

The original documents are located in Box 10, folder “Korea - North Korean Tree Incident, 8/18/76 (1)” of the Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974-77 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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~~TOP SECRET~~JCS ASSESSMENT

1. In accordance with SecState guidance, we have examined the desirability of directing US/ROK artillery fire against the NKA MAC security force barracks coincident with H-Hour (cutting down the tree), and the JCS are forced to recommend against the use of artillery fire in connection with H-Hour in the strongest terms for the following reasons:

- a. At H-Hour, the tree cutting detail and their 60 defenders will be fully exposed and absolutely vulnerable to NKA retaliatory artillery fire directed in reaction to the US initiated fire attack on the barracks.
- b. A US/ROK artillery attack directed against the barracks in reaction to NKA initiated artillery fire, would appear to serve no useful purpose, as the barracks would probably not be occupied under these conditions. The commander's proposal to have US/ROK artillery as backup during H-Hour operations for counter-battery fire, is more militarily sound, and would accomplish the same end objectives. If an extensive exchange of artillery were to occur, the MAC security force barracks could be included among the counter-battery targets, but it would appear that the significance of this targeting would be lost in the overall exchange of fire and resultant damage.

2. Therefore the JCS do not support the US/ROK command initiating artillery fire against the barracks either separately or in conjunction with H-Hour, because of the gross superiority of NKA artillery, and the exposed position of the US/ROK ground forces engaged in the tree felling. The JCS do agree with CINUNC's proposal to alert artillery for support, if necessary, of the ground forces, including counter battery fire.

3. As an alternative to the US/ROK initiation of artillery fire across the DMZ in retaliation for the murder of the two USA officers, the JCS are developing a range of alternative options which would use precision guided air munitions, surface-to-surface missiles, and unconventional warfare (SEAL) teams to destroy North Korean installations of military or infrastructure significance. These plans are under development and are conceived as follow-on efforts to the tree felling action depending upon the post H-Hour developments.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR 94-42, #20 6450 H. 4/1/94

By UBH NARA, Date 5/16/94

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.


MR 94-42 #22 OASD Mr. 4/1/94

By 168H NARA, Date 5/16/94

ADDENDUM:

1. In response to SECSTATE query, the JCS have investigated the requirements for and desirability of destroying the "bridge of no return."
2. This could be done by artillery fire, demolition charges, or air delivered precision guided munitions.
 - a. Artillery fire would be most straightforward but would invite counterbattery fire.
 - b. Demolition charges could be placed in a vehicle which would then be driven on to the bridge and the charges detonated after crew had retired to safe distance. Such action could result in crew drawing hostile fire or being blown up in truck.
 - c. Laser guided bombs or WALLEYE weapons could be used on the bridge. Laser designation could be accomplished from local ground position. Precision guided munitions could be released without aircraft crossing DMZ, but aircraft would be in NKA SAM envelope. Disadvantages of this approach would be if precision guided munition did not guide on first run (.5 to .8 reliability could be expected), bomb would be out of control, miss target and could damage non-NKA installations and cause casualties to friendly personnel as well as requiring reattack.
2. The JCS recommend in strongest terms that none of the foregoing methods be used to destroy the "bridge of no return" in conjunction with H-hour as it would most probably precipitate a fire attack from the NKA on the exposed

~~TOP SECRET~~



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and vulnerable tree cutting detail and their protective force. Furthermore it is doubtful, in our judgment* that ROK President Park would agree to blowing the bridge in conjunction with H-hour in view of his strong feelings against the use of firearms in the tree cutting effort, and the obvious danger to the exposed ROK forces supporting the tree detail.



~~SECRET~~

MR. HYLAND *White House*

DESTRUCTION OF KOREAN PEOPLES ARMY
BORDER GUARD BARRACK LOCATED IN JOINT SECURITY AREA

GENERAL. This concept provides for neutralization of the Korean Peoples Army (KPA) Border Guard barracks located in the DMZ in the vicinity of UTM BT 937043.

TARGET DESCRIPTION.

1. Following information is based on personal observation of DIA analyst formerly stationed in the Republic of Korea.

2. Kaesong Army Barracks consisting of about thirteen buildings, including barracks, mess hall and administrative support buildings located 1.7 miles from JSA.

FORCES AVAILABLE. There is sufficient US artillery in Korea to fire the mission. There is a 105 battery in a surveyed position on the DMZ that could fire the mission. Any other unit must displace to a new firing position with 6-8 hours reaction time. A minimum of three rounds must be fired for registration.

<u>MAX RANGE</u>	<u>2/3 MAX RANGE</u> (data based on)	<u>DEFLECTION</u> <u>ERROR</u>	<u>RANGE</u> <u>ERROR</u>	<u>BURSTING</u> <u>RADIUS</u>	<u>#ROUNDS</u> <u>TO DESTROY</u>
105mm 11.5 KM	8 KM	2M	14M	15M	100+
155mm 14.6 KM	10 KM	3M	37M	25M	75
8 IN 16.8 KM	11 KM	3M	23M	40M	36

The most optimum artillery weapon to be employed on this mission is the 8 IN HOWITZER.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. COMUSKOREA, using US resources will attack the KPA Border Guard barrack using tube artillery with conventional and improved conventional munitions.

ENEMY FORCES. The KPA has a predominance of artillery in firing position in the vicinity of the objective area ranging from 90mm to 203mm (8 IN). Estimate is at least a 4:1 ratio in favor of the enemy.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

MR 94-38 #21 OSD Ht. 5/23/95

By ICG H NARA, Date 6/13/95



448
~~SECRET~~

FLASH

CS WASH
CINCUNC SEOUL KOREA
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NB
INFO CSA WASH DC
CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
SAF YOKOTA AB JAPAN
14 AIRDIV OSAN AB KOREA
WHITE HOUSE WASH DC
SECSTATE WASH DC
SECDEF WASH DC
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOREA
CSA WASH DC
CNO WASH DC
CPO WASH DC
COMUSFOR JAPAN
15 TFWG KADENA AB JAPAN
17 TFW KUNSAN AB KOREA
11 COMVPO OSAN AB KOREA
MEMB SEOUL KOREA
MEMB TOKYO JAPAN
14D ANDERSEN AFB GUAM
15 SW ANDERSEN AFB GUAM
17 9 ICEVG OSAN AB KOREA
17STR CJCS OJS SJCS J3 J4 J5 ASD:ISA ASD:PA NMCC DOCDIV
~~SECRET~~

CJCS SENDS

SUBJ: MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOREA (S)


REF: CINCUNC KOREA 191450Z AUG 76 (NOTAL)

(U) THIS IS AN EXECUTE MESSAGE.

(TS) FOR CINCUNC:

YOUR PLAN OF OPERATIONS PROVIDED BY CINCUNC 191450Z AUG 76 (NOTAL)

IS APPROVED FOR IMPLEMENTATION.



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

MR 94-42, #23, OASD Ltr. 9/1/94

By KBH NARA Date 5/16/94

OL H. L. DAVISSON, USA
DD J3 EXT 52548/LA

2- 3
D. OPERATIONS TO CUT DOWN, NOT REPEAT NOT PRUNE, THE TREE WILL
COMMENCE AT ABOUT 202200Z AUG 76.

E. OPERATIONS GUIDANCE:

- (1) OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED QUICKLY AND AGGRESSIVELY.
- (2) PLAN OF OPERATIONS PROVIDED BY CINCUNC 191450Z AUG 76 APPLIES.

REMOVAL OF TWO KPA INSTALLED DROP BARRIERS IS AUTHORIZED UNLESS SUCH
ACTION WOULD DELAY THE MISSION OR ADD TO THE RISK.

F. (TS) FOR CINCPAC:

- A. PROVIDE CINCUNC US FORCES AS NECESSARY IN SUPPORT OF
CINCUNC 191450Z AUG 76.


B. DIRECT COMUSFK TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM PROTECTION TO SAC B-52 SORTIES
TO INCLUDE CAP. PARAGRAPH 4, BELOW.

G. (TS) FOR CINCSAC:

- A. CONDUCT B-52D KOREAN TRAINING SORTIES AT THE RATE OF ONE CELL
PER DAY FOR FIVE DAYS.

B. MISSIONS WILL BE FLOWN AS PLANNED IN SAC 190600Z AUG 76 EXCEPT,
ON THE FIRST DAY, ALL RUNS WILL BE AT MEDIUM OR HIGH ALTITUDE.

C. INITIAL MISSION SHOULD BE LAUNCHED SO AS TO ENSURE CELL ARRIVAL
AT THE IP FOR THE FIRST RUN AT 202130Z AUG 76. RANDOM TOTS ARE
AUTHORIZED ON SUCCEEDING DAYS MISSIONS.



3 3

ALL TURNS OFF THE RBS WILL BE TO THE SOUTH AS PLANNED.

DIRECT COORDINATION WITH THE 314AD IS AUTHORIZED.

(U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY PARAGRAPH 6, JCS 190404Z

76 APPLIES. XGDS



Dear Mrs. Barrett:

I was deeply saddened by the report of the death of your husband, First Lieutenant Mark T. Barrett, United States Army, while serving in Korea.

