be signed, and will guard against any illusory sense of accomplishment over the results.

-- How are your relations going with the Europeans? What do you sense of the European mood? As you know we favor increased ties between the PRC and our friends in Europe.

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Middle East

Middle East Background:

Since you last saw the Chinese the step-by-step negotiating process has broken down at least temporarily, and we have launched a reassessment of our Middle East policies. Lord alerted the Chinese to the breakdown of the shuttle at the time, but there has been no subsequent discussion of the state of play and future prospects. The Chinese have backed our Middle East efforts from the beginning and would want us to continue our role so as to diminish Soviet influence. Thus they were undoubtedly disappointed at the failure of your last mission and may be somewhat apprehensive of greater Soviet-US cooperation in the negotiating process.

Another interesting recent development is Iran's growing solidarity with the Arab states, including its dumping of the Kurds in order to patch up relations with Iraq. To the extent that this could represent an effort to wean Iraq away from Moscow the Chinese may take some comfort from the development.

In addition, the Soviets have been exploring contacts with Israel and have stated their willingness to guarantee Israel within its 1967 borders.

Finally, Prince Fahd has effectively replaced the deceased King Faisal of Saudi Arabia.

You will want to reassure the Chinese about our determination to continue our central involvement, point out that we remain the only outside power able to talk to both sides, and outline our ongoing strengthening of bilateral ties with various states in the region.

Middle East Talking Points:

-- Explain briefly why the shuttle broke down.

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-- Outline the rationale for our reassessment, the possible diplomatic options, and the current state of play with the various actors.

-- As the President and I have stressed, we are determined to continue our central role in facilitating a settlement. All the Arab states are urging us to do so, and they continue to reflect suspicions of Soviet intentions.

-- The President's meetings with Sadat and Rabin will help to cap our policy review. Shortly thereafter we will decide on our strategy.

-- We are continuing to strengthen our bilateral ties with the Arab states. This includes efforts to help Egypt's economic situation (e.g., Robinson's trip and working with Iran and Saudi Arabia). Sadat has urged us to send warships through the Suez Canal on the day it reopens. (We are the only country that he wishes to do so.)

-- Iran's improved relations with Iraq should help moderate Soviet influence there. Iraq is playing a rather active diplomatic role now.

-- The new leadership in Saudi Arabia remains pro-American and anti-Soviet.

-- What readings of the Middle East situation do you have from your own contacts with the Arab states, including Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien's recent visit to Teheran?

Subcontinent

Subcontinent Background:

At the turn of the year the Chinese initiated efforts to draw the Indians into an improved relationship. In January Peking sent a ping pong team to Calcutta, sparking rumors that some new diplomatic initiative might be in the offing, and at the end of February a PRC Vice Premier, transiting the same city on his way to Nepal, remarked to the press that "Sino-Indian relations cannot continue in the present state for long." New Delhi demonstrated considerable reserve in responding to these signals from Peking, and with the Indian installation of Sheikh Abdullah as Chief Minister of Kashmir in February, and the annexation of Sikkim in mid-April, the Chinese pulled back from their forthcoming posture. The drawing back was symbolized by the visit to Islamabad late last month of third-ranking Vice Premier Li Hsiennien shortly after a trip to Iran. Li attacked Indian actions in Kashmir and Sikkim, but did not close the door to the possibility of renewed movement toward improved relations with New Delhi at some point in the future. Li's visit to Pakistan seems to have been largely a handholding operation, as no specific agreements were announced at the end of the visit. One CAS report indicates that Li told the Paks that it would be best for the U.S. if it withdrew completely from Southeast Asia and Korea.

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Peking also continues to maintain diplomatic contacts with Bangladesh officials in a low-key exploration of the issue of establishing diplomatic relations. Until recently the Chinese have held back in establishing a formal relationship with Dacca, while pushing the Pakistanis to make the move first. In view of the continuing delays in diplomatic progress between Islamabad and Dacca, however, Peking may have decided to precede the Paks -- indeed, we have one report that President Bhutto expressed to the Chinese his willingness to see this happen. A recent CAS source indicates that a Bangladesh economic delegation now in China to attend the Canton Trade Fair will discuss the recognition question with PRC officials.

On our side, Pakistan has yet to follow up on our offer to renew arms sales, and India has resumed its invective against the U.S.

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Subcontinent Talking Points:

-- Earlier this year your ping pong players stirred up speculation that there might be some improvement in China's relations with New Delhi. Do you anticipate any progress in Sino-Indian relations?

-- I noticed that Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien recently visited Teheran and Islamabad. Have there been any interesting developments in your relations with Iran and Pakistan?



