### Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

**WITHDRAWAL ID 05918**

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<tr>
<td>Creator's Name</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>re Panmunjom Incident</td>
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<tr>
<td>Creation Date</td>
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<td>Volume</td>
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<td>Date Withdrawn</td>
<td>10/01/1993</td>
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*Digitized from Box 10 of Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974-77 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library*
1. In accordance with SecState guidance, we have examined the desirability of directing US/ROK artillery fire against the NKA MAC security force barracks coincident with H-Hour (cutting down the tree), and the JCS are forced to recommend against the use of artillery fire in connection with H-Hour in the strongest terms for the following reasons:

   a. At H-Hour, the tree cutting detail and their 60 defenders will be fully exposed and absolutely vulnerable to NKA retaliatory artillery fire directed in reaction to the US initiated fire attack on the barracks.

   b. A US/ROK artillery attack directed against the barracks in reaction to NKA initiated artillery fire, would appear to serve no useful purpose, as the barracks would probably not be occupied under these conditions. The commander's proposal to have US/ROK artillery as backup during H-Hour operations for counter-battery fire, is more militarily sound, and would accomplish the same end objectives. If an extensive exchange of artillery were to occur, the MAC security force barracks could be included among the counter-battery targets, but it would appear that the significance of this targeting would be lost in the overall exchange of fire and resultant damage.

2. Therefore the JCS do not support the US/ROK command initiating artillery fire against the barracks either separately or in conjunction with H-Hour, because of the gross superiority of NKA artillery, and the exposed position of the US/ROK ground forces engaged in the tree felling. The JCS do agree with CINCUNC's proposal to alert artillery for support, if necessary, of the ground forces, including counter battery fire.

3. As an alternative to the US/ROK initiation of artillery fire across the DMZ in retaliation for the murder of the two USA officers, the JCS are developing a range of alternative options which would use precision guided air munitions, surface-to-surface missiles, and unconventional warfare (SEAL) teams to destroy North Korean installations of military or infrastructure significance. These plans are under development and are conceived as follow-on efforts to the tree felling action depending upon the post H-Hour developments.
ADDENDUM:

1. In response to SECSTATE query, the JCS have investigated the requirements for and desirability of destroying the "bridge of no return."

2. This could be done by artillery fire, demolition charges, or air delivered precision guided munitions.
   
a. Artillery fire would be most straightforward but would invite counterbattery fire.

   b. Demolition charges could be placed in a vehicle which would then be driven on to the bridge and the charges detonated after crew had retired to safe distance. Such action could result in crew drawing hostile fire or being blown up in truck.

   c. Laser guided bombs or WALLYE weapons could be used on the bridge. Laser designation could be accomplished from local ground position. Precision guided munitions could be released without aircraft crossing DMZ, but aircraft would be in NKA SAM envelope. Disadvantages of this approach would be if precision guided munition did not guide on first run (.5 to .8 reliability could be expected), bomb would be out of control, miss target and could damage non-NKA installations and cause casualties to friendly personnel as well as requiring reattack.

2. The JCS recommend in strongest terms that none of the foregoing methods be used to destroy the "bridge of no return" in conjunction with H-hour as it would most probably precipitate a fire attack from the NKA on the exposed and
and vulnerable tree cutting detail and their protective force. Furthermore it is doubtful, in our judgment that ROK President Park would agree to blowing the bridge in conjunction with H-hour in view of his strong feelings against the use of firearms in the tree cutting effort, and the obvious danger to the exposed ROK forces supporting the tree detail.
1. Should Midway Carrier Task Force proceed to the Sea of Japan?

2. Should F-111's deploy to South Korea?

3. Should B-52's execute exercise over South Korea?

4. If answer to 3 is "yes", should B-52's carry offensive ordinance? Note: Planned flight path of one plan is out of range of both DPRK SAM's and ordinance ranges in ROK. JCS is developing another option which would permit dropping of ordnance.

5. Should we take one or more of the punitive military actions to be presented by JCS?

6. Should there be other military deployments from the options JCS is developing, particularly in light of North Korean announcement of war posture?

7. Should we undertake formal consultations with Congress under provisions of the War Powers Act?

8. What informal consultations with the Congress should we initiate?

9. Should CIA brief Jimmy Carter?

10. When should we inform NATO allies?

11. Should we inform ANZUS allies, Philippines and Thailand?

12. What other diplomatic moves -- Soviets, PRC, etc.?

13. Choose option regarding pruning of tree in JSA:
   -- Proceed ASAP without prior notification to DPRK
   -- Notify DPRK and media beforehand
   -- Postpone action
14. Should CINCUNC send report to UN Security Council?

15. Any other UN action, e.g., Security Council meeting?

16. What precautionary measures should be taken to guard against possible North Korean military action or provocation, e.g.,

-- review intelligence and reconnaissance operations for possible targets of DPRK attack
-- review JSA procedures
-- reinforce forward deployment units

17. Decide on scope and intensity of public affairs/diplomatic activity.

-- Announce DefCon 3 and F-4 deployment?
-- Exploit pictures of incident? (arriving Washington 1700 Thursday)
-- Statement geared to North Korean announcement of war posture?

18. What high-level involvement should there be in providing honors to slain officers?
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>ACTION COMPLETED</th>
<th>ACTION IN PROGRESS</th>
<th>PENDING DECISION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. DefCon 3</td>
<td>DefCon 3 Set (JCS 190001Z)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Press Guidance for DefCon 3</td>
<td>Press guidance sent (Joint State/Defense 206129)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Inform other countries of DefCon 3, etc.</td>
<td>SecDef message went to NATO countries instructing that host countries' Ministers of Defence be informed after concurrence US Ambassador. (SecDef 190311Z). JCS informed Canadians directly (JCS 190219Z). State sent message to Embassies in NATO countries to defer action on SECDEF message pending further instructions.</td>
<td>Whether to inform NATO and other countries of DefCon, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. F-4 Deployment</td>
<td>F-4 Squadron being moved from Kadena to Korea. &quot;Execute&quot;: (JCS 190103Z). Aircraft to arrive by 191100Z (0700 Washington time).</td>
<td></td>
<td>Whether to deploy B-52 on training exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. B-52 Deployment</td>
<td>Alert cable sent to SAC for training flights without ordinance (JCS 190010Z). JCS is working on second option involving ordinance delivery.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>ACTION</td>
<td>ACTION COMPLETED</td>
<td>ACTION IN PROGRESS</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Deploy Carrier Gp.</td>
<td>Carrier Task Group alerted (JCS 190218Z)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Whether to deploy carrier Task Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Additional deployments to ROK</td>
<td>JCS examining possibilities to present to WSAG</td>
<td></td>
<td>Whether additional deployments should be made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Punitive military actions</td>
<td>JCS examining possibilities to present to WSAG</td>
<td></td>
<td>Whether punitive actions should be taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Notify Pres. Park</td>
<td>General Stilwell saw Pres. Park in advance of receipt of instructions. According to charge (phone) CinCUNC remarks to President were on lines of instruction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Notify Japanese</td>
<td>Embassy Tokyo informed GOJ of precautionary military measures taken (Tokyo 12529-NODIS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>ACTION COMPLETED</td>
<td>ACTION IN PROGRESS</td>
<td>PENDING DECISION</td>
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<td>--------</td>
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<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. MAC meeting 8/19</td>
<td>MAC meeting held from 1600 to 1735 Korea time, N.K. proposed recess. North claimed US started incident and if situation continued, war could break out.</td>
<td>JCS is reviewing Gen Stilwell's proposed plan for completing work in JSA (CincUNC 1820352, 1817452) (JCS 1820352)</td>
<td>WSAG to make decision on implementation</td>
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<td>14. Tree trimming</td>
<td></td>
<td>State/DOD lawyers looking into war powers questions. (Adrich to Habib memo)</td>
<td>Whether we need to inform Congress under War Powers Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. War Powers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. General Consultation with Congress</td>
<td></td>
<td>Habib and McCloskey considering the question</td>
<td>Whether to consult with Congress regardless of decision on War Powers Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Proposed CincUNC letter to Kim Il Song (CincUNC 1817452)</td>
<td>JCS advised Stilwell not to send letter to Kim Il-Song (JCS 1902172)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>ACTION IN PROGRESS</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Further Diplomatic Actions, Soviets, Chinese, etc.</td>
<td>Mr. Habib handling</td>
<td></td>
<td>What further diplomatic action should be taken</td>
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<tr>
<td>19. Pictures of incident</td>
<td>Enroute to Washington ETA 1700 Aug 19.</td>
<td></td>
<td>How to exploit these pictures</td>
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<tr>
<td>20. Honors for slain officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Degree of honors and media coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Press Guidance on F-4 Deployment</td>
<td>ISA Rep has asked DGD to prepare guidance</td>
<td></td>
<td>When to use it</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

EA/K:FMisch
8/19/76
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
               Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
               Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
               Director, National Security Agency

FROM: George Bush

SUBJECT: Task Force on National Intelligence Situation Reports

I direct that an interagency Task Force shall immediately be created to produce National Intelligence Situation Reports on the crisis in Korea. Procedures for this action have been developed by the Intelligence Community Staff and reviewed by NFIB members. I designate the Defense Intelligence Agency as the Executive Agent to assume responsibility for assembling this Task Force and issuing the National Situation Report. You shall be requested by the Executive Agent to participate in and, as appropriate, to supply analysts for this action.

George Bush

cc: Secretary of State
    Secretary of Defense
    Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
    Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community
    Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence
# Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

## NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

### Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

**WITHDRAWAL ID 05951**

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<tr>
<td>DESCRIPTION</td>
<td>Intelligence report</td>
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<tr>
<td>CREATION DATE</td>
<td>08/18/1976</td>
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<td>VOLUME</td>
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*Declassified with portions exempted*

12/5/96 KBH
DMZ Incident
Korea, 18 August 1976
18 August 1976

Korea: The Military Balance

KEY JUDGMENTS

The CIA views the military balance on the Korean Peninsula as being stable at present and believes it will remain so for the foreseeable future. The key element ensuring stability is the presence in South Korea of US forces, particularly combat aircraft and other means for the delivery of massive firepower.

Much of North Korea's military equipment has been produced locally in recent years, allowing Pyongyang to reduce but not entirely eliminate its dependence on the Soviet Union and China to equip its forces.

We do not believe that North Korea intends to attack the South in the near future. Pyongyang's current strategy appears to be based on a waiting game—that is, maintaining a strong and improving
defensive posture, while improving offensive capabilities should future events provide the conditions believed necessary for a successful invasion.

If US forces withdraw, if US resolve appears seriously weakened, we believe the North might well act on its overriding goal of unification and seize the opportunity to achieve it militarily.
Korea: The Military Balance

THE WARNING PROBLEM

Intelligence sources can provide much accurate information on the capabilities of the North Korean armed forces, but we are not at all sanguine that they could provide a clear and timely warning of a North Korean attack.

Up to 24 hours advance, warning might be obtained if the North Koreans were to undertake certain observable preparations and redeployments prior to attack. But it is entirely possible that Pyongyang could mount a sizable attack with little or no warning in order to achieve the advantage of surprise.

The warning problem is particularly serious given Seoul's location less than 50 miles south of the Demilitarized Zone.

- North Korea's supersonic aircraft are only minutes away from Seoul.
- Air attacks against the capital, especially surprise attacks, could cause serious morale problems among the populace.
The problem of providing warning is compounded by the extreme security-consciousness of the North Koreans and the fact that over half of Pyongyang's ground forces are within 50 miles of the DMZ. The forces in this area have sufficient equipment and support to mount a strong attack without reinforcement, and they are combat ready.

Some military activities could signal an impending North Korean offensive against the South. However, these would not necessarily be detected even if they occurred. Deception, communications security, and movement at night could preclude any advance warning of North Korean action. Among the potential indicators are:

-- Movement of major command units into assembly areas nearer the DMZ.

-- Shifting of North Korean command posts to field locations.

-- Large-scale deliveries of military equipment from China and/or the Soviet Union, or a sudden influx of Soviet or Chinese advisory personnel or technicians into North Korea.

