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## Department of State

TELEGRAM

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O 110015Z AUG 74 ZFFA  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 5979  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ STATE 175376

CONTROL: 2 8 8 6 Q

RECD: 10 AUGUST 74 -

9 26 PM

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, JA

SUBJECT: YASUKAWA MEETING WITH PRESIDENT FORD AND SECRETARY

1. SECRETARY MET WITH AMB. YASUKAWA AT WHITE HOUSE FOR APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES AT 2:45 P.M. AUG. 9. DURING THAT TIME, SECRETARY ESCORTED YASUKAWA TO OVAL OFFICE FOR TEN-MINUTE PRIVATE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT.

2. SECRETARY BEGAN BY EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR "WARM WORDS" CONTAINED IN AUG. 9 STATEMENT BY CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY MIKADO. SECRETARY SAID THAT MAIN PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING WAS TO EMPHASIZE THAT FOREIGN POLICY OF PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION WILL CONTINUE AND THAT FRIENDSHIP WITH JAPAN IS ONE OF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THAT POLICY. HE NOTED THAT MEETING WITH YASUKAWA WOULD BE FIRST MEETING OF NEW PRESIDENT WITH AN INDIVIDUAL FOREIGN AMBASSADOR-- PRESIDENT HAD MET SHORTLY BEFORE WITH NATO AMBASSADORS AS A GROUP--AND EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS INTENDED TO SYMBOLIZE IMPORTANCE THE ADMINISTRATION ATTACHES TO RELATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES, INCLUDING JAPAN. IN RESPONSE, YASUKAWA STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT APPRECIATES--AND FULLY RECIPROCATES--OUR CONTINUED EMPHASIS ON IMPORTANCE OF US-JAPAN RELATIONS.

3. SECRETARY SAID THAT PRESIDENT HAD TOLD HIM IN DISCUSSIONS DURING THE LAST DAY AND A HALF THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO VISIT JAPAN IN LATE NOVEMBER OR EARLY DECEMBER IF THE GOJ WERE PREPARED TO RECEIVE HIM AT THAT TIME. HE SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE AMONG THE PRESIDENT'S FIRST VISITS ABROAD AND THAT IT WOULD SYMBOLIZE THE PRESIDENT'S INTENTION TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN US-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP. YASUKAWA SAID HE WAS CERTAIN THAT GOJ WOULD WELCOME PRESIDENTIAL VISIT, PROVIDED APPROPRIATE TIMING COULD BE WORKED OUT. SECRETARY SAID PRESIDENT COULD PROBABLY VISIT JAPAN NEXT SPRING IF GOJ SO PREFERRED. THEY AGREED

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NOT TO INFORM PRESS OF POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT UNTIL YASUKAWA REPORTED TO AND RECEIVED GUIDANCE FROM TOKYO.

4. ON OTHER VISITS, SECRETARY SAID HE LOOKED FORWARD TO EXTENSIVE MEETING WITH FONMIN KIMURA WHEN HE ATTENDS UNGA IN SEPTEMBER. IN RESPONSE TO YASUKAWA'S STATEMENT THAT KIMURA WOULD LIKE TO PAY COURTESY CALL ON PRESIDENT, SECRETARY STATED THAT HE WOULD "DO UTMOST" TO ARRANGE A MEETING BUT NOTED THAT OUR PAST PRACTICE HAS BEEN FOR PRESIDENT NOT TO RECEIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS DURING UNGA, SINCE HE WOULD BE UNDER PRESSURE TO SEE A NUMBER OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IF HE AGREED TO SEE ONE.

5. YASUKAWA NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR HODGSON HAD INFORMED PRIME MINISTER TANAKA THAT SECRETARY WOULD LIKE TO VISIT JAPAN IN CONJUNCTION WITH HIS CHINA VISIT. HE STATED THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT CLOSELY ON TIMING, NOTING THAT GOJ WILL BE OCCUPIED WITH MINISTERIAL CONSULTATIONS WITH GERMANS OCT 8-9. SECRETARY INDICATED THAT PLANNING FOR CHINA VISIT IS NOT YET COMPLETED BUT THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY GO TO CHINA EITHER BETWEEN SEPTEMBER 3-15 OR OCTOBER 20-NOVEMBER 5.

6. YASUKAWA STATED THAT FINMIN OHIRA WOULD VISIT WASHINGTON AROUND SEPTEMBER 30 FOR IMF/IBRD MEETING. SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD WISH TO MEET WITH AND HOST LUNCH FOR OHIRA, STATING THAT HE FEELS GREAT AFFECTION FOR OHIRA.

7. ONLY OTHER SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES DISCUSSED WERE TRADE BILL AND ECG ACTIVITIES. YASUKAWA REITERATED GOJ'S STRONG HOPE FOR EARLY PASSAGE OF TRADE BILL. SECRETARY SAID THAT WE WILL CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS WITH CONGRESS TO MOVE THE TRADE BILL AND THAT HE WAS HOPEFUL WE WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL.

8. SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WAS PLEASED THAT GOOD PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE AT LAST ECG MEETING IN BRUSSELS. YASUKAWA AGREED, STATING THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH IEP PROPOSAL. SECRETARY SAID HE WAS CONSIDERING POSSIBILITY OF INFORMAL TALKS ON ENERGY AMONG SMALLER GROUP OF COUNTRIES. HE NOTED THAT A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES,

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-3- STATE 175376

INCLUDING JAPAN, WOULD BE UNABLE TO BEAR BALANCE OF  
TRADE DEFICITS ARISING FROM OIL PRICES. HE SAID HE WOULD  
CONSULT WITH GOJ AS HIS THINKING BECAME FIRMER. KISSINGER

EA/J:THUBBARD/SB  
08/09/74 X23152  
S/S - WHLUERS

EA - MR. HUMMEL

| S - MR. EAGLEDURGER



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TELEGRAM

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0 110016Z AUG 74 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 5980

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 175377

CONTROL: 2 8 8 7 Q

RECD: 10 AUGUST 74 -

NODIS

9 28 PM

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: APOR, JA

SUBJECT: GOJ RESPONSE TO SUGGESTED PRESIDENTIAL VISIT

1. AMBASSADOR YASUKAWA CALLED ON ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY HUMMEL DURING MORNING OF AUGUST 10 UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO RESPOND URGENTLY TO SECRETARY'S SUGGESTION, MADE PREVIOUS DAY TO YASUKAWA, THAT PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE TO VISIT JAPAN IN LATE NOVEMBER OR EARLY DECEMBER (SEPTEL). YASUKAWA SAID HIS GOVERNMENT VERY MUCH APPRECIATED THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER AND HOPED THAT PRESIDENT, PERHAPS ACCOMPANIED BY MRS. FORD, WOULD VISIT JAPAN AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE, IF POSSIBLE BY END OF THE YEAR. HE SUGGESTED THAT AGREEMENT OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO SUCH A VISIT SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, LEAVING TIMING FOR LATER DISCUSSION THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. HE SAID GOJ HOPED THAT ANNOUNCEMENT COULD BE AGREED UPON FOR JOINT RELEASE ON WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 14, OR EARLIER.

2. YASUKAWA ALSO SAID THAT PM TANAKA WOULD LIKE TO VISIT WASHINGTON FOR BRIEF WORKING MEETING WITH PRESIDENT DURING HIS SEPTEMBER VISIT TO LATIN AMERICA AND CANADA. HE SAID THAT AFTERNOON OF SEPT 21 WOULD BE MOST CONVENIENT TIME FOR TANAKA, WHO WOULD BE ENROUTE BETWEEN A VISIT TO BRAZIL AND A REST STOP IN BERMUDA. HE COULD ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON IN TIME FOR MORNING MEETING WITH PRESIDENT IF THAT WERE MORE CONVENIENT. HE EMPHASIZED THAT TANAKA

WOULD EXPECT NO CEREMONIAL OR SOCIAL EVENTS, THAT HE WOULD BE IN WASHINGTON ONLY A FEW HOURS, AND THAT HE WOULD NOT PLAN TO SPEND A NIGHT IN WASHINGTON.

