The original documents are located in Box 7, folder “Japan - MIG-25 Incident (3)” of the NSC East Asia and Pacific Country Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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TYPE OF MATERIAL . Intelligence Report
DESCRIPTION . Re MIG-25
CREATION DATE . 09/24/1976
VOLUME . 1 page
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COLLECTION TITLE . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, PRESIDENTIAL COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER . 7
FOLDER TITLE . Japan - MIG-25 Incident (3)
DATE WITHDRAWN . 09/04/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . GG

REDACTED
JAPAN: (FOBAT Exploitation) 24 Sep 76

(MAP) On site exploitation of the Soviet FOXBAT was completed at Hakodate on 22 September. The aircraft has since been prepared for movement and will be airlifted to Hyakuri Air Base by C-5 at 1000 EDT this morning.

A proposal was made to further ship one of the FOXBAT engines to the US for further exploitation. The Japanese responded favorably to this request, however, the US Ambassador has serious reservations concerning the proposals which are being discussed among US officials.

Analysis of the aircraft thus far continues to generally confirm previous US assessments of FOXBAT capability. (PHOTO) The mixture of rather crude and highly sophisticated technology used to meet specific requirements has been noteworthy. While there has been considerable effort expended in reducing the overall weight of the aircraft, there is a marked disregard for minimizing aerodynamic drag. Flap, rudder, and aileron actuators are exposed, and a variety of course joining and fastening techniques are used on all surface areas.
BELINKO'S COMMENTS

- His unit lost 2 FOXBATs last 6 months
- All air-defense interceptors to be equipped with machine guns
- FOXBAT checklist is classified and cannot be carried by pilots
- Aircraft cooling alcohol regularly pilfered for drinking purposes

SOURCE: AFIS
ROUGH SURFACE INCREASES DRAG

RIVETS

ROUND HEAD RIVETS

SCREW FASTENERS

GLUE/SPOT WELDING

SOURCE: USDAO

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TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Intelligence Report

TITLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . The MIG-25 and Its Pilot

CREATION DATE . . . . . . 09/24/1976

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10/16/01
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Intelligence Report

TITLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . The MIG-25 Foxbat

CREATION DATE . . . . . . 09/24/1976

VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400270

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BOX NUMBER . . . . . . . . . 7

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . . Japan - MIG-25 Incident (3)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . . 09/04/2001

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6/8/12
SPECIAL EQUIPMENT EXPLOITATION REPORT
The MIG-25 FOXBAT

26 SEPTEMBER 1974

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted
E.O. 12356 (as amended) SEC 3.3
NRC 29-070-14015

By: D.D. NARA Date: 11/12/1999

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<td>Warning, Notice, Sentinel, Intelligence Sources and Methods, Intellegible</td>
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These special equipment exploitation reports are being issued to provide timely reporting on the status and results of exploitation activities relating to a MiG-25 FOXBAT which landed in Japan on 6 September 1976. The information is preliminary in nature and may be revised as the exploitation process continues. The data have been obtained by the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) as well as the U.S. exploitation team.

This document was prepared under the direction of the Deputy Director for Scientific and Technical Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, for publication by authority of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.

Jack Vorona
Deputy Director for Scientific and Technical Intelligence
DEFENSE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
24 SEPTEMBER 1976

SPECIAL EQUIPMENT EXPLOITATION REPORT
The MIG-25 FOXBAT

PREPARED BY
LT COL JOHN CHEVALIER, USAF

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This is a Department of Defense intelligence product prepared by the Directorate for Scientific and Technical Intelligence of the Defense Intelligence Agency
SPECIAL EQUIPMENT EXPLOITATION REPORT
MIG-25/FOXBAT

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SPECIAL EQUIPMENT EXPLOITATION REPORT
MiG-25/FOXBAT

Summary
This Defense Technical Intelligence Report is the first in a series designed to disseminate the results of an ongoing technical exploitation of a Soviet MiG-25/FOXBAT which landed at the Hakodate City Airport, Hokkaido, Japan on 6 September 1976.

The exploitation data contained herein is based on information provided by the Japanese Self Defense Force during the period 6 through 18 September and from "hands-on" investigations by the U.S. on-site exploitation team at Hakodate City between 19 and 21 September. Data based on detailed testing and analysis of subsystems and materials will be contained in future exploitation reports when the aircraft is moved from its current location.

