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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 256637

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TO USDEL KYOTO FLASH

~~SECRET~~ STATE 256637

NODIS  
TOSEC 208

E.O.: 11652: XGDS  
TAGS: PFOR, IS  
SUBJ: UNDOF RENEWAL

FOR EAGLEBURGER FROM SISCO

1. I CALLED SHALEV AND SAID TO HIM I HAD COMMUNICATED ISRAELI SUGGESTED CHANGES TO THE SECRETARY, AND HOPE TO HAVE RESPONSE FOR HIM SOMETIME TOMORROW MORNING.

2. I THEN SAID, PARENTHETICALLY, THAT I ERRONEOUSLY COMMUNICATED OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH A TO HIM. IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO A REFERENCE TO 338 ONLY. I SAID FROM THE ISRAELI POINT OF VIEW IT IS BETTER NOT TO HAVE 350 IN THAT PARAGRAPH SINCE IT MAKES A VERY CLOSE LINK BETWEEN NEGOTIATIONS AND A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND THE REAFFIRMATION OF UNDOF. I SAID, FACETIOUSLY, THAT IF YOU TWIST OUR ARM TO TRY TO GET 350 IN, I SUPPOSE WE COULD TRY TO GET IT IN. SHALEV RESPONDED, EQUALLY FACETIOUSLY, THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF DOING SO AND COMMENTED PERSONALLY THAT HE DID NOT THINK GOI WOULD HAVE ANY DIFFICULTY IN LEAVING 350 OUT.

3. AT LEAST BASED ON SHALEV'S REACTION HE WAS TOTALLY

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*

STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES TD 9/23/02

BY HR, NARA, DATE 1/27/03

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
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WITHDRAWAL ID 013791

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . SECSTATE WASHDC

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . USDEL KYOTO

TITLE . . . . . New York Times Query on CIA in India

CREATION DATE . . . . . 11/21/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400279

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE  
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 8

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Japan - State Department Telegrams:  
From SECSTATE - NODIS (4)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/06/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG



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APPROVED BY P - MR. SISCO  
EUR - MR. HARTMAN  
S/S :JPMOFFAT

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TO USDEL KYOTO FLASH

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
E.O. 11652:GDS  
TAGS:PFOR, GR, CY, TU  
SUBJECT:LETTER TO ESENBEL

REF: (A) SECTO 054 (B) ANKARA 9087

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SISCO

1. BELOW IS A SUGGESTED DRAFT LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER ESENBEL FOR THE SECRETARY'S APPROVAL AND ONWARD TRANSMITTAL.

2. BEGIN TEXT. DEAR MR. MINISTER: I AM ENCOURAGED BY AMBASSADOR MACOMBER'S REPORT ON HIS CONVERSATION WITH YOU NOVEMBER 20 IN WHICH YOU INDICATED YOUR DESIRE TO MOVE AHEAD RAPIDLY TOWARD SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON CYPRUS. I BELIEVE WE UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER'S PROBLEMS WITH REGARD TO THE TIMING OF AN INITIATIVE THAT WOULD REPRESENT A SIGN OF PROGRESS TOWARD A SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCESS THAT LED TO PLANS FOR MY EARLIER VISIT TO ANKARA SHOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO CONTINUE IN LINE WITH THE STRATEGY DEVELOPED THEN.



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PAGE 02 STATE 256614

3. YOU WILL RECALL THAT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THAT STRATEGY WAS THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT OF A SET OF UNILATERAL GESTURES AS AN IMPETUS TO THE

DENKTASH-CLERIDES TALKS. I STILL FEEL THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THESE GESTURES BE AS MEANINGFUL AND UNCONDITIONAL AS POSSIBLE. I AM AWARE THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WAS RELUCTANT TO PRODUCE ITS MAXIMUM GESTURES WITHOUT THE SET OF PRINCIPLES HAVING PREVIOUSLY BEEN ENDORSED BY THE GREEK GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT REQUESTED IN THE PRINCIPLES, IT WOULD TAKE SOME TIME TO OBTAIN AN AGREED TEXT WITH THE GREEK GOVERNMENT. I REMAIN PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH THE GREEKS IN TERMS OF THE LATEST FORMULATIONS GIVEN TO THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT BY AMBASSADOR MACOMBER. I SUGGEST, HOWEVER, THAT SINCE THE UNGA RESOLUTION OF NOVEMBER 1 PROVIDES A GENERAL FRAMEWORK, AND THE GREEKS, AS ILLUSTRATED BY CLERIDES' REALISTIC SPEECH OF NOVEMBER 6, HAVE ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT OF A GEOGRAPHIC FEDERATION, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO MAKE ITS GESTURES WITHOUT AN AGREEMENT ON PRINCIPLES.

4. I HAVE ALSO REGISTERED YOUR CONCERN REGARDING THE POSSIBLE RETURN OF ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS TO CYPRUS. WHILE I SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT COULD MAKE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS MORE DIFFICULT, I BELIEVE NEVERTHELESS THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE DENKTASH CLERIDES TALKS WILL BE THE PRINCIPAL FORUM IN WHICH A NEGOTIATION OF THE FUTURE OF CYPRUS WILL TAKE PLACE. THUS, WHATEVER MAKARIOS' MOVEMENTS, THE TURKISH GESTURES RETAIN THEIR IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO THE PROSPECTS OF A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT AS WELL AS TO PROBLEMS ARISING FROM DOMESTIC PRESSURES IN THE UNITED STATES.

5. I APPRECIATE YOUR DESIRE TO MOVE RAPIDLY AND YOUR SUGGESTION THAT I VISIT ANKARA AT THE END OF MY CURRENT TRIP. IF, INDEED, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IS ABLE TO FORMULATE A POLICY ON GESTURES THAT WOULD ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF MY VISIT, I WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO



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PAGE 03 STATE 256614

ARRANGE MY SCHEDULE SO AS TO BE ABLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THAT OPPORTUNITY. IF, HOWEVER, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO MOVE AT THAT PACE, I SUGGEST THAT THE INITIATIVE WE ENVISAGE MIGHT BE TAKEN DURING A MEETING WITH YOU IN BRUSSELS ON DECEMBER 11 OR, IF MY PRESENCE IN ANKARA WERE ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF OUR STRATEGY, I MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAKE SUCH A VISIT JUST BEFORE THAT DATE. I LOOK FORWARD TO HAVING YOUR VIEWS ON THE ABOVE.

6. WARM REGARDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER. END TEXT. INGERSOLL

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TO USDEL KYOTO IMMEDIATE

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TDSEC 199

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PFOR, LE

SUBJECT: PRESS BRIEFING

FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO

YOU WILL BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING THAT THERE WERE NO  
INQUIRIES AT TODAY'S BRIEFING RE LEBANESE MATTERS BEING  
CITED IN BEIRUT PRESS. INGERSOLL

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APPROVED BY EA:AWHUMMEL  
IO:MR. BLAKE  
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S/S - JPMOFFAT

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO USDEL KYOTO IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY LOME  
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NODIS  
TOSEC 198

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CB, UN, TO

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM SECRETARY ON KHMER REPRESENTATION

1. WE DETECT IN TOGO A POSSIBLE SOFT SPOT IN THE OTHERWISE SOLID PRO-SIHANOUK FRONT PRESENTED BY MOST OF THE FRANCOPHONESTATES OF WEST AFRICA IN THE KHMER REPRESENTATION ISSUE (IVORY COAST IS A NOTABLE EXCEPTION) PRESIDENT EYADEMA IS UNDER SOME CRITICISM AT HOME FOR HIS TILT TOWARDS THE ASIAN COMMUNISTS, ESPECIALLY THE NORTH KOREANS WHO HAVE NOT FULFILLED AID PROMISES. MOREOVER, THE TOGOLESE PERMPREP TOLD THE CAMBODIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IN NEW YORK THAT, THOUGH HE WAS A CO-SPONSOR OF THE PRO-GRUNK RESOLUTION, HE LIKED THE ASEAN RESOLUTION. THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE A MESSAGE FROM YOU TO FOREIGN MINISTER HUNLEDE COULD HAVE A SALUTARY EFFECT AND PERHAPS PRECIPITATE AN ABSTENTION FROM A COUNTRY GENERALLY



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WELL DISPOSED TO

THE US.