In this time of your bereavement, no words of condolence are really adequate. I believe you can be proud that your husband was actively serving his country in a position of leadership at the time of his death. He was contributing directly to the cause of freedom our country represents throughout the world.

Mrs. Ford joins with me in sending our heartfelt sympathy in this hour of grief.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

Mrs. Mark T. Barrett
3773-C Gilmer Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29207



1414
PRECEDENCE

Unclass
CLASSIFICATION

FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY

FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM/TOSCO 81

TO: MCFARLANE FOR GENERAL SQUADROFT

DEX _____

DAC 147

GPS _____

LDX _____

PAGES 8

TTY _____

CITE _____

INFO:

DTG: 19 02 38 Z

RELEASED BY:

DN

TOR: 19 02 50 Z

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

TOSCO 81

RECEIVED

1976 AUG 18 PM 11:02

1976 JUL 19 02 38



August 18, 1976

TO: BUD MC FARLANE

FROM: JOHN MATHENY

Attached are DOD drafts of Presidential letters of condolence. Elmer Brooks advised that after consultation with the Adjutant General of the Army, Defense recommends similar letters be sent to each set of survivors, i.e., different letters to spouse and parents but similar letters for each spouse and each set of parents. In fact, they aren't much different within the same family -- so I have included a suggested re-draft of the letter to the parents.



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

18 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Draft Communications to the Next of Kin of Officers
Killed in Korea

Attached are draft communications to the next of kin of the
U.S. Army officers who were killed in the Korean DMZ on 18
August 1976.

As of 1730 hours on 18 August 1976, the parents of both officers
and the wife of Captain Bonifas had been notified personally.
However, the wife of 1st Lt. Barrett had not been contacted and
notified. Consequently, we recommend that communications from
the White House to 1st Lt. Barrett's family be withheld until
official notification of the spouse has been made by the Depart-
ment of the Army. We will inform you by telephone as soon as
that has been done.

M. Staser Holcomb
Rear Admiral, USN
Military Assistant

Attachments - 4
a/s



Dear Mrs. Barrett:

I was deeply saddened to learn of the death of your son, First Lieutenant Mark T. Barratt, United States Army.

I know at this time of bereavement words alone cannot provide solace; however, you can be justly proud of your son's service to his country. He contributed directly to maintaining the freedom our country supports throughout the world.

Mrs. Ford joins with me in sending our heartfelt sympathy in this hour of grief.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

Mrs. Helen Barrett
6667 Almond Avenue
Jacksonville, Florida 32210



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 05974

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Report

DESCRIPTION Situation report, 1800 hours

CREATION DATE 08/19/1976

VOLUME 5 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500064

COLLECTION TITLE HENRY A. KISSINGER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT
PARALLEL FILE OF DOCUMENTS OPENED FROM
UNPROCESSED COLLECTIONS (National
Security Advisors)

BOX NUMBER A1

FOLDER TITLE Korea - North Korean Tree Incident,
8/18/76 (1)-(3)

DATE WITHDRAWN 10/08/1993

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST KBH

EXEMPTED

4/14/0



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 05823

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Memorandum

TITLE Korean Task Force

DESCRIPTION re task force created in support of DCI

CREATION DATE 08/19/1976

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500064

COLLECTION TITLE HENRY A. KISSINGER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT
PARALLEL FILE OF DOCUMENTS OPENED FROM
UNPROCESSED COLLECTIONS (National
Security Council)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/29/1993

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 05975

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram

DESCRIPTION Intelligence report

CREATION DATE 08/19/1976

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500064

COLLECTION TITLE HENRY A. KISSINGER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT
PARALLEL FILE OF DOCUMENTS OPENED FROM
UNPROCESSED COLLECTIONS (National
Security Advisors)

BOX NUMBER A1

FOLDER TITLE Korea - North Korean Tree Incident,
8/18/76 (1)-(3)

DATE WITHDRAWN 10/08/1993

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST KBH

EXEMPTED

4/14/11



8

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PANMUNJOM INCIDENT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines, State Unit 7/62

By KSH, NARA, Date 10/2/02

Situation Report as of 0700 Hours, August 19

U.S. Military Moves

Defcon 3 has been established in the ROK and the order has been given for the deployment of the F-4 squadron from Kadena to South Korea (Taegu). The ETA of the F-4's in Korea is 0700 EDT. A warning has gone out from JCS on preparing for the possible movement of the Midway, the F-111's and the B-52's.

North Korean Actions

Radio Pyongyang announced at 0320 that military units had been put on a war footing. The announcement said that U.S. forces in South Korea had been put on an emergency alert and that "faced with this reckless war clamor," NK military units and militia forces have been ordered to "enter into war posture." The announcement stated "we will not provoke others first but we will never tolerate the enemy's provoking us."



Park-Stilwell Conversation

On the basis of a telecon with the Acting CJCS, General Stilwell discussed the Defcon 3 move and the F-4 deployment with President Park and Minister of Defense Suh before receiving the cabled instructions. Park termed the North Korean incident "beyond human reason" and said that the situation was sufficiently grave to demand more than a protest. He viewed the move to Defcon 3 and the F-4 deployment as appropriate. He urged that the strongest possible protest be issued, together with a demand for reparations. At the same time he called for the deliberate development of appropriate counteraction which would not play into North Korean hands. He said we should teach the North Koreans a lesson but without the use of arms. Park questioned the value of a show of force, noting that deployments after the Pueblo incident did not deter the North Koreans from shooting down the EC-121.

General Stilwell observed that it was essential to complete the tree-pruning operation, to which Park agreed. Park offered ROK specialists in judo and karate to assist in this operation. He suggested that we proceed deliberately

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operation to ensure we will be certain of the NK reaction and do not have to use firearms. We informed Embassy Seoul and CINCUNC that General Stilwell should get to President Park the information about the possible moves under consideration (F-111, B-52's, Midway) and have been informed by telephone that this has been done.

Discussion with GOJ

Embassy Tokyo informed American Affairs Director General Yamazaki in the Foreign Office of Defcon 3 and the move of F-4's from Kadana to South Korea. Yamazaki expressed appreciation for the timely notification. He asked whether the GOJ could confirm publicly that it been informed of the F-4 deployment in advance if this move comes to public attention. We have instructed the Embassy to request the Japanese not to discuss the move publicly in the absence of any public acknowledgement by the USG of the deployment.

Informing Other Countries of Defcon 3

As a result of standing, computerized procedures triggered when there is a change of Defcon, DOD sent out instructions to NATO posts instructing the chief US military representative in each country to inform the Minister of Defense about the move to Defcon 3 in South Korea upon authorization by the Chief of Mission. On the basis of Op Center discussions with Eagleburger, we sent a subsequent message to all concerned posts instructing that such authorization not be given for the time being. The DOD message did go, however, directly to the Canadians. Thus, as far as we know, the Koreans, Japanese, and Canadians are the only ones who have been officially informed of the Defcon 3 move.

Military Armistice Commission Meeting

Embassy Seoul informed us by phone that a MAC meeting was concluded at 0430 ETD. The North Korean side accused us of provoking the incident and claimed that some of their men had been injured. They presented photos purporting to prove these points. They charged that the US was raising tensions in the area and said war could break out if this continued. A cable report on the meeting is being prepared by CINCUNC. The atmosphere at the Joint Security Area has been normal.

Media Coverage

AFP reported from Seoul that US forces had gone on "full alert." The report was apparently based on the Armed Forces Korea Network announcement cancelling all military leaves.

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ROK press gave wide coverage to the Panmunjom incident, urging that the US make a tough response to Pyongyang's provocation. One newspaper commentary speculated that the incident was an attempt to lay the groundwork for direct US-North Korean contacts. A government newspaper, on the other hand, suggested that incident was aimed at having the US public call for a troop pull-out; the newspaper commented, "We are gravely concerned about the UNC reaction."

US network TV gave considerable coverage to the incident on the evening of August 18.

No other media coverage available at this time.

UN and Colombo Connection

At the UN, a meeting of potential additional co-sponsors of the friendly resolution was held August 18. Attendance was good. We are supporting the effort with approaches in various capitals. Embassy/CINCUNC has been asked to prepare a report on the JSA incident for the Security Council. We have no indication as yet that the incident will affect our UN position.

The non-aligned meeting in Colombo has not yet completed its consideration of the Korea question and we have no indication the JSA incident has had any effect on the attitudes at Colombo

S/S	DOD via LDX
S-3	WH "
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FBIS 07

Hyland, LL

ROK POLITICAL PARTIES SHOCKED, INDIGNANT OVER DMZ KILLINGS

OW190153Y SEUL HAPTONG IN ENGLISH 0056 GMT 19 AUG 76 OW

(TEXT) SEOUL, AUG 19 (HAPTONG)--SPOKESMEN FOR THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION PARTIES ALIKE TODAY EXPRESSED DEEP SHOCK AND INDIGNATION AT THE BRUTAL MURDERING OF TWO U.S. OFFICERS BY NORTH KOREAN GUARDS IN THE JOINT SECURITY AREA OF THE TRUCE VILLAGE OF PANMUNJOM WEDNESDAY MORNING.