Exploitation Data Based on JSDF Information

The aircraft was manufactured between December 1975 and the first quarter of calendar year 1976. Thus, the MiG-25 in Japan is representative of the newest FOXBAT production. Initial exploitation, however, revealed no surprising technological advancements.

All airborne-intercept radar components appeared to be standard tube-type with no evidence of miniaturization. There was also no evidence of either doppler processing or a lookdown capability for the airborne-intercept (AI) radar.

Many of the panels and switches in the FOXBAT cockpit are identical to those used in late models of the MiG-21 FISHBED. Some of the aircraft fittings, flight control actuators and design techniques were also used in the MiG-21. From this parts commonality, it should not be inferred that the MiG-25 is just a larger and faster MiG-21; rather, such commonality follows the Soviet practice of relying on proven hardware whenever possible.

Skin buckling or wrinkling appears in many places on the aircraft suggesting the use of minimum gauge skin. The buckling appearance also suggests that hat-section stiffeners are used to reduce panel weight, particularly for large area panels. It is not clear whether the buckling occurred as a result of service conditions or happened during the fabrication of the panel.
The fastening techniques observed do not reflect a great concern for minimizing drag by maintaining the smoothest possible external surface. At the same time the use of thin gauge skin panels and honeycomb panels suggest concern for weight reduction.

The FOXBAT high altitude speed limits reported by the pilot agree with current DIA estimates, but the sea level speed limits are significantly different. This deviation could result from differences between the actual and the estimated aerodynamic assessment (g limit) and/or from the use of materials different than those in the current assessment. The pilot reported the use of titanium alloy in the wing leading edges and in other parts of the aircraft susceptible to aerodynamic heating.

**FOXBAT MAXIMUM SPEEDS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Reported</th>
<th>Assessed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sea Level (kts/Mach)</td>
<td>640/0.98</td>
<td>540/0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 57,000 ft (Mach)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Missiles</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The FOXBAT is equipped with a Short Range Navigation System (RSBN-6S) which is similar to the unit noted on the Soviet Supersonic Transport, the TU-144 Charger. Use of the RSBN and the Automatic Flight Control System (SAU) enables the aircraft to be flown automatically through its entire flight regime, except for takeoff and landing. There are provisions for three enroute waypoints or navigation stations and three letdown or landing associated turning points. These are probably preprogrammed into the RSBN system before flight. It appears that dropping enroute waypoints can be accomplished, but at this time it is not known if new waypoints can be programmed in flight.
MIG-25 FOXBAT AT HAKODATE CITY AIRPORT
Exploitation Based on U.S. Hands-on Inspection

(NoFORN) An eleven man U.S. on-site exploitation team is conducting a five-day exploitation effort during the disarming and dismantling of the MiG-25 FOXBAT. This effort represents only a small portion of the total FOXBAT exploitation requirements but was felt to be reasonable given the limited number of experts allowed access to the aircraft and the limited facilities available at the work site. After the aircraft has been moved from Hakodate, a more comprehensive exploitation plan can be initiated. The team has reported that the first three days of the exploitation were very successful in providing new data on the FOXBAT.

The following list represents the teams initial five-day exploitation plan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exploitation Category</th>
<th>Category Breakdown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avionics</td>
<td>Data link, radar, IFF/ATC, flight recorder, voice warning, navigation systems, communications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propulsion</td>
<td>Physical description and measurements, detailed photography, metal samples, acoustic recording (engine running), clay impressions, X-rays.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerodynamics</td>
<td>Measurements, profiles, surface deflections, clay impressions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures and Materials</td>
<td>Metal samples, X-rays, measurements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electro-optical</td>
<td>Infrared search track sets, sighting equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photography</td>
<td>Stereo detail, pilot visibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>Pilot workload, switch location requirements for aircraft operation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Missile Launchers
Air Frame
Infrared Signature
Infrared Countermeasures

Structures

(NOFOFRM) The main wing box (the spars and skin between the 1st and 4th spars) is all welded steel. The steel skins are seam-welded to the spars and stiffness is provided by formed-lip hat sections spot welded to the skin. The wing leading edge and trailing edge appear to be titanium and aluminum, respectively. Metal samples have been taken for analysis.