2. WE PROPOSE THAT, IF YOU APPROVE THE TEXT OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE, EMBASSY LOME DELIVER IT AND MAKE THE NECESSARY REQUEST FOR SUPPORT OR AT THE VERY LEAST ABSTENTION ON THE ASEAN RESOLUTION AND PRIORITY FOR IT.

3 BEGIN QUOTE: DEAR MR. MINISTER: I REGRET THAT WE DID NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WHEN YOU VISITED NEW YORK FOR THE UNITED NATIONS IN ORDER TO DISCUSS ALL OF THE ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN TO US. I AM THEREFORE TAKING THIS MEANS OF BRINGING TO YOUR ATTENTION A MATTER TO WHICH I ATTACH THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE AND ON WHICH I EARNESTLY SEEK YOUR GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT. I REFER TO THE PROBLEM OF CAMBODIA AND, MORE PARTICULARLY, TO THE DEBATE ON THE ISSUE OF CAMBODIAN REPRESENTATION WHICH IS TO BEGIN SHORTLY IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. WE BELIEVE THAT WAR IN INDOCHINA IN GENERAL AND CAMBODIA IN PARTICULAR HAS GONE ON TOO LONG AND COST TOO MUCH IN TERMS OF HUMAN LIVES AND RESOURCES AND IN TERMS OF DISTRACTING ATTENTION FROM MORE POSITIVE ENDEAVORS. WE BELIEVE THAT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE WAR IN CAMBODIA IS AN URGENT NECESSITY. WE STAND READY TO HELP IN ACHIEVING SUCH A SOLUTION. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC FOR ITS PART, HAS OFFERED NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS AND I HOPE THAT ALL PEACELOVING NATIONS WOULD SUPPORT THE PRINCIPLE OF NEGOTIATIONS EVEN THOUGH THERE MAY NOT BE AGREEMENT ON THE MERITS OF THE RESPECTIVE CAUSES. UNFORTUNATELY, THE NOMINAL LEADER OF THE COMMUNIST INSURGENTS, PRINCE SIHANOUK, HAS REJECTED NEGOTIATIONS, BELIEVING THAT A MILITARY VICTORY CAN BE ACHIEVED.

MY GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT THE INSURGENTS CANNOT WIN MILITARILY. IT IS ALSO EVIDENT THAT THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT DEFEAT THE INSURGENTS AND THE COUNTRY APPEARS DESTINED FOR ENDLESS WAR UNLESS GREATER MORAL AUTHORITY IS BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE PARTIES.

AS YOU KNOW, THE ASIAN NEIGHBORS OF CAMBODIA HAVE JOINED TOGETHER TO DRAFT AND SPONSOR A RESOLUTION IN THE UNITED



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NATIONS WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE THE UN TO ENGAGE ITSELF IN THIS ENDEAVOR. WE SUPPORT THIS AND BELIEVE IT IS A MOST APPROPRIATE ACTIVITY FOR THE ORGANIZATION. WE DO NOT BELIEVE, AND HOPE THAT YOU AGREE, THAT THE UN SHOULD ATTEMPT TO PREJUDGE THE ISSUE BY TAKING UPON ITSELF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO CHANGE THE REPRESENTATION OF THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE AS PROPOSED BY ONE RESOLUTION NOW BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY. THIS WOULD NOT ONLY DO GREAT DAMAGE TO THE BASIC UN PRECEPT OF SELF-DETERMINATION BUT WOULD CONSTITUTE A VERY DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FOR ALL MEMBER STATES. WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH AN ACTION TO SEAT AN EXILE REGIME COULD ALSO WELL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS, THEREBY PROLONGING THE SUFFERING OF THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE.

I HOPE THAT YOU CAN AGREE WITH ME ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF PEACE FOR THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE AND WILL AUTHORIZE YOUR DELEGATION TO SUPPORT THE ASIAN RESOLUTION OR, AT THE VERY LEAST, REFRAIN FROM OPPOSING IT.

I HAVE SUGGESTED THAT AMBASSADOR RAWLS GIVE YOU GREATER DETAILS CONCERNING THE ASIAN RESOLUTION AND SEEK YOUR THOUGHTS ABOUT THIS MOST IMPORTANT MATTER. BEST REGARDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER. END QUOTE. INGERSOLL

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TO USDEL KYOTO IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS), TOSEC 196

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S SCHEDULE

FOR EAGLBURGER AND GOMPERT FROM BREMR

FOLLOWING REVISED SUGGESTED SCHEDULE FOR SECRETARY UPON  
HIS RETURN:

MONDAY, DECEMBER 2

7:45

BREAKFAST - DEPT.

8:00

PRINCIPALS/REGIONAL ASSISTANT SEC RETARIES (INGERSOLL

8:00

PROPOSES TO DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS PURSUANT TO

8:00

REQUEST IN SECTO 35) YES NO

9:00

THE PRESIDENT

10:30

VERIFICATION PANEL - MBFR YES NO

1:00

LUNCHEON WITH MR. SEIDMAN - 8TH FLR.

3:00

MESSRS. SISCO, DEAN BROWN AND TOON RE: CIA

4:00

PERSONAL TIME

5:00

AMBASSADOR DAVID NEWSON YES NO

5:00

(MR. NEWSON SAID SECRETARY ASKED SPECIFICALLY TO

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-- SEE HIM BEFORE HE, NEWSOM , LEAVES WASHINGTON  
-- ON DECEMBER 4)

MONDAY, DECEMBER 2 (CONTINUED)

5:00 DRINKS WITH CONGRESSMAN FRASER YES NO

-- DINNER FOR DR. CARLO PESENTI AT F STREET CLUB  
-- (DAVID ROCKEFELLER)

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 3

7:45 BREAKFAST - DEPT.  
8:00 PRINCIPALS/REGIONAL ASSISTANT SECRETARIES  
9:00 THE PRESIDENT  
10:30 SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE - CAPITOL  
1:00 YOU WILL SEE FROM SEPTEL FROM H THAT THE ONLY  
-- TIME THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE CAN  
-- RECEIVE THE SECRETARY IS AT 1:00 PM TUESDAY,  
-- DEC. 3. THIS WOULD GIVE HIM THE ENTIRE MORNING  
-- ON THE HILL. H SAYS THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO  
-- ARRANGE IT SO THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD HAVE A  
-- BREAK BETWEEN HIS SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE AND  
-- HFAC HEARINGS FOR LUNCH.

-- IF SECRETARY DECIDES NOT TO DO HFAC AT 1:00 PM,  
-- THEN THESE ARE THE FOLLOWING LUNCHEON ALTERNA-  
-- TIVES (SCOTTY RESTON AS REQUESTED SECTO 37 UNABLE  
-- ACCEPT DUE TO SPEAKING ENGAGEMENT. WE HAVE  
-- OFFERED HIM DEC 4.)