-- Movement of Soviet or Chinese ground, air, or naval forces nearer to Korea.
THE FORCE BALANCE

Korea: The Military Balance
SUMMARY

1. On the morning of 18 August North Korean guards attacked and overpowered a small UN Command work party in the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom. Two US Army officers were killed and several other military personnel -- both US and South Korean -- sustained injuries. The two US officers were beaten to death while they lay helplessly on the ground. (See Tab A)

2. We are virtually certain that this incident was a deliberate provocation. We believe it was intended to support North Korea's diplomatic offensive against the US and South Korea -- Pyongyang is asserting that it proves that the US is the major source of tension in Korea -- and also to arouse US public opinion about the American troop presence in Korea during the presidential election campaign. The North Koreans are unlikely to undertake any high-risk military adventures; whether they will engage in further controlled acts of violence will depend heavily on their interpretation of the US response.
BACKGROUND ON DMZ INCIDENT

1. The Joint Security Area at Panmunjom represents only a small segment of the 151-mile long Korean Demilitarized Zone. The Demilitarized Zone, which extends 2,000 yards to either side of the military demarcation line, has been relatively quiet in recent years. Since about 1970 there have been less than ten incidents reported each year. This is in comparison to the hundreds of incidents that occurred annually in the late 1960s.

2. In the 1960s, US forces in Korea sustained a number of casualties because at that time some of them were stationed along the DMZ. At present, the only US forces directly deployed along the DMZ are those in the special company-sized detail assigned to the Joint Security Area. The last combat-related US fatality in Korea occurred in late 1974 when a US army officer was killed by a mine while inspecting a tunnel.

3. Most of the incidents that have occurred in recent years involve random firing across the DMZ. In the most recent such incident on 5 August, fire was exchanged for several minutes by both sides. There were no casualties.

4. From time to time the North Koreans have attempted to infiltrate agents and reconnaissance teams into the South through the DMZ. A three-man team was discovered south of the DMZ in June and taken under fire by South Korean forces. In the ensuing firefight the three infiltrators and four South Korean soldiers were killed.

5. Beginning in about 1972 the North Koreans began to construct elaborate tunnels under the DMZ. One of these tunnels was discovered in November 1972 and a second in March 1975.
to a continued US troop presence. The reaction in the US will undoubtedly have an important impact on North Korea's next move. Should Pyongyang perceive the beginning of a divisive domestic debate over the advisability of maintaining US troops in Korea, further controlled acts of violence can be expected.

6. President Kim Il-song almost certainly does not intend to resume the confrontation policy of the late 1960s, in which the North Koreans staged hundreds of armed violations of the Demilitarized Zone. Nor is he likely to undertake high-risk military provocations, either in the DMZ or against the South Korean garrisons on islands in the Yellow Sea, that might result in serious clashes with South Korean forces.

7. The North Koreans respect the South's military capabilities; blatant North Korean military provocations, moreover, would undercut Pyongyang's political strategy of portraying the US and the South as the aggressors. This strategy is intended to discredit the Pak regime and to build international pressure for a withdrawal of US forces.

8. Kim has acknowledged publicly that the time is not ripe for major military action and that he is relying on trends in international opinion and on developments in South Korea to create opportunities for advancing his goal of reunification on North Korean terms.

9. In an interview with a Japanese journalist in late March, Kim said North Korea "in the future" planned to "stir up world opinion more vigorously" by "publicizing" US "criminal barbarities" and South Korean political repression. Kim candidly declared that his objective was to "make the Korean question the focal point of attention both in Asian and in world affairs."
DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT

1. North Korean military personnel carried out a violent, unprovoked assault on Wednesday, 18 August, against a UN Command security force, including Americans, in the Panmunjom Joint Security Area. The attack, in which the numerically superior North Koreans employed axes and clubs, resulted in the deaths of two US officers who were supervising a routine work detail. There were also a number of injuries to other US and ROK personnel.

2. The work party consisted of five Korean laborers accompanied by three UN Command officers -- two US and one South Korean -- and a seven-man security force. The objective of the work detail was to prune a tree which was obstructing observation from a UN Command checkpoint.

3. Shortly after the UN Command crew arrived to begin work, a North Korean detachment appeared and within 10 to 15 minutes demanded that the work stop. When the UN Command group indicated that work would continue the North Koreans sent for reinforcements which brought their strength to approximately 30.

4. Immediately thereafter a North Korean officer approached one of the UN Command officers and struck him, knocking him to the ground. The other North Koreans then violently turned on the remaining UN Command personnel with clubs which had been concealed. In addition, some of the North Koreans picked up axes which had been used by the work party and used them as weapons.

5. The incident in the Joint Security Area yesterday morning was almost certainly a deliberate provocation by Pyongyang.

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For some months, North Korean propaganda has portrayed the US as the major source of tension in Korea, culminating in a government statement on 5 August which charged that the US had "completed" preparations for war.
NORTH KOREAN INTENTIONS AND OUTLOOK

1. The violent incident at Panmunjom seems to accomplish two objectives:

-- To underscore North Korea's general diplomatic case that the US is the major source of tension in Korea, an argument being made now at the nonaligned meeting in Colombo and one that will be made later at the UN this fall.

-- To arouse US public opinion about the US troop presence in Korea in the midst of the election campaign.

2. Since early this spring, North Korean propaganda has charged almost daily that the US is introducing new weapons into the South, conducting provocative military exercises, and keeping South Korean armed forces on a war footing. Pyongyang has warned that these developments have created a "grave situation" in which war may break out at any time.

3. On 5 August -- only a few hours after an exchange of fire between South and North Korean troops on the Demilitarized Zone -- North Korea, in an unusually high-level statement, alleged that the US and South Korea have now "completed" war preparations. This was the first such high-level statement since 1969 directed specifically at US actions in the South.

4. North Korea currently is working hard to get a harsh anti-US statement at the nonaligned summit conference, now drawing to a close in Colombo. The effort in Colombo is intended to enhance prospects for North Korea in the UN General Assembly debate on the Korean issue this fall. A resolution has already been introduced which once again calls for US withdrawal from Korea.

5. Despite some gains in international forums, the North Koreans still hope to stimulate opposition in the US
-- A North Korean officer at the scene of the incident was heard to tell his group to kill the UNC (i.e., US) personnel.

-- A North Korean radio broadcast shortly after the incident occurred described it as a US provocation which forced North Korean security personnel to take defensive measures. The broadcast warned that future incidents of US aggression would be met in like fashion, but otherwise signalled no major change in Pyongyang's policy.
The North's ground forces are organized into 25 maneuver divisions including 2 armored divisions, plus 5 independent armored regiments. Fourteen infantry divisions, and two armored regiments are in forward defense positions along the DMZ. All but two of the remaining divisions are deployed along direct lines of communication to the DMZ area.

The air forces are organized into five fighter divisions, a bomber division, and an air transport division. Air defense remains the primary mission of the air force, but increasing emphasis has been given to the ground attack role. The aircraft can be deployed from 22 jet capable airfields, many recently added nearer the DMZ. Fighter coverage of the whole country is assured, and the attack aircraft, based mostly in the northern part of the country, can be staged out of more forward fields.

North Korea's air defense is augmented by over 40 operational SA-2 sites having 250 launchers. These SAM units, supplemented by concentrated antiaircraft artillery, cover the DMZ, both coasts, and all of the urban, industrial, and military targets in the North.

The navy is divided into East and West Coast fleets. There is a preponderance of submarines, guided missile boats, and coastal patrol craft on the east coast, and a greater number of amphibious and fire support craft on the west coast.
Besides the primary mission of coastal defense, the navy is capable of supporting limited offensive operations against coastal and island areas of the South, and interdicting shipping in the northern portions of South Korean waters, particularly near the northwest islands. Moreover, the large number of small amphibious craft and fire support boats are capable of landing and supporting up to 3,000 troops on the west coast of South Korea and over 2,100 on the east coast. Pyongyang could reinforce amphibious operations with up to 1,600 airborne troops.

There are several significant limitations on the capabilities of the North's forces.

-- Ground forces are vulnerable to air attack outside of the North's static SAM envelope because of a lack of mobile battlefield air defense missiles and artillery.

-- There are still some shortages of armor in many units.

-- About half of the jet combat aircraft are old MIG-15s and MIG-17s with limited air defense and ground-attack capabilities.

-- The submarine force is too small to effectively interrupt seaborne supply lines to southern South Korea in the face of modern ASW efforts.

-- The North's ASW capability is very weak.

-- There may not be enough missile boats to counter the South's larger surface combatants.
When US ground, air, and naval assets supporting the South are considered, the North's advantages are largely neutralized, particularly in the air.
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<td>Active Duty Personnel</td>
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<td>Reserve (Militia)</td>
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<td>Maneuver Divisions</td>
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<td>Multiple Rocket Launchers</td>
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<td>Large Surface-to-Surface</td>
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1.5(e)(d)  
1.8(c)(f)(g)
TABLE 2

NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN AIR AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES

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<td>Older Fighters</td>
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<td>Transport, helicopter, utility, and trainer aircraft</td>
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<td>Surface-to-air Missile Launchers</td>
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<td>Anti-Aircraft Artillery Pieces</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships**</td>
<td>NORTH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Submarines</td>
<td>9-13***</td>
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<td>Destroyers/Frigates</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Escorts/Subchasers</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mine Warfare</td>
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<td>Guided Missile</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious</td>
<td>82</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patrol/Torpedo</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Support****</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Does not include auxiliary and miscellaneous craft.

*** The spread reflects uncertainty as to whether four recently launched R-class submarines will become operational this year.

**** Torpedo boat hull with 85mm guns and/or 122mm rocket launchers. Designed to provide fire support for amphibious landings, but also can be used for hit-and-run operations or coastal defense.
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . . . . Topographical Map

<table>
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<th>TITLE</th>
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<td>August 18 Incident, Panmunjom, Korea</td>
<td>08/18/1976</td>
<td>1 page</td>
<td>027500066</td>
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<td>A1</td>
<td>Korea - Operation Paul Bunyan</td>
<td>10/08/1993</td>
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Exempt 7/27/2004
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . . Joint Chiefs of Staff
RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . CINCUNC Seoul, et al

DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . re Panmunjom Incident

CREATION DATE . . . . . . 08/19/1976

VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500066
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . . HENRY A. KISSINGER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT
PARALLEL FILE OF DOCUMENTS OPENED FROM
UNPROCESSED COLLECTIONS (National Security Council)

BOX NUMBER . . . . . . . . . A1
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . . . . Korea - Operation Paul Bunyan

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . . 10/01/1993
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . GG
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . . . Topographical Map

DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . re Korea

CREATION DATE . . . . . . . . 07/1976

VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500066
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BOX NUMBER . . . . . . . . . A1
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . . . . . Korea - Operation Paul Bunyan

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . . 10/01/1993
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ...... National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ........ Briefing Paper

TITLE ..................... JCS Assessment
DESCRIPTION .............. re Panmunjom Incident

CREATION DATE ............ 08/1976

VOLUME .................... 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500066

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BOX NUMBER ............... A1

FOLDER TITLE ............... Korea - Operation Paul Bunyan

DATE WITHDRAWN ............ 10/01/1993

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST ..... GG

(except 9/29/04)
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . Briefing Paper

TITLE . . . . . . . . . . . . Addendum
DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Panmunjom Incident

CREATION DATE . . . . . . . 08/1976

VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500066
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WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

\textit{Reference 9129104}
OP IMMEDIATE
ESEA91RE4642
DE ROKORE 6475 23307736
O 200719Z AUG 76
FM AMBASSADOR SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASH DC NIAC IMMEDIATE 6060
INFO CINCUNC NIAC IMMEDIATE
JCS/OSD/ISA NIAC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF SEOUL 6475

SECRET

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE
E.O. 116521 COS
TAGS: KS, KN, US, HARR, MOPS
SUBJECT: APPROACH TO PRESIDENT PARK

1. IN ACCORDANCE INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED STATE 296294,
GENERAL STILWELL AND I SAW PRESIDENT PARK THIS MORNING.
THE PRESIDENT WAS BRIEFED ON THE ACTIONS UNDERWAY (R-52
AND F-11) AND THE TENTATIVE PLANS FOR THE TREE REMOVAL.
ON THIS LAST ITEM, THE PRESIDENT WAS INFORMED ON A COUPLE
OF OCCASIONS THAT NO "EXECUTE" MESSAGE HAD BEEN RECEIVED.
THE PRESIDENT SPENT A GOOD DEAL OF TIME ASKING QUESTIONS
ABOUT THE JSA AREA.