REP YI CHONG-SIK, SPOKESMAN FOR THE PRO-GOVERNMENT PARLIAMENTARY GROUP YUJONGHCE, CHARGED THAT THE BRUTAL MURDERING BY NORTH KOREANS WAS APPARENTLY MOTIVATED POLITICALLY TO AIM AT THE FORTHCOMING U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN NOVEMBER.

YI SAID THE RECENT SERIES OF PROVOCATIONS BY THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNISTS ALONG WITH THEIR UNFOUNDED CLAIM ABOUT THE THREAT OF SOUTH KOREA'S NORTHWARD INVASION SHOWED THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAVE BEEN IN DEEP TROUBLE AT HOME, WHICH COMPELLED THEM TO MAKE PROVOCATIONS ON THE SOUTH TO DIVERT WORLD ATTENTION.

REP YI CHUNG-HWAN, ACTING PRESIDENT OF THE OPPOSITION NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY, SAID THE NORTH KOREAN BARBARITY ONCE AGAIN SHOWED CLEARLY THE "BEASTLY AND BELLIGERENT NATURE" OF THE COMMUNIST REGIME.

THE OPPOSITION LEADER STRONGLY URGED THE KOREAN AND U.S. MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO TAKE RESOLUTE ACTIONS TO COUNTER AND PUNISH THE BARBAROUS ACTS BY THE NORTH KOREANS SO AS TO PREVENT THE RECURRENCE OF SUCH INCIDENTS.

19 AUG 0300Z DEH/GFE



Priority
PRECEDENCE

Confidential
CLASSIFICATION

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FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM/TOSCOO 76 //

MC FARLANE FOR GENERAL SQUACROFT

INFO:

RELEASED BY:
DN

DEX _____

DAC 142

GPS _____

LDX 1976 JUL 19 01

PAGES 2

TTY _____

CITE _____

DTG: 19 01 32 Z

TOR: 19 01 36 Z

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

TOSCOO 76



76 JUL 18 PM 9 44

CONFIDENTIAL

August 18, 1976

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: BILL HYLAND *weh*

Attached is the press guidance that will be used by State, Defense,
etc., if asked this evening.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/92, State Dept. Guidelines
By KBH, NARA, Date 3/6/01

Press Guidance (in response to question only)

Q: Are we taking any military actions in response to the North Korean attack in the Joint Security Area.

A: We have taken the precautionary move of increasing the readiness status of the forces in ^{South Korea} ~~the area~~. This increased alert status has been taken in view of the unprovoked and premeditated assault which occurred in the Joint Security Area and resulted in the murder of two US officers and the injury of US and Korean personnel.

Q: Are we making any force changes in Korea? What other measures have been taken or are contemplated?

A: We cannot discuss any other measures that may be taken.



FBIS 33*****

Hyland, CC

BULLETIN

PYONGYANG RADIO: KPA UNITS ON WAR POSTURE

OW190329 FOR YOUR INFORMATION

PYONGYANG DOMESTIC SERVICE AT 0823 GMT ON 19 AUG
REPORTS A KPA SUPREME COMMAND ORDER FOR ALL KPA
PERSONNEL AND OTHER UNITS TO PUT THEMSELVES ON A WAR
POSTURE.

DETAILS AS AVAILABLE.

19 AUG 0339Z BR/TM*****



APB134

104

KOREA (TOPS)

Hyland, LL

(PANMUNJOM, KOREA) -- THE UNITED STATES WARNED NORTH KOREA TODAY THAT THE SLAYING OF TWO AMERICAN OFFICERS IN THE TRUCE VILLAGE OF PANMUNJOM ''JEOPARDIZED THE ENTIRE FRAMEWORK'' OF THE KOREAN ARMISTICE. THE WARNING COMES IN A LETTER TO NORTH KOREAN PRESIDENT KIM IL-SUNG FROM GENERAL RICHARD STILWELL, THE AMERICAN HEAD OF THE UNITED NATIONS KOREAN COMMAND. GENERAL STILWELL ALSO SAYS THAT NEVER BEFORE IN THE 23 YEARS SINCE THE CEASE-FIRE WAS FORMALLY SIGNED HAS THERE BEEN THE OUTRIGHT AND BRUTAL MURDER OF JOINT SECURITY AREA SECURITY FORCE PERSONNEL.'' THE LETTER WAS READ AT AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION IN THE TRUCE VILLAGE ABOUT 300 YARDS FROM THE SPOT AT WHICH THE UNITED STATES CHARGED NORTH KOREAN GUARDS ''BRUTALLY MURDERED'' THE TWO AMERICAN OFFICERS.

07:09AED 08-19-76

APB135

105



NEWS CONFERENCE

#564

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON NESSEN

AT 11:10 A.M. CDT

AUGUST 18, 1975

WEDNESDAY

(Kansas City, Missouri)

MR. NESSEN: Let me, first of all, tell you two things that are somewhat unrelated to the Convention.

I think some of you know that Senator Jake Garn's wife was killed in a car crash.

Q Who?

MR. NESSEN: Senator Jake Garn, of Utah. His wife was killed in a car crash. The President sent a telegram of condolence and sent flowers to Senator Garn and about 30 minutes ago, telephoned Senator Garn and reached him in Bloomfield, Colorado, to express his condolences. Senator Garn's wife's name was Hazel and she was killed in a car wreck in Nebraska the day before yesterday, I believe.



The other matter has to do with a story you may have seen on the wires, or heard, concerning the death of two American officers around Panmunjon, and I would like to make a statement on behalf of the President concerning that.

"The President condemns the vicious and unprovoked murder of two American officers last night in the demilitarized zone near Panmunjon, in Korea. These officers were peacefully supervising a work detail in the neutral zone when they were subjected to a brutal and cowardly attack totally without warning. The total responsibility for the consequences of these murders rests with the North Korean Government."

That is the end of my statement. I will tell you, additionally, that the United States is seeking a meeting immediately of the Military Armistice Commission in Korea. I understand that the State Department also has further information and the President is being kept informed by Bush Secretary of State and NSC advisors.

Q Ron, what are the consequences?

MR. NESSEN: Tom, I think, at this point, all I can say is that there are meetings being held in Washington on the situation and I don't, at this time, have anything further on it.

Q Ron, is it the belief of the President and the U.S. Government that this was a deliberate connection with the nonaligned meeting in Sri Lanka and the attacks were evidence of the North Korean's desire to get us off the Korean peninsula?

MR. NESSEN: The Embassy, in its initial assessment, has been unable to determine the motive of the attacks.

Q That was in Seoul?

MR. NESSEN: In Seoul, correct.

The President's schedule you have is unchanged.

Q Excuse me. Before you go further, I would like to ask a question about a line in the President's statement, the "total responsibility for the consequences of these murders rests with the North Korean Government." Can you elaborate on what that means?

MR. NESSEN: I can't, Walt. I think the language speaks for itself. The first step we are taking is to seek an immediate meeting of the Military Armistice Commission, as well as meetings going on now in Washington by American officials, on the situation.

Q When was the President informed, and by whom?

MR. NESSEN: He was informed as soon as the word came this morning, by Brent Scowcroft.

Q Does the President feel that these attacks underscore the need for a continued American military presence in South Korea and the need not to reduce the number of American troops there?

MR. NESSEN: I don't think I am going to go into a very lengthy discussion of that now, John, other than to give you this statement.

Q What is the purpose of the meeting called in Panmunjon, to demand an explanation?



MR. NESSEN: You mean a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission?

Q Yes.

MR. NESSEN: I don't have precisely what presentation the United States will make at that meeting, but the State Department probably will.

Q Who were the two officers, Kon?

MR. NESSEN: I don't have the details here, Les.

Q Have they been identified by anybody?

MR. NESSEN: I don't know, you will have to check at the State Department.

Q Is anyone checking from here?

MR. NESSEN: I know that Brent was on the phone with Washington.

The President's schedule is unchanged for the day, so far. He slept in just a little later than normal this morning and had breakfast at 7:30.

He arose just shortly before that. He had breakfast alone, incidentally, contrary to all the little things I have been reading.

Then, the first activity that he had was the PFC staff meeting here on the third floor, which I think some of you covered.

Other than that, I don't really have anything.

MORE



Q About the schedule, could you please tell us if that noon trip, the 12:30 trip is all pool coverage, and tell us which events the rest of the day are pool coverage as opposed to those which aren't? Is there any open coverage on the President's schedule today?

MR. NESSEN: It is all travel pool coverage.

Q Ron, has the President heard from the Secretary of State on the subject of the international morality plank?

MR. NESSEN: I know there was a good deal of discussion last night, and the President made his decision that his plank really simply stated the basic principles on which the American foreign policy has been based.

Q Did he talk to Secretary Kissinger about it?

MR. NESSEN: I am not sure whether the President talked to him directly. I know the Secretary's views were brought into the discussion.

Q Is there going to be a pool allowed in to watch the President during the nominating tonight?

MR. NESSEN: We are working on that and haven't really finalized the plans yet. I hope so.

Q Aside from this light schedule listed, what else is the President doing today?

MR. NESSEN: He has two major projects, as you know, and one is to select his Vice Presidential running mate. The other is to work further on his acceptance speech.