3. HUMMEL AGREED TO CONVEY BOTH OF THESE SUGGESTIONS TO SECRETARY AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. KISSINGER

EA/J:THUBBARD:CB

8/30/74 EXT: 23152


EA - MR. HUMMEL

S/S - MR. LUERS

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TELEGRAM

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CONTROL: 7285Q

RECD: 27 AUG '74 5:11P

O 2, 2022Z AUG 74 ZFFQ  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO NIACT IMMEDIATE 6247  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 180049

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OVIP, JA  
SUBJECT: VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER TANAKA

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR

1. PRESIDENT FORD HAS AGREED RECEIVE PRIME MINISTER TANAKA SEPTEMBER 21. JAPANESE EMBASSY HAS BEEN INFORMED HERE.

2. WE PLAN ISSUE AT 5:00 P.M. FOLLOWING PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT, EMBARGOED FOR JOINT RELEASE IN TOKYO AND WASHINGTON AT 10:00 P.M. AUGUST 27 WASHINGTON TIME: "PRIME MINISTER TANAKA OF JAPAN, AFTER HIS OFFICIAL VISITS TO MEXICO AND BRAZIL, WILL STOP OVER IN WASHINGTON, D.C. ON SEPTEMBER 21 TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT FORD."

3. WE PLAN ISSUE TRAVEL ORDERS AUTHORIZING YOUR RETURN TO PARTICIPATE IN MEETING. KISSINGER

BT  
08049

DRAFTED BY: EA/J: WCSHERMAN APPROVED BY: EA: MR. HUMMEL  
CLEARANCES: EA/P: MR. ROSEN WH: MR. SMYSER (PHONE) S: MR. BREMER  
S/S: JEMOFFAT



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TELEGRAM

P 102142Z OCT 74 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 7026  
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9376  
INFO RUMJSL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 4860  
RUESNG/USLO PEKING 3786  
BT

CONTROL: 3 0 9 30

~~SECRET~~ STATE 223926

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, KS, KN, US, CH  
SUBJECT: PRC VIEWS ON UN COMMAND

FOR AMBASSADOR

REF: STATE 220134

1. EMBASSY TOKYO SHOULD NOT TAKE ACTION AS INSTRUCTED PARA 4 REFTTEL. DISCUSSIONS ON THIS MATTER WITH JAPANESE HAVE TAKEN PLACE HERETOFORE AT USUN AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW UP THERE.
2. FOR USUN: YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM JAPANESE OF SUBSTANCE REFTTEL, AND SEEK THEIR CONTINUED COOPERATION AS INDICATED PARA 4 REFTTEL. INGERSOLL

EA/J/WCSHERMAN/EA/K:DLRANARD:LM  
10/10/74 EXT 23152  
EA:AWHUMMEL

IO: WBUFFUM

13/S:JPHOFFAT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES  
BY hr, NARA, DATE: 12/10/03

State Review  
TD 9/23/02

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Para 3 line 3&4..line added..

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TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 0680Q  
RECD: 2 NOV 74  
6:40PM

P 030029Z NOV 74 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0000  
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 0000  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ STATE 241954

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS 3  
TAGS: ENRG  
SUBJECT: CAMP DAVID FOLLOWUP

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AN INFORMAL PAPER FOR ENDERS AND COOPER DISCUSSIONS NEXT WEEK. REQUEST THAT TOKYO PASS TO MIYAZAKI AND YOSHIDA AND BONN TO POEHL AND HERMES. PLEASE STRESS TO RECIPIENTS THAT THIS PAPER IS OF THE HIGHEST SENSITIVITY AND IS FOR THEIR EYES ONLY. REQUEST THAT NO DISTRIBUTION BE MADE IN EMBASSY.

2. BEGIN TEXT. A PROPOSAL FOR MORE COMPREHENSIVE COLLABORATION AMONG THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES.

3. IN LIGHT OF THE DANGEROUS SITUATION FACING THEM, PARTICULARLY AS A RESULT OF THE OIL PRICE INCREASES, THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES SHOULD UNDERTAKE A MORE COMPREHENSIVE COLLABORATION WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF: BRINGING ABOUT LOWER COSTS FOR THEIR OIL SUPPLIES; REDUCING THE DAMAGE TO THEIR ECONOMIES CAUSED BY THE HIGHER COSTS OF THEIR IMPORTS; PREVENTING DISRUPTION OF THE BASIC COHESION OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD; AND CREATING PROCEDURES TO IMPROVE THEIR CAPACITY TO RESPOND TO UNFORESEEN FUTURE EVENTS.

4. IN UNDERTAKING THIS MORE COMPREHENSIVE COLLABORATION, THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES MUST BUILD UPON WHAT HAS

ALREADY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AND IS ALREADY BEING UNDERTAKEN IN VARIOUS EXISTING INTERNATIONAL BODIES, INCLUDING THE IMF, THE OECD, AND THE IEA.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5

STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES

BY 64, NARA, DATE 2/30/01

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5. AS THE NEXT STEP TOWARD THIS DESIRED COLLABORATION, FURTHER DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE HELD AMONG THE FOREIGN AND FINANCE MINISTERS OF THE FIVE MAJOR NATIONS IN AN EFFORT TO REDUCE DIFFERENCES IN THEIR PERCEPTIONS OF PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES BEFORE FORMAL DISCUSSIONS OF CLOSER COOPERATION ARE UNDERTAKEN WITH A WIDER GROUP OF INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES.

6. A PROGRAM OF ADDITIONAL COOPERATION IS DESIRABLE! ONE IN WHICH THE DIFFERENT PARTS REINFORCE ONE ANOTHER BOTH POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY.

7. INCLUDED IN THE PROGRAM SHOULD BE: (A) AN INTERNATIONALLY AGREED SET OF ADDITIONAL MEASURES INTENDED TO REDUCE RELIANCE BY THE INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES ON IMPORTS OF OIL FROM OUTSIDE THE GROUP, TO BE REFERRED TO BELOW AS "CONSERVATION MEASURES"; (B) A NEW SET OF COMMITMENTS AND PROCEDURES BY WHICH THE GROUP COULD PROVIDE ECONOMIC SUPPORT, AS NEEDED, IN THE FORM OF LOANS TO THOSE MEMBERS OF THE GROUP WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE SUFFER ACUTE ECONOMIC DAMAGE AS A RESULT OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS, TO BE REFERRED TO BELOW AS "FINANCIAL SOLIDARITY MEASURES"; AND (C) AN UNDERTAKING TO ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP VARIOUS OTHER FORMS OF COLLABORATION ON MEASURES SUPPORTIVE OF THE ACTIVITIES INCLUDED IN A AND B, REFERRED TO BELOW AS "OTHER SUPPORTIVE MEASURES".