2. IN ADDITION, HE REPEATED SEVERAL POINTS HE MADE TO
GENERAL STILWELL YESTERDAY CONCERNING:
A. HIS DEEP REGRETS FOR NORTH KOREA's BARBAROUS ACTIONS
AND HIS CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILIES OF THE DEAD
OFFICERS.
B. HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE FIRM POSITION BEING TAKEN
BY THE US.
C. HIS VIEW (REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES) THAT A
RESPONSE CONSISTING ONLY OF PROTESTS WOULD INVITE
FURTHER PROVOCATIONS, BUT THAT THE PLAN FOR THE TREE
REMOVAL WOULD SHOW FIRMNESS AND RESOLVE WHICH WOULD
BE UNDERSTOOD BY THE NORTH.
D. HIS HOPE, WHICH HE SAID IS PROBABLY MISTHFUL, THAT
NORTH KOREA WOULD APOLOGIZE AND PROMISE TO INSURE THAT
THERE WOULD BE NO REPETITION OF THE INCIDENT. WE
SHOULD HOWEVER CONTINUE TO PURSUE THIS GOAL.
E. HIS FIRM BELIEF THAT RESPONSE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO

* * * * * * * * * * * WHIRL COMMENT * * * * * * * * * * * *

HYLAND, LL

RECALLED
PSN#023956
PAGE 81

TOR:233/07:56Z OTG:200719Z AUG 76

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

NR:94-34.37 State 6/10/64

By KB#4, NARA, Date 6/27/64
PRESENT PLANS AND THAT ESCALATION SHOULD ONLY EVOLVE IF NORTH ESCALATES (E.G., BY FIRING). IF NORTH DOES NOT RESPOND, THEN THE MATTER DROPS.

3. THE PRESIDENT HAD NO SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER ACTIONS THAT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED BY USG. HE SEEMED VERY PLEASED WITH USG POSTURE AND ACTIONS. HE OBVIOUSLY CONSIDERS THE TREE REMOVAL TO BE ESSENTIAL.

STERN

BT
OFFICERS - NIGHTLEAD AMERICAN

WASHINGTON AUG 20, REUTER - Two Air Force squadrons flew into South Korea today to bolster U.S. troops on increased alert status following the killing earlier this week of two American army officers in the Korean demilitarized zone.

The squadrons -- F-4 supersonic fighters from Okinawa and F-111 fighter-bombers from Idaho -- were ordered to Korea as a precautionary measure after the officers were killed by North Korean border guards and North Korea put its military forces on full alert.

Both the F-4s and F-111s are capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

Defense Department officials said they did not know of plans to send in any additional U.S. units to back up the 41,000 troops stationed in South Korea.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who summoned top-level national security advisers to White House meetings on Wednesday night and yesterday morning to discuss the situation, would not say what other steps, if any, the United States planned.

Washington DR. KISSINGER SAID ON NBC TELEVISION THIS MORNING: "WE CANNOT PERMIT THE PRINCIPLE TO BE ESTABLISHED THAT AMERICANS CAN BE ASSAULTED WITH IMPUNITY...."

ASKED WHAT THE UNITED STATES COULD DO, HE REPLIED: "THE STEPS DEPEND ON THE SATISFACTORY RESULTS TO OUR INQUIRIES." HE DID NOT ELABORATE.

On Wednesday night, a few hours after the two U.S. officers were attacked and killed by North Korean guards wielding axes and pikes, Dr. Kissinger discussed the situation with the head of the Chinese liaison office in Washington.

A state department spokesman who disclosed the meeting declined comment when asked if Peking were being asked to use its influence with the North Korean government.

Dr. Kissinger stayed in close contact with the situation from Kansas City, where he flew yesterday for last night's final session of the Republican national convention which chose President Ford as its nominee for the November 2 election.

He planned to stay in Kansas City until late this afternoon and was not expected back in Washington until evening.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was also in Kansas City, flying there from Michigan after a brief rest following a minor operation last week. He was not expected back at the Pentagon until Monday.

Officials said no further meetings of the special action group of the White House national security council had been called.
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL .... National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL .... Memorandum
CREATOR'S NAME ...... Chief, CIA Operations Center
DESCRIPTION .......... re Panmunjom Incident
CREATION DATE ....... 08/19/1976
VOLUME ............... 1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500066
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BOX NUMBER ............ A1
FOLDER TITLE ........... Korea - Operation Paul Bunyan
DATE WITHDRAWN ....... 10/01/1993
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST .... GG

Original date 11/12/03
MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Korean Task Force

A Korean Task Force in support of the Director of Central Intelligence was established at 1100 this morning. Located in the Operations Center's [redacted], the Task Force can be phoned on the following numbers:

Chief - Task Force

CIA Operations Center Task Force Area

Senior Duty Officer

DDS&T Watch Office

VINCENT J. HEYMAN
Chief, CIA Operations Center
F-111 DEPLOYMENT:

Deployment of F-111's commenced at 1825Z on 19 August. Five launches (CELLS) consisting of four F-111's are scheduled as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CELL</th>
<th>Depart</th>
<th>ETA 20 August</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ONE</td>
<td>1825Z</td>
<td>0713Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWO</td>
<td>1855Z</td>
<td>0743Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THREE</td>
<td>1925Z</td>
<td>0813Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOUR</td>
<td>1955Z</td>
<td>0843Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIVE</td>
<td>2025Z</td>
<td>0913Z</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total flight time including airborne refueling, is 12 hours 48 minutes. This information was provided by Col. Hammond, NMCC.
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY USAR EA Review 11/24/03

BY NLF DATE 5/21/05
PANMUNJOM INCIDENT

Situation Report as of 0600 Hours, August 20

Planned US Military Moves: Discussion with President Park

Charge Stern and General Stilwell briefed President Park on the B-52 flights, the deployment of F-111s, and the tree surgery plan. Park reiterated his appreciation of the firm position being taken by the US and his belief that our response should be limited to the present plans for the tree surgery, saying that escalation should only evolve if the North escalates. He had no suggestions for further US actions.

President Park's Public Statement on Incident

In a speech at a military academy graduation exercise read by the Minister of National Defense, Park called the JSA incident "collective murder" and said from now on, "we will have to take immediate punitive actions, whether small or large," against Northern provocations. He also suggested that the provocations were a North Korean means of concealing its "economic bankruptcy" and internal power struggles.

Blue House Opinion on the Incident

Some officials close to President Park believe that North Korea made several errors with the JSA incident. They feel North Korea might have done better to attack South Koreans rather than US troops as the attack will influence US public opinion to the disadvantage of the North whereas as attack on South Koreans would not have had the same impact. They also believe the incident can be used to counter North Korean propaganda at the UNGA. Our Embassy notes that the consciousness of a renewed threat from the North also seems to have had the effect of increasing support for the Park government. The leaders of the government and the opposition political parties have agreed to call a joint meeting of the National Assembly's foreign affairs and national defense committees Saturday to hear reports from ROKG officials on the JSA incident.

North Korean Military Actions

There has been no significant change in North Korean military posture and no movements of major military units reported.
World Reaction

International reaction continues to be sparse:

-- None of the monitored Arab media have commented on the Panmunjom incident, nor have the media of Cyprus, Greece or Turkey. Most of these have carried factual stories of the incident based on international press reports.

-- Southeast and South Asian media reaction is similarly light. Vietnamese, Cambodian and Lao media have not mentioned either the incident or the North Korean force alert.

-- The London Daily Telegraph calls Kim Il Sung a "megolomaniac Communist dictator" and the "whole affair comes as a reminder that he could send the area up in flames again."

-- Havana Radio has reported the incident without mentioning US involvement: "agents of the Park Chung Hee regime created an incident in order to blame the DPRK." An earlier Cuban government statement had not mentioned the incident.

-- Field Marshal Idi Amin has supported the attack on the UNC personnel after an explanation by the North Korean Ambassador.
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DOD via LOX.
WH
CIA
NSA
JCS
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . . Joint Chiefs of Staff
RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . . CINCPAC Honolulu, CINCSAC Offutt AFB NE

TITLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-52 Training Sorties

CREATION DATE . . . . . . . 08/20/1976

VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500066
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BOX NUMBER . . . . . . . . . A1
FOLDER TITLE : . . . . . . . Korea - Operation Paul Bunyan

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 10/01/1993
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . GG

Attempt 9/29/04
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . . . National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . . Joint Chiefs of Staff
RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . . CINCUNC Seoul, CINCPAC Honolulu
DESCRIPTION . . . . . . re Panmunjom Incident
CREATION DATE . . . . . . 08/20/1976
VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . 2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500066
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FOLDER TITLE . . . . . . . Korea - Operation Paul Bunyan
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . . 10/01/1993
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . GG
U.S.-KOREA LEAD
BY FRED S. HOFFMAN

WASHINGTON (AP) -- THE NAVY AIRCRAFT CARRIER MIDWAY WAS REPORTED PREPARING TODAY TO SAIL FOR KOREAN WATERS, INCREASING THE U.S. MILITARY BUILDUP DESIGNED TO WARN NORTH KOREA AGAINST ATTACKING SOUTH KOREA.

FORD ADMINISTRATION SOURCES SAID THE MIDWAY WAS EXPECTED TO LEAVE YOKOSUKA, JAPAN FOR THE KOREAN AREA WHERE TWO AIR FORCE WARPLANE SQUADRONS WERE SENT THURSDAY FROM OKINAWA AND THE UNITED STATES. THE TRIP IS EXPECTED TO TAKE ABOUT 40 HOURS.

OFFICIALS CONTINUED TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE U.S. MILITARY MOVES ARE PRECAUTIONARY AND DO NOT FORESHADOW ANY RETALIATION AGAINST NORTH KOREA FOR THE SLAYING BY NORTH KOREAN GUARDS OF TWO U.S. ARMY OFFICERS IN THE PANMUNJOM TRUCE AREA. IT WAS THIS INCIDENT THAT LED TO THE NEW TENSION IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

THE TWO OFFICERS WERE KILLED WEDNESDAY AS THEY SUPERVISED A WORK PARTY PRUNING BRANCHES FROM A TPFE IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID FRIDAY NIGHT THAT A UNITED NATIONS COMMAND WORK CREW RETURNED TO THE SITE AT 7 A.M. SATURDAY, KOREAN TIME, AND CUT DOWN THE TREE.

08-20-76 20:23 EDT

R785R A2702ZSARYRCYN
OFFICERS - TREE
WASHINGTON, AUG 20, REUTER - A WORK GROUP OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND IN THE KOREAN DEMILITARIZED ZONE HAS CUT DOWN THE TREE THAT TWO AMERICAN OFFICERS WERE PRUNING WHEN THEY WERE KILLED BY NORTH KOREAN BORDER GUARDS ON WEDNESDAY, THE STATE DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCED TONIGHT.

"AT ABOUT 7 A.M. KOREAN TIME ON AUGUST 21, A U.N. COMMAND WORK GROUP CUT DOWN THE TREE WHICH THE NORTH KOREANS HAD PREVENTED AN EARLIER WORK PARTY FROM PRUNING ON AUGUST 18," THE STATEMENT SAID.

REUTER 2016
R787R S2650)1ZSARYRZSA
R I

AM-KOREA INSERT 7THGRAF A215 8-20
XXX POSTURE.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT LATER ANNOUNCED IN WASHINGTON THAT A U.N. COMMAND WORK GROUP FRIDAY CUT DOWN THE TPFE IT HAD BEEN PREVENTED FROM TRIMMING.

PICKUP 8TH GRAF: NORTH KOREA
UPI 08-20 08:30 PED
FLASH
69A355AABB841
DE: RUKORE #6520 2342653
Z 210648Z AUG 76
FM: AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC FLASO 2988
SECRET SEOUL 6520
E.O. 11622 GDS
TAGS: PFOR, KS, KN
SUBJECT: MAC MEETING

1. PRIVATE MEETING BETWEEN KPA AND UNC SENIOR MAC MEMBERS,
   CALLED FOR BY KPA SENIOR MEMBER TO DELIVER RESPONSE FROM KPA
   SUPREME COMMANDER TO CINCUNC MESSAGE, CONVENED FROM 12 NOON TO
   1215 PM, AUGUST 21, CHINESE NOT PRESENT. FOLLOWING ARE KPA
   SENIOR MEMBERS OPENING STATEMENT AND DESCRIPTION OF MEETING

2. OPENING STATEMENT: BEGIN QUOTE: I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED BY
   THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY TO CONVEY
   HIS MESSAGE TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE UNC SIDE.
   BEGIN INTERIOR QUOTE: IT WAS A GOOD THING THAT NO BIG INCIDENT
   OCCURRED AT PANMUNJOM FOR A LONG PERIOD. HOWEVER, IT IS REGRETTABLE
   THAT AN INCIDENT OCCURRED IN THE JOINT SECURITY AREA, PANMUNJOM,
   THIS TIME, AN EFFORT MUST BE MADE SO THAT SUCH INCIDENTS MAY NOT
   RECUR IN THE FUTURE. FOR THIS PURPOSE, BOTH SIDES SHOULD MAKE
   EFFORTS. WE URGED YOUR SIDE TO PREVENT PROVOCATION, OUR SIDE
   WILL NEVER PROVOKE FIRST BUT WILL TAKE DEFENSIVE MEASURES
   ONLY WHEN PROVOCATION OCCURS. THIS IS OUR CONSISTENT STAND.
   END INTERIOR QUOTE
   I HOPE YOU CONVEY THIS MESSAGE TO YOUR SIDE'S COMMANDER IN
   CHIEF IN THE QUICKEST POSSIBLE TIME. END QUOTE.