Q Can you tell us the running mate yet?

MR. NESSEN: He has not chosen a running mate.

Q Is he going to see Reagan tonight?

MR. NESSEN: As I said before, the President would like to see Governor Reagan after the nomination and that could very well be tonight, but it also could be tomorrow morning. There hasn't been a time fixed yet.

Q Could you give us a rundown on the President's meeting with the Governors?

MR. NESSEN: I was in another meeting at the time and didn't attend. I know the intention was to talk about party business, about the fall campaigning and hear their views on the Vice Presidential question and I came in sort of at the end of it, and I know that they indicated, as they were sort of breaking up, that the President had not



Q One of the Governors said there was a great deal of talk by the Governors, not the President, about the selection or the possibilities of him selecting Ronald Reagan as his running mate,

MR. NESSEN: As I say, I was in another meeting and I didn't attend the meeting today.

Q Ron, how will he go about the process of choosing? Will the possible candidate come in and see him or will he talk to them on the phone?

MR. NESSEN: There are no plans for that. Some of the Governors who were in this morning have been mentioned by the great mentioners as possible contenders but there is no plan to have people come in and be interviewed and so forth today. I would look for the President to make his decision either late tonight or tomorrow morning, and I would look for the announcement to be made possibly around the noon hour tomorrow.

Q Here?

MR. NESSEN: Here, yes.

Q What will he do today to refine his process of making his selection?

MR. NESSEN: Think.

Q Will the President make his own announcement on that subject?

MR. NESSEN: Will the President come here and announce his running mate?

Q Yes.

MR. NESSEN: That is my anticipation.

Q In this room?

MR. NESSEN: Yes.

Q Ron, he indicated he was going to see people today.

MR. NESSEN: That he was going to see Vice Presidential possibilities today?

Q Yes.

MR. NESSEN: That is not on the schedule and not anticipated as far as I know.



Q Who is he seeing today?

MR. NESSEN: Aside from this schedule, I know of nobody who is coming in in addition to the schedule.

Q Did Senator Baker go up to the 18th floor yesterday?

MR. NESSEN: Did Senator Baker go up to the 18th floor yesterday?

Q Did he, or did he not?

MR. NESSEN: I am not aware that he did. I will check, but he didn't see the President.

Q Ron, is the President still going to make his decision only after he meets with Mr. Reagan?

MR. NESSEN: That is correct.

Q Tell us some of the things President Ford will be doing after he returns from the Muehlebach Hotel and before he goes to the New Jersey delegation? He has about a four-hour time period on his schedule that is absolutely blank.

MR. NESSEN: One thing he will do is eat lunch. The three other things he will be doing are, one, work on his acceptance speech; thinking about his Vice Presidential choice; and doing anything that has to be done in connection with this North Korean episode.

Q Ron, now that the test vote has been made and you have won on that, and you have no doubt you will win the nomination, don't you think in the interest of party unity Ronald Reagan ought to consider dropping out of the race at this point?

MR. NESSEN: Phil, you know we are going to go and have the rest of the Convention in the scheduled way, and you know the ball game isn't over until the last out and the President feels that way.

Q Ron, can you tell about that?

MR. NESSEN: We are not taking anything for granted.

Q At what point exactly was the President informed of the assassination of the two officers?

MR. NESSEN: I said the first thing this morning by Brent Scowcroft.



Q Do you expect the President to announce the Vice Presidential candidate tomorrow or is it something you might do?

MR. NESSEN: I mentioned to Andy I thought the President would come here and would announce it.

Q If the President has not made up his mind when he goes to see Reagan, what will he consult with him about?

MR. NESSEN: He will consult with Governor Reagan about the Vice Presidency.

Q What will he do, present him a list and say who do you like?

MR. NESSEN: They will discuss the Vice Presidency.

Q Ron, can you comment on the amount of input Ronald Reagan will have on the President's final decision?

MR. NESSEN: I can't quantify for you, Russ. He will consult with Reagan about the Vice Presidency.

Q If he had in mind a particular man Reagan was absolutely and totally opposed to, would that cause the President to change?

MR. NESSEN: That is too speculative, Russ, for me to answer.

Q Is Senator Baker still in the running?

MR. NESSEN: We haven't said who is in the running and who is not in the running.

MORE



Q There are some reports that the President has gotten sort of a special communication.

MR. NESSEN: I read the list, Helen, and there is a list of five people out based on the reports. There was a list of four people out and three of the people on the list of five are not on the list of four.

Q There was a list of four in Jack Anderson's column.

MR. NESSEN: I forget how Jack worded it, but the fact is that the so-called reports, and then there is a list of two, and then there is a way, I am told--one story is that if a certain thing happens, it will be one of those two. If another thing happens, it is another one of those two. The fact is, the only person who knows who is on the list, whether the list has been narrowed down or not, is the President. He has told no one, absolutely no one. I can assure you of that.

I know of one gentleman going around town telling people he knows who the President has selected and that gentleman has seen the President for a total of 30 seconds this week and they didn't talk about the Vice Presidency during that brief chat. The fact is, nobody knows.

Q Is he going to confer with his present Vice President?

MR. NESSEN: The present Vice President has been a very active participant in this week's events, as you know, including last night's platform.

Q Will you let me please follow up my question? People are all bellowing. I would like to finish the question. You took off on Rockefeller's activities last night. You said he has been a very active participant. Has he been an active participant in the Vice Presidential selection process?

MR. NESSEN: The President has discussed it with him, yes.

Q Is he going to discuss it with him some more?

MR. NESSEN: I don't know, Carol.

Q Will the President give Ronald Reagan's word any more weight in his mind-making-up process than anyone else?

MR. NESSEN: I just can't say to what degree that will affect him as opposed to someone else's views and his own views. It is a complex process.



Q Ron, is there any plan to support Rockefeller for National Committee Chairman?

MR. NESSEN: There is no plan to, John.

Q What about coverage of the President tonight?

MR. NESSEN: We are working on what I hope will be a satisfactory pool plan, Aldo. I want to make sure it is acceptable to the President and if he says okay, then I will announce it later this afternoon.

Wait a minute. Are you talking about watching the balloting?

Q Both.

MR. NESSEN: Certainly, if the President goes tonight to see Governor Reagan tonight, there will be a travel pool, and I am working on what I hope will be an acceptable plan for a pool to watch at least part of the balloting with the President.

Q Will that be more than one pool?

MR. NESSEN: Just one.

Q Your comment was very interesting on the foreign policy amendment. You mean to say the Administration doesn't view that as critical?


MR. NESSEN: We have no objection to this. As I say, it is based on the -- these basic principles outlined in this amendment are the ones on which the Ford foreign policy has been based.

Q If you have no objection to it, why didn't you say so in the first place when it was proposed?

MR. NESSEN: As I said when it came up, if it came up we would take a look at it and give a view.

Q Why did it take you so long to make up your mind? Everyone was kept waiting around until around midnight before anything was said.

MR. NESSEN: I mean, Aldo, as I said, what happened was there were other matters to deal with and when it came time to deal with this one, there were conferences held and the President made a decision and sent the word to his aides.



Q Did the Vice President help him in making a decision? Did the Vice President involve Kissinger in this?

MR. NESSEN: The Vice President, I think, spoke eloquently on television last night in explaining why this amendment was acceptable.

Q You said Dr. Kissinger was consulted --

MR. NESSEN: I said I thought his views were certainly brought into this.

Q Were his views supportive of this?

MR. NESSEN: I don't know precisely what his views were.

Q Do you know imprecisely what they were?

MR. NESSEN: No, I don't.

Q Who will be with the President in his suite tonight?

MR. NESSEN: I haven't got the full list, but I will get it for you. I think the family will be in the arena but the Cheney-Marsh folks will be up there.

Q Can you give us anything further, time-wise, for a departure on Friday?

MR. NESSEN: I would say for your own planning and guidance, you could look for a departure Friday around noon.

Q From where?

MR. NESSEN: From the airport. That is just rough and only for your guidance so you can plan your lives.


Q Will he address the Republican National Committee Friday morning?

MR. NESSEN: I think there is a plan for the President to attend that meeting.

Q When is that and where?

MR. NESSEN: It is traditional, I think you know, for the Republican National Committee to meet on the day after the Convention, so Friday morning is the RNC meeting and I do expect the President to go to that.

Q Will there be a recommendation for the Chairman?



MR. NESSEN: I am not ready to say anything about that, yet.

Q Since the President's floor manager, Senator Griffin, told the Detroit Free Press of trying to work the Reagan supporters, "even if we have to hold our noses," and since this pamphlet issued by Rogers Morton referred to 16-C is not honest and not sincere, I was wondering, how does the President think the terminology by such close associates will help with the unity needed to beat Jimmy Carter?

MR. NESSEN: Is that a multiple choice?

Q We hear a lot about unity. We heard that mentioned yesterday when Griffin said, "we will work with the Reagan supporters if we have to hold our noses," and they say this is dishonest. I wonder, what is the President's feeling about this?

MR. NESSEN: About what?

MORE



Q His close associates are using this terminology.

MR. NESSEN: I will have to look at them, Les. I haven't seen any one of those statements.

