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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN *dy*
28-7

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONINFORMATIONJanuary 16, 1975 *dy*

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*

SUBJECT: New Year's Greetings from Leaders
of the People's Republic of China

The Liaison Office of the People's Republic of China has conveyed to you and Mrs. Ford personal New Year's greetings from key Chinese leaders. You had previously sent New Year's greetings to these officials on behalf of yourself and Mrs. Ford.

At Tab A are cards addressed to you and the First Lady from Chairman Mao and his wife Chiang Ch'ing, Premier Chou En-lai and his wife, Acting Chief of State Tung Pi-wu and his wife, and Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua and his wife. The cards are enclosed in envelopes each of which is addressed, in Chinese, to "President of the United States of America Gerald Ford and Mme. Ford." A translation of the message on each card is enclosed with the card.

The one note of particular interest in these greetings is the card from Chairman Mao's wife. Last year President and Mrs. Nixon sent cards to the Chairman and his wife, but received one only from Mao. This year Mme. Mao has responded to your greetings. Our analysts have assumed for some time that Mao's wife is in a tenuous but combative political position within the PRC leadership, where she -- as a leading representative of the radical wing of the Chinese Communist Party -- is attempting to preserve a political role for herself as the Party is reconstructed in the wake of the disruptive Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s. Whether the Chairman's wife is now in a more secure position is something we would not want to estimate on the basis of her sending a New Year's card; yet this is a development worth watching.

*The cards were not returned
in the outbox. /dy*



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

January 15, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: RICHARD H. SOLOMON *RHS*
SUBJECT: PRC Leaders' New Year's Greetings
for the President and Mrs. Ford

The PRC Liaison Office recently conveyed to us a set of New Year's cards for President and Mrs. Ford from Chairman Mao and his wife, Tung Pi-wu (Acting Chief of State) and his wife, Premier Chou and his wife, and Foreign Minister Ch'iao and his wife (Tab A). The President had previously sent New Year's greetings to these same individuals.

The one unusual development in these greetings is that this year the President received a card from Mao's wife Chiang Ch'ing -- with the signature brushed in Mme. Mao's own calligraphy (unlike Mao's card, which has a printed signature). Last year President Nixon received a card from Mao alone, although the wives of the other leaders sent the President and Mrs. Nixon cards. What this development might mean for the political standing of Chiang Ch'ing is something that I would not want to interpret on the basis of only one indicator, but it certainly implies that Mme. Mao is a more active element in the leadership than she was a year ago. Chiang Ch'ing's efforts to establish a more active "First Lady" role for herself were suggested by her visible hosting of the wife of Philippine President Marcos last September and participation in the visit to Peking in December of Australian Communist Party leader F. F. Hill. Whether or not she has been able to establish a stable position for herself will become evident only over time.

The New Year's cards are covered by a brief memorandum from you to the President. A translation of the message on each card is enclosed in the appropriate envelope.

Recommendation:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.



美利堅合眾國

杰拉尔德·福特总统和夫人

祝賀新年

江青



祝賀新年



江青

美利堅合眾國

杰拉尔德·福特总统和夫人

祝賀新年

邓颖超

祝賀新年



月旦集

美利堅合衆國

杰拉尔德·福特总统和夫人

祝賀新年

何蓮芝

祝賀新年



董必武



美利堅合眾國

杰拉尔德·福特总统和夫人

祝賀新年

李金之

祝賀新年



李冠华



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520


January 2, 1974

7500019
75 28

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Greeting Cards from Officials of
the Peoples Republic of China

Transmitted herewith are two greeting cards addressed to the President and Mrs. Ford from officials of the Peoples Republic of China. The greetings were handed to an officer of the Department by an official of the PRC liaison office. The Department would appreciate receiving copies of both greetings.


for George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Two greetings, in sealed envelopes



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: New Year's Greetings from Leaders
of the People's Republic of China

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Each The cards are enclosed in envelopes each of which is addressed in Chinese, to "President of the ~~American~~ United States of America Gerald Ford and Mme. Ford." A translation of the message ~~on~~ each card is enclosed with the card.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

January 8, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: RICHARD H. SOLOMON *RHS*
SUBJECT: PRC Leaders' New Year's Greetings
for the President and Mrs. Ford *(of Tab A)*.

The PRC Liaison Office recently conveyed to us a set of New Year's cards for President and Mrs. Ford from Chairman Mao and his wife, Tung Pi-wu (Acting Chief of State) and his wife, Premier Chou and his wife, and Foreign Minister Ch'iao and his wife. The President had previously sent New Year's greetings to these same individuals.

The one unusual development in these greetings is that this year the President received a card from Mao's wife Chiang Ch'ing -- with the signature brushed in Mme. Mao's own calligraphy (unlike Mao's card, which has a printed signature). Last year President Nixon received a card from Mao alone, although the wives of the other leaders sent the President and Mrs. Nixon cards. What this development might mean for the political standing of Chiang Ch'ing is something that I wouldn't want to interpret on the basis of only one indicator, but it certainly implies that Mme. Mao is a more active element in the leadership than she was a year ago. Chiang Ch'ing's efforts to establish a more active "First Lady" role for herself were suggested by her visible hosting of the wife of Philippine President Marcos last September. ~~But~~ whether or not she has been able to establish a stable position for herself will become evident only over time.

The New Year's cards are covered by a brief memorandum from you to the President. *A translation of the message on each card is enclosed in the appropriate envelope.*

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.



*and participation
in the visit
to Peking in
December of
Australian
Communist Party
leader F.F. Will.*

Mr Solomon

State should have

- 1) Opened these
- 2) Listed their ~~index~~ ~~index~~
- 3) Listed their positions
- 4) Recommended acknowledgment,
of appropriate.