3. UNC SENIOR MAC REP. ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT MESSAGE AND UNDERTOOK
   TO FORWARD IT.

4. KPA SIDE: THE MADE SECOND STATEMENT:
   BEGIN QUOTE: I HAVE ONE THING TO ADD. THIS MORNING YOUR SIDE
   AGAIN COMMITTED A PROVOCATION BY BRINGING HUNDREDS OF COMPLETELY
   ARMED PERSONNEL INTO THE JSA WITHOUT ANY ADVANCE NOTIFICATION.
   SUCH ACTIONS ON YOUR PART MIGHT CAUSE SUCH INCIDENTS AS THE ONE
   THAT OCCURRED ON THE 16TH. I STRONGLY DEMAND THAT YOUR SIDE

****** WHSR COMMENT *******

HYLAND, McFARLANE, LLSENT TO SCUYERCT

PSN:1025026 PAGE 01 TOR:234/07/186Z DTC:210648Z AUG 76

******* SECRET ******* COPY

by 7/17/01

GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY
**SECRET**

**SECRET**

COMM'T NO SUCH PROVOCATIONS. END QUOTE.

5. UNC REQUESTED COPY OF KPA MESSAGE. KPA SAID IT HAD NO COPY, THEN REQUESTED REPLY TO THEIR STATEMENT. UNC SAID HE HAD COME TO RECEIVE A MESSAGE AND HAD NOTHING FURTHER TO SAY. KPA ENDED WITH FOLLOWING FINAL STATEMENT:

BEGIN QUOTE: I WOULD LIKE TO STATE ONCE MORE CLEARLY THAT THE PROVOCATION YOU COMMITTED THIS MORNING IS A SERIOUS ONE WHICH MIGHT CAUSE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. THEREFORE I HOPE THAT YOU SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THIS AND TAKE RESPONSIBLE MEASURES SO THAT SUCH PROVOCATIONS DO NOT RECUR. END QUOTE.

6. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS CALM AND QUIET. ONE INTERESTING SIDELIGHT TO MEETING: THE NEUTRAL NATIONS' REPRESENTATIVES WERE PRESENT IN THE AREA; THE POLES AND CZECHS WERE FRIENDLY; THE SWISS AND SWEDES PRESUMABLY ANNOYED OVER LACK OF ADVANCE NOTICE THIS MORNING WERE COLD AND REFUSED TO ACKNOWLEDGE US REP'S SALUTE.

7. REPORT ON MEETING GIVEN ROKE. COMMENT: KPA STATEMENTS ARE COMPARATIVELY MILD AND AMBIGUOUS.

SNEIDER

ST
OP IMMRED /PRIORITY
E0974REA630
DE RUKORE #6476 2330740
G P 2909743Z AUG 76
FM AMBASSAD Y SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NACT IMMEDIATE 8961
INFO AMBASSAD Y TOKYO PRIORITY 8606
AMBASSAD AIPEI PRIORITY 2590
CINC PAC PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SEOUL 6476
E09, 11652: N/A
TAGS: KS, KN, PFOR
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT PAK SPEAKS OUT ON PANMUNJOM INCIDENT
BEGIN SUMMARY: PRESIDENT SHARPLY ATTACKS NORTH KOREA FOR
COLLECTIVE MURDER. END SUMMARY.

1. ON AUGUST 28, MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SO' CHONG-GHOL
READ MILITARY ACADEMY COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT PAK IN
WHICH HE DESCRIBED PANNUNJOM INCIDENT OF AUGUST 16, CALLING
NORTH KOREAN INVOLVEMENT "COLLECTIVE MURDER".

2. AT GRADUATION CEREMONY OF ROK THIRD MILITARY ACADEMY,
PRESIDENT'S SPEECH SAID "A MAD DOG NEEDS A STICK" AND THERE
IS NO REASON THAT (ROK) ALWAYS HAS TO BE UNILATERALLY
PROVOKED BY NORTH KOREANS. HE SAID "OUR PATIENCE IS LIMITED.
FROM NOW ON, IF THEY COMMIT UNLAWFUL PROVOCATIONS AGAINST US,
WE WILL HAVE TO TAKE IMMEDIATE PUNITIVE ACTIONS, WHETHER SMALL
OR LARGE, AND ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS SHALL BE BORNE BY
NORTH KOREAN COMMUNISTS THEMSELVES."

3. PAK ALSO SUGGESTED IN SPEECH THAT SUCH PROVOCATIONS AS ONE
AT PANNUNJOM WERE NORTH KOREAN MEANS OF CONCEALING ITS
"ECONOMIC BANKRUPTCY" AND ITS "SERIOUS (INTERNAL) POWER
STRUGGLE." HE SAID THAT NORTH HAS SENT ARMED AGENTS SOUTH TO
DESTROY ROK DEFENSES BUT FAILED, AND ALSO NOTED MACHINE GUN
FIRING BY NORTH KOREAN GUARDS ON AUGUST 9.

4. IN SUMMARY, HE ASKED ROK PEOPLE TO BUILD UP TOTAL
SECURITY SYSTEM AND THAT ALL SHOULD UNIFY INCLUDING "FRONT,
REAR, OLD AND YOUNG TO DEFEND FATHERLAND.

5. SPEECH WAS GIVEN PROMINENT COVERAGE BY AUGUST 20. AFTERNOON PRESS BUT EDITORIAL OPINION HAS NOT YET EMERGED. STERN BT
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TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . Telegram
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RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . . . CINCUNC Seoul, CINCPAC Honolulu
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COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID .... 027500066
COLLECTION TITLE .... HENRY A. KISSINGER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT PARALLEL FILE OF DOCUMENTS OPENED FROM UNPROCESSED COLLECTIONS (National Security Council)
BOX NUMBER ......... Al
FOLDER TITLE ......... Korea - Operation Paul Bunyan
DATE WITHDRAWN ....... 10/01/1993
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST .... GG
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . . Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . . . Joint Chiefs of Staff
RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . . . CINCPAC Honolulu, CINCPAC Offutt AFB NE
TITLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-52 Training Sorties
CREATION DATE . . . . . . . 08/20/1976
VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500066
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . . HENRY A. KISSINGER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT
PARALLEL FILE OF DOCUMENTS OPENED FROM
UNPROCESSED COLLECTIONS (National
Security Council)
BOX NUMBER . . . . . . . . . . . . A1
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . . . Korea - Operation Paul Bunyan
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . . . 10/01/1993
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG
OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #7257 2330419
D 200422Z AUG 76
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMBASSAD TOYKID IMMEDIATE 1556
INFO AMBASSAD SEOUL IMMEDIATE 0012
COMUSJAPAN FUCHU AS
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 207257
E'O 116521 GDS
TAGS I MAR, MOPS, JA, KS, KN, US
SUBJECT: MOVEMENT OF KC-135 TANKERS

1. DUE TO WEATHER CONDITIONS, 10-12 KC-135 TANKERS REFUELING F-111S WILL LAND AT YOKOTA RATHER THAN RETURNING TO KADENA. ANY FURTHER DETAILS DESIRED AVAILABLE THROUGH MILITARY CHANNELS.

2. IF ASKED BY PRESS WHY THESE PLANES ARE LANDING AT YOKOTA AND/OR IF THEY ARE INVOLVED IN KOREAN OPERATIONS, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT KADENA AB, WHERE THEY ARE NORMALLY BASED IS BEING ROUTINELY EVACUATED DUE TO TYPHOON CONDITIONS AND THESE AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO LAND AT YOKOTA AB. AS YOU KNOW, WE DO NOT COMMENT ON THE OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF THESE FORCES.

3. IF WEATHER CLOSURE OF KADENA CONTINUES IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO FLY FURTHER REFUELING MISSIONS FROM YOKOTA A.B.
ROBINSON
BT

DECLASSIFIED
R.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines, Stat Visit 7/72
By 1034, NARA, Date 10/3/72
OP IMMED
E8A98REA640
DE RUKORE #6475 2330735
O 290719Z AUG 76
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACIT IMMEDIATE 8960
INFO CINCUNC NIACIT IMMEDIATE
JCS/ORD/ISA NIACIT IMMEDIATE

SECRET SEOUL 6475

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE
E.O. 11552: GOS
TAGS: KS, KN, US, HARR, HOPS
SUBJECT: APPROACH TO PRESIDENT PARK

1. IN ACCORDANCE INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED STATE 296294,
GENERAL STILWELL AND I SAW PRESIDENT PARK THIS MORNING.
The President was briefed on the actions underway (B-52
AND F-111) AND THE TENTATIVE PLANS FOR THE TREE REMOVAL.
ON THIS LAST ITEM, THE PRESIDENT WAS INFORMED OF A COUPLE
OF OCCASIONS THAT NO “EXECUTE” MESSAGE HAD BEEN RECEIVED.
The President spent a good deal of time asking questions
ABOUT THE JSA AREA.

2. IN ADDITION, HE REPEATED SEVERAL POINTS HE MADE TO
GENERAL STILWELL YESTERDAY CONCERNING:
A. HIS DEEP REGRETS FOR NORTH KOREA’S BARBAROUS ACTIONS
AND HIS CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILIES OF THE DEAD
OFFICERS,
B. HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE FIRM POSITION BEING TAKEN
BY THE USG,
C. HIS VIEW (REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES) THAT A
RESPONSE CONSISTING ONLY OF PROTESTS WOULD INVITE
FURTHER PROVOCATIONS, BUT THAT THE PLAN FOR THE TREE
REMOVAL WOULD SHOW FIRMNESS AND RESOLVE WHICH WOULD
BE UNDERSTOOD BY THE NORTH,
D. HIS HOPE, WHICH HE SAID IS PROBABLY WISTFUL, THAT
NORTH KOREA WOULD APOLOGIZE AND PROMISE TO INSURE THAT
THERE WOULD BE NO REPERITION OF THE INCIDENT. WE
SHOULD HOWEVER CONTINUE TO PURSUE THIS GOAL.
E. HIS FIRM BELIEF THAT RESPONSE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HYLAND, LL

RECALLED PAGE 01
PSN:023955 TOR:233/07:55Z DTG:290719Z AUG 76

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines, S/N 24/69

By K244, NARA, Date 10/20/82
PRESENT PLANS AND THAT ESCALATION SHOULD ONLY EVOLVE IF NORTH ESCALATES (E.G., BY FIRING). IF NORTH DOES NOT RESPOND, THEN THE MATTER DROPS.

3. THE PRESIDENT HAD NO SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER ACTIONS THAT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED BY USG. HE SEEMED VERY PLEASED WITH USG POSTURE AND ACTIONS. HE OBVIOUSLY CONSIDERS THE TREE REMOVAL TO BE ESSENTIAL.

STERN
PANMUNJOM INCIDENT

Situation Report as of 0700 Hours, August 19

U.S. Military Moves

Defcon 3 has been established in the ROK and the order has been given for the deployment of the F-4 squadron from Kadena to South Korea (Taegu). The ETA of the F-4's in Korea is 0700 EDT. A warning has gone out from JCS on preparing for the possible movement of the Midway, the F-111's and the B-52's.

North Korean Actions

Radio Pyongyang announced at 0320 that military units had been put on a war footing. The announcement said that U.S. forces in South Korea had been put on an emergency alert and that "faced with this reckless war clamor," NK military units and militia forces have been ordered to "enter into war posture." The announcement stated "we will not provoke others first but we will never tolerate the enemy's provoking us."