8. CONSERVATION MEASURES. ADDITIONAL MEASURES BY THE MAJOR INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES TO REDUCE THEIR RELIANCE ON HIGH COST OIL IMPORTS ARE DESIRABLE: TO REDUCE VULNERABILITY TO FUTURE INTERRUPTIONS IN SUPPLY; TO LIMIT THE REAL BURDEN BEING PLACED ON THEIR ECONOMIES BY THE NECESSITY OF PAYING EITHER CURRENTLY FOR THE COSTLY IMPORTS OR ULTIMATELY FOR AMORTIZATION OF DEBT BEING UNDERTAKEN TO FINANCE THE CURRENT CONSUMPTION OF ENERGY; TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF POTENTIAL DISRUPTION TO THE WORLD'S FINANCING SYSTEM AS A RESULT OF CONCENTRATION OF LARGE HOLDINGS OF FINANCING ASSETS IN THE HANDS OF A SMALL NUMBER OF PRODUCING COUNTRY GOVERNMENTS; AND TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE PRODUCERS MORE PROMPTLY THE DAMAGE WHICH WILL BE DONE TO THEIR ECONOMIC WELFARE, AS WELL AS THAT OF THE CONSUMING NATIONS, BY ATTEMPTS TO PROLONG CURRENT HIGH OIL PRICES.

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9. THE MOST APPROPRIATE MIX OF ADDITIONAL CONSERVATION MEASURES WILL VARY FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY. AMONG THE IMPORTANT TYPES OF MEASURES ARE LIKELY TO BE REMOVAL OF OFFICIAL RESTRAINTS ON THE COST OF ENERGY TO CONSUMERS, IMPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL TAXATION ON CONSUMPTION OF IMPORTED ENERGY, AND INDUCEMENTS TO SWITCH FROM OIL TO OTHER SOURCES OF ENERGY.

10. THE HIGHER PRICES WHICH HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO TAKE EFFECT IN THE MARKET PLACE HAVE ALREADY REDUCED OIL CONSUMPTION. NOT ONLY HAVE THE 5# TO 10# INCREASES FORECAST EARLIER FOR CONSUMPTION GROWTH IN 1974 NOT TAKEN PLACE, BUT RECENT CONSUMPTION LEVELS IN THE MAJOR INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN RUNNING 5# TO 10# BELOW THE LEVELS BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE MID-EAST WAR IN OCTOBER 1973. SOME OF THE REDUCTIONS IN CONSUMPTION ARE ATTRIBUTABLE, HOWEVER, TO THE SLOWER OVERALL RATES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH BEING EXPERIENCED IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES, AND THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF NEW GOVERNMENT MEASURES THERE WILL BE NO RESURGENCE OF DEMAND IN 1975 WHEN HIGHER RATES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH RESUME AND WHEN THE SHOCK OF THE SUDDEN MOVE TO HIGHER PRICES IS FURTHER IN THE PAST. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, ADDITIONAL CONSERVATION AND PRODUCTION-ENCOURAGING MEASURES ARE DESIRABLE IN ALL COUNTRIES, AND PROBABLY IN EVERY COUNTRY IT WILL BE EASIER TO GAIN LEGISLATIVE AND POPULAR ACCEPTANCE OF ADDITIONAL MEASURES IF THEY ARE TAKEN IN THE CONTEXT OF AN EQUITABLY SHARED COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. (#READ AS PERCENT)

11. IT IS PROBABLY NEITHER PRACTICAL NOR DESIRABLE TO EXPECT GOVERNMENTS TO COMMIT THEIR COUNTRIES TO SPECIFIC MAXIMUM AMOUNTS OF OIL IMPORTS IN 1975 OR TO ADOPT IDENTICAL PROGRAMS OR STANDARDS OF CONSERVATION MEASURES. BUT INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY PROGRAMS FOR 1975 SHOULD BE COLLATED INTO A TOTAL INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM, WHICH WOULD THEN BE REVIEWED FOR THE ADEQUACY OF ITS TOTAL IMPACT AND FOR THE EQUITY OF DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS, AND ADJUSTED AS NECESSARY. IT SHOULD BE USEFUL TO ESTABLISH AN AGREED TIMETABLE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMS AND THEIR INTERNATIONAL REVIEW AND ADJUSTMENT. BASED ON EXPERIENCE, IN THE COURSE OF 1975 ADDITIONAL MEASURES COULD BE CONSIDERED, IF NECESSARY, FOR IMPLEMENTATION LATER IN 1975 OR IN 1976.

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12. AS A FIRST APPROXIMATION, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT MEASURES BE SOUGHT WHICH WOULD RESULT IN TOTAL MEMBER COUNTRY IMPORTS IN THE THIRD QUARTER OF 1975 OF AT LEAST 20 ,CT,

ABOUT 5 1/2 MILLION BARRELS A DAY, BELOW THEIR IMPORTS OF ABOUT 27 1/2 MILLION BARRELS A DAY IN THE THIRD QUARTER OF 1973. ALREADY, BY THE THIRD QUARTER OF 1974, THEIR IMPORTS HAD BEEN REDUCED TO ALMOST HALF THE AMOUNT PROPOSED FOR THE THIRD QUARTER OF 1975. THE CUTBACK IN CONSUMPTION COULD ALTERNATIVELY BE EXPRESSED IN TERMS IN REDUCTION IN CONSUMPTION BELOW LEVELS WHICH WOULD HAVE PREVAILED IN THE ABSENCE OF NEW CONSERVATION MEASURES.

13. FINANCIAL SOLIDARITY. DESPITE THE REDUCTION IN OIL IMPORT COSTS WHICH CAN BE ACHIEVED BY ADDITIONAL CONSERVATION MEASURES, AND DESPITE THE DESIRABLE IMPACT WHICH SUCH CONSERVATION MAY HAVE IN PREVENTING FURTHER INCREASES IN OIL PRICES AND POSSIBLY IN BRINGING ABOUT SOME PRICE REDUCTIONS, THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES ARE LIKELY TO BE FACED, IN 1975 AND LATER YEARS, WITH ENORMOUS OIL IMPORT BILLS. VAST CHANGES IN THE PATTERN OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT FLOWS WILL RESULT. ADJUSTMENT OF THESE FLOWS IS LIKELY TO TAKE PLACE IN MANY DIFFERENT WAYS, BOTH THROUGH THE MANY EXISTING CHANNELS OF CONTACT BETWEEN THE OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES AND THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES AND THROUGH VARIOUS NEW CHANNELS.

14. IN THIS PROCESS, HOWEVER, THERE IS THE DANGER THAT - IN THE ABSENCE OF NEW MEASURES OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION - PARTICULAR INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES MIGHT BE FACED WITH ACUTE ECONOMIC HARDSHIP OR WITH THE NECESSITY TO RELY ON FINANCIAL HELP FROM PRODUCING COUNTRIES ON TERMS WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED POLITICALLY OR ECONOMICALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE COMMUNITY OF INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS. TO COUNTER THIS DANGER, IT WOULD SEEM HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES DEVELOP AMONG THEMSELVES A NEW SET OF COMMITMENTS AND PROCEDURES BY WHICH THE GROUP COULD PROVIDE ECONOMIC SUPPORT IN THE FORM OF LOANS, WHEN APPROPRIATE, TO INDIVIDUAL MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE GROUP. WHAT IS NEEDED IS MORE LIKELY TO PROVE A SAFETY NET THAN AN ARTIFICIAL LIMB, BUT THE

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SAFETY NET WOULD NEED TO BE DESIGNED FOR USE IN ANY EMERGENCY WHICH MIGHT ARISE IN ORDER TO PROVIDE COUNTRIES IN ADVANCE WITH A CONFIDENCE WHICH WOULD ALLOW THEM TO AVOID INTERNATIONALLY DISRUPTIVE ECONOMIC POLICIES WHICH MIGHT OTHERWISE BE UNDERTAKEN OUT OF EXTREME FEAR OF THE FUTURE.