YOUR OPTIONS

A. SEND BACK TO State for above.

B. Do it here - Needed by the
Sacral Office.

THK



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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| SUBJECT: <u>Meeting Cues From Officers of PRC To Pres This Ford</u> | | | | |

| DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT | INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION | | | REC CY FOR | ACTION REQUIRED |
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| | | ACTION | INFO | | |
| | ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT | | | | MEMO FOR HAK (_____) |
| | STAFF SECRETARY | | | | MEMO FOR PRES (_____) |
| | FAR EAST <u>Solomon</u> | <u>X</u> | | <u>X</u> | REPLY FOR _____ (_____) |
| | SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA | | | | APPROPRIATE ACTION (<u>X</u>) |
| | MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA | | | | MEMO _____ TO _____ (_____) |
| | EUROPE / CANADA | | | | RECOMMENDATIONS (_____) |
| | LATIN AMERICA | | | | JOINT MEMO (_____) |
| | UNITED NATIONS | | | | REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ (_____) |
| | ECONOMIC | | | | ANY ACTION NECESSARY? (_____) |
| | SCIENTIFIC | | | | CONCURRENCE (_____) |
| | PROGRAM ANALYSIS | | | | DUE DATE: <u>01/04</u> |
| | NSC PLANNING | | | | COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS) |
| | CONGRESSIONAL | | | | <u>See note attached.</u> |
| OCEANS POLICY | | | | | |
| INTELLIGENCE | | | | | |

| SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS | DATE | FROM | TO | S | SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN): | CY TO |
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| | <u>1/8</u> | | <u>HAK</u> | <u>X</u> | <u>has for info 1-15</u> | |
| | <u>1/12/75</u> | | <u>NSC/3</u> | | <u>Solomon - Further Action per SCOWCROFT note</u> | |
| | <u>1/13</u> | | <u>HAK</u> | <u>X</u> | <u>has for info 1-20</u> | |
| | <u>1/15/75</u> | | <u>Pres</u> | <u>DIP</u> | <u>Info</u> | |
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONINFORMATION~~SECRET~~January 27, 1975 *[Handwritten signature]*

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *[Handwritten initials]*

SUBJECT: China's National People's Congress
Formalizes the Continuity of the PRC's
Recent Policies: But Where is Mao?

Following is an analysis of the results of Peking's recent National People's Congress which I thought you might find of interest.

* * * *

Peking's long-delayed National People's Congress was held secretly between January 13 and 17. Prior to the session the Chinese Communist Party convened a three day Central Committee Plenum which gave formal approval to the list of Congress delegates and its basic documentation, and elevated Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing to membership in the Politburo's Standing Committee and to a Party Vice Chairmanship. Premier Chou En-lai delivered a political report in person to the Congress in which he confirmed continuity of Peking's foreign and domestic policies of the past several years. As well, senior leaders we have been dealing with since 1971 have, without exception, been reaffirmed in high state positions. Civilian control over the military has been strengthened, and the organization influence of the left wing of the Communist Party has been further attenuated. The one curious note in these proceedings has been the absence of Chairman Mao as a direct participant. His policies, however, are strongly represented in the Congress documents.

Continuity in Key Personnel

The Congress reappointed Chou-En-lai as Premier of the State Council. One senses that Chou is now resuming a more active political role after a period of illness. He not only delivered the political report to the

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/83, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY *[Handwritten initials]*, NARA, DATE *1/30/03**State Dept Review*
TD 9/26/02

Congress but also left his hospital to participate in the funeral of a long-time associate a few days before the leadership meetings began. How much of his old work load Chou will reshoulder remains to be seen. My own guess is that he will continue to delegate much of the day-to-day business to Teng Hsiao-p'ing and other deputies, and increasingly play the role of a Mao -- arbiter of key political decisions and above the play of administration and bureaucratic politics.


Yeh Chien-ying was formalized as Minister of Defense, thus confirming Teng Hsiao-p'ing's hint to me during my November trip that such a development was in the offing. The elderly Yeh represents continuity for Mao's national defense policy, although his appointment probably is a reflection of continuing problems with the military, from which the Party was unable to draw a younger candidate. The Congress explicitly named Mao as Commander-in-Chief of China's armed forces, thus re-asserting Party control over the military.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua was formalized as Foreign Minister. He was not, however, made a Vice Premier (as was his long-term predecessor Chen Yi). This suggests Ch'iao's domestic political base remains rather narrow, or that he is somewhat controversial. Mao, for example, has contemptuously referred to the Foreign Minister on several occasions as "Lord Ch'iao"; and Teng Hsiao-p'ing needled him in front of the Fulbright Congressional delegation by referring to himself [Teng] as a "rural bumpkin" and then characterizing Ch'iao as a "foreign bumpkin."

PRC Liaison Office Chief Huang Chen, who was a delegate to the Third National People's Congress in 1964, was -- for unknown reasons -- not a delegate to the present session. Huang left Peking for Washington while the Congress was in session, although he did presumably participate in the Central Committee Plenum which preceded it.

Attenuation of the Political "Left"

The list of Ministerial posts confirmed by the Congress indicates that the left wing of the Chinese Communist Party, which we have hypothesized has been on the political defensive during the past three years (despite their polemicizing in the press), was further attenuated in its organizational influence at the Congress. Mao's wife Chiang Ch'ing, the young Shanghai leader Wang Hung-wen, and the propagandist Yao Wen-yuan, are noticeable in their absence from posts in the state administration. None of the three were even made members of the permanent presidium of the NPC; and it is difficult to identify newly appointed state officials who represent the Party's left wing.




Conversely, there are a number of appointments which clearly go against the influence of the left. The Minister of Education, for example, is a professional bureaucrat who was criticized and removed from office during the Cultural Revolution for supporting a "bourgeois" educational line. The left has attempted to repoliticize the Chinese educational system since the summer of 1973, but these efforts have apparently failed. The Secretary-General of the Congress, in addition, is a man who was under attack from the left in 1974 for having allowed the performance of a play in 1973 which was a veiled ridicule of Chiang Ch'ing.

In policy terms, however, there are several areas where compromises with the left appear to have been made. The Revolutionary Committees of the Cultural Revolution era -- through which the left and military exercised administrative power -- are given permanent status, although they are clearly placed under Party and state control. Similarly, the new state constitution affirms the legitimacy of mass debates via big character posters, which the left used during the Cultural Revolution to attack Party "revisionists." As well, Chou En-lai -- known for being a balancer of political factions -- made several verbal bows in the direction of policies supported by Mao's wife, but these seem unlikely to have a major influence on the otherwise moderate program approved by the Congress.

Implications for the Succession

We have assumed for some time that the 63 year old Shanghai leader Chang Ch'un-ch'iao -- who hosted President Nixon in that city in 1972 -- is a good bet as one of the more likely leaders for a successor to Party and state leadership after Mao and Chou leave the scene. Chang appears to have eclipsed his younger protégé Wang Hung-wen at the Congress by reading the delegates a report on the new state constitution. (Wang delivered the report on the Party Constitution at the 10th Party Congress in 1973.) Chang appears to be situated in both the Party and state systems as a key "organization man," positioned to be able to build a national political following over the long run. At the same time, the overall list of ministerial appointments indicates that the generation of leaders in their 50s and 60s has yet to take the reins of national leadership. The Congress returned administration of the state apparatus to men in their 70s who were removed from power during the Cultural Revolution. China remains a gerontocracy.