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WITHDRAWAL ID 012749

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL .	 National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL	 . Summary
CREATOR'S NAME	. Gleysteen, Lord, and Habib . Secretary Kissinger
TITLE	
CREATION DATE	 . 05/08/1975
VOLUME	 . 7 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER COLLECTION TITLE	. 032400136 . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER	. 13 . People's Republic of China (5)
DATE WITHDRAWN	

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Bilateral Relations

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Bilateral Relations Background:

Since the turn of the year, U.S.-PRC bilateral relations have proceeded in low-key fashion without major developments. Trade, which reached a high point of \$922 million in 1974, now shows signs of dropping almost 50% in 1975 as a result of China's cutbacks in agricultural imports. This downturn does not seem to represent any political motivation, but rather reflects Peking's substantial balance of payments deficit (nearly \$1 billion), improved domestic agricultural production, and certain technical problems with American grain products. Chinese trading officials continue to indicate, however, that imports of high technology items from the U.S. will be sustained (an electronics industry delegation is scheduled to visit Peking in June), and Peking appears to be moving toward a more institutionalized trading relationship with us by sending industry delegations of their own to survey the American market. A textile production group visited the U.S. in March, and the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade is scheduled to send a delegation here in September.

Cultural exchanges continue on even keel, despite our cancellation of the performing arts troupe tour at the end of March. Peking has not retaliated for this development, despite some complaining by Foreign Minister Ch'iao to the Albert/Rhodes Congressional delegation. The Chinese recently agreed to a two month extension of the tour of their archaeological exhibition to include San Francisco, and approved a world affairs council delegation visit to the PRC in the fall. An American track and field team departs for Peking later this month, and the spring and summer visits to the U.S. of several PRC scientific groups will be capped by the tour of their Scientific and Technical Association -- the counterpart organization of our Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC.

The one recent note of discord in the exchange program is related to the expulsion from Canada early in May of a PRC diplomat, for security reasons. The Chinese Press Attache in Ottawa was surveiled by the Canadian authorities passing funds to several Canadian and

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American "revolutionary" groups, including the Revolutionary Union. This latter organization, a semi-covert Marxist-Leninist group with Maoist pretentions, set up the U.S.- China People's Friendship Association as a front organization. This latter group held a counterpress conference to protest our cancellation of the performing arts troupe tour, and shows signs of actively trying to build itself up as a mass-based alternative to the National Committee on U.S.- China Relations, the organization we have relied upon to facilitate cultural exchanges with the Chinese.

Political contacts with the PRC have been at a minimal level since January. You have seen Huang Chen only twice, and the half-dozen 'meetings Phil Habib and Win Lord have held with Han Hsu included the one positive note of informing Peking of our Taiwan air base closings scheduled for 1975. The Chinese did approve the "add-on" visit of Congressional leaders Albert and Rhodes. They recently turned down another request by Senator Kennedy for a China trip. Peking undoubtedly watched through our press the backing and forthing on U.S. representation at the Chiang Kai-shek funeral. PRC officials have not protested the Vice President's participation in the event.

The Chinese undoubtedly sense that in the wake of Indochina developments the Administration is cross-pressured on China policy. We have presented conflicting signals to them in recent weeks, and may have raised doubts in Peking about our intentions regarding normalization. On the one hand the President sent a forthcoming message of congratulations to Premier Chou in January, and mentioned his trip to China and the intention to "accelerate" U.S.- PRC relations in his April 10 message to Congress. During your press conference of April 29 you pointed out the President's reaffirmation of our alliances, yet conspicuously omitted mention of Taiwan from the list of major treaty commitments in Asia or the governments we would consult with in reassessing our foreign policy.

At the same time, however, Peking could see us respond to conservative pressures in constituting the Chiang funeral delegation. They read Senator Goldwater's remark that if the Administration is considering

major changes in China policy, "it will have a helluva fight on its hands." They noted that the President's remarks to the ASNE editors included the comment that he considers U.S. relations with the Republic of China, "a matter of very, very great importance" and that we remain concerned about the ROC's security and stability. Most recently, in his May 6th press conference Mr. Ford failed to mention the re-establishment of U.S.-PRC contact as a major Republican accomplishment, and he looked forward to reaffirming our commitments to Taiwan. He also failed to mention his forthcoming trip to Peking. In addition, they saw your remark to the ASNE group that, "We shall not forget who supplied the arms which the North Vietnamese used to make a mockery of its signature on the Paris accords"; and they must also be pondering Secretary Schlesinger's remark of May 1 that Taiwan is defensible and that as long as we have treaty obligations with the island we will continue to protect it.