Park-Stilwell Conversation

On the basis of a telecon with the Acting CJCS, General Stilwell discussed the Defcon 3 move and the F-4 deployment with President Park and Minister of Defense Suh before receiving the cabled instructions. Park termed the North Korean incident "beyond human reason" and said that the situation was sufficiently grave to demand more than a protest. He viewed the move to Defcon 3 and the F-4 deployment as appropriate. He urged that the strongest possible protest be issued, together with a demand for reparations. At the same time he called for the deliberate development of appropriate counteraction which would not play into North Korean hands. He said we should teach the North Koreans a lesson but without the use of arms. Park questioned the value of a show of force, noting that deployments after the Pueblo incident did not deter the North Koreans from shooting down the EC-121.

General Stilwell observed that it was essential to complete the tree-pruning operation, to which Park agreed. Park offered ROK specialists in judo and karate to assist in this operation. He suggested that we proceed deliberately.
operation to ensure we will be certain of the NK reaction and do not have to use firearms. We informed Embassy Seoul and CINCUNC that General Stilwell should get to President Park the information about the possible moves under consideration (F-111, B-52's, Midway) and have been informed by telephone that this has been done.

Discussion with GOJ

Embassy Tokyo informed American Affairs Director General Yamazaki in the Foreign Office of Defcon 3 and the move of F-4's from Kadena to South Korea. Yamazaki expressed appreciation for the timely notification. He asked whether the GOJ could confirm publicly that it been informed of the F-4 deployment in advance if this move comes to public attention. We have instructed the Embassy to request the Japanese not to discuss the move publicly in the absence of any public acknowledgement by the USG of the deployment.

Informing Other Countries of Defcon 3

As a result of standing, computerized procedures triggered when there is a change of Defcon, DOD sent out instructions to NATO posts instructing the chief US military representative in each country to inform the Minister of Defense about the move to Defcon 3 in South Korea upon authorization by the Chief of Mission. On the basis of Op Center discussions with Eagleburger, we sent a subsequent message to all concerned posts instructing that such authorization not be given for the time being. The DOD message did go, however, directly to the Canadians. Thus, as far as we know, the Koreans, Japanese, and Canadians are the only ones who have been officially informed of the Defcon 3 move.

Military Armistice Commission Meeting

Embassy Seoul informed us by phone that a MAC meeting was concluded at 0430 EDT. The North Korean side accused us of provoking the incident and claimed that some of their men had been injured. They presented photos purporting to prove these points. They charged that the US was raising tensions in the area and said war could break out if this continued. A cable report on the meeting is being prepared by CINCUNC. The atmosphere at the Joint Security Area has been normal.

Media Coverage

AFP reported from Seoul that US forces had gone on "full alert." The report was apparently based on the Armed Forces Korea Network announcement cancelling all military leaves.
ROK press gave wide coverage to the Panmunjom incident, urging that the US make a tough response to Pyongyang's provocation. One newspaper commentary speculated that the incident was an attempt to lay the groundwork for direct US-North Korean contacts. A government newspaper, on the other hand, suggested that incident was aimed at having the US public call for a troop pull-out; the newspaper commented, "We are gravely concerned about the UNC reaction."

US network TV gave considerable coverage to the incident on the evening of August 18.

No other media coverage available at this time.

UN and Colombo Connection

At the UN, a meeting of potential additional co-sponsors of the friendly resolution was held August 18. Attendance was good. We are supporting the effort with approaches in various capitals. Embassy/CINCUNC has been asked to prepare a report on the JSA incident for the Security Council. We have no indication as yet that the incident will affect our UN position.

The non-aligned meeting in Colombo has not yet completed its consideration of the Korea question and we have no indication the JSA incident has had any effect on the attitudes at Colombo.

S/S  DOD via LDX
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D  CIA  "
P  NSA  "
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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . General Stilwell
CREATOR'S TITLE . . . . CINCUNC Korea
RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . Vice Admiral Hannifin

DESCRIPTION . . . . . . re Panmunjom Incident

CREATION DATE . . . . . . 08/19/1976

VOLUME . . . . . . . . . 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500066
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . HENRY A. KISSINGER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT PARALLEL FILE OF DOCUMENTS OPENED FROM UNPROCESSED COLLECTIONS (National Security Council)

BOX NUMBER . . . . . . . A1
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . . Korea - Operation Paul Bunyan

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . . 10/01/1993
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . GG
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 05952

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . . Report

DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . Situation Report--Korea

CREATION DATE . . . . . . . . 08/20/1976

VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500066

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . . . HENRY A. KISSINGER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT
PARALLEL FILE OF DOCUMENTS OPENED FROM UNPROCESSED COLLECTIONS (National Security Advisors)

BOX NUMBER . . . . . . . . . . A1

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . . . . Korea - Operation Paul Bunyan

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . . . 10/08/1993

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . KBH
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . Report

DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . Situation Report--Korea, 1400 hours

CREATION DATE . . . . . . . 08/20/1976

VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . 9 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500066
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . . HENRY A. KISSINGER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT
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DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . . 10/08/1993
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . KBH
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . Report

DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . Situation Report--Korea, 1400 hours

CREATION DATE . . . . . . 08/20/1976

VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500066

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PARALLEL FILE OF DOCUMENTS OPENED FROM UNPROCESSED COLLECTIONS (National Security Advisors)

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DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . . 10/08/1993

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . KBH
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . . . Report

DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . Situation Report--Korea, 0200 hours

CREATION DATE . . . . . . . . 08/20/1976

VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500066

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . . HENRY A. KISSINGER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT PARALLEL FILE OF DOCUMENTS OPENED FROM UNPROCESSED COLLECTIONS (National Security Advisors)

BOX NUMBER . . . . . . . . . . . A1

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . . . . Korea - Operation Paul Bunyan

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . . . . 10/08/1993

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . KBH
REQUEST/RECEIPT FOR TRANSMISSION

DATE AND TIME TRANSMITTED: 1976 AUG 20 AM 8:39

NMCC STATION SERIAL NR.: Y31

DATE AND TIME RECEIVED:

SITE: D

RECEIVED BY:

TO BE FILLED IN BY REQUESTER

FROM: CDOS

OFFICE/DESK: SITUATION ROOM: 79121

SUBJECT: Current Assessment

CLASSIFICATION: F5

PAGES: 2

TRANSMIT TO:

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<th>OFFICE</th>
<th>PHONE NR.</th>
<th>ROOM NR.</th>
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<tr>
<td>TEL</td>
<td>Mr. Hyland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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ReceiFED: 20 AM 8:40
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . Briefing Paper
CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . . Chief, Joint Chiefs of Staff
RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . . William Hyland
TITLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Current Assessment
DESCRIPTION . . . . . . re Panmunjom Incident
CREATION DATE . . . . . . . . 08/20/1976
VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500066
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DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . . . . 10/01/1993
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

9/29/04
FBIS 01 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ANALYSIS NOTE/AG WA

PYONGYANG MEDIA BEHAVIOR

In the past 24 hours North Korean media have not originated any new authoritative comment on the 13 August clash in the Panmunjom Joint Security Area (JSA). Reiterating long-standing charges of U.S. war preparations in South Korea, routine-level press and radio comment has continued to portray the incident as a further U.S. effort to "kindle the fuse of war," to exhort the people to be prepared for combat, and to call upon the United States to be restrained in the face of DPRK readiness. The DPRK News Agency, KCNA, has cited reports of U.S. military deployments to Korea.

The last authoritative DPRK comment, a 19 August Nodong Sinmun commentary article, and the Korean People's Army (KPA) Supreme Command report calling for combat readiness were repeatedly broadcast in Pyongan domestic service programs on the 19th, but have only been repeated once by the radio on the 20th. (See item 02 of 19 August FBIS wire and item 76 of 13 August FBIS wire for analysis of the earlier Pyongan media treatment of DPRK-UN Command clash.)

DPRK media on the 20th generally focused on exhorting the people to be prepared for an attack by the United States and urged the "U.S. imperialists...not to miscalculate our people's firm resolve." In calling upon the people to be prepared for war, Pyongan radio specifically referred to the Supreme Commander's order--revealed in the 19 August Supreme Command report--for all forces to be in a state of "combat readiness." Both the Party daily and Pyongan radio embellished somewhat on the order by indicating that while the army was to be militarily prepared, others must fulfill their duty by concentrating on economic production. Thus, a commentary in Nodong Sinmun called on the people to "firmly keep their posts" maintaining a "mobilized posture" while "further expediting socialist construction and intensifying the economic struggle." Economic tasks were also cited in a special radio program directed at all those named in the Supreme Command report--the army, the worker, peasant red guards and the young red guards.

PEKING AND MOSCOW MEDIA

There was not yet been any monitored Peking or Moscow media comment on the JSA incident. However, beginning at 1943 GMT on the 20th, NcNa acknowledged the clash by reporting the KCNA authorized statement on the incident, the DPRK report on the 19 August Mac meeting at which the incident was discussed, and the KPA, Supreme Command report.

21 AUG 0034Z SCT/WK
FBIS 41 (OUT OF SEQUENCE) (SUB FOR 39)

DPRK REPORTS 'NEW GRAVE U.S. PROVOCATION' IN DMZ

OW210825 PYONGYANG DOMESTIC SERVICE IN KOREAN 0800 GMT 21 AUG 76 OW

(TEXT) LISTENERS, THIS REPORT HAS JUST BEEN RELEASED. THIS IS JUST RECEIVED NEWS.

THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSOR FORCES HAVE CARRIED OUT A GRAVE MILITARY PROVOCATION AGAIN IN THE PANMUNJOM JOINT SECURITY AREA (JSA).

THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS, WHO HAVE BEEN RUNNING AMUCK TO FIND A PRETEXT FOR PROVOKING WAR BY CARRYING OUT A PREMEDITATED PROVOCATIVE ACT IN THE PANMUNJOM JSA ON 18 AUG, ILLEGALLY INFILTRATED INTO THE JSA MORE THAN 300 FULLY ARMED HOOLIGANS INCLUDING U.S. TROOPS, AT 0710 (2210 GMT) THIS MORNING, AND CARRIED OUT SUCH GRAVE PROVOCATIONS IN SUCCESSION AS RANDOMLY FELLING TREES, DESTROYING OUR POSTS, AND DESTROYING (ROAD BLOCKS) WITH MILITARY TRUCKS.

HOW VICIOUSLY AND RECKLESSLY THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS CARRIED OUT THIS INCIDENT CAN BE CLEARLY SEEN FROM THE FOLLOWING FACT ALONE: THEY KEPT MORE THAN 400 ARMED PERSONNEL READY AT THEIR COMBAT POSITION, ABOUT 400 METERS AWAY FROM THE SCENE OF THE INCIDENT AND DEPLOYED ARMED PERSONNEL IN FIVE LARGE TRUCKS IN THE BACK AND, WORSE, CREATED A MURDEROUS WAR ATMOSPHERE BY MOBILIZING EVEN A HELICOPTER AND COMMANDING THE PROVOCATIVE ACT.

(MORE)

21 AUG 0845Z BR/MC

SENT TO SCOWCROFT
XXX THE PROVOCATIVE ACT.


THIS NOTWITHSTANDING, THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS, FOLLOWING ON THE HEELS OF THE GRAVE PROVOCATION CARRIED OUT ON 13 AUGUST, CARRIED OUT ANOTHER GRAVE LARGE-SCALE MILITARY PROVOCATION IN THE JSA TODAY. THIS CLEARLY SHOWS THAT THE SCOUNDRELS ARE SHAMELESSLY MANEUVERING TO TRAP US INTO THEIR WAR PROVOCATION PLOT BY RESORTING TO EVERY MEANS AND METHOD.

THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS MUST CLEARLY REALIZE WHAT CONSEQUENCES SUCH A PROVOCATIVE ACT WILL BRING TO THEM AND MUST ACT DISCREETLY.