The new state constitution does not provide for a chief of state. Thus the post which Mao held concurrently with his position as Party chairman until 1959, has been abolished. This is a victory for Mao in that



Lin Piao had tried to gain the post of state chairman in 1970. Mao objected to there even being such a post at that time as a way of undercutting Lin's efforts to consolidate his power. The fact that the new constitution is consistent with Mao's view of 1970 can be seen as evidence of the Chairman's continuing influence, as well as the leading role of the Party over the state bureaucracy.

Continuity of Foreign and National Defense Policies

The Congress documents express support for "Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in foreign affairs" and assert that "we [Chinese] should ally ourselves with all the forces that can be allied with." As well, the key Congress documents reaffirm Mao's national defense policy when they express support for his "principle" of "dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony."

At the same time, the Congress communique calls on China to ally with the Third World and to support the Second World in their struggle against "superpower control, threats, and bullying." The documents also asserts that "the contention for world hegemony between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, is becoming more and more intense. The factors for both revolution and war are increasing. The peoples of all countries must get prepared against a world war."

Chou En-lai's political report makes it clear that the Soviet Union remains China's primary security problem, and that Peking has not relented in its political feud with Moscow, which he predicted will continue "for a long time." The Premier asserts in his speech that the "Soviet leading clique has betrayed Marxism-Leninism" and indicates that Peking's intransigent stand on the border negotiations has not changed: "We [Chinese] wish to advise the Soviet leadership to sit down and negotiate honestly, do something to solve a bit of the [border] problem and stop playing deceitful tricks."

Chou makes a brief and low-key statement on Sino-American relations that seems intended to convey to us the message that Peking looks to the U.S. to "earnestly" follow through on the terms of the Shanghai Communique:

There exist fundamental differences between China and the United States. Owing to the joint efforts of both sides the relations between the two countries have improved to some extent in the last three years, and contacts between the two



peoples have developed. The relations between the two countries will continue to improve so long as the principles of the Sino-American Shanghai Communique are carried out in earnest.

Regarding Taiwan, the Premier's report asserts in familiar terms, "We are determined to liberate Taiwan! Fellow countrymen in Taiwan and people of the whole country, unite and work together to achieve the noble aim of liberating Taiwan and unifying the Motherland!"

Economic Policy: How to Control a "Rightist" Line?

The Congress approved an economic policy line which allows for contract labor, private plots, and the continuity of the commune system as it was in the early 1960s. This is the same set of policies which was criticized heavily during the Cultural Revolution, and for which men like Teng Hsiao-p'ing were removed from power. This indicates that PRC leaders remain concerned about their economic base, and will attempt to make a big push in economic production in the coming year. Premier Chou indicated in his speech that the PRC leadership sees the coming decade as "crucial" for consolidating a viable economic system.

The "rightist" economic line approved by the Congress is very likely the subject of controversy within the leadership, however. Chou En-lai's political report revealed, for example, that China's recent policy of importing foreign technology has drawn criticism from the "left" as representing "servility to things foreign." He indicates all the same that imports will continue, but stresses the goal of developing an independent economy. Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's report on the constitution contains the one overtly threatening political note of the Congress when he warns that "in some [economic] enterprises the form is that of socialist ownership, but the reality is that their leadership is not in the hands of Marxists and the masses of workers. The bourgeoisie will seize hold of many fronts if the proletariat does not occupy them." Chang seems to hint at political pressure on economic managers to counteract the otherwise rightist economic line.

Where Was Mao?

Mao Tse-tung was conspicuous by his absence from both the Central Committee Plenum and Congress. Ill health does not seem to be the issue, inasmuch as the Chairman received Maltese leader Dom Mintoff



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on January 9, and West German leader Strauss on January 16. Both meetings appear to have taken place in South China, where Mao has been for more than six months.

It is difficult to conclude from the Congress documents that Mao's political influence has diminished. The new state constitution reaffirms that "Mao Tse-tung thought" is one of the "theoretical bases guiding the thinking of our nation"; and the speeches of Premier Chou and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao make repeated references to the "principles" and policies of "our great leader Chairman Mao." Indeed, except for agricultural policy, the decisions of the Congress -- designating the Chairman as commander of the PRC's armed forces, accepting Mao's personal proposal that the constitution contain a provision ensuring the freedom of workers to strike, and abiding by Mao's view that there should be no state chairman -- are unquestionably Maoist positions.

We would just note that in past periods of diminished power and conflict over policy Mao has "retreated" to the provinces and has absented himself from formal leadership conclaves. We do not know if Mao's current aloofness represents such a situation. There is tenuous evidence in the Chinese press that the Chairman wants to carry the struggle against political dissenters and military renegades through to the end. It is possible that while Mao accepts the consolidation of the bureaucratic organs of state power, as was accomplished by the National People's Congress, at the same time he wishes to avoid personal identification with this development as he has more disruptive political objectives in mind -- such as purging remaining dissidents from the military. We do not know if this is the case, yet the questions raised by Mao's absence from the Party Plenum and Congress will be worth watching in the months ahead.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION~~SECRET~~

January 21, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: RICHARD H. SOLOMON *PHS*
SUBJECT: An Analysis of the Results of the National
People's Congress for the President

You have requested that my analysis of the results of Peking's National People's Congress, which was prepared for you last weekend, be reworked and forwarded to the President on your behalf. Such a memorandum from you to the President is at Tab A.

Recommendation:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12065, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY 1&R, NARA, DATE 5/9/01

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dick -

Person conversation

to



NEW UPDATED
VERSION, 40y
399.

366 2d
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT
INFORMATION~~SECRET~~

January 19, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: RICHARD H. SOLOMON *RHS*
SUBJECT: China's National People's Congress
Formalizes the Continuity of the PRC's
Recent Policies: But Where is Mao?

Beginning on January 5 Peking convened preparatory meetings for the long-delayed National People's Congress. The Congress was convened secretly between January 13 and 17. Prior to the session the Chinese Communist Party convened a three day Central Committee Plenum which gave formal approval to the list of Congress delegates and its basic documentation, and elevated Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing to membership in the Politburo's Standing Committee and to a Party Vice Chairmanship. In overview, the Plenum and Congress have confirmed Peking's foreign and domestic policies of the past several years. Senior leaders we have been dealing with since 1971 have, without exception, been reaffirmed in high state positions. Civilian control over the military has been strengthened. And the organizational influence of the left wing of the Communist Party has been further attenuated. The one curious note in these proceedings has been the absence of Chairman Mao as a direct participant. His policies, however, are strongly represented in the Congress documents.