Q Ron, the pool this morning reported the President was asked if he was going to have any Vice Presidential candidates coming in to see him today. The President replied, "I might have a lot of them." You said it is not on his schedule for him to see anybody else, but you said that yesterday and I know some people he saw who were not on the schedule.

So, I am asking, can we believe your schedule?

MR. NESSEN: Yes, you can believe the schedule. I don't know of any plan for the President to interview people as Vice Presidential possibilities today. I mean, it is obvious that at the Governor's meeting this morning there were people who have been mentioned but the purpose of that meeting was not to interview them and there may be others the President crosses paths with today in the course of his moving around town or having meetings here that may have been mentioned, also.

Q But coming in to see him, that is the way the question was.

MR. NESSEN: I don't know of any plans, I will check further.

Q Is he about to do that at all at any time during the selection process?

MR. NESSEN: What, have an interview process?

Q Yes.

MR. NESSEN: It is not planned that he will, no.

Q Ron, what was the President's reaction to the Vice President's tussle last night over the sign? He saw it, didn't he? Did he see this on TV?

MR. NESSEN: I don't think he did.

Q He knows about it. He is aware of what happened. I wonder, has he said anything about it? Did he smile, or was he happy about it or what?

MR. NESSEN: I haven't heard any reaction from him about it.



Q No reaction at all?

MR. NESSEN: No.

Q Are there any other briefings planned by the PFC staff?

MR. NESSEN: There are no plans for any further PFC briefings in here. Peter doesn't plan to. What I would like to do is if we have anything to post, is to post it about 6:00. That 6:00 posting could well include pool plans for coverage of the balloting tonight. The office is open all the time and you can come in there if you have any questions or problems.

Q Are you planning to get out an advance text of the President's acceptance speech like tomorrow afternoon?

MR. NESSEN: I am aiming to get out a text out of the President's acceptance speech somewhere between mid- and late afternoon tomorrow.

Q How long will it be, would you guess?

MR. NESSEN: I would guess the spoken word would be somewhere around 25 minutes with time for interruptions for applause after virtually every sentence.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END (AT 11:31 A.M. CDT)



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August 18, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: Jeanne W. Davis
SUBJECT: Minutes of WSAG Meeting
August 18, 1976

Attached are the minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group meeting held August 18, 1976 to discuss Korea.

Attachment



cc: William G. Hyland
William Gleysteen
Col. Clint Granger

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

^{#19}
MR 94-35 NL ser 9/29/00
By dal NARA, Date 3/27/01

~~SECRET~~

WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP MEETING

August 18, 1976

Time and Place: 3:47 pm - White House Situation Room

Subject: Korea

Participants:

Chairman: Henry A. Kissinger

State: Charles Robinson
Philip Habib

Defense: William Clements
Morton Abramowitz

JCS: Admiral James L. Holloway
Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith

CIA: Enno Knoche
Evelyn Colbert

NSC: William G. Hyland
William Gleysteen
Michael Hornblow



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Secretary Kissinger: There is a practical problem I would like to point out. The attack occurred at 9:43 last night and I was not notified until 9:00 this morning.

Mr. Knoche: That was poor performance on our part and we will take the blame.

Mr. Clements: There is no reason for CIA to take the blame - why not DOD and State who also received messages in these channels.

Mr. Habib: The information came in at midnight last night but I did not learn about it till this morning.

Secretary Kissinger: It was in my take this morning along with some fifty other cables.

Mr. Habib: It was 8:30 this morning when I first knew about it.

Mr. Abramowitz: ISA did not learn about it until 9:30 this morning.

Mr. Knoche: There was discussion between the operation centers but nobody alerted the principals.

Secretary Kissinger: Wasn't there another incident where this sort of thing happened recently? Of course, there was the Mayaguez.

Mr. Habib: We should of been informed at 12:01 am. The machinery did not work properly.

Mr. Knoche: The various operation centers talked with each other but did not send it up to the principals.

Secretary Kissinger: I am not blaming CIA. Each department should be organized to inform its principals. Let's begin the briefing.

(Knoche begins briefing. Attached)

Secretary Kissinger: were photographers taking pictures. Why don't we see any North Koreans' dead bodies.

Adm. Holloway: Stilwell doesn't believe that there were any North Korean casualties.

Mr. Robinson: Did the North Koreans report on the incident?

Mr. Knoche: Yes, but there was not mention of casualties.
(Knoche continues and finishes briefing).



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Secretary Kissinger: What does the South have in terms of manpower?

Mr. Knoche: They have 523,000 men in their army, 280 jet fighters, 175 patrol craft and no submarines. In our judgment a military action by the North to be effective would have to be a surprise attack. We, therefore, do not believe that the North had a major attack in mind.

Secretary Kissinger: Can somebody provide me with an analysis of how the two sides balance forces?

Admiral Holloway: The North Korean ground forces have good hitting power, but the South Korean army is well lead and backed by the U.S. The North Korean air force is larger, but the South Koreans are better trained. There is also the confidence factor. The South Koreans are confident because the U.S. backs them up. The North Korean submarines are not worth very much. Each country has a military force which is well designed to support its own strategy and position. In my judgment, it is a military stand-off. I do not think that at the present time that the North Koreans could mount an effective military invasion.



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Colbert: Were you factoring in the US forces?

Knoche: That is a key judgment. We believe there are two key elements. One is the US-South Korean Mutual Defense Treaty and the other is the presence of US forces. If the US Forces withdraw then the North Koreans would have the military advantage.

Kissinger: Why was the reaction force so late in getting into the area?

Holloway: Stillwell has avoided answering that.

Kissinger: He sure mentioned the photo coverage. Why was it necessary to prune that tree?

Holloway: It obstructed the line of view between the observation post and the tower. On this chart I can only find one of the two positions cited.

Clements: Wasn't that a routing operation - keeping the area clear?

Kissinger: This cable which was just handed to me makes it sound as though there was a lot of backing and forth about this.

Hyland: They told us not to do it. (The North Koreans)

Holloway: Stillwell's report says that the original plan was to cut the tree down but the North Koreans said no. We then decided to prune it. An eyewitness account says that when the North Korean Officer arrived on the scene he asked what they were doing. He was told "Pruning" and answered "good.")

Habib: There are some differences in the reporting of that.

Kissinger: Why do the North Koreans have the right to object to our cutting down or pruning a tree?

Habib: The whole area is a joint area.

Kissinger: If the North Koreans decide to prune a tree do they ask our permission.

Habib: No. We don't care. Each side has its own area within the joint area.

Kissinger: Can each side order the other side around?

Habib: They can't force each other but there is a lot of argumentation.

Kissinger: Well there are two problems as I see it. ~~1st~~ The first problem is that two American officers have been beaten to death. The second problem is to review the procedures we are following in the DMZ. Now regarding the first issue I agree with the CIA analysis. My impression is that it was a premeditated attack. There were some fifty other things they could have done to stop us from pruning the tree.

Now this letter Stillwell wants to send to Kim. Why should he send a letter to Kim? What standing does he have?

Habib: Well Stillwell is the Commander of the UN Forces and Kim is the Commander of the North Korean Army. Kim also signed the original Peace agreement.

Kissinger: There have already been White House and State Department statements deploring these murders. Why do we now also need a Stillwell statement. Does he have the authority to make a statement?

Abromowitz: No. He needs Washington approval.

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Kissinger: Well lets put that into abeyance. I have talked to the President today about this. he feels that some sort of strong action is necessary but does not know precisely what it should be. Now there are two things that come to my mind. A few weeks ago we turned off a B-52 exercise because it would be provocative to the Chinese. We might resurrect that exercise. The second possibility would be to alert all forces in Korea.

Holloway: We could go from DEFCON 4 to DEFCON 3.

Kissinger: What would that do?

Holloway: Unless we had a specific plan in mind or the North Koreans felt we had a specific plan in mind they probably would not react at all.

Kissinger: Well on that basis you could not threaten anything.

Abromowitz. Stillwell recommends that we finish pruning the tree.

Clements: I am in complete accord with that and think we should cut the God damn thing down.

Kissinger: I am in favor of that too but I don't think we should do anything ^{about the tree} until after we do something with our forces. What is the meaning of the DEFCON alert stages?

Holloway: 5 is normal and 1 is war. Stage 2 means that war is inevitable and stage 1 is when the shooting starts.

Colbert

~~xxxxxx~~ If the alert was moved up to 3 how would the media and the US people react to that in this campaign year.

Kissinger: That has nothing to do with it. The important thing is that they beat two American to death and must pay the price.

Colbert: The North Koreans are looking for indications that they can create another Vietnam type mentality in this country. Therefore to disabuse them of this it is important to have the right kinds of expressions of support from the media and opinion makers.

Kissinger: What about resurrecting the B-52 exercise? The State Department hereby withdraws its objections to it. This is now the best time in the world to run it.

Habib: It was a training exercise.

Abromowitz: Would it scare the Americans or the Koreans?

Gleysteen: There is another exercise planned.

Kissinger: But everybody already knows about that one.

Clements: Is it true that in the exercise we would fly the B-52s over Korea and then go back?

Holloway: Yes.

Kissinger: How long would it take?

Smith: We could get it going in 72 hours - possibly less.