-- (A) SHULTZ AND INGERSOLL (PER SECTO 63)  
-- YES NO

-- (B) DAVID LANDES AND OTHERS  
-- YES NO


-- (C) HERB SCHLOSSER  
-- YES NO

3:00 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ARAB AMERICANS (SHADYAC)

4:00 PERSONAL TIME

5:00 AMBASSADOR SHEN OF CHINA

6:00 FRANCISCO SARNEIRO, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE



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-- CENTER-LEFT POPULAR DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF PORTUGAL.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 4

7:45 BREAKFAST - DEPT.  
8:00 PRINCIPALS/REGIONAL ASSISTANT SECRETARIES  
9:00 THE PRESIDENT  
10:30 SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE - CAPITOL  
1:00 LUNCHEON WITH SCOTTY RESTON - 8TH FLR. (TO BE  
-- CONFIRMED)  
3:00 PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU/THE PRESIDENT

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 4 (CONTINUED)

5:00 PERSONAL TIME  
8:00 STAG DINNER FOR PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU BY THE  
-- PRESIDENT - WH

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 5

7:45 BREAKFAST - DEPT  
8:00 PRINCIPALS/REGIONAL ASSISTANT SECRETARIES  
9:00 THE PRESIDENT  
10:30 WELCOMING CEREMONY FOR CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT - WH  
  
-- FOLLOWED BY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT AND  
-- CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT  
1:00 HOST STAG WORKING LUNCHEON FOR CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT  
-- 8TH FLR.  
5:00 PFIAB MEETING - WH YES NO  
8:00 WH DINNER FOR CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 6

7:45 BREAKFAST - DEPT.  
8:00 PRINCIPALS/REGIONAL ASSISTANT SECRETARIES  
9:00 THE PRESIDENT  
-- POSSIBLE FURTHER MEETING WITH PRESIDENT AND  
-- CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT  
TIME? MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT - GERMAN  
-- RESIDENCE



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AFTER-

NOON

PRIVATE MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER

4:00

SIR CHRISTOPHER SOAMES

5:00

PERSONAL TIME

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 7

8:00

DINNER BY AMBASSADOR AND LADY RAMSBOTHAM

--

HONORING SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL'S BIRTH OVER 100

--

YEARS AGO - BLACK TIE (ACCEPTED "IF IN TOWN")

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 8

--

DINNER BY AMBASSADOR DINITZ FOR ALLON

MONDAY, DECEMBER 9

--

MEETINGS WITH ALLON

8:30

TRILATERAL COMMISSION DINNER (DAVID ROCKEFELLER)

--

8TH FLR. (FOR ABOUT 150 PEOPLE)

NOTES:

1. I HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH BOYD FRANCE ABOUT THE "BUSINESS WEEK" INTERVIEW. SINCE IT MAKES NO DIFFERENCE TO THEIR PUBLISHING DEADLINES, AND SINCE SECRETARY'S SCHEDULE FOR THE WEEK OF THE 2ND IS ALREADY SO CROWDED WE AGREED TO SCHEDULE THE INTERVIEW DURING THE WEEK OF DECEMBER 16.

2. SHULTZ WILL BE IN TOWN FROM LATE MONDAY EVENING TO EARLY WEDNESDAY MORNING. IF THE SECRETARY DOES NOT HAVE LUNCH WITH HIM DECEMBER 3, HE COULD INVITE SHULTZ FOR BREAKFAST DECEMBER 3 OR DECEMBER 4. PLEASE ADVISE.

3. GUIDO GOLDMAN'S FATHER, DR. NAHUM GOLDMAN HAS ASKED TO SEE THE SECRETARY SOMETIME DECEMBER 5, 6 OR 9. WILL SEE. OTHER. INGERSOLL

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RECD: NOV 23, 1974

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NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: STATEMENT FOR SFRC AND HFAC

FOR S/S AND BREMER; ALSO PASS LORD FROM BARTHOLOMEW

1. THIS IS FIRST DRAFT OF SECRETARY'S TESTIMONY BEFORE SFRC AND HFAC, SCHEDULED FOR EARLY DECEMBER. THE DISCUSSION PRESENTS AN OVERVIEW OF THE MAJOR CHALLENGES FACING OUR POLICY AND OF OUR INITIATIVES TO DEAL WITH THEM, INCLUDING THE TRAVELS OF THE SECRETARY AND THE PRESIDENT. IT ALSO DISCUSSES THE QUESTION OF THE FOREIGN AID BILL. THE GENERAL THEME IS THE NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR A FAR-REACHING AMERICAN POLICY IN A TIME OF CRISIS. THE



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DISCUSSION OF SECRETARY'S TRAVELS AND OF THE FOREIGN AID QUESTIONS MAY HAVE TO BE REVISED IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENS ON THESE VISITS AND IN CONGRESS UP TO THE TIME OF THE TESTIMONY.

2. THANK YOU MR. CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSMEN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN.

3. I APPRECIATE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO COME BEFORE YOU TO DISCUSS RECENT INITIATIVES IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. THE PRESIDENT AND I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM OUR TRAVELS TO THE FAR EAST, A JOURNEY WHICH WE BOTH CONSIDER TO HAVE BEEN OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE FOR THE WHOLE RANGE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES. IT IS AN IMPORTANT JUNCTURE FOR THE CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION TO HAVE A SHARED PERCEPTION OF THE CHALLENGES CONFRONTING THIS NATION AND FOR US TO WORK TOGETHER TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE.

4. THE CHALLENGES TO OUR POLICY (UNDERSCORE)  
TODAY, THE UNITED STATES FACES A WORLD IN WHICH UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGES POSE GREAT DANGERS, BUT ALSO GREAT OPPORTUNITIES, TO OURSELVES AND TO ALL NATIONS. TODAY,



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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 STATE 259215

-- WE MUST STRENGTHEN OUR TIES TO OUR TRADITIONAL FRIENDS AND ALLIES, AT A TIME WHEN SOLIDARITY IS VITAL TO THE INTERESTS OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD BUT WHEN NEW ISSUES HAVE ARISEN TO CAUSE DIVISION.

-- WE MUST PURSUE DETENTE WITH OUR TRADITIONAL COMMUNIST ADVERSARIES, AT A TIME WHEN CONSTRUCTIVE TIES TO THEM ARE EVEN MORE NECESSARY THAN IN THE PAST BUT WHEN DISARRAY IN THE WEST COULD TEMPT A RETURN TO MORE AGGRESSIVE POLICIES.

-- WE MUST MODERATE SITUATIONS OF LOCAL TENSION, SUCH AS THE MIDDLE EAST OR SOUTH ASIA, WHERE CONFLICT COULD THREATEN THE LARGER TRENDS TOWARD INTERDEPENDENCE AND COOPERATION IN THE WORLD.

-- AND WE MUST DEAL WITH OVERARCHING NEW ISSUES, SUCH AS FOOD AND ENERGY, WHICH THREATEN TO CREATE ENTIRELY NEW DIMENSIONS OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TENSION.

5. AMERICA'S CHALLENGES ARE ALSO THE CHALLENGES OF OTHER COUNTRIES. WHETHER WE MEET THEM TOGETHER WILL DEPEND, MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE, ON WHETHER OUR VISION CAN RISE TO THE LEVEL OF OUR COMMON PROBLEMS. SINCE OUR NATIONS HAVE PROVEN TO BE INTERDEPENDENT IN THEIR VULNERABILITY, THEY MUST ALSO CONCERT THEIR RESPONSES AND IDENTIFY THEIR

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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 04 STATE 259215

HOPES. THE POLITICAL CHOICE WE FACE IS BETWEEN A COOPERATIVE EFFORT TO SURMOUNT OUR PROBLEMS AND A DESTRUCTIVE RIVALRY IN WHICH UNILATERAL PURSUIT OF IMMEDIATE ADVANTAGE WOULD BRING RUIN UPON US ALL.

6. AMERICAN POLICY PROCEEDS FROM A FIRM CHOICE OF COOPERATION OVER CONFRONTATION. WE BELIEVE THAT CRISIS MUST PROVIDE THE OCCASION, NOT FOR COLLAPSE, BUT FOR THE CREATION OF A NEW AND STRONGER INTERNATIONAL ORDER.

7. THE UNITED STATES HAS LEARNED THAT WE CANNOT SOLVE EVERY PROBLEM BY OURSELVES. BUT WE ALSO KNOW THAT OTHER NATIONS CANNOT ACT EFFECTIVELY WITHOUT US. AMERICAN LEADERSHIP AND MAJOR AMERICAN CONTRIBUTIONS ARE PRECONDITIONS FOR THE COMMON ENDEAVOR WHICH MUST BE THE GUARANTEE OF WORLD PEACE AND PROSPERITY TODAY.

8. THE UNITED STATES IS AWARE OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. WE HAVE A POLICY TO DEAL WITH EACH OF THE CHALLENGES I HAVE MENTIONED. WE ARE CONFIDENT WE CAN BE SUCCESSFUL. BUT WE MUST BE WILLING TO MAKE THE COMMITMENTS AND ACCEPT THE SACRIFICES WHICH RESOLUTE ACTION WILL REQUIRE. WE MUST BE READY TO NEGOTIATE PATIENTLY AND MAGNANIMOUSLY.