This memorandum summarizes the major results of the Congress.

Continuity in Key Personnel

The Congress reappointed Chou En-Lai as Premier of the State Council. Indeed, one senses that Chou is resuming a more active political role, having delivered the Political Report to the Congress in person and having left his hospital to participate in the funeral of a long-time associate a few days before the Congress. How much of his old work load Chou will resoulder remains to be seen. My own guess is that he will continue to delegate much of the day-to-day business to Teng Hsiao-p'ing

~~SECRET~~DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5NSC MEMO, 11/24/93, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY htr, NARA, DATE 11/30/03*State Dept Review*
TD 9/26/02

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and other deputies, and increasingly play the role of a Mao -- arbiter of key political decisions and above the play of administration and bureaucratic politics.

Yeh Chien-ying was formalized as Minister of Defense, thus confirming Teng Hsiao-p'ing's hint to you of such a development during your November trip. The elderly Yeh represents continuity for Mao's national defense policy, although his appointment probably is a reflection of continuing problems with the military, from which the Party was unable to draw a younger candidate. The Congress explicitly named Mao as Commander-in-Chief of China's armed forces.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua was formalized as Foreign Minister. He was not, however, made a Vice Premier (as was his long-term predecessor Chen Yi). This suggests Ch'iao's domestic political base remains rather narrow, or that he is somewhat controversial. Mao, for example, has contemptuously referred to him on several occasions as "Lord Ch'iao"; and Teng Hsiao-p'ing needled him in front of the Fulbright Congressional delegation by referring to himself (Teng) as a "rural bumpkin" and then characterizing Ch'iao as a "foreign bumpkin."

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Attenuation of the Political "Left"

The list of Ministerial posts confirmed by the Congress indicates that the left wing of the Chinese Communist Party, which we have hypothesized has been on the political defensive during the past three years -- despite their polemicizing in the press, was further attenuated in its organizational influence at the Congress. Mao's wife Chiang Ch'ing, the young Wang Hung-wen -- whose star rose so high at the 10th Party Congress in the summer of 1973, but who has been out of sight in recent months -- and the propagandist Yao Wen-yuan, are noticeable in their absence from posts in the State administration. None of the three were even made members of the permanent presidium of the NPC; and it is difficult to identify newly appointed State officials who are identified with the Party's left wing.

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Conversely, there are a number of appointments which clearly go against the influence of the left. The Minister of Education, for example, is a man who was criticized and removed from office during the Cultural Revolution for supporting a "bourgeois" educational line. The Secretary-General of the Congress, in addition, is a man who was under attack from the left in 1974 for having allowed the performance of a play in 1973 which is a veiled ridicule of Chiang Ching.

In policy terms, however, there are several areas where compromises with the left appear to have been made. The Revolutionary Committees of the Cultural Revolution era -- through which the left and military exercised administrative power -- are given permanent status, although they are clearly placed under Party and State control. Similarly, the new State Constitution affirms the legitimacy of mass debates via big character posters, which the left used during the Cultural Revolution to attack Party "revisionists."

Implications for the Succession

We have assumed for some time that the 63 year old Shanghai leader Chang Ch'un-ch'iao -- who hosted President Nixon in that city in 1972 -- is a good bet as one of the more likely leaders for a successor to Party and State leadership after Mao and Chou leave the scene. Ch'iao appears to have eclipsed his younger protégé Wang Hung-wen at the Congress by reading the delegates a report on the new State Constitution.* Chang appears to be situated in both the Party and state systems as a key "organization man," positioned to be able to build a national political following over the long run. At the same time, the overall list of Ministerial appointments indicates that the generation of leaders in their 50s and 60s has yet to take the reins of national leadership. The Congress returned administration of the State apparatus to men in their 70s who were removed from power during the Cultural Revolution. China remains a gerontocracy.

The new State Constitution does not provide for a chief of state. Thus the post which Mao held concurrently with his post as Party Chairman until 1959, has been abolished. This is a victory for Mao in that Lin Piao had tried to gain the post of State Chairman in 1970. Mao objected to there even being such a post at that time as a way of undercutting Lin's efforts to consolidate his power. The fact that the new Constitution is consistent with Mao's view of 1970 can be seen as evidence of Mao's continuing influence, as well as the leading role of the Party over the State bureaucracy.

* Wang delivered the report on the Party Constitution at the 10th Party Congress in 1973.

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Continuity of Foreign and National Defense Policies

The Congress documents express support for "Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in foreign affairs" and assert that "we (Chinese) should ally ourselves with all the forces that can be allied with." As well, Mao's national defense policy is supported when the key Congress document reaffirms his "principle" of "dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony."

At the same time, the Congress communique calls on China to ally with the Third World and to support the Second World in their struggle against "superpower control, threats, and bullying." The document also asserts that "the contention for world hegemony between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, is becoming more and more intense. The factors for both revolution and war are increasing. The peoples of all countries must get prepared against a world war."

Economic Policy: How to Control a "Rightist" Line?

The Congress approved an economic policy line which allows for contract labor, private plots, and the continuity of the commune system as it was in the early 1960s. This is the same set of policies which was criticized heavily during the Cultural Revolution, and for which men like Teng Hsiao-p'ing were removed from power. This suggests that PRC leaders remain concerned about their economic base, and will attempt to make a big push in economic production in the coming year.

This "rightist" economic line is very likely the subject of controversy within the leadership. Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's report on the Constitution contains the one overtly threatening political note of the Congress when he warns that "in some [economic] enterprises the form is that of socialist ownership, but the reality is that their leadership is not in the hands of Marxists and the masses of workers. The bourgeoisie will seize hold of many fronts if the proletariat does not occupy them." Chang seems to hint at political pressure on economic managers to counteract the otherwise rightist economic line.

Where Was Mao?

Mao Tse-tung was conspicuous by his absence from both the Central Committee Plenum and Congress. Ill health does not seem to be the



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issue, inasmuch as the Chairman received Maltese leader Dom Mintoff on January 9, and West German leader Strauss on January 16. Both meetings appear to have taken place in South China, where Mao has been for more than seven months.

It is difficult to conclude from the Congress documents that Mao's political influence has diminished. The new State Constitution reaffirms that "Mao Tse-tung thought" is one of the "theoretical bases guiding the thinking of our nation"; and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's report makes ample reference to the "principles" and policies of "our great leader Chairman Mao." Indeed, except for agricultural policy, the decisions of the Congress -- designating the Chairman as commander of the PRC's armed forces, accepting Mao's personal proposal that the Constitution contain a provision ensuring the freedom of workers to strike, and abiding by Mao's view that there should be no state chairman -- are unquestionably Maoist positions.