Kissinger: The quicker the better.



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Mr. Clements: Do we wish to drop live bombs?

Secretary Kissinger: If that is part of the program, do it. If not then don't do it.

Mr. Clements: Well let me play Devil's Advocate. Why not drop live bombs?

Secretary Kissinger: If it is part of the plan do it.

Mr. Clements: I can make it part of the plan.

Mr. Abramowitz: *The exercise* would be well below nightmare range and they were not scheduled to drop live ordinance.

Mr. Habib: Those planes will come within easy range of North Korea. Distances there are close.

Secretary Kissinger: OK. That will be a good lesson for them.

What I would like to do now is to go over possible courses of actions and meet again tomorrow at 8:00 am to discuss them. The President wants to explore the possibility of taking one military step. What can we do? You may wish to think about it over night. Whatever we do must be commensurate.

Adm. Holloway: There are several possibilities, we could lay mines, we could seize a North Korean flag vessel or a fishing boat. But seizing a fishing boat might be beneath our dignity. The North Koreans have 34 commercial flag vessels. None of them are in our ports or allied ports. We have only been able to locate 9 of them so the remainder are probably in North Korean waters.

There is also the possibility of a combined *exercise* with the South Korean's. It would take a minimum of four days to set this up. We could also send in a carrier task group. The Midway could be there between 48-72 hours. It is in Yakuska now. They could have a missile-shoot off the coast.

Secretary Kissinger: I like the idea of cutting the tree down. We should generate our forces first and then cut it down. We should also go on a higher alert. Let's put our forces on defcon 3 tonight and get a plan for cutting down the tree from Stillwell. (to Adm. Holloway) Can you start gearing up the B-52 run?

Adm. Holloway: Yes.



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Secretary Kissinger: We need to know what forces Stilwell needs to cut the tree down?

Adm. Holloway: There are two difficult decisions before us.

1) At what point do we stop putting in reinforcements. In the past when we have moved in men they have acted reciprocally and vice versa. At what point would we stop. The next question is the use of firearms. In this recent incident both sides ^{had} with firearms that were not used.



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Kissinger: If I had been one of those men and was being beaten to death, I would have used a firearm.

Habib: They were attacked from behind and had no chance.

Holloway: Most of these men are Vietnam veterans. They were taught there to die before violating the rules of engagement.

Habib: Stillwell knows the estimated forces and that we can't move men without violating the agreement. If there was a fight there would be a need for reinforcements from outside of the zone.

Hyland: Should we reinforce that company?

Habib: The Koreans are the main force in the zone. Stillwell will have to tell us ~~that~~ what to do.

Kissinger: Who consults with the South Koreans.

Habib: Stillwell

Hyland: We need to send a message to Stillwell telling him not to go ahead with the letter and to prepare a plan for cutting down the tree.

Habib: The troops could be prepositioned and he could bring them up the road and have them move in as he requires them.

Kissinger: It will be useful for us to generate enough activity so that the North Koreans begin to wonder what those crazy American bastards are doing or are capable of doing in this election year.

Abromowitz: We should consider putting more US forces into Korea.

Kissinger: That might be desirable.

Habib: There is also the question of the Northwest Island. They are highly vulnerable.

Kissinger: Now about our forces. Should they go on alert tonight. We should also get that training exercise laid on. I would like for tomorrow morning to have a list of US forces which could be moved into Korea. We should consider moving F-111s and F-4s in. Then on Friday morning we can move to cut that tree.

Perhaps we should decide now to move the F-4s and decide on the F-111s tomorrow.

Smith: We can do it from scratch in twelve hours.

Habib: We have to consult with the Japanese.

Kissinger: Well then do it. Get the process started.

Abromowitz: To temporarily move our aircraft does not require us to consult with the Japanese.

Habib: We do have to advise them

Kissinger: I would like to get a working group started. Phil will you set one up?

Habib: Yes - we will need representatives from State, Defense, JCS and the CIA.

Kissinger: Who will inform Park?



~~SECRET~~

Habib: The Charge and Stillwell should go jointly

Cleyste: A lot of this will soon become public knowledge.

Kissinger: Yes. We have to decide on press guidance. It should be low key. We can admit to going onto DEFCOM 3 because of the premeditated murders.

Clements: Do we have to notify the UN

Habib: No. We have gone to DEFCOM 3 before without notifying them..

~~XXXXXXXX~~

Holloway: Stillwell ~~is~~ takes his orders from the JCS not the UN.

Habib: I think there is a procedure for the JCS to inform the UN

Kissinger: For tomorrow's meeting there should be a chart prepared of what everybody has to do.

Abramowitz: What about the War Powers Act?

Kissinger: That is a valid point. There should be one central ~~point~~ plan for consulting with Congress.

Holloway: We will look at it. I have it right here.

Habib: Your lawyers and our lawyers can study it.

Kissinger: By early this evening we should have

1. What we want to do about the War Powers Act
2. Press Guidances - "we are taking these precautionary moves because of the premeditated murder of American soldiers which raised the question of what the North Koreans might be up to.
3. Consultations with ~~KORE~~ South Korea, Japan ~~xxxxxx~~

Abramowitz: What about the North Korean allies?

Kissinger: I am seeing the Chinese at 5:00

Habib: The North Koreans have already come out with their version of the story. They have not agreed to a meeting tonight. Eventually they must come to a meeting.

~~XXXXXXXX~~

Hyland: The proposed statement is not very strong.

Habib: Stillwell must be told not to submit a letter at the meeting

Kissinger: For the 8:00 meeting tomorrow I want a spread sheet. We should also alert the task force to the possibility they may ~~xxxx~~ need to move. Tomorrow we can concentrate on ~~xxxx~~ things.

1. Additional military deployments to Korea
- 3.2 Possible Diplomatic actions. who we should notify and brief.
- 2.3. What military action we might take
4. Congressional activity

The meeting ended at 4:43pm

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18 August 1976

DDCI BRIEFING FOR
18 AUGUST WSAG MEETING

NORTH KOREA

- I. We are virtually certain that the violent incident in the Joint Security Area this morning was a deliberate provocation. We believe it was primarily intended to agitate American public opinion over the issue of our troops in Korea in the context of the US election campaign.
- II. Since early this spring, North Korean propaganda has charged almost daily that the US is introducing new weapons into the South, conducting provocative military exercises, and keeping South Korean armed forces on a war footing.
 - Pyongyang has warned that these developments have created a "grave situation" in which war may break out at any time.
 - On August 5 -- only a few hours after an exchange of fire between ROK and North Korean troops on the DMZ -- North Korea, in an unusually high level statement, alleged that

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AUTHORITY SAC Review 9/9/04

BY lan NLF, DATE 6/24/07 ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

the US and South Korea have now "completed" war preparations. The statement was the first issued at this level since 1969 that was directed specifically at US actions in the South.

III. North Korea's efforts have most recently been focused on the Non-Aligned Conference in Colombo, now drawing to a close.

-- Their efforts in Colombo, in turn, were intended to affect favorably their prospects in the UN General Assembly debate. A resolution has now been introduced that once again calls for American withdrawal from Korea.

IV. While the North Koreans have made gains in the international forum, their propaganda efforts have won them little or no return in the American political forum. They may now be raising the ante in hopes of stimulating American opposition to a continued US troop presence. This morning's incident seemed deliberately intended to produce American casualties.

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- The Joint Security Area is one of the very few places where North Koreans have direct, continuing contact with US military personnel.
- In June, there were several similar incidents in which US forces in the Joint Security Area were harassed by North Korean personnel. No casualties resulted, however.
- According to the account of today's incident issued in Seoul, a North Korean officer at the scene was heard to tell his troops to kill the UNC (i.e., US) personnel.
- A North Korean radiobroadcast shortly after the incident occurred described it as a US provocation that forced North Korean security personnel to take defensive measures. The broadcast warned that future incidents of US aggression would be met in this fashion, but otherwise signaled no major change in Pyongyang's policy.

V. North Korea's next moves will undoubtedly be conditioned by the American reaction.

- Should the response to this probe lead them to believe that they can play effectively on American sensitivities by further con-

~~SECRET~~

trolled acts of violence, we would expect them to pursue this course.

VI. But we believe that their principal immediate objective is to improve upon their 1975 success in the General Assembly. Accordingly, we believe that they are extremely unlikely to embark upon a course that would run the risk of major US reprisals or portraying North Korea as significantly raising the threat of instability on the peninsula.

- 4 -

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 05973

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Report

DESCRIPTION Intelligence analysis
CREATION DATE 08/18/1976
VOLUME 2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 027500064
COLLECTION TITLE HENRY A. KISSINGER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT
PARALLEL FILE OF DOCUMENTS OPENED FROM
UNPROCESSED COLLECTIONS (National
Security Advisors)
BOX NUMBER A1
FOLDER TITLE Korea - North Korean Tree Incident,
8/18/76 (1)-(3)

DATE WITHDRAWN 10/08/1993
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST KBH

REDACTED

3/29/11



INR AFTERNOON SUMMARY

August 19, 1976

SPECIAL ANALYSIS

Pyongyang's Possible Motives in the
DMZ Incident

We still do not have the full details of the incidents in which two US officers were killed in the Panmunjom Joint Security Area and thus we cannot rule out the possibility that the fighting resulted spontaneously from unplanned remarks and actions by people on both sides. On balance, however, it seems likely that the North Koreans deliberately provoked the fighting, which follows a number of seemingly related events.