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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 05 STATE 259215

CONCERNING ISSUES WHERE AGREEMENT HAS BECOME THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO RUINOUS COMPETITION OR CONFLICT. WE MUST BE WILLING TO MAKE THE SACRIFICES AT HOME AND THE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ABROAD WHICH WILL BE NECESSARY TO SOLVE THE ENERGY AND FOOD PROBLEMS ON A COOPERATIVE, INTERNATIONAL BASIS.

9. THIS NATION HAS PASSED THROUGH A TRAUMATIC DECADE, A PERIOD OF DIVISION AND DOUBT WHICH WOULD HAVE DESTROYED OTHER NATIONS. BUT THE LONG NIGHT OF OUR DESPAIR CAN NOW GIVE WAY TO A RESURRECTION OF THE AMERICAN SPIRIT. TODAY WE FACE GREAT CHALLENGES WHICH CAN LEAD TO A TRULY HISTORIC ERA OF AMERICAN CREATIVITY. BUT OUR NATION CANNOT SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY WITHOUT CONGRESSIONAL UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT.

10. I COME BEFORE YOU TODAY TO ASK THAT YOU JOIN IN PROVIDING, IN THE NAME OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, THE VISION, THE RESOLUTION, AND THE RESOURCES WHICH ARE NECESSARY FOR THE SUCCESS OF OUR POLICIES. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE POLICY WE AGREE ON WILL COMMAND THE ALLEGIANCE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND WILL VINDICATE THEIR HOPES FOR A MORE PEACEFUL AND PROSPEROUS WORLD.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 06 STATE 259215

11. LET ME NOW ADDRESS THE SPECIFIC ISSUES THAT ARE OF CONCERN TO THIS COMMITTEE. IT MAY SEEM POSSIBLE TO SEPARATE ONE MATTER FROM ANOTHER, BUT WE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT THE ASPECTS OF OUR POLICY ARE AS INTERDEPENDENT AS THE WORLD THEY ADDRESS. EACH AFFECTS A DIFFERENT STRAND OF THE WEB OF RELATIONSHIPS WHICH HAS COME TO BIND THE UNITED STATES TO OTHER NATIONS AND WHICH MUST BE THE BASIS FOR OUR COMMON SECURITY AND WELL-BEING.


12. THE TRAVELS OF THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY (UNDERSCORE)

LET ME FIRST DISCUSS THE VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT AND MYSELF TO EAST ASIA.

13. JAPAN: OUR FIRST STOP, IN JAPAN, MARKED A NEW AND IMPORTANT STAGE IN AMERICA'S DEEPENING RELATIONSHIP WITH ONE OF OUR MOST TRUSTED FRIENDS AND ALLIES. THE VISIT HAD A SPECIAL DIMENSION BECAUSE IT WAS THE FIRST VISIT OF A SERVING AMERICAN PRESIDENT TO JAPAN. PRESIDENT FORD'S CONSULTATIONS WITH THE EMPEROR AND WITH PRIME MINISTER TANAKA SIGNIFY, IN OUR OPINION, JAPAN'S EMERGENCE INTO A MORE EQUAL PARTNERSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES. THE DAYS

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*Department of State*

**TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 07 STATE 259215

OF AMERICAN PREEMINENCE AND JAPANESE QUIESCENCE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP ARE OVER. THE JAPANESE ARE NOW JOINING US IN A CONFIDENT EFFORT TO ADDRESS, NOT ONLY BILATERAL ISSUES, BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY THE MAJOR MULTILATERAL QUESTIONS ON THE WORLD SCENE.

14. WE PURSUED VERY USEFUL SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS COVERING THE WHOLE RANGE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. WE ASSURED THE JAPANESE THAT WE WILL REMAIN A RELIABLE TRADING PARTNER AND SUPPLIER OF RAW MATERIALS. ANY MILITARY ISSUES THAT MAY ARISE BETWEEN US WILL BE DEALT WITH IN THE ACCEPTED FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITY TREATY. THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERS OUR CLOSE TIES WITH JAPAN TO BE OF THE HIGHEST VALUE TO BOTH OUR COUNTRIES AND TO THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY OF EAST ASIA.

15. OUR CHALLENGE NOW IS TO USE OUR STRONG RELATIONSHIP TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE MULTILATERAL SOLUTION OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ISSUES THAT HAVE ARISEN, NOTABLY FOOD AND ENERGY. WE DISCUSSED JAPAN'S SPECIAL DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTED FOOD AND OIL AND THE DIFFICULTIES SHE WILL HAVE IN ECONOMIZING ON CONSUMPTION. AT THE SAME TIME, JUST BECAUSE JAPAN IS A MAJOR CONSUMER WITH ONE OF THE MOST

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*Department of State*

**TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 08 STATE 259215

POWERFUL ECONOMIES, NO COMMON SOLUTION TO THE FOOD AND ENERGY PROBLEMS IS CONCEIVABLE WITHOUT HER PARTICIPATION. WE DISCUSSED WITH THE JAPANESE THE COOPERATIVE APPROACHES TO THE FOOD AND ENERGY PROBLEMS WHICH WE HAVE RECENTLY PROPOSED. WE WERE ASSURED THAT JAPAN WILL CONTRIBUTE ITS UNUSUAL RESOURCES AND GROWING CONFIDENCE TO OUR COMMON EFFORT TO AID A THREATENED WORLD ORDER.

16. KOREA: THE VISIT TO SOUTH KOREA WAS A NATURAL EXTENSION OF OUR TRIP TO JAPAN. BOTH COUNTRIES ARE VITAL TO AMERICAN SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE FAR EAST. KOREA HAS ALWAYS BEEN A NEXUS OF GREAT-POWER INTERESTS. WE REAFFIRMED THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO THE SECURITY OF A NATION WHICH IS IMPORTANT TO THE STABILITY OF THE ENTIRE REGION AND, THEREFORE, TO PROSPECTS FOR DETENTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA.

17. THE SOVIET UNION: (THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION WILL HAVE TO BE CHANGED OR SUPPLEMENTED IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENS.) OUR SUBSEQUENT JOURNEY TO VLADIVOSTOK SYMBOLIZED THE FACT THAT TODAY PEACE REQUIRES THAT WE BUILD CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS WITH OUR ADVERSARIES AS WELL AS

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*Department of State*

**TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 09 STATE 259215

STRONGER UNITY WITH OUR FRIENDS. THE STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF THE WORLD CAN NO LONGER TOLERATE SO SEVERE AN ENMITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION THAT ALL RESOURCES ARE CONSUMED IN A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN BLOCS AND NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST IS A CONSTANT POSSIBILITY.

18. OUR VISIT HAD THE IMMEDIATE PURPOSE OF ALLOWING PRESIDENT FORD TO ESTABLISH PERSONAL CONTACT WITH THE LEADERS OF THE SOVIET UNION. SUCH ACQUAINTANCES CAN HELP BOTH SIDES MAKE CORRECT JUDGMENTS OF INTENTIONS IN OUR BROADER DIPLOMACY AND IN SITUATIONS OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT.

19. THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS ALSO REVIEWED OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH GREAT THOROUGHNESS. BOTH SIDES ARE COMMITTED TO THE PROGRESS OF DETENTE. BOTH HAVE AN INTEREST IN THE RELAXATION OF TENSIONS ON MANY FRONTS. YET, AT THE SAME TIME, THE UNITED STATES IS DETERMINED NOT TO COMPROMISE OUR VITAL INTERESTS SIMPLY TO MAINTAIN AN ATMOSPHERE OF AGREEMENT. A SUCCESSFUL POLICY OF DETENTE REQUIRES THE PARADOXICAL REALIZATION THAT MODERATE BEHAVIOR BY THE TWO SUPERPOWERS CAN -- INDEED,



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 10 STATE 259215

MUST -- COEXIST WITH A BASIC OPPOSITION BETWEEN MANY OF THEIR INTERESTS AND VALUES. DETENTE RECOGNIZES THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US, BUT IT ALSO ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE AREAS OF AGREEMENT WHICH SERVE OUR INTERESTS AND THE INTERESTS OF A MORE SECURE WORLD ORDER. DETENTE REQUIRES THAT WE NEITHER ABANDON OUR POSITIONS FOR THE SAKE OF GOODWILL NOR INSIST THAT ALL THE ADVANTAGES OF AGREEMENT ACCRUE TO OURSELVES.