We would just note that in past periods of diminished power and conflict over policy Mao has "retreated" to the provinces and has absented himself from formal leadership conclaves. We do not know if Mao's current aloofness represents such a situation. There is tenuous evidence in the arcane polemics on history which have been published in China during the past year that Mao -- or at least his surrogate figure, Emperor Ch'in Shih Huang -- sees the need for national unity, but wants to carry the struggle against political dissenters and military renegades through to the end. It is possible that while Mao accepts the consolidation of the bureaucratic organs of State power, as was accomplished by the National People's Congress, at the same time he wishes to avoid personal identification with this development as he has more disruptive political objectives in mind -- such as purging remaining dissidents from the military. We do not know if this is the case, yet the questions raised by Mao's absence from the Party Plenum and Congress will be worth watching in the months ahead.

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SCOWCROFT _____
DAVIS _____

FROM: KISSINGER, H _____
COLBY, W _____
SCHLESINGER, J _____
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SUBJECT:

NSC Analysis of Chinas Natl Peoples Congress

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

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NEW UPDATE



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT
INFORMATION~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

January 27, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

RICHARD H. SOLOMON *RHS*

SUBJECT:

Is the Period of Immobilism in Peking
Over? Some Comments on the Current
State of U.S.- PRC Relations

A number of recent developments suggest that with the conclusion of the National People's Congress (NPC) in Peking earlier this month, the air of immobilism in the PRC's leadership which we have sensed for some time is now dissipating. The Chinese have taken a number of steps in their dealing with us in recent days which suggest an interest in moving ahead in developing a more active and visible relationship. At the same time, the campaign of stimulated press sniping about dissatisfaction in Peking with the state of U.S.- PRC relations seems to have been turned off.

This memorandum highlights the indications of a change in mood in Peking.

Publicizing President Ford's Letter of Congratulations to Premier Chou

The Foreign Ministry called John Holdridge today and asked for permission on an urgent basis to publish the text of President Ford's letter of congratulations to Chou En-lai upon his reappointment as Premier by the NPC. A few hours after this permission was cabled to USLO, the text of the letter was released to the public by NCNA. It may only be accidental that the Chinese asked for this "urgent" permission and released the President's letter on the second anniversary of the signing of the Paris Agreement on Vietnam, but my own sense is that Peking wanted to give some visibility to the fact that its relations with the U.S. have gone beyond the Vietnam stage -- or hope that they have. One can speculate about how they would like this letter to be read in Hanoi, or Moscow, but it does seem clear that Peking wants to give heightened visibility to its relationship with Washington.

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XGDS 5b(3)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *1/30/03**State Dept Review*
TD 9/26/02

Publication of the Ford letter may also be intended by Peking as a sign to the U.S. that in the wake of the NPC it is in a position to move ahead more actively in its dealing with us, and may be able to give Sino-American relations greater visibility now that its contentious leadership meetings are over. (In this regard, I might mention that a review of your discussions with Teng Hsiao-p'ing last November gives the clear impression that Teng did not want to get off into any detailed discussion of the normalization issue. Indeed, he seemed almost relieved to be able to go on to other subjects.)

Is Chou En-lai Back in the Action?

Another implication of publication of the Ford letter is that Premier Chou is back in a more visible leadership role. This development, of course, was more directly suggested by Chou's reappointment as Premier, despite his illness, and by his more active pattern of public appearances in the last three weeks. Indeed, I have a sense which is more intuitive than documentable that much of the "sour" quality of our dealings with Peking in 1974 was as much attributable to the predominant role of the dour Teng Hsiao-p'ing in foreign policy matters as to the domestic political campaign. If Chou has indeed reasserted himself more actively in the leadership process in the context of the NPC this may now be evident in a new atmosphere more consistent with the Premier's personal style.

The Press Sniping Appears to Have Ended

Another sign that the "old Chou" approach to dealing with the U.S. may be reasserting itself is the apparent drying up of the stimulated campaign of press sniping which we saw begin at about the time of your November trip to Peking. Since Phil Habib's December 24 demarche to Han Hsu on this subject, there has been sufficiently noticeable a shift in the tone of PRC public and semi-public statements on the U.S. and Sino-American relations that even CIA analysts (who do not know about the Habib-Han conversation) have commented on it (see the analysis at Tab A).

Moving Ahead with Exchanges

Another sign that Peking may be taking steps to pump life into its relations with us is that in the past two weeks PRC trade organizations have informed the National Council for U.S.-China Trade that the long-delayed

visit of its counterpart organization, the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, will take place later this year (in August or September), and that they will be sending a delegation of specialists to the U.S. in late February to survey the textile market. This is the first such industry-oriented delegation that Peking has sent to the U.S. (Because of the political sensitivities for us in the textile problem, Bob Hormats and I are working with State, Commerce, and the National Council for U.S.- China Trade to structure the visit of this delegation so that it doesn't set off domestic and international textile producers, and does not alienate the Chinese through a simple recitation of our problems with textile imports.)

In sum, at the moment there seem to be a number of signs that Peking wants to move ahead with the U.S. in a positive direction. The only question about this trend -- if it is sustained -- is whether it will create more of a sense of momentum than suits your sense of timing or that of the President.



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012734

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Report

CREATION DATE 01/20/1975

VOLUME 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400135

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 13

FOLDER TITLE People's Republic of China (4)

DATE WITHDRAWN 05/01/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION~~TOP SECRET~~

February 3, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM:

RICHARD H. SOLOMON *RHS*

SUBJECT:

Your Meeting with George Bush



You have agreed to meet with George Bush, Chief of our Liaison Office in Peking, at 4:00 p.m. today. He is on a brief period of home leave, having returned to Washington via Pakistan. While in Pakistan he contracted a case of amoebic dysentery which put him in the hospital for a number of days and forced him to curtail his Washington schedule.

Bush had a brief chat with the Secretary in the White House barber shop last week, and hopes to see him before he returns to Peking at the end of this week. In addition, he had one general review of our relations with Peking with Phil Habib, Win Lord, and myself. His comments at this session in essence parallel an interesting reporting cable he sent us via White House channels just before returning to Washington (at Tab A). The key points he makes are:

-- He likes his job, and has no evidence that the Chinese are dissatisfied with their relationship with the U.S.

-- He is disturbed, however, by some critical remarks about the President and Secretary which he has picked up from fellow diplomats in Peking which are attributed to Chinese officials.