15. TO BE EFFECTIVE IN COMBATting FEAR, THE POTENTIALLY AVAILABLE LOANS WOULD HAVE TO BE VERY LARGE. ON THE

OTHER HAND, SUCH LOANS COULD NOT BE PROMISED TO ANY MEMBER OF THE GROUP AUTOMATICALLY. THE AVAILABILITY OF THE LOANS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDITIONED UPON JUDGMENT ON BEHALF OF THE GROUP THAT A PROSPECTIVE BORROWING NATION WAS FOLLOWING REASONABLE POLICIES OF SELF-HELP.

16. AS A PRELIMINARY PROPOSAL TO MEET THE NEED FOR A SAFETY NET, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO AN AGREEMENT AMONG INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES THAT THEY WOULD - IN THE CONTEXT OF A LARGER PROGRAM OF COLLABORATION ON CONSERVATION AND OTHER ENERGY MATTERS - AGREE TO UNDERTAKE LOAN COMMITMENTS CALLABLE ON DEMAND BY A COMMON-FUND WHEN LOAN ASSISTANCE WAS NEEDED AND APPROVED FOR A PARTICULAR MEMBER COUNTRY.

17. THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE FUND WOULD BE BASED COULD BE AS FOLLOWS: (A) THE TOTAL SIZE OF THE FUND WOULD BE RELATED TO THE ESTIMATED ANNUAL COMBINED DEFICIT ON CURRENT ACCOUNT OF PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES VIS-A-VIS OUTSIDE OIL SUPPLIERS (AN APPROPRIATE NUMBER FOR THE FIRST YEAR MIGHT BE ONE HALF, WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A FUND ON THE ORDER OF \$20 OR \$25 BILLION). (B) EACH COUNTRY'S MAXIMUM LENDING OBLIGATION AND MAXIMUM BORROWING LIMIT WOULD BE IDENTICAL. (C) THESE LIMITS WOULD BE DETERMINED BASICALLY BY REFERENCE TO AN APPROPRIATE FORMULA INCORPORATING RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS: AN APPROPRIATE FORMULA MIGHT BE BASED ON OIL IMPORTS FROM OUTSIDE THE GROUP, PARTICIPATION IN FOREIGN TRADE, AND GNP. (D) PARTICIPANTS WOULD SHARE IN FINANCING LOANS ON THE BASIS OF THEIR SHARES IN THE FUND.

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18. ADDITIONAL COMMITMENTS WOULD BE ANTICIPATED FOR 1976. EACH LOAN FROM THE COMMON FUND WOULD BE APPROVED BY A BOARD OF TRUSTEES ACTING ON A QUALIFIED WEIGHTED VOTING BASIS ON BEHALF OF THE MEMBER NATIONS IN THE GROUP. THE DISCRETION OF THE BOARD SHOULD PROBABLY BE LIMITED BY AGREED GUIDELINES. THE BOARD MIGHT WELL BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE OECD. PRESUMABLY, THE LOANS TO AND FROM THE COMMON FUND WOULD BE ON COMMERCIAL TERMS. LOAN ASSISTANCE FROM THE COMMON FUND SHOULD PROBABLY BE MADE CONDITIONAL ON THE BORROWER MAKING APPROPRIATE USE OF OTHER ASSETS AVAILABLE TO IT AND MAKING EFFORTS TO OBTAIN CAPITAL FROM OTHER SOURCES ON REASONABLE TERMS. BORROWERS WOULD ALSO BE EXPECTED NOT TO TAKE TRADE OR OTHER RESTRICTIVE MEASURES INCONSISTENT WITH THEIR GATT, IMF, AND OECD OBLIGATIONS.

19. AN IMPORTANT FEATURE OF THE FINANCIAL SAFETY NET,

AS DESCRIBED ABOVE, WOULD BE THAT THE ASSISTANCE TO ANY PARTICULAR NATION WOULD NEITHER BE, NOR APPEAR TO BE, DEPENDENT ON THE APPROVAL OF ONE OR MORE OF THE OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES. THE ASSISTANCE WOULD BE ON A MUTUAL SELF-HELP BASIS AMONG THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES. EACH OF THOSE COUNTRIES COULD RAISE THE FUNDS FOR ITS CONTRIBUTION AS IT SAW FIT: FROM CASH ON HAND, FROM TAXATION, OR FROM NEW BORROWING. SUCH NEW BORROWING COULD, IN EFFECT, BE FROM AN OIL-PRODUCING GOVERNMENT IF AN OIL PRODUCER HAPPENED TO PURCHASE THE DEBT OBLIGATIONS SOLD BY THE BORROWING GOVERNMENT ON THE MARKET, OR IF A LOAN WERE ARRANGED DIRECTLY BY THE BORROWING COUNTRY GOVERNMENT FROM AN OIL PRODUCERS. BUT, IN THE USUAL - AND PREFERABLE - CASE, LENDING TO THE COMMON FUND WOULD BE BUT ONE OF THE MANY WAYS IN WHICH AN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRY GOVERNMENT WERE DISBURSING FUNDS, AND IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE AN UNAMBIGUOUS CONNECTION BETWEEN ONE SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND ONE USE OF FUNDS BY THAT GOVERNMENT.

20. IT WOULD ALSO BE POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE THAT THE TRUSTEES OF THE COMMON FUND WOULD BE EMPOWERED TO MAKE INVESTMENTS IN PROMISING INTERNATIONALLY SIGNIFICANT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS WHEN APPROPRIATE.



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# TELEGRAM

PAGE -7- STATE 241954, NOV 3

21. AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO LOANS TO THE COMMON FUND, CONSIDERATION COULD BE GIVEN TO BORROWING BY THE FUND ON THE STRENGTH OF GUARANTIES PROVIDED BY THE COOPERATING GOVERNMENTS, PRESUMABLY IN ABOUT THE SAME PROPORTIONS AS LOANS MIGHT BE MADE TO THE COMMON FUND. IN SOME COUNTRIES, IT MIGHT BE THAT SUCH GUARANTIES WOULD APPEAR LESS ONEROUS TO LEGISLATURES THAN DIRECT LOANS TO A COMMON FUND, EVEN THOUGH THE RISK EXPOSURE TO THE GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE THE SAME BY EITHER METHOD. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE GUARANTY METHOD WOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL DISADVANTAGE IN THAT THE POLITICAL CREDIT FOR THE ASSISTANCE MIGHT TEND TO ACCRUE IN LARGE MEASURE, TO THE PROVIDER OF THE LOAN FUNDS, QUITE POSSIBLY AN OIL PRODUCER, RATHER THAN TO THE PROVIDERS OF THE GUARANTIES WHO WOULD BE THE REAL BEARERS OF THE RISK. THE GUARANTY ROUTE WOULD ALSO HAVE THE DISADVANTAGE THAT THE RATE OF INTEREST PAID ON THE GUARANTEED BORROWINGS WOULD PROBABLY BE HIGHER THAN THAT PAID ON AVERAGE BY GOVERNMENTS BORROWING THEIR SEPARATE SHARES OF THE NEEDED FUNDS DIRECTLY ON THEIR OWN SEPARATE FULL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS.

IN VIEW OF FREQUENT PUBLIC FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF GUARANTIES, THERE WOULD ALSO BE SOME DANGER THAT THE GUARANTY ROUTE WOULD BE TREATED AS A "SOMETHING FOR NOTHING" METHOD AND WOULD THUS LEAD TO LESS CAREFUL MONITORING OF THE ASSISTANCE INVOLVED.