--On August 5, North and South Korean forces exchanged gunfire across the DMZ.

--On the same day, Pyongyang issued a Government Statement accusing the US and the ROK of having "completed" war preparations. (The DPRK has issued a Government Statement protesting US actions on only two previous occasions--following the 1968 seizure of the USS Pueblo and the 1969 downing of a US reconnaissance aircraft.)

--On August 15, according to Belgrade Radio, Kim Il-sung wired President Tito that he could not attend the Non-Aligned Conference in Colombo because of the "deteriorated situation on the Korean border."

So far, Pyongyang's statements on the latest incident offer only the predictable explanation that "our security personnel were compelled to take a step in self-defense." We can only speculate on North Korea's motives (we have no information from CIA). Some plausible explanations are that Kim is:

--Laying the ground work for military action such as commando raids or an attack on the Northwest Islands. Kim might judge such heightened military activity during an election year would help drive a wedge between the US and ROK. We are inclined to doubt this possibility, but it cannot be dismissed.

--Attempting to strengthen North Korea's international position, particularly in the Third World. Only 23 nations have so far co-sponsored this year's North Korean resolution in the UN, compared with 43 last year, and Kim might judge that tensions along the DMZ would garner greater support for Pyongyang's efforts both in the UN and at the conference now under way in Colombo.

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted
EO 1.3526 (as amended) SEC 3.3

MR # 10-230, 126

LAC 6/17/05 Date 4/29/11

By del NARA Date 3/26/12



~~TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD~~

-10-

INR AFTERNOON SUMMARY

August 19, 1976

--Seeking to deal with internal problems, including recently apparent difficulties in dealing with factional problems in North Korea's armed forces. Kim may have increased the tension on the DMZ to provide both an excuse for his non-attendance at Colombo and a rationale for recent and perhaps contemplated changes in domestic policy and leadership shake-ups.

In any case, if Pyongyang deliberately provoked the incident, it probably acted for more than one reason. At a minimum, Kim may intend to indicate to Americans the risks continuing US involvement in Korea entail.



~~TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD~~

N102

RW

U.S.-KOREA LEAD
BY BARRY SCHWEID

WASHINGTON (AP) -- THE UNITED STATES CONDEMNED AS AN UNPROVOKED "ACT OF AGGRESSION" THE SLAYING OF TWO U.S. ARMY OFFICERS BY NORTH KOREAN GUARDS TODAY IN KOREA'S NEUTRAL ZONE.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT ISSUED A FORMAL STATEMENT SAYING THAT NORTH KOREA MUST BEAR "FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS BRUTAL ACTION."

IT ALSO SAID THAT THE VIOLENCE WAS A COWARDLY ACT OF MURDER THAT CANNOT BE TOLERATED.

EARLIER, BOTH PRESIDENT FORD AND SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER SAID THE SLAYING WAS UNPROVOKED MURDER.

U.S. OFFICIALS REFUSED TO SAY WHAT STEPS, IF ANY, WERE UNDER CONSIDERATION AS POSSIBLE RETALIATION FOR THE SLAYING.

A HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT SECURITY GROUP PLANNED TO DISCUSS THE INCIDENT, BUT PENTAGON OFFICIALS DISCOUNTED THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY U.S. MILITARY RESPONSE.

SINCE THE 1953 KOREAN ARMISTICE, 47 AMERICANS AND MORE THAN 1,000 SOUTH KOREANS HAVE BEEN KILLED ALONG THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, BUT THE SLAYING OF THE TWO ARMY OFFICERS WAS THE FIRST IN THE U.N. COMMAND VILLAGE AT PANMUNJOM ITSELF.

"THIS BRUTAL BEHAVIOR BY THE NORTH KOREAN REGIME TELLS US SOMETHING OF ITS TRUE NATURE," THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID.

IT "DEMONSTRATES THE HOLLOWNESS OF NORTH KOREA'S ALLEGED DESIRE FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE DIFFERENCES THAT EXIST BETWEEN IT AND SOUTH KOREA," IT ADDED.

SPOKESMAN FREDERICK Z. BROWN SAID THE NORTH KOREANS POSSIBLY WERE INTERESTED IN RAISING TENSIONS TO PROVE THEIR CLAIM THAT THERE IS A DANGER OF WAR ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. HE ALSO SAID THE INCIDENT MAY BE LINKED TO NORTH KOREA'S CRITICISM OF THE UNITED STATES AT A SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED NATIONS IN SRI LANKA.

"THE NORTH KOREANS HAVE FALSELY CHARGED THAT THE PERSONNEL OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND FIRST ASSAULTED NORTH KOREAN GUARDS," THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID. "THIS IS A LIE AND A FLAGRANT ATTEMPT TO



Sent to Scowcroft

NOI WONT
2320 LOCAL

RO81R 10989910ZORINZQ1
LEAD OFFICERS

SEOUL, AUG 18, REUTER - TWO U.S. ARMY OFFICERS WERE KILLED TODAY WHEN ABOUT 30 NORTH KOREAN GUARDS ATTACKED THEM WITH AXES AND METAL PIKES IN THE BORDER AREA BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA, THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND ANNOUNCED.

FIVE SOUTH KOREANS AND FOUR AMERICAN SOLDIERS WERE INJURED IN THE ATTACK AT THE BORDER ARMISTICE VILLAGE OF PANMUNJOM, THE U.S.-LED COMMAND SAID.

IT SAID THE ATTACK WAS UNPROVOKED AND OCCURRED AS THE OFFICERS, WITH OTHER AMERICAN AND SOUTH KOREAN SOLDIERS, WERE ESCORTING A U.N. WORK PARTY.

A SOUTH KOREAN SPOKESMAN SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WAS "OUTRAGED BY THE UNIMAGINABLY BARBAROUS AND INHUMANE ACT OF MURDER."

THE U.N. COMMAND CALLED FOR A MEETING OF THE JOINT MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION AT PANMUNJOM TOMORROW.
MORE 0816

RO82R 1091302CZCRYRBYL
LEAD OFFICERS 2 SEOUL

THE U.N. COMMAND WOULD NOT NAME THE MEN KILLED OR INJURED UNTIL RELATIVES HAD BEEN INFORMED.

THE WORK PARTY WAS TRIMMING BRANCHES FROM A TREE WHEN TWO NORTH KOREAN OFFICERS AND SEVERAL GUARDS APPEARED, THE U.N. COMMAND SAID.

AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, DURING WHICH A NORTH KOREAN OFFICER EXPRESSED NO OBJECTION TO THE TREE-TRIMMING, THE NORTH KOREANS SUDDENLY DEMANDED THAT THE WORK BE STOPPED, THE COMMAND SAID.

SHORTLY AFTERWARDS, A NORTH KOREAN VEHICLE BROUGHT UP ADDITIONAL GUARDS AND THE NORTH KOREAN OFFICER WAS HEARD TO TELL THEM "TO KILL" THE U.N. PERSONNEL. THE FIGHT FOLLOWED.
MORE 0821

RO83R 10967CZCRYRZYR
LEAD OFFICERS 3 SEOUL

THE SOUTH KOREAN SPOKESMAN SAID IN HIS STATEMENT THAT "WE WILL BE WATCHING DEVELOPMENTS WITH GRAVE CONCERN AS THIS ATROCIOUS PROVOCATION CAME AT A TIME WHEN THE NORTH KOREANS WERE FABRICATING AND SPREADING GROUNDLESS RUMORS OF NORTHWARD AGGRESSION.

"THIS INCIDENT SHOWS TO THE WORLD THAT THE NORTH KOREANS ARE ACTING BEYOND REASON TO PROVOKE SOUTHWARD AGGRESSION AND THAT THEY ARE BRUTAL BANDITS."

ON JUNE 30 LAST YEAR, U.S. ARMY MAJOR WILLIAM HENDERSON WAS KICKED AND KNOCKED DOWN TO THE GROUND AT PANMUNJOM BY NORTH KOREAN NEWSMEN AND GUARDS.

MAJOR HENDERSON WAS EVACUATED TO WALTER REED HOSPITAL IN WASHINGTON THE FOLLOWING DAY WITH A FRACTURED LARYNX.

(NO PICKUP R069)

REUTER 0825

Hyland, cc



Hyland, LL

FBIS 54***** (SEE 44) (OUT OF SEQUENCE)

B U L L E T I N

KCNA 19 AUG STATEMENT ON DMZ INCIDENT

OM191123 PYONGYANG KCNA IN ENGLISH 1119 GMT 19 AUG 76

(TEXT) PYONGYANG AUGUST 19 (KCNA) -- THE KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY WAS AUTHORIZED TO MAKE PUBLIC A STATEMENT ON AUGUST 19.

THE STATEMENT READS AS FOLLOWS:

AS ALREADY REPORTED, THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS RUNNING WILD TO START A NEW WAR OF AGGRESSION IN KOREA COMMITTED A GRAVE PROVOCATION AGAINST OUR SIDE IN THE JOINT SECURITY AREA OF PANMUNJOM ON AUGUST 18.