-- He does not believe we should move to solve the Taiwan question on Peking's terms now as it would hurt the President's party support at the 1976 GOP convention. He says we should look toward some compromise on the part of the PRC if we are to make further progress toward full normalization.

-- He believes we should take active measures to promote the view in the public mind that President Ford can go to Peking without a substantial political agreement on normalizing relations.

Following are talking points which pick up some of Bush's concerns. I will plan to sit in on the meeting and take notes.

~~TOP SECRET~~

XGDS 5b(3)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *4/31/03*
State Dept Review
4 D 9/26/02

~~TOP SECRET~~

2

Talking Points

-- You have sent us some excellent reporting cables and suggestions on China policy. I trust you are finding the backup support from here all that you need.

-- I wonder if you could elaborate on some apparently critical remarks about the President and the Secretary that you picked up from the diplomatic circuit. What do you think the Chinese are up to in making such comments?

-- I gather you feel that the Chinese are really satisfied with our current relationship. Why do you think they began the campaign of press sniping last fall which propagated the view that they want more rapid progress -- only to cut it off when Phil Habib complained to them about it?

-- What do you think will be the impact of the recent National People's Congress on our relations with Peking?

-- I noted in one of your cables that you are concerned that further steps toward normalization with Peking will cause problems for the President in the party if not accompanied by some supporting concessions from the PRC. I think you will find substantial sentiment around here that our present relationship with Peking is giving us all we need. Do you think we can expect any real concessions from the PRC on the Taiwan question?


-- You raised the very useful idea of trying to prepare our public opinion for the President's trip to Peking later this year with the view that the visit need not result in a major development such as normalization -- in effect, preparing people for a largely ceremonial visit. How do you think we should proceed in this direction?

-- Is there anything further we can do for you from here in the way of backup support?

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TO THE WHITE HOUSE
FM PEKING 100 (BUSH)~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

VIA VOYAGER CHANNEL

PEKING 100

JANUARY 15, 1975

TO: THE SECRETARY

FROM: GEORGE BUSH

A FEW COMMENTS FROM PEKING BEFORE BARBARA AND I LEAVE FRIDAY
FOR THE BHUTTO VISIT THEN ON TO WASHINGTON BY JANUARY 22ND.GENERALLY RELATIONS CONTINUE ALONG ABOUT THE SAME
AS WHEN YOU WERE HERE. PRESS SPECULATION, MAINLY OUT OF HONG KONG,
CONTINUES THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP IS WORSENING--NOT SO.THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS SPENDS ENDLESS HOURS SPECULATING
ON OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRC. SOME DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS FEEL
THERE HAS BEEN A SHIFT AND THAT THE PRC IS GROWING INCREASINGLY
RESTLESS AT THE LACK OF PROGRESS ON TAIWAN.AMB. YOUDE OF UK, WHOM I RESPECT, HAS TRIED
UNSUCCESSFULLY TO RUN DOWN THESE MANY RUMORS AND HAS CONCLUDED
FOR HIM THAT THEY ARE JUST THAT--RUMORS. HE AGREES WITH ME THAT
AT THIS MOMENT THERE IS NOT AN INCREASING PRESSURE TO GET THE
TAIWAN QUESTION SOLVED.JAN 13, MOYNIHAN AND I CALLED ON CHIAO KUAN HUA
WHO REITERATED THAT RELATIONS HAD MOVED FORWARD AND GENERALLY
SOUNDED THE SAME THEME AS IN YOUR TALKS AND IN MY VISIT WITH
HIM OF DEC 27TH.WHEN THE DUTCH FOREIGN MIN. WAS HERE CHIAO HIT US
HARD IN A TOAST REFERRING TO BOTH SUPERPOWERS WITH "HONEY ON THEIR
LIPS AND MURDER IN THEIR HEARTS"--PRETTY STRONG STUFF. I THOUGHT
WE MIGHT BE SEEING A MOVE TOWARDS PUTTING US ON EQUAL FOOTING
WITH THE USSR SO I CALLED THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR. HE ASSURED ME
THEN AND IN A SUBSEQUENT VISIT THAT THE DUTCH SIDE AGREED THE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*

STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES TD 7156102

BY Dr, NARA, DATE 1/31/03

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THE TONE OF THE TALKS WAS NOT ANTI-AMERICAN AND THAT THE USSR GOT MOST OF THE CRITICISM.

MY PERSONAL VIEW IS THE PRC IS RUNNING A RISK IN CRITICIZING US AS MUCH AS THEY DO. SO FAR AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION HAS NOT FOCUSED IN ON ALL THE ATTACKS ON US. WHEN IT DOES SO FOCUS WE CAN EXPECT SOME GRIEF ON THE HILL.

ONE BASIC PROBLEM IS THAT THE PRESS WANTS TO SEE VISIBLE SIGNS OF PROGRESS AND THERE JUST AREN'T THAT MANY AREAS WHERE WE CAN KEEP SAYING "LOOK AT ALL THAT PROGRESS". TRADE AND EXCHANGES ARE ROCKING ALONG O.K.

USLO HASN'T EXPANDED THE "SCOPE OF ITS FUNCTIONS", BUT THE PRC HAS NOT HIT YOUR RECENT BID ON THAT ONE. FOR EVEN ONE MORE PERSON WE WOULD NEED MORE SPACE. I FEEL WE COULD USE MORE PEOPLE PRODUCTIVELY, BUT CERTAINLY WE ARE NOT SHORT HANDED. THE ONE MAIN REASON IN FAVOR OF EXPANSION WOULD BE TO DEMONSTRATE FORWARD MOVEMENT IN THE RELATIONSHIP. IN TERMS OF DAY TO DAY OPERATIONS OR TREATMENT IN PEKING WE DON'T MISS FULL EMBASSY STATUS. WE ATTEND DIPLOMATIC RECEPTIONS WITHOUT HAVING TO MEET THE PRIME MINISTER OF MALTA AT THE AIRPORT. WE SEE AS MUCH IF NOT MORE OF HIGH CHINESE OFFICIALS AS ANY OTHER MISSION HERE.

ON THE TAIWAN QUESTION, THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE CONVINCES ME THAT THAT QUESTION CANNOT BE SOLVED WITHOUT COMPROMISE ON THE PART OF THE PRC.

THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE TO BE MAKING SOME TOUGH DECISIONS IN THE DOMESTIC FIELD. THESE WILL UNDERSTANDABLY ANTAGONIZE HIS CONSERVATIVE "CONVENTION GOING" SUPPORT. THIS ISSUE SHOULD NOT BE SOLVED IN A MANNER ADDING TO HIS POLITICAL WORRIES. THERE IS NO PRESSURE HERE IN PEKING AT THIS JUNCTURE THAT WOULD CAUSE ME, AT LEAST, TO RECOMMEND THAT THE PRESIDENT SOLVE THE TAIWAN QUESTION ON THE PRC TERMS.

NATURALLY I WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE TAIWAN QUESTION OUT OF THE WAY AND OUR RELATIONS NORMALIZED; BUT THE PRESIDENT MUST NOT BE POSTURED AS HAVING "SOLD OUT" TAIWAN.

IN MY VIEW US PUBLIC OPINION IS CONDITIONED TO ACCEPT EMBASSY STATUS HERE AND SOMETHING LESS FOR TAIWAN, BUT IT HAS NOT YET FOCUSED ON THE DETAILS. THE PEOPLE FORD NEEDS AT THE GOP CONVENTION WOULD ACCEPT DOWNGRADING TAIWAN TO LESS THAN EMBASSY STATUS BUT WOULD NOT ACCEPT SELL-OUT.

I CONTINUE TO AGREE WITH MANY DIPLOMATS HERE WHO FEEL THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP IS THE MOST IMPORTANT GAME IN TOWN FOR THE PRC. EVEN WITHOUT EMBASSY STATUS THIS USLO IS THE MOST

***** ~~T A P S E C R E T~~ *****S COPY

IMPORTANT OFFICE HERE AS FAR AS THE PRC GOES.

I SET THESE VIEWS OUT NOT THAT I SENSE DISAGREEMENT WITH THEM IN THE DEPARTMENT RATHER BECAUSE I FEEL THE QUESTION WILL INCREASINGLY BE ASKED "CAN THE PRESIDENT GO TO CHINA IN 1975 WITHOUT SOLVING THE TAIWAN QUESTION?" I THINK THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO HOW BEST TO GET AN ANSWER IN THE AFFIRMATIVE SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE PRESS SO AS TO AVOID GETTING THE ISSUE BUILT WAY UP IN THE MINDS OF THE PUBLIC.

REGARDING MY OWN JOB HERE: I LIKE IT. I AM TRYING TO SHOW THE CHINESE THAT AMERICANS ARE NOT ALOOF. GOING TO THE RECEPTIONS OF THE SMALL THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES HELPS. WE SEE CHINESE THERE AND THE WORD SPREADS. BICYCLING IN PEKING HELPS. HAVING THE CHINESE TO OUR RESIDENCE HELPS. THE TRADE MINISTER COMES TODAY FOR LUNCH. LIVING INFORMALLY HELPS. HITTING WITH THE CHINESE TENNIS PLAYERS HELPS.

I CONTINUE TO BE AMAZED AT HOW OUR ACTIVITIES ARE REPORTED TO HIGH CHINESE OFFICIALS--THEY KNOW WHAT WE DO. I'M NOT SURE THEY YET KNOW WHAT I'M TRYING TO CONVEY BUT I AM HOPEFUL ON THIS POINT.

WHEN YOU WERE HERE TENG SUGGESTED I GO SEE THE "CAVES". I WENT AND SAW A RATHER UNSOPHISTICATED NETWORK OF TUNNELS UNDER A SHOPPING STREET--IMPRESSIVE IN THE AMOUNT OF HOURS IT MUST HAVE TAKEN TO BUILD THEM, BUT CLEARLY MORE FOR MORALE THAN FOR REAL DEFENSE AGAINST HEAVY BOMBING. I WAS NOT HALF AS IMPRESSED WITH THE CAVES AS I WAS WITH SEEING 3 YEAR OLD KIDS IN REVOLUTIONARY STREET COMMITTEE SINGING ABOUT THEIR "INDUSTRIAL HANDS" AND THE GLORY OF THE PLA. WHAT A DELIVERY SYSTEM FOR THE PARTY LINE THEY HAVE.

LASTLY THERE ARE A COUPLE OF HIGHLY SENSITIVE COMMENTS ABOUT THE PRESIDENT AND ABOUT YOU ATTRIBUTED TO A HIGH PRC SOURCE THAT I WOULD NOT WANT TO PUT ON ANY PAPER. CAN WE CHAT BETWEEN JAN 23 AND JAN 31.

EXCUSE THE RAMBLING NATURE OF THIS MESSAGE BUT I WANTED TO GET SOME IMPRESSIONS OFF TO YOU BEFORE LEAVING FOR PAKISTAN.

BEST REGARDS,

BT



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION~~SECRET~~

February 7, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

RICHARD H. SOLOMON *RS* *JK*

SUBJECT:

Peking's Campaign of Smiles Toward the
U.S. Gains Momentum

With each passing day we gain more indications that Peking has embarked on an active and coordinated campaign of "smiles" to build a positive public mood conveying the message that U.S.-PRC relations are fine and improving -- a clear dialectical swing away from the press sniping which they promoted at the end of last year.

PRCLO Chief Huang Chen returned to the U.S. in mid-January primed to build such a mood. He made an otherwise unnecessary stop off on the way back to Washington in San Francisco and strongly hinted to city officials that Peking would look favorably on an extension of the current tour of the PRC archaeological exhibition to include the Bay area. Last year Chinese authorities repeatedly stonewalled the notion of an extended tour which would include three American cities over a nine month period. State is now exploring Huang's "hint" with PRC authorities.

On February 6 Ambassador Huang called the National Governors' Conference and invited the governors who had visited the PRC last year to lunch with him when they are in Washington later this month for a conference session. He also indicated he would be willing to arrange a guided tour of the archaeological exhibition for any of the other 48 governors who might like to see it.

Despite Chinese balance of payments problems, which have led Peking to cancel major grain contracts with American and other foreign suppliers, PRC trade officials have taken pains to make settlements which will be quite acceptable to the American merchants (in essence, paying the firm the difference between the contracted price and the current market price). In addition, a long-outstanding dispute with an American

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY *KJR*, NARA, DATE *5/9/01*

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buyer of PRC frozen shrimp was recently resolved in an unusually amicable manner when the Chinese trading officials involved directly acknowledged their culpability in the matter and accepted the trader's proposed solution. (This is a clear shift in tactics from the testiness of PRC commercial behavior with American firms last year.)