20. A FIRM GRASP OF THIS BALANCE GOVERNED OUR DISCUSSIONS OF THE CRITICAL SALT ISSUE. THE UNITED STATES IS DETERMINED TO OBTAIN AN AGREEMENT WHICH CAN GAIN CONTROL OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE WITHOUT SACRIFICING OUR OWN SECURITY OR MAKING US DEPENDENT ON SOVIET GOOD INTENTIONS. WHILE IT WAS PREMATURE TO EXPECT A CONCRETE AGREEMENT AT VLADIVOSTOK, OUR DISCUSSIONS WERE HIGHLY SUBSTANTIVE AND IMPORTANT PROGRESS WAS MADE. WE CONTINUE TO BE CONFIDENT THAT A MEANINGFUL NEW AGREEMENT WILL BE POSSIBLE IN 1975.

21. THERE WERE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS OF IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS THAT CONCERN BOTH OUR COUNTRIES, NOTABLY THE MIDDLE EAST. THE UNITED STATES HAD PLAYED A MAJOR

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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 11 STATE 259215

ROLE IN DEALING WITH THIS PROBLEM. BUT A CONSTRUCTIVE AND COOPERATIVE SOVIET STANCE IS ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESS. ON THIS ISSUE, JUST AS IN THE MORE TRADITIONAL AREAS OF OUR RIVALRY, ENMITIES DATING FROM THE PAST MUST BE MODERATED IN THE INTERESTS OF A BETTER WORLD ORDER IN THE PRESENT AND IN THE FUTURE.

22. CHINA: (THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION WILL HAVE TO BE CHANGED OR SUPPLEMENTED IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENS.) AFTER VLADIVOSTOK, THE PRESIDENT RETURNED HOME AND I WENT ON TO PEKING. THIS VISIT TO CHINA, LIKE MY VISITS TO THE SOVIET UNION, WAS ONE OF A REGULAR SERIES OF MEETINGS OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS. IN BOTH CASES, THE PURPOSE HAS BEEN, NOT SO MUCH TO CONCLUDE DEFINITE AGREEMENTS, AS TO CARRY ON AND DEVELOP MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE MAJOR COMMUNIST POWERS.

23. IN CHINA, THE RELATIONSHIP WE HAVE ESTABLISHED IS ITSELF OUR MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT. ONLY A FEW YEARS AGO, CHINA WAS VIRTUALLY ISOLATED FROM INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ENGAGED IN ACTIVE OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN INTERESTS IN ASIA. TODAY, THE NORMALIZATION OF OUR RELATIONS HAS PROCEEDED TO THE POINT WHERE WE DISCUSS



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 12 STATE 259215

OUR DIFFERENCES FRANKLY AND HAVE REGULAR DIPLOMATIC INTERACTIONS ON A NUMBER OF LEVELS.

24. THE PURPOSE OF THIS LAST VISIT WAS TO CARRY THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION A STEP FURTHER. WE ALSO WANTED TO AFFIRM OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NEW GENERATION OF CHINESE LEADERS WHICH IS ASSUMING INCREASING RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE GOVERNMENT. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA WILL CONTINUE TO IMPROVE, TO THE MUTUAL BENEFIT OF BOTH OUR PEOPLES.

25. THE MIDDLE EAST: PRIOR TO MY TRIP WITH THE PRESIDENT TO THE FAR EAST, I TRAVELLED TO MANY OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA. LET ME ALSO SUMMARIZE BRIEFLY THE RESULTS OF THESE VISITS.

26. THE MIDDLE EAST IS OF CENTRAL CONCERN TO THE ENTIRE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. THERE IS NO OTHER AREA WHERE THE POSSIBILITY OF ARMED CONFLICT POSES SO IMMEDIATE A THREAT TO OUR LARGER HOPES FOR PEACE AND PROSPERITY IN THE WORLD. ALTHOUGH IT DID NOT LEAD TO WAR, THE RECENT STATE OF ALERT IN THE MIDDLE EAST SHOULD WARN US NOT TO BE COMPLACENT ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY.



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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 13 STATE 259215

OUR APPROACH OF PROCEEDING TOWARDS A GENERAL SETTLEMENT THROUGH PARTIAL AGREEMENTS HAS MET WITH SUCCESS, BUT SUCCESS WILL NOT CONTINUE UNLESS WE PERSEVERE IN OUR EFFORTS WITH ENERGY AND IMAGINATION.

27. MY IMMEDIATE REASON FOR GOING TO THE MIDDLE EAST WAS TO EXPLORE THE CHANCES FOR FURTHER STEPS IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS. THE ARAB SUMMIT AT RABAT, AT WHICH THE PLO WAS RECOGNIZED AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS, AND THE RECENT HARDENING OF TENSIONS IN THE AREA HAD SEEMED TO FORECLOSE CHANCES FOR FURTHER PROGRESS. BUT MY OWN TALKS REVEALED THAT THE PARTIES STILL DESIRE NEGOTIATIONS AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE THEM TAKE PLACE. CONSULTATIONS ARE NOW UNDER WAY TO DISCOVER HOW THIS MAY BE POSSIBLE. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT RHETORIC MUST YIELD TO REALISM ON ALL SIDES IF FURTHER ACCOMMODATIONS ARE TO BE POSSIBLE. THE UNITED STATES IS READY TO OFFER ITS GOOD OFFICES, AS WE HAVE DONE IN THE PAST. AND WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT A RENEWED COMMITMENT TO PEACE BY ALL INVOLVED CAN MAINTAIN MOMENTUM TOWARDS A LASTING SETTLEMENT.

28. CYPRUS: AS YOU KNOW, I ALSO INTENDED TO VISIT TURKEY TO DISCUSS THE CYPRUS SITUATION. WE HAD REASON



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*Department of State*

**TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 14 STATE 259215

TO BELIEVE THAT AGREEMENT WITH THE TURKISH LEADERS WAS POSSIBLE ON A NUMBER OF MEASURES TO PROMOTE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES IN CYPRUS. UNFORTUNATELY, A DOMESTIC POLITICAL CRISIS IN TURKEY INTERVENED. BUT WE ARE STILL CONFIDENT THAT MAJOR STEPS TOWARD A RESOLUTION OF THIS AGE-OLD CONFLICT ARE POSSIBLE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE ARE WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE NEW TURKISH GOVERNMENT AND WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREECE AND CYPRUS TO ACHIEVE A LASTING SETTLEMENT.

29. INDIA AND SOUTH ASIA: TURNING TO SOUTH ASIA, OUR PRINCIPAL INTEREST IS THAT THESE COUNTRIES MEET THEIR REGIONAL CHALLENGES SUCCESSFULLY AND PARTICIPATE IN ADDRESSING THE NEW GLOBAL ISSUES THAT ARE OF CONCERN TO ALL NATIONS.

30. MY VISIT TO THIS REGION MARKED A NEW BEGINNING IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA. BOTH COUNTRIES WERE WILLING TO PUT AN END TO THE PERIOD OF STRAIN DATING FROM 1971. BOTH WERE READY TO UNDERTAKE A RENEWED RELATIONSHIP BASED ON A MORE REALISTIC AND SYMPATHETIC APPRECIATION OF EACH OTHERS INTERESTS AND



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*Department of State*

**TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 15 STATE 259215

INTENTIONS'. THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES THAT INDIA'S SIZE AND POSITION ENTITLE HER TO A POSITION OF LEADERSHIP IN THE SUBCONTINENT'. BUT ALONG WITH POWER AND PRE-EMINENCE MUST GO A SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RESTRAINT'. INDIA ASSURED US THAT IT SHARED OUR CONCERN FOR THE SECURITY OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE AREA AND FOR CONTRIBUTING CONSTRUCTIVELY TO INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO CONTROL NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND DEAL WITH THE FOOD AND ENERGY PROBLEMS'.