(ENDALL)

21 AUG 0353Z BR/MC
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

TO DIA WASHDC
INFO COMIPAC HONOLULU HI
DA WASHDC

CONFIDENTIAL THIS IS IR 6 855 0383 76

COMIPAC FOR I=221, DA FOR DAMI=FII

1. ROK/NK.
2. EST OF KOREAN SITUATION 21 AUG 76
3. NA
4. 21 AUG 76
5. SEOUL KOREA 21 AUG 76
6. B2
7. RO
8. 6 855 0383 76
9. 21 AUG 76
10. NA
11. INITIATIVE: PG 2440
12. USDAO SEOUL KOREA

* * * * * * * * * * * * WHSR COMMENT * * * * * * * * * * * *

HYLAND, MCFARLANE, LL

RECALLED PAGE 01

TOR: 234/101352
OTG: 2108342 AUG 76

*****CONFIDENTIAL*****COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

mgci-17 #32-05044, S191410 DIA-452 4/24101

by dca NARA Date 2/31101
15. (C) THIS IR PROVIDES THE RO's ESTIMATE OF THE KOREAN
SITUATION FOLLOWING UNC MILITARY OPERATIONS IN JOINT
SECURITY AREA (JSA) ON 21 AUG 76.
(C) THE OPERATION LAUNCHED BY UNC TO REMOVE THE TREE IN
THE JSA HAS ACCOMPLISHED IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER. THE
DETAILS OF THE OPERATION CAN BE OBTAINED FROM THE NMCC,
DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD FROM THE ORIGINAL INCIDENT TO
THIS POINT IN TIME THE KOREAN POPULATION HAS BEEN
CONCERNED, SYMPATHETIC AND COMPLETELY SUPPORTIVE OF UNC
ACTIONS. THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO PANIC. PUBLIC OPINION
SUPPORTS POSITIVE ACTION EVEN AT THE THREAT OF FURTHER
INVOLVEMENT. THE GENERAL PUBLIC CONSIDERS THE NK LEADERSHIP
AS IRRATIONAL, IRRESPONSIBLE AND BRUTAL. THE RO BELIEVES THAT
THE ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE OF THE NK SECURITY FORCE (REF IN 6 856
031776) GOT OUT OF HAND. THE KILLING OF TWO UNC WAS NOT ORDERED
BY THE NK GOVERNMENT, THE NK GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN HAPPIER
WITH A LESS SERIOUS INCIDENT. THE RO ALSO BELIEVES THAT THE
PRC DID NOT APPROVE OF SUCH AN ACTION AND DEMONSTRATED THEIR
NON SUPPORT BY NOT ATTENDING THE MAC MEETING WHEN UNC PRESENTED
THE OFFICIAL CHARGE AGAINST NK. THE RO FEELS THAT THE PRC WOULD
HESITATE TO BECOME SERIOUSLY INVOLVED IN NK WITH THEIR OWN
INTERNAL LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS. RECOVERY OPERATIONS FROM THE
RECENT EARTHQUAKE AND RECENT SUCCESS WITH US IN ESTABLISHING
BETTER RELATIONS, THE KOREAN MILITARY DEMONSTRATED OUTSTANDING
COMMAND AND CONTROL THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD, ALL SERVICES
REACHED THE DESIRED READINESS LEVEL AND WERE FULLY PREPARED TO
EXECUTE ANY DEGREE OF MILITARY ORDERS. ALL PERSONNEL
CONTACTED BY RO, WERE CONFIDENT, ORGANIZED, AND HIGHLY
PROFESSIONAL. IT IS OBVIOUS TO THE RO THAT EXPERIENCE GAINED
IN UFL EXERCISE HAS OF GREAT BENEFIT. THE JSA AND DMZ APPEARS
TO BE STABILIZED AT THE PRESENT AND RO ANTICIPATES NO FURTHER
INCIDENTS BY THE NK'S AT THIS TIME.
868 31 DEC 82.
87
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . Telegram

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . . Secret Service, et al

DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . re Panmunjom Incident

CREATION DATE . . . . . . . 08/21/1976

VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500066

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . HENRY A. KISSINGER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT PARALLEL FILE OF DOCUMENTS OPENED FROM UNPROCESSED COLLECTIONS (National Security Council)

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DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . . 10/01/1993

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

EXEMPTED 11/30/05
HAPTONG CITES SUPPORT FOR GOV'T OVER DMZ INCIDENT

210336 SEOUL HAPTONG IN ENGLISH 0823 GMT 21 AUG 76 OW

(TEXT) SEOUL, AUG. 21 (HAPTONG)--BOTH GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION LAWMAKERS TODAY EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT TO PRESIDENT PAK CHONG-HUI WHO ADVOCATED UNFAILING RETALIATION AGAINST NORTH KOREAN PROVOCATIONS IN THE FUTURE.

PAK, REFERRING TO WEDNESDAY'S BORDER INCIDENT OF HACKING TWO U.S. OFFICERS BY NORTH KOREANS, WARNED FRIDAY THAT ANY COMMUNIST PLOT TO HARASS THE SOUTH WOULD BACKFIRE.

WE WAS FULLY BACKED WHEN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE COMMITTEES OPENED A JOINT HEARING SESSION THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS THE PANMUNJOM INCIDENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS.

HEARING GOVERNMENT REPORTS, THE LAWMAKERS FROM BOTH RULING AND OPPOSITION CAMPS VOICED THAT THE INCIDENT WAS A PREMEDITATED ONE TO INVENT AN EXCUSE FOR THE COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA THAT THE SOUTH IS PREPARING ANOTHER WAR AGAINST THE NORTH.

IT IS ALSO DESIGNED TO TEST U.S. DETERMINATION TO HONOR ITS DEFENSE COMMITMENT TO SOUTH KOREA IN CASE OF EMERGENCY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, THEY SAID.

MEANWHILE, ABOUT 3,000 HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS HELD RALLIES HERE TO DENOUNCE THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNISTS FOR THEIR BRUTALITIES. SCORES OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS ALSO ISSUED STATEMENTS OPPOSING THE COMMUNISTS.

21 AUG 0955Z BR/IM
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ...... National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL .......... Topographical Map
DESCRIPTION ............... re Panmunjom Incident
CREATION DATE ............. 08/1976
VOLUME ..................... 4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500066
COLLECTION TITLE .......... HENRY A. KISSINGER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT PARALLEL FILE OF DOCUMENTS OPENED FROM UNPROCESSED COLLECTIONS (National Security Council)
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DATE WITHDRAWN ........... 10/01/1993
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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . . . . . Diagram

TITLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joint Security Area
DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . Military Armistice Commission
Headquarters Area

CREATION DATE . . . . . . . . 08/1976
VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500066
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . . HENRY A. KISSINGER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT
PARALLEL FILE OF DOCUMENTS OPENED FROM
UNPROCESSED COLLECTIONS (National Security Council)

BOX NUMBER . . . . . . . . . . A1
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . . . . Korea - Operation Paul Bunyan

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . . . 10/01/1993
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL .... National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL ....... Topographical Map

DESCRIPTION ............ 3 maps of area of Panmunjom incident
CREATION DATE .......... 08/1976
VOLUME .................. 3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500066
COLLECTION TITLE ........ HENRY A. KISSINGER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT PARALLEL FILE OF DOCUMENTS OPENED FROM UNPROCESSED COLLECTIONS (National Security Advisors)
BOX NUMBER .............. A1
FOLDER TITLE ............ Korea - Operation Paul Bunyan
DATE WITHDRAWN .......... 10/08/1993
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST ... KBH
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . Topographical Map
DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . Shows intelligence information
CREATION DATE . . . . . . . . 08/1976
VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500066
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . . HENRY A. KISSINGER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT
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BOX NUMBER . . . . . . . . . . A1
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DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . . . 10/08/1993
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . KBH
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . . . . Topographical Map
DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . re Panmunjom Incident
CREATION DATE . . . . . . . . 08/1976
VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . 1 page
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BOX NUMBER . . . . . . . . A1
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . . . . Korea - Operation Paul Bunyan
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . . . 11/09/1993
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . Topographical Map

DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . . . re Panmunjom Incident

CREATION DATE . . . . . . . . . 08/1976?

VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500066
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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . Topographical Map

DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . re Panmunjom Incident

CREATION DATE . . . . . . 08/19/1976

VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . . 027500066
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PARALLEL FILE OF DOCUMENTS OPENED FROM
UNPROCESSED COLLECTIONS (National
Security Advisors)

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<th>ACTION COMPLETED</th>
<th>ACTION IN PROGRESS</th>
<th>PENDING DECISION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. DefCon 3</td>
<td>DefCon 3 Set (JCS 190001Z)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Press Guidance for DefCon 3</td>
<td>Press guidance sent (Joint State/Defense 206129)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Inform other countries of DefCon 3, etc.</td>
<td>SecDef message went to NATO countries instructing that host countries' Ministers of Defence be informed after concurrence US Ambassador. (SecDef 190311Z). JCS informed Canadians directly (JCS 190219Z). State sent message to Embassies in NATO countries to defor action on SECDEF message pending further instructions.</td>
<td>Whether to inform NATO and other countries of DefCon, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. B-52 Deployment</td>
<td>Alert cable sent to SAC for training flights without ordinance (JCS 190010Z).</td>
<td>JCS is working on second option involving ordinance delivery.</td>
<td>Whether to deploy B-52 on training exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>ACTION COMPLETED</td>
<td>ACTION IN PROGRESS</td>
<td>PENDING DECISION</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Deploy Carrier Gp.</td>
<td>Carrier Task Group alerted (JCS 190218Z)</td>
<td>Whether to deploy carrier Task Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Additional deployments to ROK</td>
<td>JCS examining possibilities to present to WSAG</td>
<td>Whether additional deployments should be made</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Punitive military actions</td>
<td>JCS examining possibilities to present to WSAG</td>
<td>Whether punitive actions should be taken</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Notify Pres., Park</td>
<td>General Stilwell saw Pres., Park in advance of receipt of instructions. According to charge (phone) CinCUNC remarks to President were on lines of instruction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Notify Japanese</td>
<td>Embassy Tokyo informed GOJ of precautionary military measures taken (Tokyo 12529-NODIS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
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<td>ACTION IN PROGRESS</td>
<td>PENDING DECISION</td>
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<td>13. MAC meeting 8/19</td>
<td>MAC meeting held from 1600 to 1735 Korea time, N.K. proposed recess. North claimed US started incident and if situation continued, war could break out.</td>
<td>JCS is reviewing Gen Stilwell's proposed plan for completing work in JSA (CinCUNC 182035Z, 181745Z) (JCS 182035Z)</td>
<td>WSAG to make decision on implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Tree trimming</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. War Powers</td>
<td></td>
<td>State/DOD lawyers looking into war powers questions. (Adrich to Habib memo)</td>
<td>Whether we need to inform Congress under War Powers Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. General Consultation with Congress</td>
<td></td>
<td>Habib and McCloskey considering the question</td>
<td>Whether to consult with Congress regardless of decision on War Powers Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Proposed CinCUNC letter to Kim Il Song (CinCUNC 181745Z)</td>
<td>JCS advised Stilwell not to send letter to Kim Il-Song (JCS 190217Z)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>ACTION IN PROGRESS</td>
<td>ACTION COMPLETED</td>
<td>PENDING DECISION</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>18. Further Diplomatic Actions, Soviets, Chinese, etc.</td>
<td>Mr. Habib handling</td>
<td>What further diplomatic action should be taken</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Pictures of incident</td>
<td>Enroute to Washington ETA 1700 Aug 19.</td>
<td>How to exploit these pictures</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>20. Honors for slain officers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Degree of honors and media coverage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Press Guidance on F-4 Deployment</td>
<td>ISA Rep has asked DOD to prepare guidance</td>
<td>When to use it</td>
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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . Briefing Paper

DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . re Panmunjom Incident

CREATION DATE . . . . . . 08/19/1976

VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500066
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . HENRY A. KISSINGER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT
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BOX NUMBER . . . . . . . . . . . A1
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . . . . Korea - Operation Paul Bunyan

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . . 10/01/1993
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . GG
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL .... National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL ......... Topographical Map

DESCRIPTION .............. re Korea
CREATION DATE ............ 07/1976
VOLUME .................... 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID .. 027500066
COLLECTION TITLE ............. HENRY A. KISSINGER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT PARALLEL FILE OF DOCUMENTS OPENED FROM UNPROCESSED COLLECTIONS (National Security Council)

BOX NUMBER ................. A1
FOLDER TITLE ............... Korea - Operation Paul Bunyan

DATE WITHDRAWN ............. 10/01/1993
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST ....... GG
Pak Chong-Hui condemns N. Korean provocation at DMZ

0200341 SEOUL HAPTONG IN ENGLISH 0316 GMT 20 AUG 76 OW

(TEXT) SEOUL, AUG 20 (HAPTONG)--President Pak Chong-Hui, saying "we have no reason just to take North Korean provocations lying down," warned that South Korea would take immediate steps to retaliate North Korea for any and every provocation it dares to commit in the future.

Pak said the North Korean communists had intentionally picked up a fight with the Americans at the border town of Panmunjom Wednesday and had committed the "brutal murders."