22. IT WOULD ALSO BE POSSIBLE, AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE COMMON FUND OUTLINED ABOVE, TO CONSIDER ATTEMPTING TO USE THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AS THE PROVIDER OF THE DESIRED SAFETY NET FOR THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES. THAT ALTERNATIVE WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF MAKING USE OF AN EXISTING INSTITUTION WITHOUT REQUIRING ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW COMMON FUND. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE WOULD BE A NUMBER OF DISADVANTAGES OF ATTEMPTING TO USE

THE IMF. ESTABLISHMENT WITHIN THE IMF OF A SAFETY NET OF THE LARGE SIZE NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THE DESIRED OBJECTIVE FOR THE MAJOR INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES WOULD LEAD TO EXTREME PRESSURES WITHIN THE IMF FOR LARGE, COMPARABLE FACILITIES FOR THE LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, EVEN THOUGH SUCH FACILITIES WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE TO THE NEEDS OF

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# TELEGRAM

PAGE -8- STATE 241954, NOV 3

MOST SUCH COUNTRIES. FOR MANY OF THEM, CONCESSIONAL LENDING IN SMALLER AMOUNTS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. IT WOULD ALSO BE MORE DIFFICULT TO DEVELOP IN AN INTEGRATED PROGRAM OF CONSERVATION, FINANCIAL SOLIDARITY, AND OTHER SUPPORTIVE MEASURES, IF THE SAFETY NET WERE ATTEMPTED IN THE IMF, WHICH INCLUDES IN ITS MEMBERSHIP BOTH THE OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES AND MANY OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD NOT BE LIKELY PARTICIPANTS IN THE PROPOSED INTEGRATED PROGRAM.

23. IN ANY EVENT, WHATEVER METHOD OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT IS CHOSEN FOR INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES, THE NEED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL CONCESSIONAL ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WILL NEED TO BE CONSIDERED. TO THE EXTENT THAT FINANCIAL SOLIDARITY LEADS TO IMPROVED ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES, LESSER AMOUNTS OF DIRECT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING NATIONS WILL BE REQUIRED HOWEVER.

24. OTHER SUPPORTIVE MEASURES. ALTHOUGH CONSERVATION EFFORTS AND FINANCIAL SOLIDARITY WOULD BE THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF COOPERATION, THERE ARE LIKELY TO BE MANY OTHER INDIVIDUAL FORMS OF COOPERATION WHICH, IN COMBINATION, COULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE TWO MAIN MEASURES. A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM SHOULD, THEREFORE,

INCLUDE AN UNDERTAKING BY THE GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED TO ATTEMPT COOPERATION IN OTHER WAYS CONTRIBUTING TO THE SAME OBJECTIVES.

25. FOR THIS PURPOSE ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH PRODUCERS WOULD BE REVIEWED IN AN EFFORT TO IDENTIFY WAYS AND MEANS IN WHICH OIL COMPANY POLICIES ON PRICING AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF LIFTINGS, CONSUMING COUNTRY IMPORT AND EXPORT POLICIES, EXPORT CREDITS, AND LOANS AND POLICIES OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS COULD BE MANAGED TO YIELD A BETTER BALANCE OF BARGAINING POWER WITH THE PRODUCERS. TIMING AND CONTEXT OF BILATERAL AND EVENTUAL MULTILATERAL PRODUCER/CONSUMER CONTACTS SHOULD ALSO BE STUDIED. INGERSOLL

EB:TOENDERS

11/2/74 X20396

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS

S/S-0:RELTZ

~~SECRET~~



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Department of State  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONTROL: 1077Q

RECD : NOV 4, 1974  
10:41 P.M.

O 050341Z NOV 74 ZFFA  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 7522  
BT  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 243162

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ENRG, EFIN

SUBJECT: G-5 FINANCE DEPUTY'S LUNCHEON  
FOR ENDERS AND COOPER FROM BENNETT

POEHL CALLED TODAY TO REPORT THAT DE LAROSIERE WOULD  
NOT AGREE TO HOST G-5 FINANCE DEPUTY'S LUNCHEON ON  
NOVEMBER 19 OR 20. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER FRENCH  
WOULD ATTEND MEETING HOSTED BY ANOTHER. I INFORMED  
POEHL I WOULD COME BACK WITH ADVICE NEXT WEEK. INGERSOLL

TREASURY: BENNETT  
11/4/74  
EB:JLKATZ

S/S-O: GW&amp;TWOHIE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

66 8/30/01







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# Department of State

## TELEGRAM

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0 102032Z NOV 74 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO NIACT IMMEDIATE 7677  
BT

CONTROL: 2 8 3 6Q

~~SECRET~~ STATE 247821

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY)  
SUBJECT: VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER TO PRC

FOR AMBASSADOR HODGSON FROM THE SECRETARY

1. AT 12 NOON, NOVEMBER 11 (1:00 A.M. TUESDAY, PEKING TIME) THE FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE ISSUED JOINTLY IN WASHINGTON AND PEKING: BEGIN TEXT IT HAS BEEN AGREED UPON THROUGH CONSULTATIONS THAT THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE AND ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, WILL VISIT THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FROM NOVEMBER 25 TO NOVEMBER 29, 1974. END TEXT

2. YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO INFORM PM TANAKA AT 2:00 P.M. TOKYO TIME NOVEMBER 11 OF THIS ANNOUNCEMENT, TELL HIM WE WANTED JAPAN TO BE INFORMED IN ADVANCE, AND ASK THAT STRICTEST SECRECY BE MAINTAINED UNTIL ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE PUBLIC. YOU SHOULD ALSO EMPHASIZE TO HOST GOVERNMENT THAT "THIS VISIT IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE WHICH CALLED FOR PERIODIC HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS."

3. WHEN YOU DELIVER ABOVE MESSAGE, YOU SHOULD ALSO REQUEST GOJ AGREEMENT TO PERMIT ME AND MY PARTY TO OVERNIGHT IN JAPAN NOVEMBER 24, EN ROUTE FROM VLADIVOSTOK TO PEKING.

KISSIN

EA:JJHELDLE/SB  
11/06/74 X22146  
EA - MR. HABIB

S - MR. EAGLEBURGER

S/S - D: GTUOHIE



4

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013781

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . SECSTATE WASHDC

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TITLE . . . . . GOJ Views Re Nuclear Controversy

CREATION DATE . . . . . 11/11/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400276

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE  
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 8

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Japan - State Department Telegrams:  
From SECSTATE - NODIS (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/05/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

**EXEMPTED**

8/13/07

2/8/11

6/30/2015



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 3 2 0 80

RECD: 12 NOV '74, 904A

O 121352Z NOV 74 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 7724  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ STATE 248883

NOOIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, JA  
SUBJECT: TANAKA GOVERNMENT CRISIS

1. DURING CONVERSATION WITH HABIB REPORTED SEPTEL, YASUKAWA DISCUSSED CRISIS OF TANAKA CABINET AND SAID HIS RECENT CONTACTS IN JAPAN WITH KIMURA, OHIRA, SHIINA AND OTHERS HAD LED HIM TO CONCLUDE THAT, TANAKA WOULD RESIGN FOLLOWING PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT. HE SAID SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT WOULD BE FORMED BY LDP UNDER LEADERSHIP OF SHIINA, FUKUDA OR OHIRA.

2. YASUKAWA EMPHASIZED THAT VISIT SHOULD PROCEED AS SCHEDULED AND WOULD NOT BE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED BY TANAKA'S POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES.