31'. I ALSO VISITED BANGLADESH, PAKISTAN, AND AFGHANISTAN. TO THESE COUNTRIES I EXPRESSED OUR SUPPORT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF ALL NATIONS IN THE AREA AND FOR THE SIMLA PROCESS FOR ADJUSTING DIFFERENCES PEACEFULLY'. THE UNITED STATES WILL CONDUCT ITS OWN POLICY SO THAT NO GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE REASON TO FEEL THAT OUR FRIENDSHIP WITH ONE COUNTRY PRECLUDES FRIENDSHIP WITH THE OTHERS'. IN ALL COUNTRIES I EMPHASIZED THAT THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO ECONOMIC AND FOOD ASSISTANCE WILL CONTINUE BUT THAT IT MUST BE COMPLEMENTED BY MULTILATERAL EFFORTS AND BY MORE EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR SELF-HELP'.

32'. TO SUM UP, THE VISITS I HAVE DISCUSSED WERE VERY

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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 16 STATE 259215

USEFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE. THEY GAVE THE UNITED STATES A CHANCE TO COMMUNICATE CLOSELY WITH COUNTRIES IN SEVERAL REGIONS CONCERNING ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN.

33. NOW LET ME ADDRESS THREE POLICY AREAS IN WHICH ALL THESE COUNTRIES WERE VIRTUALLY INTERESTED AND WHICH ARE OF DIRECT CONCERN TO THIS COMMITTEE.

34. ENERGY: FIRST, THE ENERGY CRISIS. THE RECENT, CATASTROPHIC RISE IN OIL PRICES HAS CAUSED WORLDWIDE INFLATION AND BLIGHTED HOPES FOR BETTERMENT IN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING NATIONS ALIKE. THE PROBLEM MUST BE FACED. ALL THE CONSUMING COUNTRIES MUST RECKON WITH THE CERTAINTY THAT THE MASSIVE TRANSFER OF RESOURCES TO THE PRODUCERS THAT IS NOW OCCURRING CANNOT CONTINUE INDEFINITELY WITHOUT SERIOUS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DAMAGE TO OUR SOCIETIES.

35. THE UNITED STATES HAS ALREADY STATED A STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM, A STRATEGY WHICH HAS MET WITH WIDESPREAD SUPPORT AT HOME AND ABROAD. ON NOVEMBER 14, I SET OUT A FIVE-POINT PROGRAM OF ACTION. IT SPECIFIED WAYS THE CONSUMING NATIONS COULD COOPERATE



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 17 STATE 259215

TO LOWER ENERGY CONSUMPTION, DEVELOP ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES, SAFEGUARD OUR ECONOMIES AGAINST THE DANGERS POSED BY OIL BOYCOTTS AND RECYCLING OF OIL REVENUES, INCREASE AID TO THE HARD-PRESSED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, AND PREPARE FOR AN EVENTUAL NEGOTIATION WITH THE PRODUCERS. THESE STEPS SHOULD CREATE THE OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS FOR EVENTUAL REDUCTION IN THE PRICE OF OIL AND, IN THE MEANTIME, GUARD AGAINST THE DISRUPTION OF OUR ECONOMIES BY THE NEW ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL POWER POSSESSED BY THE PRODUCERS.

36. AT EVERY STAGE IN ITS REACTION TO THE ENERGY PROBLEM, THIS COUNTRY HAS STRESSED THAT THE SOLUTION WOULD DEPEND, MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE, ON THE ABILITY OF THE CONSUMING NATIONS TO WORK TOGETHER. EXPERIENCE HAS ALREADY SHOWN THAT ATTEMPTS BY INDIVIDUAL CONSUMERS TO SECURE SUPPLIES ONLY FOR THEMSELVES WILL PERPETUATE HIGH PRICES FOR ALL. BUT COOPERATION CAN RESTORE THE BALANCE OF ECONOMIC POWER AND ASSURE A MORE PROSPEROUS FUTURE FOR BOTH CONSUMING AND PRODUCING NATIONS.

37. THE RECENT ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY PROGRAM

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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 18 STATE 259215

(IEP) ALREADY DEMONSTRATE WHAT THE CONSUMERS CAN ACHIEVE BY WORKING TOGETHER. THROUGH THE IEA, THE INDUSTRIAL NATIONS CAN COLLABORATE IN THE MANY AREAS OF ENERGY POLICY I HAVE MENTIONED. AND IN THE IEP THEY HAVE ALREADY AGREED ON A COMMON PROGRAM TO DEAL WITH ANY FUTURE OIL EMERGENCIES COLLECTIVELY AND EQUITABLY. THE PRODUCING NATIONS SHOULD NOT FEEL THAT CONSUMER SOLIDARITY WILL BE USED FOR A CONFRONTATION WITH THEM, SINCE THEY THEMSELVES HAVE ASKED THAT THE CONSUMERS WORK TOGETHER ON CONSERVATION AND COMMON GUARANTEES FOR FINANCIAL SOLVENCY. RATHER, CONSUMER UNITY WILL ALLOW US TO WORK WITH THE PRODUCERS TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS THAT WILL ENSURE THE HEALTH OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY, TO THE BENEFIT OF PRODUCER AND CONSUMER ALIKE.

38. THE ISSUE NOW IS WHETHER WE HAVE SUFFICIENT RESOLUTION AT HOME TO SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL ACTION WITH THE NECESSARY DOMESTIC DECISIONS. OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE IEP WILL SHORTLY REQUIRE US TO ENACT LEGISLATION PROVIDING FOR EMERGENCY ENERGY POWERS TO BE USED IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER OIL BOYCOTT. THE TARGETS FOR OIL



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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 19 STATE 259215

CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW ENERGY SOURCES WHICH I ANNOUNCED ON NOVEMBER 14 WILL REQUIRE OTHER DIFFICULT DECISIONS FROM US. AS THE PAST YEAR HAS DEMONSTRATED, OIL PRICES WILL NOT DECLINE ON THEIR OWN. AND ADEQUATE ENERGY WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR THE YEARS AHEAD UNLESS WE MOVE TO CREATE IT. THE CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION MUST ACT TOGETHER TO DEAL DECISIVELY WITH THE GREAT DANGERS THAT ARE ALREADY UPON US.

39. FOOD: THE OTHER MAJOR WORLD ECONOMIC PROBLEM CONFRONTING US IS THE FOOD SHORTAGE. A COMBINATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES, INCLUDING POOR HARVESTS, THE ENERGY CRISIS, AND GREATER CONSUMPTION IN ALL COUNTRIES, HAS CAUSED DEMAND FOR FOOD GRAINS TO OUTFRAN SUPPLY FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A GENERATION. IN THE FACE OF THE RESULTING SCARCITIES, THE POOREST NATIONS ARE BEING FORCED TO ABANDON THEIR PROUD HOPES FOR DEVELOPMENT AND STRUGGLE TO SECURE MERE SUSTENANCE FOR THEIR PEOPLES. THIS IS A CATASTROPHE FOR THE RICHER NATIONS AS WELL. WE CANNOT SIT BY AND WITNESS THE HUMBLING OF HUMAN HOPES AND VALUES IN WHICH WE ALSO DEEPLY BELIEVE. NOR CAN WE ASSUME THAT WE COULD KNOW PEACE AND PLENTY IN A WORLD



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 20 STATE 259215

RIVEN BY SCARCITY AND RISING TENSIONS.