(NOFOFRM) The upper fuselage skins covering the fuel tanks are steel and are bead welded to the steel frames on the outer surface. The interior portion of the integral fuselage fuel tanks are constructed of corrugated steel. Inspection of tank interiors revealed no paint or sealant. The outer skins of the fuselage encompassing the fuel tanks also have spot welded hat sections which are quite closely spaced.

(NOFOFRM) The rough corrugated type skin on the engine duct is also steel. The outboard leading edge of the engine inlet is steel. All landing gears are steel.

(NOFOFRM) The fin is semi-monocoque and probably has some integ rally stiffened skins. The rudder is sheet and rib construction. The aileron and the aft half of the flap is honeycomb. The forward half of the flap is skin and rib construction.

Propulsion

(NOFOFRM) The powerplant is a Tumanskiy designed afterburning turbojet with a single spool compressor, a can-type combustion system and a two-stage turbine. The engine has 30 fixed inlet guide vanes with no obvious camber. The first stage rotor is steel and has 26 blades. The second stage rotor is also steel and has 41 blades. There is no compressor casing treatment nor any bypass at the engine face. The compressor has no variable geometry. The inlet guide vanes, second and third stage stators are spot welded to the compressor case. The afterburner has three circular, V-gutter type flameholders.
with interconnecting flame propagation ribs. These flame
holders are coated with a green ceramic coating. Afterburner
ignition is provided by a pilot burner located in the turbine
exhaust cone. The screech-liner is highly tapered, as is the
tailpipe downstream of the screech liner. The afterburner
fuel system has four distinct stages. An airframe mounted
afterburner heat shield is used. The engine accessories
include a D.C. starter generator, an A.C. generator, an
auxiliary power unit (used in the starting sequence), two
hydraulic pumps, a main fuel pump, main fuel control, an
afterburner fuel pump, afterburner fuel control, a fuel
boost pump, an afterburner distributor, two tachometer-
generators, and several other currently unidentified items.

The inlet appears to be all external compression
with two fixed ramps plus one variable ramp in the super-
sonic region followed by one subsonic panel. The first
moveable ramp is hinged to the second fixed ramp and is
pinned to the subsonic panel. The subsonic panel trailing
guard edge rides in a horizontal sliding track. The inlet has
no by-pass system. The inlet boundary layer bleed air is
removed via a series of holes located in the throat region.
This air feeds into a plenum and is dumped overboard via a
fixed door in the upper nacelle. The inlet instrumentation
includes an apparent temperature sensor plus some static
pressure taps near the engine face. The two position inlet
lower cowl lip is hinged and is lowered for take-off to
serve as an auxiliary inlet.

The nozzle is a mechanically linked, engine
mounted, convergent - divergent system with a single
actuator system. The actuator uses a split rod with one
segment going to the primary nozzle and one segment going
to a moveable ring. There is no internal contouring on the
secondary flap. The secondary flap has provisions for
internal air cooling. The primary nozzle has 12 petals and
12 seal flaps. The secondary nozzle has 11 petals and 10
seal flaps. One petal and two seals flaps have been
removed to allow close spacing between the nozzles.

Miscellaneous antennas: Right rear ventral fin
contains an antenna which is resonant at 56 MHz in field tests.
Connector is marked MRP-56P. The top antenna appears to be a
sense antenna for radio compass. The drag chute compartment
is dielectric but has no apparent RF connection. The left
vertical stabilizer has a prizma HF antenna.
AI Radar: The antenna structure has been exploited and is well understood. However, the I/J Band radar feed has fifteen separate feed inputs. Their functions and the functions of the waveguides are not readily discernible. The I Band portion of the antenna system is quite similar in concept to the SPIN SCAN reflector.