KISSINGER  
BT  
#8883

EA/J:UCSHERMAN:RD  
13/11/74 EXT 23152  
EA - MR. GLEYSTEN

S/S - MR. NOFFAT

~~SECRET~~

44 8/30/01

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10

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 013782

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . SECSTATE WASHDC

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TITLE . . . . . GOJ Views Re Nuclear Controversy

CREATION DATE . . . . . 11/13/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400276

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE  
PACIFIC

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 8

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Japan - State Department Telegrams:  
From SECSTATE - NODIS (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 09/05/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

**REDACTED**

8/13/07

2/8/11



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TELEGRAM

O 132229Z NOV 74 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 7760  
BT  
~~TOP SECRET~~ STATE 250522

CONTROL: 3 7 5 8Q

NODIS  
CAP STADIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS  
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, JA  
SUBJECT: GOJ VIEWS RE NUCLEAR CONTROVERSY

1. YASUKAWA CALLED ON HABIB EVENING NOV 12 TO DISCUSS  
NUCLEAR QUESTION PRIOR TO HIS RETURN TO JAPAN TO WELCOME  
PRESIDENT FORD. ACCORDING YASUKAWA, BOTH TANAKA AND OHIRA  
REMAIN CONVINCED THAT RESOLUTE ACTION TO RESOLVE ISSUE AND  
TAKE PUBLIC POSITION [REDACTED] IS  
NECESSARY. HOWEVER, FONMIN KIMURA MAY BE WAVERING.  
YASUKAWA SAID HE WOULD TAKE NEW READING ON HIS RETURN TO  
JAPAN AND WOULD RELAY ANY NEW IMPRESSIONS TO DEPT THROUGH  
AMB HODGSON. NONE OF HIS STAFF AT JAPANESE EMBASSY HERE IS  
AWARE OF DETAILS HE HAS BEEN DISCUSSING AND HE THEREFORE  
DOES NOT RPT NOT WISH USE FONOFF CHANNELS FOR COMMUNICATION.

KISSINGER

EA/J:WCSHERMAN:RD  
11/13/74 EXT 23152  
EA - MR. HABIB

S/S - MR. MOFFAT

EA - MR. GLEYSTEN

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted  
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
MR # 10-094-#19  
Rtts dept. etw 2/8/11  
By dal NARA, Date 6/3/11

~~TOP SECRET~~



## Department of State

TELEGRAM

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CONTROL: 3832Q

O 140554Z NOV 74 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

RECD : NOV 15, 1974

TO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000 1:03 A.M.

RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000

RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 250994

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS

TAGS: PFOR, ENRG

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM SECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOT BEFORE 5:00 PM LOCAL TIME THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14 IN EUROPE, AND AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE DURING THE BUSINESS DAY IN JAPAN, FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 15. THE SECRETARY'S SPEECH REFERRED TO IN THIS LETTER WILL BE DELIVERED THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14 IN CHICAGO AT 9:25 PM LOCAL TIME. YOU SHOULD ASK THAT THE SECRETARY'S LETTER BE HELD IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE UNTIL HE DELIVERS THE SPEECH.

2. DEAR MR. MINISTER: THE EFFECTS OF THE ENERGY CRISIS HAVE NOW BECOME MANIFEST -- IN MORE RAPID INFLATION, ARRESTED GROWTH, INCREASING STRAINS ON THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND NARROWING OPPORTUNITIES FOR GOVERNMENTS TO CONTROL THEIR COUNTRIES' OWN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DESTINY. THIS RELENTLESS COURSE OF EVENTS LEADS NEW URGENCY TO OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO DESIGN AND CARRY OUT AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY TO OVERCOME THE PROBLEMS EMANATING FROM THE ENERGY CRISIS.

3. THE USG BELIEVES THAT THE CONCLUSION IS INESCAPABLE THAT COOPERATION AMONG THE MAJOR OIL CONSUMING AREAS OF EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND JAPAN IS THE FUNDAMENTAL PREREQUISITE FOR AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAM OF ACTION. THE CRISIS

ITSELF DEFIES NATIONAL SOLUTIONS. BUT WORKING TOGETHER WE DO HAVE OPTIONS WHICH WE DO NOT HAVE SEPARATELY. WHEREAS NO COUNTRY ALONE, EXCEPT POSSIBLY THE UNITED

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 State Dept Review  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES TO 9/23/02  
BY th, NARA, DATE 4/27/03



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# Department of State

TELETYPE

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-2- STATE 250994

STATES, CAN PROTECT ITSELF IN A SELECTIVE EMBARGO, TOGETHER WE CAN DO SO.

4. WE NOW NEED TO MOVE FURTHER IN THE COOPERATIVE ENDEAVORS BEGUN THIS YEAR AT THE WASHINGTON ENERGY CONFERENCE AND CARRIED FORWARD IN SUBSEQUENT DELIBERATIONS. OUR WORK HAS NOW PROGRESSED TO THE STAGE WHERE WE SHOULD ADVANCE SOME OF THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING AMONG THE FIVE TO THE BROADER GROUP OF COUNTRIES THAT WILL NEED TO ACT ON THEM. AS A PART OF THIS PROCESS, I INTEND TO PRESENT SOME U.S. PROPOSALS IN A SPEECH ON THE EVENING OF NOVEMBER 14 IN CHICAGO. I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME OF THE REASONING BEHIND THESE PROPOSALS, AS WELL AS THE NATURE OF THE PROPOSALS THEMSELVES, ALTHOUGH OUR GENERAL THOUGHTS ARE ALREADY FAMILIAR TO YOU.

5. ON THE IMPORTANT QUESTION OF OIL PRICE, THE PRODUCERS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT POLITICAL PERSUASION OR NEGOTIATION IS NOT NOW GOING TO RESULT IN ANY NOTABLE PRICE DECREASE. THE ALTERNATIVE LEFT US IS, THEREFORE, THE DIFFICULT BUT WORKABLE ONE OF ACTION ON THE CONSUMER SIDE (1) TO CREATE THE OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS FOR AN EVENTUAL PRICE REDUCTION, AND (2) TO PROTECT THE VITALITY OF OUR ECONOMIES IN THE INTERIM PERIOD OF HIGH OIL PRICES. TO ACHIEVE THE FIRST OBJECTIVE CONSUMING COUNTRIES NEED MAJOR NEW EFFORTS BOTH TO REDUCE DEMAND FOR OIL THROUGH CONSERVATION AND TO DEVELOP NEW SOURCES OF ENERGY SUPPLY. IN THE PERIOD UNTIL THESE ACTIONS REACH FULL EFFECTIVENESS CONSUMING COUNTRIES, AS WE HAVE RECOGNIZED, NEED TO COMPLETE TWO SAFETY NETS, ONE TO DEAL WITH ANY NEW OIL SUPPLY EMERGENCY AND THE OTHER TO DEAL WITH ANY POTENTIAL INABILITY OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM TO RECYCLE THE HUGE FLOW OF OIL FUNDS.

6. ENERGY CONSERVATION OFFERS US THE MOST IMMEDIATE PROSPECT OF RELIEF FROM HIGH OIL PRICES. FOR POLITICAL AS WELL AS ECONOMIC REASONS EFFECTIVE CONSERVATION MUST BE A COLLECTIVE EFFORT. AT A MINIMUM WE SHOULD COLLABORATE OUR INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY PROGRAMS FOR 1975 TO MAKE SURE THAT WE ARE DOING ENOUGH. THE U.S. WILL PROPOSE THAT THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES SET THE GOAL OF REDUCING THEIR CONSUMPTION FROM WHAT IT OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE BEEN BY THREE MILLION BARRELS PER DAY (150 MILLION TONS AT

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## Department of State

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-3- STATE 250994

AN ANNUAL RATE BY THE END OF 1975. THE UNITED STATES HAS ALREADY ANNOUNCED A PROGRAM TO REDUCE OUR CONSUMPTION OF IMPORTED OIL BY ONE MILLION BARRELS PER DAY IN

1975. IN THE CONTEXT OF A COMMON GOAL OF CONSUMING COUNTRIES, THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO ACHIEVE FURTHER SAVINGS.