This was Pak's first comment on the slaying by a group of North Korean guards of two American army officers at the joint security area of Panmunjom.

Terming the border incident "an act of aggressive provocation," Pak said "we have a limit in our patience in withstanding such a provocation.

"A mad dog needs a stick and so we are going to retaliate North Korea for its future provocations, small and large," Pak declared.

In a message read by Defense Minister So Chong-Chol before the 13th commencement exercise of the Third Military Academy, Pak said the reason why the communists in the North had initiated such a provocation was that they wanted to divert the world attention from their internal political and economic difficulties.

20 AUG 0426Z BR/IM****
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . . . List
CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . . . . Korean WSAG
TITLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Issues for WSAG Consideration
DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . re Panmunjom Incident
CREATION DATE . . . . . . . . 08/1976
VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500066
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . . . . HENRY A. KISSINGER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT
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DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . . . . 10/01/1993
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG
CONFIDENTIAL

UPDATE JSA INCIDENT

1. SUMMARY OF INCIDENT:
A. BASED ON INTERROGATION OF NUMEROUS WITNESSES AND UNC GUARD PERSONNEL INVOLVED, PLUS THE ANALYSIS OF 6X10 PHOTOGRAPHS OBTAINED THUSFAR, THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS PROVIDED:
   (1) THERE IS SOME HISTORICAL BUILDUP TO THIS INCIDENT OF SEVERAL DAYS DURATION. A PLAN WAS MADE BY THE UNC PERSONNEL SEVERAL DAYS AGO TO CHOP THE TREE DOWN. SEVERAL UNARMED KOREAN MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL WENT TO THE AREA, EXAMINED THE TASK, AND DISCUSSED HOW TO BEST ACCOMPLISH THE JOB. SEVERAL KPA GUARDS TOLD THE SE PERSONNEL TO LEAVE THE TREE ALONE. THE DECISION ON 18 AUGUST WAS TO TRIM THE TREE AND KPA PERSONNEL WERE SO INFORMED.
   (2) AT APPROXIMATELY 181030Z, A UNC WORK CREW OF FIVE KOREAN LABORERS, ACCOMPANIED BY THREE UNC OFFICERS (2 U.S., 1 ROK) AND A SFVEN (7) MAN SECURITY FORCE, WAS DISPATCHED TO PRUNE A LARGE TREE VIC UNCP 3 AT BT 956 028. THIS WAS A ROUTINE ACTION NECESSITATED BECAUSE THE TREE OBSCURED OBSERVATION BETWEEN UNC GUARD POST 3 AND OBSERVATION POST 5.
   (3) SHORTLY AFTER ARRIVAL, TWO (2) KPA OFFICERS AND APPROXIMATELY NINE (9) KPA GUARDS ARRIVED IN A TRUCK. ONE (1) KPA OFFICER BEGAN A DISCUSSION WITH THE ROK OFFICER, ASKING WHAT HE WAS DOING.

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY

BY

NLF, DATE 5/17/85
THE ROK OFFICER EXPLAINED THAT THE WORK PARTY WAS PRUNING THE TREE AND DID NOT INTEND TO CUT THE WHOLE TREE DOWN.

THE KPA OFFICER INDICATED THAT THIS WAS "GOOD." WORK CONTINUED FOR 10 TO 15 MINUTES AND SOME KPA PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN TRYING TO INSTRUCT THE UNC WORKERS HOW TO PRUNE THE TREES. ALL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN UNC AND KPA PERSONNEL WERE SPOKEN IN THE KOREAN (HANGUL) LANGUAGE.

(4) AT APPROXIMATELY 1050 HRS, THE KPA CO COMMANDER FOR NO KNOWN REASON TOLD THE UNC OFFICER TO STOP THE WORK.

(5) A SHORT DISCUSSION FOLLOWED AND THE KPA OFFICER THREATENED THE UNC PERSONNEL.

(6) THE UNC CMDR DIRECTED THAT THE WORK CONTINUE SINCE THIS WAS A LEGAL, PEACEFUL MATTER.

(7) THE KPA OFFICER ATTEMPTED TO ORDER THE KOREAN LABORERS TO STOP WORKING.

(8) THE FOL OFFICER, IN CONFERENCE WITH THE U.S. CMDR, INDICATED TO THE KPA THAT WORK WOULD CONTINUE.

(9) THE KPA OFFICER SENT A GUARD ACROSS THE SA CHON BRIDGE, APPARENTLY TO CALL FOR REINFORCEMENTS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, SEVERAL MINUTES) APPROXIMATELY 30 KPA GUARDS WERE ON THE SCENE.

(10) THE KPA OFFICER TOOK HIS WATCH OFF, WRAPPED IT IN A HANDKERCHIEF AND PLACED IT IN HIS POCKET. ANOTHER KPA OFFICER ROLLED UP HIS SLEEVES. CPT BONIFAS WAS OBSERVING THE TREE CUTTING AND DID NOT NOTICE THESE ACTIONS BY THE KPA OFFICERS.

(11) THE KPA OFFICER YELLED "KILL" AND STRUCK CPT BONIFAS KNOCKING HIM TO THE GROUND. FIVE OTHER KPA GUARDS JUMPED ON HIM AND CONTINUED TO BEAT HIM.

(12) IMMEDIATELY, ALL KPA GUARDS ATTACKED THE REMAINING UNC GUARDS BEATING THEM WITH AXE HANDLES AND CLUBS.

(13) ADDITIONALLY, THE KPA GUARDS PICKED UP THE AXES USED BY THE TREE PRUNERS AND ATTACKED UNC GUARDS. UNC WITNESSES OBSERVED KPA GUARDS BEATING CPT BONIFAS WITH THE BLUNT HEAD OF THE AXES WHILE HE WAS ON THE GROUND.

(14) ALL U.S., ROK, AND KATUSA PERSONNEL RECEIVED REPEATED BEATINGS. THE PHOTOGRAPHS CLEARLY REVEAL TWO Instances WHERE SEVEN (7) AND NINE (9) KPA GUARDS WERE CLUSTERED AROUND ONE UNC GUARD AND WERE BEATING THEM WITH AXE HANDLES, CLUBS, FEET AND FISTS.

(15) ADDITIONALLY, THE PHOTOGRAPHS CLEARLY IDENTIFY UNC GUARDS ATTEMPTING TO BREAK CONTACT AND EVACUATE THE AREA OR EXTRICATE OTHER UNC PERSONNEL.
THE ENTIRE ACTION LASTED NO MORE THAN FIVE OR SIX MINUTES.

GOOD CLEAR PHOTOS WERE POSSIBLE BECAUSE, BASED ON HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE, NUMEROUS CAMERAS WITH TELEPHOTO LENSES HAVE BEEN PRE-POSITIONED IN THE UNC OPS AND MOST UNC GUARDS HAVE PERSONAL CAMERAS. MOST PHOTOS WERE TAKEN FROM OP 5 APPROXIMATELY 250-300 METERS FROM THE SCENE.

COMMENT: THE CURRENT UNC/USFK/EUSA POLICY DIRECTIVE REGARDING USE OF FORCE AND FIREARMS BY UNC SECURITY FORCES CLEARLY SPECIFIES THAT:

A. PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE WITHIN THE JSA AREA IS ESSENTIAL.
B. UNC FORCES WILL USE A MINIMUM OF FORCE NECESSARY TO EXTRICATE THEMSELVES; ACTION WILL BE TAKEN TO TERMINATE ANY PHYSICAL INCIDENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
C. MINOR INCIDENTS INITIATED BY KPA/CPV PERSONNEL SUCH AS SHOVING, SPITTING, ETC., ARE TO BE IGNORED.
D. THE DISCHARGING OF FIREARMS IN THE JSA BY MEMBERS OF THE UNC JSF IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED EXCEPT WHEN ORDERED BY THE SECURITY OFFICER ON THE SCENE OR WHEN NECESSARY TO PROTECT UNC PERSONNEL. WEAPONS ARE NOT TO BE USED TO THREATEN OR FRIGHTEN KPA/CPV PERSONNEL.

OVERALL EVALUATION: UNC PERSONNEL REACTED TO A SURPRISE, UNPROVOKED ATTACK WITH RESTRAINT AND SELF-DISCIPLINE. BOTH US OFFICERS WERE STRUCK DOWN ALMOST IMMEDIATELY LEAVING THE FORCE WITHOUT A US OFFICER IN CHARGE. TOTAL TIME OF CONTACT WAS MINIMAL. UNC PERSONNEL WERE OUTNUMBERED 3 TO 1. BOTH UNC AND KPA PERSONNEL WERE ARMED WITH PISTOLS. INDiscriminate USE OF FIREARMS BY BOTH SIDES MAY HAVE PRECIPITATED AN INCIDENT OF GRAVER CONSEQUENCES. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE OF AN ON-THE-SPOT DECISION BY THE KPA TO GAIN A NUMERICAL ADVANTAGE AND ISOLATE THE UNC LEADERS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

GDS 31 DEC 82

#3814
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . . Report

TITLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . Panmunjom Incident, Situation Report as of 0700 Hours, August 19

CREATION DATE . . . . . . 08/19/1976

VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500066

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . HENRY A. KISSINGER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT
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CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . . Joint Chiefs of Staff
RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . . State Department, et al

TITLE . . . . . . . . . . . . General Plan for Completing Work in JSA re Panmunjom Incident

DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . General Plan for Completing Work in JSA re Panmunjom Incident

CREATION DATE . . . . . . . . 08/18/1976

VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . . . . . . 027500066

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WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

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FM COMUSKOREA CO-CC

TO AIC 934
CINC PAC ARMCP

SECRET
NFO/DJR55/3R//SITREP///081//AB OF 191600Z AUG 76

SECRET
SEC 1 OF 2

1. OVERALL ASSESSMENT: AS A RESULT OF THE UNPROVOKED, BRUTAL MURDER OF TWO U.S. OFFICERS DURING THE 18 AUG JSA INCIDENT, CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA DECLARED DEFCON THREE AT 190200Z. ATTAINMENT OF ALL FORCES IS EXPECTED NLT 210200Z. 379TH MAC MEETING TOOK PLACE 190700Z-190835Z AUG. NO VIOLENCE OR UNUSUAL INCIDENTS REPORTED. UNC OPENED MEETING WITH STATEMENT STRONGLY CONDEMNING THE 18 AUG INCIDENT. KPA RESPONDED WITH DISTORTIONS OF FACT AND COMMENCED LONG STATEMENT ALLEGING NUMEROUS UN PROVOCATIONS, VIOLENCE, INTRODUCTION OF ILLEGAL AIRCRAFT, AND MOVEMENT OF AIRCRAFT FROM OKINAWA TO KOREA. UNC REPLIED THAT WE CALLED THE MEETING TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC CHARGES REGARDING THE MURDER OF TWO U.S. PERSONNEL. THE MEETING WAS TERMINATED AFTER SUMMARIES BY BOTH SIDES AND A WARNING BY KPA THAT WAR COULD BREAK OUT AT ANY TIME. AT 190823Z AUG PYONGYANG RADIO STATED THAT THE "KPA SUPREME COMMANDER HAS ORDERED ALL KPA UNITS, ALL PERSONNEL OF THE WORKER-PEASANT MILITIAMEN AND THE RED GUARD YOUTH UNITS TO ENTER INTO WAR POSTURE." GENERAL ASSESSMENT SITUATION IS TENSE AND SERIOUS.

2. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY: AT 190823Z RADIO PYONGYANG, CISING THE "EMERGENCY ALERT OF U.S. ARMY UNITS IN SOUTH KOREA", ANNOUNCED A KPA SUPREME COMMAND ORDER PLACING ALL KPA UNITS AS WELL AS PARAMILITARY RESERVE UNITS, IN A "WAR POSTURE" GROUND

MYLAND, LL

RECALLED PAGE #1

SECRET

PSN1823544
TOR1232/231012 DTG:192200Z AUG 76

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED -E.O. 12358 SEC. 3.8
WITH PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12358 SEC. 1.5

MRB-99 38-050 111 419109

BY DEL. NARA DATE 8/5/109
ACTIVITY DURING THE PERIOD REFLECTED INCREASED VEHICLE AND TRACKED VEHICLE MOVEMENT SIGHTINGS IN THE KAESONG AREA.

A. GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY REMAINED SEASONABLY NORMAL THROUGHOUT THE DAY, COMMENCING IN LATE AFTERNOON, INCREASED VEHICULAR MOVEMENT WAS REPORTED AS A RESULT OF VISUAL AND GSR OBSERVATIONS, IN THE KAESONG AREA AT 1729 H, RADAR DETECTED PIFTY MILITARY PERSONNEL XDZTY TRACKED VEHICLES VICINITY BS 790919; AT 1949, FOUR ZIL-15613S WERE SIGHTED TOWING FOUR 100MM FIELD GUNS VICINITY BS 9309979; AT 2050, TWELVE UNIDENTIFIED TRACKED VEHICLES WERE SIGHTED VICINITY BT 991988 MOVING EAST AND, AT 2051, TWELVE UNIDENTIFIED VEHICLES MOVING SOUTHWEST VICINITY BT 982955.

THOUGH UNUSUAL, THE INCREASED ACTIVITY MIGHT REASONABLY BE EXPECTED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE "WAR POSTURE" ORDERED BY THE KPA SUPREME COMMAND EARLIER TODAY.

B. NAVAL (S/NF) NORTH KOREAN NAVY (NKN) ACTIVITY HAS BEEN NORMAL DURING THE PAST 24 HOURS, NO UNUSUAL DEPLOYMENTS OR FORCE BUILD-UP HAS BEEN DETECTED OFF EITHER COAST.

C. AIR (S/NF) NORTH KOREAN AIR FORCE (NKAF) FLIGHT ACTIVITY HAS CONDUCTED WITH THE ONLY FLYING REFLECTED BEING CIVIL AIR BUREAU LIMITS CONDUCTING DOMESTIC FLIGHTS, VERY POOR FLYING WEATHER IN NORTH KOREA DURING ENTIRE PERIOD, IT WAS REPORTED THE BEGINNING AT APPROXIMATELY 1730...
**C. AIR**

(1) FORCE GENERATION POSTURE IS AS FOLLOWS:

**(A) USAF**

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<td>4/F4E</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSAN</td>
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<td>OSAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>KUNSAN</td>
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**(B) ROKAF AIR DEFENSE**

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**(C) ROKAF AIR TO GROUND**

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EYES ON
CORRECTED COPY
DESTROY ALL OTHERS

19 Aug 76 15 57

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12333 Sec. 3(a)

Mr. Habib - State Dept.
Mr. Clements - Depsecdef

Mr. Hyland - National Sec.
DDO(NMCC)
J-3
DJS
CJCS(Gen Smith)
Service Chiefs
Dr. Dia

EYES ON

ZCZCKTA6899
ZTTZYIY YAIARA 0336 2321452-MHSW-YKDKA.
ZNY MMNSH
Z 191450Z AUG 76 ZYH ZFF-3/6 ZZS
FM GEN STILLWELL CINCUNC KOREA
TO VADM HANNIFIN DIR J5 OJCS WASHINGTON
INFO ADM GAYLER CINCPAC HAWAII

SUBJ: JSA INCIDENT (C)

REF: A; CINCUNC 1618222 AUG 76;
B; CINCUNC 1617452 AUG 76;
C; CINCUNC 1620352 AUG 76;
D; TELECON BETWEEN ADM HOLLOWAY, CNO AND GEN STILLWELL, CINCUNC
E; J5206555, 192217Z AUG 76

1. (S) PARA 2C OF REF E REQUESTS DETAILS OF PRELIMINARY PLAN TO
   REMOVE PRUNE THE TREE IN VICINITY OF GUARD POST NO 3; ROUGH PLAN IS
   OUTLINED BELOW.

2. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:
   A. ONE TASK FORCE WILL ENTER JOINT SECURITY AREA AT H-HOUR
   TO FELL TREE AND SIMULTANEOUSLY DEMOLISH TWO KPA INSTALLED
   DROP BARRIERS WHICH IMPED FREE CIRCULATION WITHIN THE AREA.
   B. THE WORK WILL INITIATE WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE TO THE KPA
   ALTHOUGH NOTICE OF OUR INTENTIONS WILL BE COMMUNICATED SHORTLY
   AFTER THE WORK HAS INITIATED;
   C. WORK WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY SKILLED US ENGINEER PERSONNEL
   SUPPORTED BY A PREDOMINANTLY ROK NATIONAL FORCE
   (50-60 STRONG) WITHOUT
   FIRE ARMS.
   D. DURATION OF OPERATION: APPROXIMATELY 45 MINUTES;
   E. D-DAY: NOT EARLIER THAN 21 AUGUST,
   F. H-HOUR CINCUC 0722-0730

3. AS THE FOREGOING MAKES EVIDENT, I HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION
   THAT THE ADVANTAGES OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION ARE OUTWEIGHTED BY THE DIS-
   ADVANTAGES, AND PRIMARILY BECAUSE THE KPA WOULD HAVE SCOPE, IF THEY
   DECIDED TO UTILIZE IT, TO FRUSTRATE OUR OBJECTIVE BY PASSIVE MEANS;
   SECONDLY, I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE ODDS ARE IN FAVOR OF KPA NOT
   DELIBERATELY REPEAT DELIBERATELY OPENING FIRE; THIRDLY, I HAVE OPTED
   FOR PRESIDENT PARK'S BASIC CONCEPT AND HAVE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF HIS
   OFFER TO PROVIDE THE 57 TOUGHEST AND MOST EXPERIENCE TAEKDOWN SPECIALISTS
   AVAILABLE, THE ROK SPECIAL FORCES WILL BECOME KATUSA OVERNIGHT AND
   seconded to my security group.

4. WE BANK HEAVILY ON SURPRISE AND HAVE PICKED THE EARLY MORNING
   HOUR BECAUSE THAT IS THE TIME THAT GUARD DETAILS CHANGE AND THERE IS
   CONSIDERABLE VEHICULAR ACTIVITY DAILY. A 2-1/2 TON TRUCK PROCEEDS TO
   CHECK POINT 3 AT APPROXIMATELY 0730 DAILY WITH PERSONNEL FOR THAT
   POST AND HABITUALLY REMAINS THERE UNTIL THE POST IS EVACUATED AT DARK-
   FALL. ON D-DAY THE TRUCK WOULD BE FILLED WITH HALF OF THE BASIC FORCES
   REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE TREE OPERATION; THE REMAINDER OF THE FORCE

Sent to Scannanot
Hyland
Matheny
would come by. The same means a few minutes later, if it was determined that surprise had been lost and the tree was surrounded by KPA, we would then have the option of bringing the first truck back and then extending the operation - or pressing on, if the operation went forward, one truck would be positioned to block KPA reinforcements moving across the bridge of no return by vehicle.

5. The destruction of the two road barriers is, of course, a new starter. Those road blocks consist of two heavy, manually operated barriers erected some time ago over our objections. They have been used from time to time to damage our vehicles and inhibit our movement; they are so located as to make KPA protection thereof relatively more difficult and can be disposed of readily by track or wheeled vehicle with bulldozer blade. I strongly recommend they be added to the package; they are in clear violation of the rules and change our operation from one of simple reaction.

6. I desire to have the flexibility to fell the tree either by sawing or by demolition (C-4); determination of which method will hinge on whether I have powerful enough saws to do the job in 30 minutes or less. The demolition method is faster but it does carry some additional risk by reason of violence of explosion.

7. As to back-up forces:

A. The authorized 35-man armed security force will be positioned a short distance away as immediate reserve.

B. One infantry company of the 20th US Division will be positioned close to the JSA, armed with clubs only; their weapons in nearby trucks;

C. One ROK infantry company will also be positioned near the JSA and deployed with organic weapons. In contrast to the US company, its contingent mission will be to move into overwatching positions and provide covering fires should shooting start;

D. One rifle company (ROK or US) would be launched at 4-hour in helicopters (UH-1H) and orbit vicinity of the southern trace of the DMZ, being visible and audible to personnel in JSA, we believe that the air-mobile unit would distract and concern the KPA, thus constituting a good deterrent to escalation.

E. A tank/infantry battalion tf (2 tank/1 mech infantry companies) will be positioned south of the imjin and deployed to the southern trace of the DMZ, beginning at 4-hour.

F. Artillery will be prepared to support the operation, if battle should erupt, in 8/9 battalion strength; air ops and ground artillery fos will be in place.

G. The 1 corps (ROK/US) group will be brought to defense 2;

8. Control of escalation is the out question:

A. If we are correct in our assumption that KPA will not deliberately fire on us to stop the work, the problem is manageable, should the KPA muster enough force to achieve the upper hand over our KATUSA (read special forces) I would bring in the US rifle company with clubs to cover the withdrawal of the ROK specialists. My expectation would be that the tree would then have been felled and the road barriers demolished;

B. We may, of course, be dead wrong about the KPA reaction, we have no firm evidence on which to judge whether the 18
AUGUST INCIDENT WAS DELIBERATELY ENGINEERED BY NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP WITH THE INTENT OF PROVOKING A CONFLICT OF WHETHER IT WAS A SPONTANEOUS, LOW-LEVEL OVER-REACTION, GIVEN THE BEHAVIOR PATTERN OF NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP THE FORMER CANNOT BE DISCOUNTED; ON THE OTHER HAND, THE NORTH'S AGREEMENT TO ATTEND TODAY'S MAC MEETING (WHEN THEY COULD WELL HAVE USED DELAYING TACTICS) AND ITS OBVIOUS DESIRE TO GET THE MEETING OVER WITH QUICKLY, SUGGESTS THE LATTER, OUR ROX COLLEAGUES ARE PERSUADED THAT KPA WILL NOT RESORT TO SHOOTING WITHIN THE JSA PROPER.

1. WE CANNOT FORESEE ALL THE WAYS IN WHICH THE KPA MIGHT EMPLOY DEADLY FIRES OR THE VARIETY OF ENDS KPA MIGHT SEEK TO ACHIEVE ONCE FIRE WAS OPEN; THERE ARE TWO EXTREMES:
(1) THE FIRST IS THAT THE KPA FORCES DEPLOYED TO CONTEST OUR OPERATION MIGHT REVERT TO THE USE OF THEIR REVOLVERS IN SELF-DEFENSE; IN THAT KIND OF MELEE OUR LOGICAL RIPOSTE IS MORTAR AND ARTILLERY FIRE ON KNOWN OR SUSPECTED NORTH KOREAN INSTALLATIONS JUST OUTSIDE THE JSA FOR SO LONG AS NECESSARY TO EXTRICATE OUR ELEMENTS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE OPERATION;
(2) THE OTHER EXTREME IS A CONCERTED GROUND ATTACK WITH THE INTENT OF OVERRUNNING THE JSA, WE WOULD, IN MY ESTIMATE, BE ILL-ADVISED TO CONTEST THE KPA ON THE GROUND; IN THIS SPECIFIC AREA; IN THIS EVENTUALITY, I WOULD PROPOSE EMPLOYING THE ROXALS BACK UP FORCES TO COVER THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL OUR ELEMENTS FROM THE JSA WHILE DELIVERING HEAVY ARTILLERY FIRES ON KPA TARGETS OUTSIDE THE JSA; THE FORCE BALANCE IN THAT IMMEDIATE AREA MAKES THIS COURSE PRUDENT;

2. TO BE SURE, WE WOULD LOSE THE JSA (AT LEAST TEMPORARILY) BUT WE WOULD THEN HAVE TO BE READY FOR FAR MORE IMPORTANT ACTIONS.

D. IN BETWEEN THE TWO EXTREMES ARE A LEGION OF POSSIBILITIES WHICH COULD MAKE PRECISE CONTROL OF ESCALATION DIFFICULT TO MANAGE; WE WILL NEED GOOD LOCAL COMMUNICATIONS, COOL HEADS AND THOROUGH UNDERSTANDING OF THE MISSION, THAT MISSION IS TO ACCOMPLISH THE REMOVAL OF THE OBSTRUCTIONS WITHOUT A SHOOTING BATTLE ENSUING, AND SHOULD THE OTHER SIDE START SHOOTING, THE MISSION BECOMES ONE OF RAPID EXTRICATION OF OUR FORCES FROM CLOSE CONTACT, PELING PRIMARILY ON ARTILLERY COVERING FIRES.

9. I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE OPERATION SHOULD GO FORWARD. RECOGNIZING THAT THIS OUTLINE PLAN HAS BEEN PUT TOGETHER UNDER FORCED DRAFT, I HOPE THAT WE WILL HAVE THE FLEXIBILITY TO MAKE CHANGES OF DETAIL WHILE ADHERING TO THE CONCEPT,

GDS, 94

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT.

ZCS DUE TO CORRECTIONS OF SPELLING OF TEXT: 2056

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