Implications

The data in this report is based on fragmentary information and it is too early to make firm judgements on the analysis to date. However, some preliminary implications can be drawn from the initial FOXBAT exploitation.

a. The higher maximum speed capability at sea level probably results from the extensive use of steel skin in the aircraft.

b. The previous aerodynamic assessment (aircraft and airfoil configurations, drag, etc.) have been derived from photography of the FOXBAT B (reconnaissance version) in East Germany; there have been no readily recognizable aerodynamic changes incorporated in the FOXBAT A (interceptor) now in exploitation.

c. It is noted that the use of steel skin would allow higher aircraft \( q \)-limits at sea level.

d. The use of off-the-shelf (MiG 21) components and the relatively crude fastening techniques reflect the Soviet penchant for using simple procedures whenever possible and introducing sophisticated techniques only when they are necessary.
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CINCLANT
AAC
CINCRED
CINCSO
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NMEDRSCHINNIST BETH
OP 96 (DRN1)
NAVARTTESTCEN PAX
STRATANALSUPPGRO
NAVDDFAC IND HEAD
NAVPGSCOL
FILOMOHTDESYSTCLAN
NAS GLENVIEW
NAVIONICFAC IND
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SUBJECT: SOVIET REACTION TO MIG INCIDENT
REF: MOSCON 14970, MOSCON 14711

1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION MAY BE PASSED TO JAPANESE
EMBASSY.

2. CONTRARY TO SOVIET ASSERTIONS, AIRCRAFT AND PERSONNEL
INVOLVED IN ACCIDENTAL CROSSING OF BORDER FROM TURKEY IN
1970 WERE NOT RETURNED PROMPTLY. AIRCRAFT WAS BEECHCRAFT
UW UNARMED, SPORT OR BUSINESS TYPE LIGHT PASSENGER PLANE
BELONGING TO US MILITARY AUXILIARY MISSION IN TURKEY. NO
CAMERAS OR ANY RECONNAISSANCE-RELATED EQUIPMENT WAS ON BOARD.
PLANE WAS ON FLIGHT FROM ERZURUM TO KARS, TURKEY, PERSONNEL
ON BOARD HERE THE TWO US GENERAL COMMANDING THE US MILITARY

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TELEGRAM

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3. AFTER LANDING AT LENINAKAN ON OCTOBER 21, THE PERSONNEL AND AIRCRAFT WERE DETAINED IN THE SOVIET UNION UNTIL NOVEMBER 10, 1970 FOR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION. DURING THIS THREE WEEK PERIOD, AMERICANS WERE INTERROGATED, SOMETIMES IN A CONSULTING MANNER, RIGHTS OF AMERICANS TO COMMUNICATE WITH US EMBASSY AND AMERICAN CONSULAR ACCESS WERE PERIODICALLY OBSTRUCTED AND DELAYED, AND SOVIET PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS ACCUSED THE US AND TURKEY OF SPYING AND PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS. IN SPITE OF MANY AMERICAN AND TURKISH REQUESTS, EXPRESSIONS OF REGRET, AND PROMISES TO TAKE MEASURES TO PREVENT FUTURE INTRUSIONS, SOVIETS WOULD NOT RELEASE INNOCENT AMERICANS AND PLANE FOR THREE WEEKS.

4. DIFFERENCES OF 1970 CASE FROM MIG-25 CASE ARE CLEAR:
JAPANESE BEGIN DETAILED EXAMINATION OF SOVIET MIG-25

OW254659 HONG KONG AFP IN ENGLISH 0645 GMT 25 SEP 76 CW

(Excerpts) Tokyo, Sept. 25 (AFP)--JAPANESE SPECIALISTS SATURDAY STARTED EXAMINING PART BY PART THE SUPERSECRET SOVIET MIG-25 INTERCEPTOR AT A CENTRAL JAPAN AIR BASE, ACCORDING TO THE DEFENSE AGENCY.

"THE ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET PLANE, WHICH IS STILL A MYSTERY TO THE WEST, WILL PROVE TO BE A HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT BLESSING," A DEFENSE AGENCY OFFICIAL SAID.

THE DETAILED INSPECTION AT THE BASE WILL BE CONDUCTED AT JAPAN'S INITIATIVE AND UNDER ITS SUPERVISION WITH THE HELP OF THEIR AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS, DEFENSE AGENCY SOURCES SAID.

FOCAL POINTS OF INTEREST TO THEM ARE THE HUGE TWIN ENGINES, FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM, ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURE EQUIPMENTS AND A DEVICE TO IDENTIFY ALLY OR ENEMY, THEY SAID.