7. IN DEALING WITH RECYCLING OF OIL FUNDS, WE NEED TO CONSIDER THREE BASIC OBJECTIVES: TO PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF OUR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, TO ENSURE THAT NO NATION FEELS FORCED TO PURSUE DISRUPTIVE POLICIES FOR LACK OF ADEQUATE FINANCE AND TO MAKE SURE NO CONSUMING COUNTRY IS COMPELLED TO ACCEPT FINANCING ON INTOLERABLE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TERMS. THE TASK FOR GOVERNMENTS IS TO PROVIDE A BACK-UP, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FACILITY THAT CAN AUGMENT PRIVATE RECYCLING WHENEVER NECESSARY. SUCH A SAFETY NET WOULD HELP ASSURE THE STABILITY OF THE ENTIRE SYSTEM AND THE CREDITWORTHINESS OF PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS.

8. WITH THESE CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND THE UNITED STATES IS PROPOSING THAT THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES CREATE A COMMON LOAN AND GUARANTY FACILITY TO PROVIDE A MEANS FOR RECYCLING UP TO DOLS 25 BILLION IN 1975. GOVERNMENTS WOULD INDIVIDUALLY CHOOSE HOW TO MEET THEIR COMMITMENTS TO SUCH A FACILITY, BUT PRESUMABLY MOST WOULD CHOOSE TO DO SO BY BORROWING. CALLS ON GOVERNMENTS' COMMITMENTS TO PROVIDE FUNDS TO THE FACILITY WOULD BE MADE IN CONNECTION WITH SPECIFIC DECISIONS OF PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS ON SUPPORT TO COUNTRIES IN NEED OF FINANCING, AFTER FULL RESORT TO PRIVATE OPPORTUNITIES AND REASONABLE SELF-HELP MEASURES.

9. WE ARE ALREADY CONSIDERING NEW WAYS OF ASSISTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THEIR ACUTE FINANCIAL PROBLEMS. WE NEED TO CONSIDER NEW POSSIBILITIES OF PROVIDING HIGHLY CONCESSIONAL FINANCING TO THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES MOST SERIOUSLY HURT BY THE CURRENT CRISIS. IN PARTICULAR, SPECIAL FINANCING OF THE IMF NEEDS TO BE PROVIDED ON TERMS MORE SUITABLE TO THESE COUNTRIES' NEEDS.

10. AS YOU KNOW, THE US HAS ALWAYS BEEN IN FAVOR OF A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES.

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TELETYPE

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-4- STATE 250994

CONSUMER COUNTRY COOPERATION IS NOT ANTAGONISTIC TO CONSUMER-PRODUCER COOPERATION, BUT AN ESSENTIAL PREPARATION FOR THIS BROADER DIALOGUE.

11. THE USG HOPES THAT CONSUMING COUNTRIES CAN MOVE PROMPTLY TO BROADEN OUR COOPERATIVE EFFORT. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY IS BEST PLACED TO DEVELOP A PROGRAM OF ACTION ON CONSERVATION, NEW SUPPLIES AND PREPARATION OF CONSUMER POSITIONS FOR THE EVENTUAL

CONSUMER-PRODUCER DIALOGUE. WE SUGGEST THAT THE GROUP OF 10 FINANCE MINISTERS DEVELOP A PROPOSAL FOR FINANCIAL COOPERATION LOOKING TO ENACTMENT WITHIN THE OECD FRAMEWORK.

12. THE ISSUES AND TASKS BEFORE US COMPRISE A PROGRAM OF CONSIDERABLE MAGNITUDE, REQUIRING DIFFICULT POLITICAL DECISIONS. BUT JUST AS THE TURMOIL OF THE IMMEDIATE POST-WAR PERIOD BECAME A MOMENT OF GREAT CREATION IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, SO CAN THE ENERGY CRISIS OF TODAY BE ONE LEADING TO HISTORIC ACHIEVEMENT THROUGH COOPERATION. THE ECONOMIC FACTS OF TODAY ARE STARK, AS THEY WERE IN 1947-1948. THE STRUCTURE EMERGING FROM THAT CHALLENGE HAS SECURED OUR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND SECURITY FOR A GENERATION. THESE ACHIEVEMENTS ARE NOW THREATENED. BUT WITH THE SAME POLITICAL VISION, COURAGE, AND ABOVE ALL, COOPERATION THAT SUSTAINED US IN THE EARLIER YEARS, WE CAN MEET THE NEW ENERGY CHALLENGE.

13. I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU ON THESE TASKS IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AHEAD, AND HOPE THAT WE CAN COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT AND THAT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT FOR THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE MADE.

SIGNED HENRY A. KISSINGER.

14. FOR PARIS: FINAL SENTENCE OF LETTER SHOULD END WITH WORDS QUOTE IMMEDIATELY AHEAD UNQUOTE, ELIMINATING ALL THEREAFTER FROM QUOTE AND HOPE UNQUOTE THROUGH QUOTE WE HAVE MADE. UNQUOTE. KISSINGER

ED/IFD:PHB/EKER:CU  
11/13/74 EXT. 29496  
S: LSEAGLEBURGER

EUR:AHARTMAN  
EB:MR. ENDERS  
EA:HABIB  
S/S-O: FELT

~~SECRET~~

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

R 150605Z NOV 74 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO 7815  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ STATE 252073

Control: 4235Q  
Recd: Nov 15, 1974  
1:16 AM

NODIS

TAGS: ENRG  
E.O. 11652: XGDS  
FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM ENDERS

SUBJECT: CAMP DAVID FOLLOW-UP  
REF: TOKYO 14778

1. MANY THA'XS FOR YOUR REPORT ON JAPANESE MEDIA COVERAGE OF MY VISIT AND FOR YOUR HELPFUL ROLE IN HANDLING THIS VISIT.

2. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN BY NOW FROM THE SECRETARY'S CHICAGO SPEECH THAT WE ARE PRESENTING THE ESSENCE OF OUR PROPOSALS TO A BROAD GROUP OF GOVERNMENTS AND TO THE PUBLIC. THIS COURSE SHOULD BOTH ADVANCE OUR ENERGY STRATEGY AND FACILITATE OUR TASK IN PROJECTING A COHERENT PUBLIC IMAGE OF WHAT WE ARE ABOUT. THANKS FOR YOUR HELP IN A VERY DELICATE STAGE OF THESE INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSIONS. INGERSOLL

EB/IFD:PHBOEKER  
11/14/74 29496  
EB:TOENDERS

S/S-0: R. ELTZ

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY 66, NARA, DATE 8/30/01

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DRAFTED BY P: JJSISCO:WES  
APPROVED BY P: J SISCO  
S/S-M: R. ELTZ

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE~~SECRET~~ STATE 253571NODIS  
CHEROKEE, TOSEC 003, WHITE HOUSE PLS PASS TO SAM 27000

E.O. 11652: GDS


TAGS: OVIP, (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION BETWEEN SISCO AND WALDHEIM

FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO

-- WHITE HOUSE PLS  
PASS MESSAGE TO SAM 270001. I REACHED WALDHEIM THIS AFTERNOON TO CONVEY TO HIM  
ESSENCE OF PARAS TWO AND THREE OF CAIRO 9273.2. I TOLD WALDHEIM BOTH WE AND EGYPTIANS WERE WEIGHING  
IN WITH ASAD AND URGED A DIRECT MESSAGE FROM HIM. HE  
SAID HE SENT SUCH A MESSAGE TO ASAD LAST NIGHT MAKING  
ESSENTIALLY SAME ARGUMENT SUGGESTED BY FAHMI. HE IS  
AWAITING A REPLY.3. AS TO HIS REPORT, HE NORMALLY PUTS ONE OUT ONE WEEK  
BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING, MEETING NOT SCHEDULED.~~SECRET~~

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
YET BUT WILL OBVIOUSLY BE HELD TOWARD END OF MONTH WHEN UNDOF MANDATE EXPIRES. I URGED, AND HE AGREED, THAT HE WOULD HOLD UP ISSUANCE OF REPORT UNTIL VERY LATEST POSSIBLE TIME. IN SHORT IN HIS OWN WORDS RATHER THAN A WEEK BEFORE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING, HE WILL HOLD "IT TO THE LAST MINUTE".