AROUND 10 HOURS 45 MINUTES ON THE MORNING OF AUGUST 18, THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS SUDDENLY DROVE OUT 15 BANDITS CARRYING AXES AND LETHAL WEAPONS TO FELL A TREE AT RANDOM IN THE JOINT SECURITY AREA.

THE TREE WAS PLANTED AND TENDED WITH MUCH CARE BY OUR SIDE FOR A LONG TIME.

SEEING THE ACT OF THE ENEMY, 4 SECURITY PERSONNEL OUR SIDE WENT TO THE SPOT AND REPEATEDLY TOLD THE ENEMY THAT THE TREE MUST NOT BE FELLED ARBITRARILY WITHOUT A PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH OUR SIDE AS THE TREE IS CONTROLLED BY OUR SIDE.

THE ENEMY WHO CAME OUT WITH THE AIM OF COMMITTING A PROVOCATION FROM THE OUTSET, FAR FROM COMPLYING WITH THE JUST DEMAND OF OUR SIDE, COMMITTED THE UNBEARABLE INSULTING ACT OF HURLING INVECTIVES AND SPITTING AT THE SECURITY PERSONNEL OF OUR SIDE, COUNTING ON HIS NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY, AND COLLECTIVELY POUNCED UPON AT LAST AND BEAT SECURITY PERSONNEL OF OUR SIDE, AND INJURED THEM BY THROWING AN AXE.



THIS CRITICAL SITUATION COMPELLED THE SECURITY PERSONNEL OF OUR SIDE TO TAKE A STEP IN SELF-DEFENCE.

THE SECURITY PERSONNEL OF OUR SIDE PUT UP A DEATH-DEFYING RESISTANCE AGAINST THE ENEMY, THROWING BACK THE AXE HURLED BY THE ENEMY.

WHEN THINGS DEVELOPED IN THIS WAY, THE ENEMY REINFORCED HIS FORCE WITH MORE THAN 30 HOOLIGANS HE HAD KEPT WAITING IN ADVANCE.

IN THIS INCIDENT PROVOKED BY THE ENEMY 5 SECURITY PERSONNEL OF OUR SIDE WERE WOUNDED HEAVILY OR LIGHTLY.

THIS IS THE TRUTH OF THE INCIDENT. THIS. NOTWITHSTANDING, NOW THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS AND THEIR LACKEYS ARE DISTORTING THE FACT TO MAKE IT APPEAR AS IF OUR SIDE CAUSED THE INCIDENT, CARRYING AXES. BUT, THIS CAN FOOL NO ONE. THE AXE USED BY THE ENEMY WHEN A FREE-FOR-ALL TOOK PLACE IS NOW IN OUR HANDS. IT IS AN AXE OF AUSTRIAN MAKE USED IN THE U.S. ARMY UNITS.

THE ATTEMPT OF THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS TO SHIFT THE RESPONSIBILITY ON TO OUR SIDE AFTER OPENLY COMMITTING A PROVOCATION IN THE JOINT SECURITY AREA IN BROAD DAYLIGHT, SELF-EXPOSES THAT THEY HAD PLOTTED THIS INCIDENT IN A PLANNED MANNER TO FIND A PRETEXT FOR STARTING A WAR.

AS HAS ALREADY BEEN ASCERTAINED, THIS IS CRYSTAL CLEAR FROM THE FACT THAT WHILE THIS INCIDENT WAS TAKING PLACE, THE ASSISTANT SECURITY OFFICER OF THE U.S. ARMY, THE U.S. DUTY OFFICER AND A CAPTAIN OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PUPPET ARMY DIRECTLY COMMANDED IT, WATCHING THE SCENE ON HILL NO. 3 OPPOSITE PARMUNJOM, HAVING MADE EVEN PREPARATIONS FOR PHOTOGRAPHING IT, AND MORE THAN 100 HEAVILY ARMED MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE WAITING IN THREE TRUCKS BEHIND THEM.

THAT THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS PROVOKED THE INCIDENT UNDER A PREMEDITATED PLAN WAS MADE PLAIN WHEN SUCH HIGHEST AUTHORITIES OF THE UNITED STATES AS FORD AND KISSINGER AS WELL AS THE SOUTH KOREAN PUPPET CLIQUE WERE ALL MOBILIZED, AS SOON AS THEY BEGAN THE PROVOCATIVE ACT, IN RAISING AT A TIME A LARGE-SCALE CLAMOUR HURLING GROUNDLESS SLANDERS AND CALUMNIES AGAINST OUR SIDE, SENT AN ULTIMATUM-STYLE NOTICE TO OUR SIDE AND ISSUED AN "ORDER OF EMERGENCY ALERT" TO THE U.S. FORCES OCCUPYING SOUTH KOREA.

(MORE)

19 AUG 1212Z RLL/WK*****



UP-060

R A

Hyland, LL

(KOREAN INCIDENT)

KANSAS CITY (UPI) -- PRESIDENT FORD TODAY CONDEMNED AS VISCIOUS MURDER THE AX KILLINGS OF TWO U.S. ARMY OFFICERS BY NORTH KOREA AND SAID THE COMMUNIST NORTH KOREANS WILL HAVE TO TAKE THE CONSEQUENCES.

"THE PRESIDENT CONDEMNS THE VISCIOUS AND UNPROVOKED MURDER OF TWO AMERICAN OFFICERS LAST NIGHT IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE NEAR PAN MOON JONG IN KOREA," PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SECRETARY RON NESSEN TOLD REPORTERS.

"TOTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF THESE MURDERS RESTS WITH THE NORTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT," HE SAID.

"THESE OFFICERS WERE PEACEFULLY SUPERVISING A WORK DETAIL IN THE NEUTRAL ZONE WHEN THEY WERE SUBJECTED TO A BRUTAL AND COWARDLY ATTACK TOTALLY WITHOUT WARNING," NESSEN SAID.

HE SAID THE UNITED STATES WAS CALLING A MEETING OF THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION IN PAN MOON JONG ON THE MATTER.

UPI 08-18 12:47 PED

NATIONS Commission



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

matting
AUGUST 18, 1976

Office of the White House Press Secretary
(Kansas City, Missouri)

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

The President condemns the vicious and unprovoked murder of two American officers last night in the demilitarized zone near Panmunjon in Korea.

These officers were peacefully supervising a work detail in the neutral zone when they were subjected to a brutal and cowardly attack totally without warning.

Total responsibility for the consequences of these murders rests with the North Korean Government.

#



~~Flash~~
PRECEDENCE

~~For Secret~~
~~Exclusively Eyes~~
~~Only~~
CLASSIFICATION

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FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM/TOSCO 6611

TO: MCFARLANE FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

DEX

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INFO:

DTG: 182202Z


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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

MR 94-39, #18 NSC 24/94

By KBH NARA, Date 6/9/94

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
August 18, 1976

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: W.G. Hyland

Held 45 minute WSAG this afternoon with HAK in chair. Attached is a shopping list of things that are being done or could be done tomorrow. General feeling of the group was first, to put forces in Korea on the alert, second, to return to area of incident and chop down the goddamned tree; third, move F-4s tonight; and fourth, examine whether to move some F-111s tomorrow and a carrier task force.

There was a very hesitant discussion about actual military action as you guessed. WSAG will reconvene at 8:00 tomorrow morning to look into what punitive measures we might undertake. Holloway, sitting in for Brown, discussed seizing ships and patrol craft, etc. I talked to HAK about an option in which we would launch very limited air strike in the eastern end of the DMZ, where it would be unexpected and where it would not necessarily touch off something we couldn't handle. He seemed somewhat taken with the idea.



Finally, we are going to get out some low key press guidance which I will send to you as soon as it is available because alerting forces and moving F-4s will become public this evening.


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EO 12958, SEC 3.A

NR 94-39 #189 NSC 16.5/194

10/19/94 10/19/94

TOP SECRET



Actions:

1. Put forces in Korea on DEFCON 3 tonight.
2. Move squadron of F-4s tonight from Japan to South Korea.
3. Alert F-111s for possible movement.
4. Alert carrier task force (MIDWAY) for possible movement
(no discussion of where -- Sea of Japan?)
5. Make preparations for launching B-52 bombing exercise,
in South Korea (72 hours?)
6. Prepare for tonight press guidance: low key -- "given nature
of premeditated murder certain precautionary moves being undertaken."
7. Examine question of War Powers notification.
8. Initiate consultations: with Japan; with South Korea.
9. Modify US statement to be made in MAC (already done?)
(Use State language.)
10. Hold in abeyance Stillwell letter to Kim Il Sung.

* * * *

For Tomorrow Morning WSAG:

1. What additional deployments could be made to South Korea?
2. What military actions (punitive) could be undertaken?
3. What further diplomatic actions - US, Russians, Chinese, etc. --
could or should be undertaken?

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

4. Plan for handling Congressional consultations, etc.

5. Ask Stillwell for scenario to cut down tree in Joint Security

Area tomorrow night (our time).



~~TOP SECRET~~