THE SOURCES SAID THAT THE DEFENSE AGENCY HOPES TO COMPLETE THE INSPECTION WORK IN ABOUT 3 WEEKS. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE SOVIETS ON THE RETURN OF THE "FOXBAT" TO SOVIET AUTHORITIES WILL START EARLY NEXT MONTH, THEY ADDED.
TO AMBASSADOR TOKYO NIACT IMEDIATE 23/91
INFO CINCPAC HONOLULU HI  IMEDIATE
CONSUL JAPAN IMEDIATE
S-5-C-0-4-2-STATE 23/9/32

SUBJECT MISHMASH

REF: (1) TOKYO 143877 (2) CONSUL JAPAN OTS 23/1/381

I. DEPARTMENT STRONGLY SUPPORTS POINTS DCM MADE TO MOFA

II. IN VIEW OF OVERRIDDING IMPORTANCE OF COMPLETE
INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION OF FIS 39, AMBASSADOR SHOULD
SEEK APPOINTMENT AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE SEPTEMBER 27 WITH
MOFA INSTEAD OF VISIT TO JAPAN THAT A ThOROUGH EXAMINATION
OF THE AIRCRAFT BE RETAINED. AMBASSADOR SHOULD USE
FOLLOWING AS HE SEEMS APPROPRIATE:

(A) US TECHNICAL JUDGMENT IS THAT DESTRUCTION OF DIRECT
ACCESS TO HIJACK AT 2400 SEPTEMBER 26 (TOKYO TIME) WOULD
LEAVE EXAMINATION ONLY 99 PERCENT COMPLETED, AT LEAST
SEVERAL MORE DAYS WILL BE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE OUR
OBJECTIVES, WHICH ARE ALSO OF DIRECT INTEREST TO THE
JAPANESE.

(B) HE APPRECIATE GOJ EFFORT TO RETURN AIRCRAFT WITH
SAME GENERAL TIME PERIOD AS WAS CASE WITH SIMILAR
INCIDENTS IN EUROPE. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE, HOWEVER,
THAT IN MOST CASES, SOVIET/EAST EUROPEAN AIRCRAFT HELD

SCHROEDER, NYLAND, LL

PSN 1985194 PAGE 51
IN EUROPE WERE THOROUGHLY EXAMINED PRIOR TO RETURN AND
IN SOME CASES RETURNED WITHOUT MANY COMPONENTS. US
USUALLY HAD ALMOST IMMEDIATE ACCESS, ALTHOUGH GOJ HAS
HAD MIG-28 FOR ALMOST THREE WEEKS, US HAS HAD ACCESS
FOR SCARCELY ONE WEEK.

(C) WHILE WE APPRECIATE JAPANESE WILLINGNESS TO MAKE
AVAILABLE RESULTS OF THEIR OWN CONTINUED EXAMINATION OF
AIRCRAFT, WE BELIEVE THAT PARTICIPATION IN EXAMINATION
BY HIGHLY TRAINED US EXPERTS WHO ARE FAMILIAR WITH VERY
SOPHISTICATED AVIONICS AND OTHER SYSTEMS WHICH MAY BE
INVOLVED IS ESSENTIAL TO ADEQUATE EXPLOITATION. WE
UNDERSTAND JAPANESE TECHNICIANS SHARE THIS BELIEF.

(D) AS GOJ WELL AWARE, MIG-28 IS MAJOR POTENTIAL
ADVERSARY AIRCRAFT OF BOTH US AND JAPAN AS WELL AS NATO
AND OTHER ALLIED INFORMATION GLEANED FROM THOROUGH
EXAMINATION WOULD BE OF INESTIMABLE VALUE IN IMPROVING
AIR DEFENSE, HOPEFULLY INCLUDING MEASURES WHICH
WOULD MAKE MORE DIFFICULT FUTURE VIOLATIONS OF THIS TYPE
OF JAPAN'S AIR SPACE.