4. I DID NOT, HOWEVER, CONVINCE HIM TO KEEP KHADDAM NON-RENEWAL REQUEST OUT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT IF WE GET TO THAT POINT. I NOTED HE WAS NOT UNDER ANY OBLIGATION TO INCLUDE SYRIAN POSITION, THAT HE SHOULD CONFINE HIS REPORT TO THE FACTS OF SITUATION, EXPLAINING WHAT UNDOF HAS DONE IN APPEALING TO PARTIES AND SECURITY COUNCIL THAT UNDOF BE CONTINUED. WALDHEIM MAINTAINED THAT KHADDAM HAD ASKED HIM TO REFLECT SYRIAN POSITION IN HIS REPORT, AND IF THEY HOLD TO THIS POSITION, HE WILL HAVE TO INCLUDE IT IN REPORT. I ASKED HIM NOT TO MAKE ANY FINAL JUDGEMENT ON THIS. I ASKED WHETHER HE HAD SYRIAN POSITION IN WRITING. HE SAID ORALLY ONLY. THE REASON I ASKED IS THAT IF THE SYRIANS HOLD TO THEIR POSITION WE CAN GO BACK TO WALDHEIM IN A FEW DAYS AND INSIST THAT HE INSIST WITH THE SYRIANS THAT LATTER PUT IT IN WRITING.

5. WE AGREED WE WOULD BE IN TOUCH ON THIS AGAIN EARLY IN THE WEEK.

6. SECRETARY MAY WANT TO AUTHORIZE FILTS TO COMMUNICATE ESSENCE OF ABOVE TO FAMHY. INGERSOLL

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APPROVED BY PIMR, SISCO  
S/S-O:PKJOHNSON:RAM

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TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE

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CHEROKEE, TOSEC 006

E.O. 11652:

TAGS:PFOR, UN, IS, OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)


SUBJECT:EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN WALDHEIM AND RABIN  
WHITE HOUSE PASS SAM 27000

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SISCO

1. THE TEXTS OF THE FOLLOWING LETTERS FROM SYG WALDHEIM TO  
PM RABIN ON NOVEMBER 16 AND THE RESPONSE FROM RABIN TO  
WALDHEIM ON NOVEMBER 17 WERE GIVEN ME BY MINISTER SHALEV  
WHO ASKED THAT THEY BE PASSED TO YOU. TEXTS FOLLOW:

2. FROM WALDHEIM TO RABIN: QUOTE DEAR PRIME MINISTER:  
I HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING WITH GROWING ANXIETY THE MOST RECENT  
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

I AM DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THE PRESENT INCREASE IN TENSION  
MAY LEAD TO A BREAKDOWN OF THE CEASE FIRE WHICH I FIRMLY  
BELIEVE NONE OF THE PARTIES DESIRE AND WHICH WILL CERTAINLY



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BE IN THE LONG TERM INTERESTS OF NO ONE.

SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD REMOVE ANY IMMEDIATE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING REAL PROGRESS TOWARD A PEACEFUL AND JUST SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

I FOR MY PART HAVE BEEN DOING AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO ALL THAT I CAN TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SOLUTION OF THIS CRUCIAL PROBLEM.

AS AMBASSADOR TEKOAH WILL HAVE INFORMED YOU I HAVE BEEN ADVISED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF SYRIA OF THE INTENTION OF HIS GOVERNMENT NOT TO AGREE TO THE RENEWAL OF THE MANDATE OF UNDOF WHEN ITS CURRENT SIX-MONTH MANDATE EXPIRES.

ALTHOUGH THIS IS A MATTER WHICH HAS TO BE DECIDED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL I AM NATURALLY DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A DEVELOPMENT. I SHOULD ADD THAT THE ABOVE-MENTIONED TALKS DEALT ONLY WITH THE QUESTION OF UNDOF'S RENEWAL AND DID NOT COVER THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT AS A WHOLE.

I WISH TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE MAKING EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT TO AVERT ANY DEVELOPMENT WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO A NEW OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

I AM SURE THAT WE CAN COUNT ON THE COOPERATION OF YOUR GOVERNMENT IN THIS EFFORT WHICH IS VITAL NOT ONLY TO THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION BUT ALSO TO WORLD PEACE.

I SHALL OF COURSE KEEP AMBASSADOR TEKOAH FULLY INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

PLEASE ACCEPT MR. PRIME MINISTER THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION. KURT WALDHEIM. UNQUOTE.

3. FROM RABIN TO WALDHEIM: QUOTE DEAR SECRETARY GENERAL.

I AGREE WITH YOU THAT IT WOULD BE MOST REGRETTABLE IF THE PRESENT TENSION CONTINUED ENDANGERING THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT AND THE CEASEFIRE. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT ISRAEL

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ATTACHES IMPORTANCE TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THE TERMS OF THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT AND THE CEASEFIRE AS A PREREQUISITE FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE.

I WOULD LIKE TO CLARIFY THAT ISRAEL HAS NOT BEEN THE INITIATOR OF THIS TENSION. ISRAEL WAS OBLIGED TO TAKE CERTAIN LIMITED PRECAUTIONARY STEPS ONLY AFTER IT BECAME CLEAR THAT SYRIAN ARMED FORCES HAD BEEN PUT IN A STATE OF ALERT.

YOUR MESSAGE REFERRED TO THE INTENTION OF THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT NOT TO AGREE TO THE RENEWAL OF THE MANDATE OF UNDOF WHEN ITS CURRENT SIX MONTH MANDATE EXPIRES. THIS

DEVELOPMENT IS CERTAINLY DAMAGING TO THE PROSPECTS OF PEACE. I MUST MAKE IT CLEAR THAT ISRAEL CONSIDERS THE UNDOF'S ROLE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, THE COMMITMENTS OF SYRIA AND ISRAEL, AS SET OUT IN THE AGREEMENT AND PROTOCOL, BOTH CONSTITUTING ONE INDIVISIBLE WHOLE, ARE CLEAR AND SPECIFIC.

THE ESTABLISHMENT AND STATIONING OF UNDOF IN THE AREA DESIGNATED IN THE AGREEMENT IS ONE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE AGREEMENT. UNDOF'S ROLE IS, INTER ALIA, TO SUPERVISE THE AGREEMENT AND PROTOCOL WITH REGARD TO THE AREA OF SEPARATION AND LIMITATION. PARAGRAPH E OF THE AGREEMENT SPECIFICALLY STATES THAT THE PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE CEASEFIRE, THE DISENGAGEMENT AND THE DEMILITARIZATION WOULD BE INSPECTED BY UN PERSONNEL, WHO, UNDER THIS AGREEMENT, WOULD COMPRISE THE UNDOF. THERE IS NO TIME LIMIT ON THE VALIDITY OF THE AGREEMENT AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE UNDOF THEREUNDER.

I WISH TO EMPHASIZE THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE WOULD VIEW A BREACH OF AGREEMENT. I AM GLAD TO HAVE YOUR ASSURANCE THAT YOU ARE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO AVERT UNDESIRABLE DEVELOPMENTS. I CAN ASSURE YOU OF THE COOPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IN YOUR EFFORTS. UNQUOTE. INGERSOLL

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