PRC media, in similar fashion, are now attempting to highlight the view that Sino-American relations are just fine and should improve still further. Chou En-lai's political report to the National People's Congress took the tack that the progress achieved to date toward normalization had been the result of "joint efforts" -- thus implying that remaining differences would similarly be resolved through mutual accommodation. The manner in which Peking's media have amplified this line through publication of President Ford's letter to the Premier, as well as through similar private comments which they are putting out to individuals whom they probably assume will pass them to us (see the CIA report at Tab A) seems intended to convey the message that the PRC will accommodate American concerns in future authoritative discussions.

Most recently, a February 3 article on U.S.- PRC relations published in a Peking-controlled paper in Hong Kong (see Tab B) clearly lays out the past record of the development of our relations since the Shanghai Communique was issued in a way which seems designed to erase any suggestion that the Sino-American relationship is in trouble. Indeed, the piece appears intended to build a sense of momentum about further progress in relations on the basis of the result of your past four trips to Peking. In an interesting example of Oriental subtlety, the article repeats Chou En-lai's passage on Sino-American relations from his NPC speech and glosses it with the observation that the statement -- which looks to further improvements in the relationship -- is expressed in just 76 Chinese characters. This may be intended to associate in the reader's mind 1976 and normalization. The article concludes with the elliptical suggestion that any doubts about the positive state of present and future U.S.- PRC relations can be answered by reading Premier Chou's statement and President Ford's letter of congratulations.

There is now enough evidence that this "smiles" campaign is purposeful and far-ranging to suggest that it will probably be sustained over the coming months, and that PRC leaders intend to create the kind of

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positive mood surrounding your next trip to Peking and the subsequent Presidential visit that public pressure for further progress in our relationship will be maximized. In essence, Peking is working to put us in a position where we will have to answer the question, "Since U.S.-PRC relations are so good, why can't they be even better? "

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 7, 1975

TO: Bud McFarlane

FROM: Dick Solomon

While this memo is not urgent, I would suggest that you try to make sure that it at least gets in HAK's trip folder, as it may be something he will want to look at as "bed time reading" on the Middle East tour. If he can look at it before he leaves on Sunday, of course, all the better.



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 012737

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Cable

CREATION DATE 12/30/1974

VOLUME 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400135

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER 13

FOLDER TITLE People's Republic of China (4)

DATE WITHDRAWN 05/01/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

exempt 10/4/05

TA KUNG PAO ARTICLE REVIEWS STATE OF PRC-U.S. RELATIONS

Hong Kong TA KUNG PAO in Chinese 3 Feb 75 p 2 OW

[Article by Kan Tang: "Sino-U.S. Relations and Ford's Greetings Message"]

[Text] In his "Report on the Work of the Government," Premier Chou En-lai mentioned that we will continue to implement Chairman Mac's revolutionary line in foreign affairs and talked about our foreign policies and principles. After mentioning the the relations between our country and the Third World and between our country and those of the second world such as West Europe and Japan, the report also mentions the relations between China and the United States.

Premier Chou En-lai said in his report: "There exist fundamental differences between China and the United States. Because of the joint efforts of both sides, the relations between the two countries have improved to some extent in the last 3 years, and contacts between the two peoples have developed. The relations between the two countries will continue to improve as long as the principles of the Sino-American Shanghai communique are carried out in earnest." The three sentences are composed of 76 characters.

In the last 3 years, the relations between China and the United States have improved. It has been nearly 3 years since President Nixon's visit to China in 1972 and the publication of the joint communique on 27 February in Shanghai.

Touching on matters of principle, the Shanghai communique said: "There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, nonaggression against other states, noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations."

During the past 3 years, friendly exchanges between the Chinese and American people have showed new development. The Chinese table tennis delegation, the acrobatic troupe, the Wushu delegation and scientific, medical and journalist delegations have successively visited the United States and have received a warm welcome. An exhibition of Chinese cultural relics is being held in the United States. "China fever" has emerged in the United States. American scientific, medical and university presidents delegations and a number of U.S.-China friendship organizations have also visited China and were sincerely welcomed. The Chinese and American people are increasing their mutual understanding and friendship.

During this period, China and the United States established liaison offices in both capitals.

During this period, Henry A. Kissinger, U.S. secretary of state and assistant to the President for national security affairs, flew to Peking four times to visit China. The first trip was made in 1972. Kissinger visited China from 19-23 June and held extensive talks with Premier Chou En-lai and other responsible persons. A communique was released.



The second visit was made on the eve of the first anniversary of the publication of the Sino-U.S. Shanghai communique. He visited China from 15-19 February 1973. The communique issued on 22 February said: "They reaffirmed the principles of the joint communique issued at Shanghai in February 1972 and their joint commitment to bring about a normalization of relations. They held that the progress that has been made during this period is beneficial to the people of their two countries."

The third visit was made from 10-14 November 1973, and was the second trip in the same year. The communique issued at that time said: "Both sides reviewed progress made during 1973 in their bilateral relations. The U.S. side reaffirmed: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China; the United States Government does not challenge that position. The Chinese side reiterated that the normalization of relations between China and the United States can be realized only on the basis of confirming the principle of one China."

The last visit was made from 25-29 November 1974. Kissinger brought his wife and children along with him on this visit. The communique issued on 29 November said: "The Chinese and U.S. sides held frank, wide-ranging and mutually beneficial talks. They reaffirmed their unchanged commitment to the principles of the Shanghai communique. The two governments agreed that President Gerald R. Ford would visit the People's Republic of China in 1975." This announcement, made only 3 months after President Ford took office, received worldwide attention.

Most recently, President Ford wrote a letter to Premier Chou En-lai in the latter part of January to congratulate him on his appointment as premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.

On the relations between China and the United States, the letter reads: "I look forward to meeting with you later this year to discuss matters of common concern and interest. While as you noted in your report to the congress, fundamental differences remain between our two countries, I remain hopeful that through common efforts we can overcome these differences and advance the cause of normalizing Sino-American relations and thus fulfill the joint commitment expressed in the Shanghai communique of 1972." The Chinese translation of these two long sentences consists of 119 characters.

This letter of congratulations has also aroused public attention. A message sent by a Western news agency from Peking said: "Western observers in Peking are quite interested in this letter of congratulations. To them, this letter is not merely an expression of courtesy because it almost answered point by point Chou En-lai's words on Sino-American relations in his report to the 4th National People's Congress on 13 January."

People might ask: What is the present and future status relations between China and the United States?

What is said in Premier Chou's report and in President Ford's letter of congratulations is the best answer.



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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE


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| | FAR EAST <u>Solomon</u> | | | X | REPLY FOR () |
| | SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA | | | | APPROPRIATE ACTION () |
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| | LATIN AMERICA | | | | JOINT MEMO () |
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