(E) SOVIETS ARE ALREADY UNHAPPY ABOUT THIS ENTIRE
EPISODE. GOJ COMMITMENT TO RETURN AIRCRAFT NEED NOT HAVE
A SHORT TERMINAL DATE OR INCLUDE EXCLUSION OF US ACCESS
IN ORDER TO SERVE JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC OBJECTIVES WHEN
KOBAYA MEETS GROMYKO. IT SEEMS TO US THAT A FEW DAYS
MORE WOULD MAKE LITTLE DIFFERENCE AT THIS POINT. WE SEE
NO REAL GAIN FOR GOJ IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH SOVS BY
ABRUPTLY CUTTING OFF US ACCESS ON SEPTEMBER 28 WHEN
KOBAYA MEETS GROMYKO. WHEN IT APPEARS TO US THAT
JAPANESE PURPOSES COULD EQUALLY BE SERVED BY USING
MEETING TO SET DATE FOR EVENTUAL RETURN, YOU SHOULD
EMPHASIZE THAT HIGHEST LEVELS IN US GOVERNMENT CONTINUE
TO FEEL THAT FULLEST EXPLOITATION OF POSSESSION OF
AIRCRAFT IS A MATTER OF HIGH PRIORITY AND WE COUNT ON
JAPANESE COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING. KISSINGER
BY
TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHDC HIAC Primary IMMEDIATE 2468
INFO CONUS-JAPAN YOKOTA IMMEDIATE CINCPAC-HONOLULU IMMEDIATE

O-O-R-E-T-T-W-TOKYO 14327

LrMCI8

C O R R E C T I O N (F O R T E X T PARA 1) CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 10862 XOS=8
TAGS: FOR: J. HARR
SUBJECT: MARINA EXPLOITATION
REP: TOKYO 14327

1. AMERICAN AFFAIRS OFFICER YAMAZAKI AND SECURITY DIVISION CHIEF SATO INFORMED DCM DURING EVENING OF SEPTEMBER 28 THAT ALTHOUGH FINAL SOJ DECISION NOT YET FORMALLY APPROVED (DISCUSSIONS WOULD CONTINUE OVER WEEKEND BETWEEN FOREIGN OFFICE AND DEFENSE AGENCY), IT VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT SOJ WOULD REQUEST US (PROBABLY ON SEPT 28) TO TERMINATE DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN EXPLOITATION OF NISSUS BY MIDNIGHT SEPT 28 (TOKYO TIME) AFTER THAT TIME, HOWEVER, US EXPERTS WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTINUE INVESTIGATION THROUGH INDIRECT ARRANGEMENTS (E.G., THROUGH ADVICE AND CONSULTATION WITH JASDF TECHNICIANS AND EXAMINATION OF PARTS AT OFFSITE LOCATION). YAMAZAKI STATED THAT THIS QUESTION HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BY FOREIGN MINISTERS WITH PRIME MINISTER ON SEPT 28 WHO TOOK POSITION THAT PLANE SHOULD BE RETURNED TO SOVIETS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND THAT US DIRECT ACCESS SHOULD BE TERMINATED ON DAY WHEN FOREIGN MINISTER KOZAKA MEETS WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GRISHKO IN NEW YORK (SOMETIME ON SEPTEMBER 28 NEW YORK TIME).

2. SATO TOLD DCM THAT CURRENT JDA PLANS FOR EXPLOITATION AT HYAKURI INVOLVE TWO STAGES FIRST, REASSEMBLY OF AIRCRAFT AND GTE BASIC SURVEYS UNITE (I.E., CERTAIN MEASUREMENTS AND ELECTRONIC CHECKS) AND SECOND, GTE SYSTEMS CHECKS UNITE, INCLUDING FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM, SATO URGED THAT DURING PERIOD SEPT 28 THROUGH

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8COWCROFT, NYLAND, LL

RECALLED

PONI-395688 PAGE 61 T0R18278/2516152 DTM8928657I SEP 76

****** O-O-R-E-T-T-****** O-O-R-E-T-T-

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12068, SEC. 5.6
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, DATED 9/26/88

BY: [Signature], NAVY, DATE 3/29/88
MIDNIGHT SEPT 26: US EXPERTS MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF TIME TO COMPLETE PRIORITY CHECKS. DIRECT AND OVERT PRESENCE OF US PERSONNEL DURING THIS PERIOD, HE SAID, COULD BE DEFENDED BY GOJ AS NECESSARY TO COMPLETE RELOCATION OF AIRCRAFT FROM HANDDATE TO HYAKURI.

5. BY WAY OF BACKGROUND, SATO EXPLAINED TO DCM THAT FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION FACT THAT IN MAJORITY OF SIMILAR INCIDENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE, AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN RETURNED WITHIN ONE MONTH. SOJ THEREFORE HAS NOT REACHED POINT WHERE IT MUST INFORM SOVIETS THAT PLANE WILL BE RETURNED ONCE ITS EXAMINATION COMPLETED. THIS WILL BE DONE WHEN KOBAKA MEETS GROHKO. GOJ UNDOUBTEDLY EXPECTS GROHKO TO PRESS ON THIS POINT BEFORE MOVING TO DISCUSSION OF OTHER POSSIBLE ITEMS.