These conflicting noises reflect the realities of our domestic political debate, and it is undoubtedly helpful that Peking appreciates these counter-currents. The questions they must be asking themselves are: will the negative pressures generated by Indochina events increase with time or dissipate; will President Ford's future political plans further complicate his intentions and timing regarding normalization; and will Washington therefore be less flexible on the terms of an agreement? We do not propose that you clarify our positions on any of these questions in your meeting with Huang; a period of ambiguity may be useful as developments of the next several months play themselves out. We do believe, however, that you should indicate the President's continuing intention to visit Peking later this year by asking the Chinese for their views on timing, and express interest in sustaining a visible political relationship via another Congressional delegation visit during the summer and by a Mme. Huang call on the First Lady (if you think this would be appropriate within several weeks of the Indochina defeats). $-e^{i}f^{*}$.

The developments in the American political context are paralleled by conflicting trends in the PRC domestic political scene. The January National People's Congress seemed to indicate a return to regular governmental procedures, the consolidation of civilian leadership around Premier

Chou En-lai, and the resolution of uncertainties about the leadership succession with the assumption of greater responsibilities (including heightened control over the military) by Vice Premier Teng Hsiaop'ing and Party leader Chang Ch'un-ch'iao. The Congress passed a relatively flexible economic program in the larger context of a no-nonsense effort to strengthen the state bureaucracy under the slogan of consolidating the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Since the Congress, however, Chou En-lai's health and political role have remained somewhat ambiguous. The Premier has received sixteen foreign visitors "in the hospital" for meetings that have been more symbolic than substantive, yet most reports on his health are positive. He has failed to appear in public in a domestic leadership role since the Congress, yet the reports we do receive on his work routine suggest that he remains active as a final arbiter of domestic and foreign policies.

The most puzzling and disturbing question mark, however, relates to Mao Tse-tung's position. The Chairman remained out of Peking from June of last year, failed to participate directly in the January National People's Congress or the Party Plenum which preceded it, and returned to the capital only on the eve of the Kim Il-song visit. A number of PRC press articles published since the Congress have implied that Mao is unhappy with the economic policies approved by the NPC, and that he has wanted to move more forcefully than other Party leaders against the military officials who resisted the purge of Lin Piao and his (Mao's) continuing stress on an anti-Soviet foreign policy. The Chairman apparently lacks sufficient control over the reconstituted organizations of political control to resist the consensus policies of the Chou/ Teng/Chang leadership.

affair. Wallposters which seem to ridicule the Chairman by historical analogy have appeared in Canton for some weeks without being torn down and without the writers being arrested. In short, there are signs that the Chairman's positive is somewhat insecure. Exactly what the implications might be of a diminution in Mao's stature for the normalization process is difficult to assess at this time.



Talking Points on Bilateral Issues:

-- We believe our bilateral relations are generally satisfactory. We appreciate your personal efforts to have the archaeological exhibition extended to include San Francisco. This exhibition has been very well received by our people, and has done the PRC real credit in this country.

-- We think it is important that you are sending your China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, and the Scientific and Technical Association to the U.S. this fall. Hopefully their visits will facilitate the further development of scientific and cultural exchanges. President Ford recently sent a letter of encouragement to our track and field team which will arrive in China later this month.

-- As you know, because of the need for additional time to consider aspects of the SALT II agreement, we have delayed Secretary Brezhnev's visit to Washington until September. The President indicated in his address to Congress on April 10 that he is looking forward to visiting China later in the year. I wonder if you have any thoughts about timing [around the end of the year] that would suit the convenience of the Chinese side?



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-- We believe it was important that Congressmen Albert and Rhodes visited China. We appreciate your rapid response in agreeing to their trip.

-- I recall that last November we agreed on one general Congressional delegation to visit China later this year. I wonder if it might not be useful to consider this delegation's visit for either late June or August -- during the periods of Congressional recess? Please let us know your thinking on timing. When you do we will propose a delegation composed along the lines you suggested when I was in Peking.

-- We would welcome a counterpart group of Chinese officials here at any time you feel it would be useful to have them visit the U.S.

-- [If you think it appropriate:] We have not forgotten your interest in having Mme. Huang call on Mrs. Ford at the White House. Mr. Solomon will be in touch with you to work out a convenient time.

-- [If the Chinese have not raised the issue:] I just want to
reaffirm our commitment to the Shanghai Communique and the normalization of relations. I think, in particular, that if you read carefully the authoritative
President's/April 10 address to the Congress, and my April 29 press

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conference, you will have no question about our continuing commitment to the direction of our policy established by the Shanghai Communique.

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