40. THE UNITED STATES HAS ALREADY PROPOSED A PROGRAM FOR ACTION AT THE WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE IN ROME. ON THE BASIS OF OUR PROPOSALS, THE CONFERENCE RESOLVED TO ESTABLISH A WORLD SYSTEM OF FOOD RESERVES AND TO INSTITUTE A NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL BODIES TO EXPAND FOOD PRODUCTION AND INVESTMENT AND HELP FINANCE THE FOOD IMPORTS OF THE POOREST DEFICIT NATIONS. WE EXPECT THAT A GROUP OF MAJOR EXPORTERS AND IMPORTERS WILL MEET EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR TO SETTLE DETAILS OF THE RESERVE SYSTEM. THE EFFORT MUST BE COOPERATIVE TO SUCCEED. ALL NATIONS MUST CONTRIBUTE WHO HAVE THE CAPABILITY, PARTICULARLY THE OIL PRODUCERS WHO HAVE THE MEANS TO FINANCE MAJOR PROGRAMS IN FOOD PRODUCTION AND FOOD TRANSFERS. TO MEET THE IMMEDIATE THREAT TO FAMINE, THE UNITED STATES, AS THE WORLD'S MAJOR FOOD EXPORTER, HAS A PARTICULARLY VITAL ROLE TO PLAY. WE PLAN TO SPEND SUBSTANTIALLY MORE ON FOOD AID DURING THIS FISCAL YEAR THAN LAST, IN SPITE OF TIGHT BUDGETARY AND MARKET CONDITIONS IN OUR OWN COUNTRY. FURTHER, WE HAVE TAKEN

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 21 STATE 259215

PAINS TO ASSURE OUR TRADITIONAL CUSTOMERS AMONG THE DEVELOPED NATIONS THAT WE WILL REMAIN A RELIABLE SUPPLIER OF FOOD GRAINS TO THEM. WE ARE MONITORING THE LEVEL OF DEMAND ON OUR SUPPLIES CLOSELY, TO AVOID SHARP PRICE INCREASES OF THE KIND THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN THE PAST, BUT AT PRESENT WE THINK WE CAN MEET DEMAND WITHOUT IMPOSING EXPORT CONTROLS.

41. FOREIGN AID: (THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION MAY HAVE TO BE CHANGED OR SUPPLEMENTED DEPENDING ON THE SHAPE OF THE AID BILL AND THE CONGRESSIONAL SITUATION AT THE TIME OF TESTIMONY.)


42. NOW LET ME ADDRESS THE LEGISLATIVE ISSUE OF MOST IMMEDIATE CONCERN TO THIS COMMITTEE -- THE FOREIGN AID BILL FOR THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR.

43. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO EXAGGERATE THE IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN AID FOR THE ENTIRE RANGE OF OUR DIPLOMATIC ENDEAVORS. THE WORLD POLITICAL ORDER WILL BE PROFOUNDLY INFLUENCED, PERHAPS FOR YEARS TO COME, BY THE CAPACITY THIS PROGRAM PROVIDES FOR A MAJOR AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION TO A MORE JUST, PEACEFUL AND COOPERATIVE WORLD.

44. INTERNATIONAL HOPES FOR A BETTER FUTURE HAVE SUFFERED

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**TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 22 STATE 259215

SEVERE REVERSES. RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS HAVE PLACED MANY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE MOST SERIOUS DANGER. THE FOOD AND ENERGY CRISES HAVE OVERWHELMED THEIR ASPIRATIONS FOR A RICHER EXISTENCE AND REDUCED THEM TO A DESPERATE STRUGGLE FOR SUBSISTENCE. I DO NOT FOR A MOMENT MINIMIZE THE SERIOUS RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OIL PRODUCERS FOR THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS; WE HAVE CALLED ON THEM TO ASSUME THE NEW RESPONSIBILITIES WITH REGARD TO AID THAT FOLLOW FROM THEIR NEW AFFLUENCE. BUT WHATEVER THEIR RESPONSE -- AND IT HAS NOT BEEN NEGLIGIBLE -- THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD BEARS A GREAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WELFARE OF THE POOR NATIONS WHOSE ASPIRATION WE HAVE ENDORSED AND SUPPORTED FOR A GENERATION.

45. TO SUSTAIN OUR LEVELS OF AID IS A MATTER, NOT SIMPLY OF HUMANITY, BUT OF ENLIGHTENED SELF-INTEREST. FOR NO INTERNATIONAL ORDER CAN BE LEGITIMATE IF IT DENIES THE DEEP HOPES FOR ECONOMIC ADVANCEMENT ON WHICH MANY DEVELOPING NATIONS HAVE BASED THEIR VERY IDENTITIES. THE RICHER NATIONS MUST REALIZE THAT WE CANNOT EXPECT A STABLE WORLD IF THE POORER NATIONS FEEL THAT THEY NO



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**TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 23 STATE 259215

LONGER HAVE A STAKE IN OUR PEACE AND PROSPERITY. HOPES FOR DEVELOPMENT ARE SHARED BY ALL NATIONS, RICH AND POOR ALIKE. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS GOAL MUST ALSO BE SHARED BY ALL, OR IT WILL BE ENJOYED BY NONE.

46. THE OIL CRISIS HAS RECENTLY BROUGHT HOME TO US THE DANGERS OF ALLOWING THE DEVELOPING WORLD TO CONCEIVE THAT THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL OPPOSITION BETWEEN THEIR INTERESTS AND OURS. THE BELIEF THAT THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD HAS NO COMMITMENT TO THE POORER NATIONS HAS OBSCURED THE FUNDAMENTAL STAKE WHICH ALL COUNTRIES HAVE IN A PROSPEROUS AND COOPERATIVE WORLD ECONOMY. THERE IS THE GRAVEST DANGER THAT OUR COMMON INTERESTS WILL BE FORGOTTEN BECAUSE OF A PERCEIVED DENIAL OF COMMON PURPOSES.

47. AMERICA'S FOREIGN AID CAN PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN REAFFIRMING OUR COMMITMENT TO A MORE PROSPEROUS FUTURE IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD. OUR AID PROGRAM WILL BE VITAL TO DISCHARGING THE COMMITMENTS WHICH WE MADE AT THE ROME FOOD CONFERENCE AND TO THE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS WHICH MUST HELP US TO RESOLVE THE ENERGY CRISIS.

48. OUR ECONOMIC AID IS ALWAYS LIMITED IN RELATION TO



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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 24 STATE 259215

THE NEED. IT IS MEANT TO FOSTER SELF-RELIANCE, RATHER THAN DEPENDENCE, IN THE COUNTRIES WE HELP. THE SAME IS TRUE OF OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS WHOLEHEARTEDLY ACCEPTED THE GOAL THAT OUR ALLIES SHOULD BECOME MORE SELF-SUFFICIENT. BUT WE MUST REALIZE THAT A PERIOD OF TRANSITION IS NECESSARY TO BRING THIS ABOUT WITHOUT DANGER TO OUR VITAL INTERESTS, PARTICULARLY IN AREAS LIKE SOUTHEAST ASIA WHERE OUR PARTNERS ARE STILL UNDER HEAVY MILITARY PRESSURE FROM THEIR OPPONENTS.

49. OUR ASSISTANCE IS ALSO CRITICAL TO OUR ABILITY TO ACHIEVE QUITE SPECIFIC DIPLOMATIC OBJECTIVES. IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, WE HAVE CONCLUDED DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENTS THAT INCLUDED AMERICAN PLEDGES OF AID TO THE COMBATANTS. OUR ABILITY TO PROMISE THIS ASSISTANCE WAS A MAJOR FACTOR IN OUR CAPACITY TO OBTAIN THE AGREEMENTS. AND OUR REFUSAL TO PROVIDE THE AID NOW WOULD BE RECEIVED ABROAD AS EVIDENCE OF OUR BAD FAITH.

50. BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN AID, THE ADMINISTRATION URGENTLY SEEKS PASSAGE OF A FOREIGN AID BILL. WE WANT A BILL RATHER THAN A CONTINUING

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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 25 STATE 259215

RESOLUTION, AND WE WANT IT IN THIS SESSION. A CONTINUING RESOLUTION WOULD NOT GIVE US THE NEW LEGISLATIVE AUTHORIZATION THAT WE NEED TO BEGIN THE NEW ASSISTANCE PROJECTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND TO LAUNCH A GLOBAL EFFORT IN FOOD. AND EVEN DELAY IN ENACTING A BILL WOULD CAST DAMAGING DOUBT UPON HOW SERIOUSLY WE TAKE THE MOST THREATENING DANGERS FACING THE WORLD TODAY.

51. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS IMPORTANT RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE FOREIGN AID BILL THAT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THIS COMMITTEE. WE WILL OPPOSE ANY PROVISION THAT WOULD MAKE SPECIFIC AID PROJECTS SUBJECT TO RETROSPECTIVE VETO BY THE CONGRESS. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND WOULD CAST A PALL OF UNCERTAINTY OVER OUR ABILITY TO MAKE AID COMMITMENTS ABROAD. WE WILL OPPOSE EFFORTS TO IMPOSE UNREASONABLE POLITICAL CONDITIONS UPON THE COUNTRIES TO WHICH WE GIVE AID. AMERICA'S ACCEPTANCE THAT WE LIVE IN A PLURALIST WORLD WILL NOT BE A REAL ONE UNTIL WE CEASE TO LEVY UNNECESSARY EXPECTATIONS ON THE DOMESTIC ARRANGEMENTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. AND FINALLY, THE ADMINISTRATION REGRETS THAT CEILINGS FOR AID HAVE BEEN SET SUBSTANTIALLY BELOW THOSE REQUESTED, EVEN

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 26 STATE 259215

THOUGH OUR INITIAL REQUEST REPRESENTED WELL UNDER ONE PERCENT OF OUR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT. AT A TIME WHEN MILLIONS OF MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN ARE STARVING TO DEATH AND WHEN ENTIRE REGIONS ARE THREATENED WITH NEW CAUSES OF CONFLICT A MAJOR AMERICAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS MORALLY AND POLITICALLY ESSENTIAL.

52. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ADMINISTRATION IS EAGER TO OBTAIN PASSAGE OF AN AID BILL QUICKLY. WE APPRECIATE THAT THE HOUSE BILL IS MORE MODERATE IN THE PARTICULARS I HAVE JUST MENTIONED THAN THE SENATE VERSION. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT WE CAN WORK WITH BOTH HOUSES TO ACHIEVE A BILL WHICH IS ACCEPTABLE TO CONGRESS WHILE MEETING THE BASIC NEEDS FOR ASSISTANCE WHICH WE PERCEIVE IN THE WORLD.

CONCLUSION (UNDERScore)

53. I WOULD LIKE TO CONCLUDE BY STRESSING THE NEED FOR VISION. TODAY I HAVE DISCUSSED A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC ISSUES AND DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES. EACH CAN BE CONSIDERED IN ITS OWN TERMS. EACH POSES QUESTIONS OF IMMEDIATE CONCERN TO CONGRESS. IT WOULD BE VERY EASY TO CONSIDER



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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 27 STATE 259215

EACH COMPONENT OF OUR POLICY IN ISOLATION AND TO FOCUS ONLY ON THE COSTS WHICH IT WILL IMPOSE ON US IN THE SHORT RUN.

54. BUT GREAT FOREIGN POLICIES ARE MEASURED, IN PART, BY THEIR BREADTH AND THEIR PERSEVERENCE. AMERICAN POLICY TODAY HAS CONSCIOUSLY TRIED TO BE COMPREHENSIVE AND TO LOOK TO THE LONG TERM. WE CANNOT EXPECT THAT EVERY ASPECT OF IT WILL SECURE AN IMMEDIATE ADVANTAGE FOR THE UNITED STATES. EACH ASPECT MUST BE SEEN IN RELATION TO THE WHOLE. AND THE WHOLE MUST BE MEASURED AGAINST ITS CAPACITY TO SECURE A SAFER AND MORE PROSPEROUS WORLD, NOT ONLY FOR THE PRESENT GENERATION, BUT FOR GENERATIONS TO COME.

55. THE MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATION REALIZE THAT WE CANNOT SET POLICY ALONE. WHAT WE PROPOSE MUST BECOME, THROUGH YOUR AGREEMENT, THE POLICY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. WHEN WE COME BEFORE YOU, WE EXPECT CRITICISM, AND WE EXPECT TO COMPROMISE. BUT WE ASK THAT CRITICISM

BE PITCHED AT A LEVEL THAT IS ABLE TO ADDRESS THE CHALLENGES BEFORE US. WE ASK THAT OUR DECISIONS SHOULD BE

WORTHY OF THE RESPONSIBLE ROLE WHICH OUR GREAT NATION





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 28 STATE 259215

MUST CONTINUE TO PLAY IN THE WORLD TODAY.

56. WE HAVE NOT SHRUNK FROM OUR RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE PAST. THE POSTWAR INTERNATIONAL ORDER IS A TESTIMONY TO OUR STATESMANSHIP AND GENEROSITY IN THE GENERATION THAT IS PAST. WE MUST NOW RESOLVE TO PREPARE A BETTER WORLD FOR THE GENERATIONS TO COME. THROUGH AMERICAN LEADERSHIP, THE PRESENT CRISIS CAN BRING FORTH THE CREATION OF A NEW, MORE COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL ORDER THAT CAN SECURE GREATER PEACE AND PLENTY FOR ALL NATIONS. TO BE WORTHY OF THAT CHALLENGE SHOULD BE OUR HIGHEST GOAL AS WE ADDRESS THE IMMEDIATE ISSUES BEFORE US.

57. THANK YOU. I WILL NOW BE HAPPY TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS. I UNDERSTAND THAT QUESTIONS ABOUT THE TRAVELS OF THE PRESIDENT AND MYSELF ARE TO BE TAKEN IN EXECUTIVE SESSION. INGERSOLL

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# Department of State

## TELEGRAM

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH, US

SUBJECT: CANADIAN/PRC JOINT COMMUNIQUE

REF: TOKYO 15311

FOR GLEYSTEN FROM HUMMEL

1. THE PERTINENT PASSAGES IN THE JOINT PRC-CANADIAN COMMUNIQUE OF OCTOBER 13, 1970 ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS: BEGIN TEXT

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF MUTUAL RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND EQUALITY AND MUTUAL BENEFIT, HAVE DECIDED UPON MUTUAL RECOGNITION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 13, 1970.

THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT REAFFIRMS THAT TAIWAN IS AN INALIENABLE PART OF THE TERRITORY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT TAKES NOTE OF THIS POSITION OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.



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# Department of State

## TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 259294

THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AS THE SOLE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA.  
END TEXT.

2. IN SUBSEQUENT COMMUNIQUE, INCLUDING THOSE RAISING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS TO THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL WITH THE UK AND THE NETHERLANDS, THE FORMULATIONS VARY WIDELY. IN THE GREAT MAJORITY OF CASES THE PRC IS RECOGNIZED AS EITHER "THE SOLE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA" OR AS "THE SOLE LEGAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTING THE ENTIRE CHINESE PEOPLE." MEXICO, THE FRG AND SEVERAL OTHERS, HOWEVER, DID NOT USE EITHER FORMULA. NUMEROUS COUNTRIES SUCH AS ITALY AND GREECE FOLLOWED THE CANADIAN EXAMPLE IN THAT EACH "TAKES NOTE" OF THE PRC'S POSITION THAT "TAIWAN IS AN INALIENABLE PART OF THE TERRITORY OF THE PRC" OR THAT "TAIWAN IS A PROVINCE OF THE PRC." THE MALDIVES "RECOGNIZES" THIS POSITION, THE UK "ACKNOWLEDGES," THE NETHERLANDS "RESPECTS," AND JAPAN BOTH "UNDERSTANDS AND RESPECTS." MANY OF THE COMMUNIQUE, HOWEVER, HAVE NOT EXPLICITLY MENTIONED TAIWAN.

3. WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE HAVE DRAWN UPON THE "FIVE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" IN STATING THE BASIS FOR ESTABLISHING RELATIONS. THE PRINCIPLES CITED HAVE VARIED, BUT SUCH REFERENCES HAVE ALWAYS INCLUDED "TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY" AND "NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS," WHICH IN PEKING'S EYES REINFORCE ITS CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER TAIWAN.

4. IN THE TWO MOST RECENT COMMUNIQUE, BRAZIL AND GRENADA BOTH RECOGNIZED THE PRC AS THE SOLE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA. BRAZIL, HOWEVER, "TOOK NOTE" OF THE PRC POSITION ON TAIWAN, WHILE GRENADA "ACKNOWLEDGED" IT. THE SIMPLIST FORMULA TO DATE WAS OCTOBER 11, 1972 COMMUNIQUE WITH FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, WHICH MERELY STATED THAT "THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY DECIDED ON OCTOBER 11, 1972 TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND TO EXCHANGE AMBASSADORS WITHIN A SHORT TIME." INGERSOLL