ONCE SUCH NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO RETURN GIVEN THEN, IN FOREIGN MINISTRY VIEW, MATTER WILL MOVE TO STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS DURING WHICH IT WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE FOR GOJ TO PERMIT CONTINUED DIRECT ACCESS BY US PERSONNEL, ALTHOUGH DCM ASKED WHETHER KOBAKA WOULD INDICATE APPROXIMATE DATE ON WHICH PLANE WOULD BE RETURNED AND WHETHER JOA HAD MADE ANY ESTIMATE OF TIME REQUIRED TO COMPLETE ITS INVESTIGATION AND PREPARE PLANE FOR SHIPMENT TO USER, SATO COULD NOT RESPOND ON THESE POINTS.

6. DCM EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR TIGHT DEADLINE WHICH WOULD BE IMPOSED BY ANTICIPATED GOJ DECISION. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH US EXPERTS WOULD OF COURSE MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF WHATEVER TIME AVAILABLE FOR DIRECT ACCESS, WHETHER PRIORITY CHECKS COULD BE COMPLETED IN NEXT THREE DAYS WOULD BE CRITICAL FACTOR ON WHICH CAREFUL TECHNICAL JUDGEMENT REQUIRED. HE URGED THAT GOJ RETAIN SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT TIME FOR DIRECT ACCESS TO COMPLETE SUCH PRIORITY CHECKS.

7. AFTER DISCUSSION WITH COMUSJAPAN GENERAL GALLAGAN, DCM INFORMED SATO THAT 16-MAN TEAM OF US EXPERTS WOULD ARRIVE AT HYAKURI SEPTEMBER 26 AND THAT EVERY EFFORT WOULD BE MADE TO EXPEDITE COMPLETION OF ONSITE INVESTIGATIONS. HE ALSO CONVEYED TO SATO, GENERAL GALLAGAN’S ASSURANCE THAT US TECHNICIANS WOULD OF COURSE TAKE MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE OF WHATEVER TIME REMAINS FOR DIRECT ACCESS BUT EMPHASIZED GALLAGAN’S CONCERN THAT THIS BE SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE US TO COMPLETE THE JOB.

8. EMBASSY WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 27.
SECRET

47

Department of State

STATE 220959

TELEGRAM

-7 SEP 1923 -53

COPY NO. 47 OF 15.

INFO OCT-81 ISO-80 /651 R

INTELLIGENCE

APPROVED BY: PICHABIS

DATE: 02 SEP 76 ZFF4

TO: AMBASSADOR WASHINGTON

FROM: AMBASSADOR TOYOKI

EXAMINED 11531541 ACCIDENT

SUBJECT: HIG 25

YOU SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT HIGHEST LEVELS ARE INTERESTED IN MAXIMIZING BENEFIT WE Derive FROM JAPANESE POSSESSION OF HIG 25. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SEEK COMPLETE ACCESS TO THE AIRCRAFT BY AMERICAN EXPERTS FOR AS MUCH TIME AS NECESSARY. YOU SHOULD APPROACH GOJ AT HIGHEST LEVEL YOU BELIEVE NECESSARY TO GAIN JAPANESE COOPERATION. IN ANY EVENT THE JAPANESE SHOULD NOT BE IN MURRY TO RETURN AIRCRAFT BEFORE IT HAS BEEN THOROUGHLY EXAMINED ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. ROBINSON

SECRET

(47 9/30/81

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . . Intelligence Report
DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . Re MIG-25
CREATION DATE . . . . . . . . 09/27/1976
VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032400270
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, PRESIDENTIAL COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER . . . . . . . . . . 7
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . . . . Japan - MIG-25 Incident (3)
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . . . . 09/04/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

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1/23/15
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Redacted
EXPLOITATION CONTINUES
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL          National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL              Outline
TITLE                        Problems Caused by Termination of
                            Direct US Involvement
CREATION DATE                09/1976
VOLUME                       1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID  032400270
COLLECTION TITLE            NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, PRESIDENTIAL
                            COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
                            PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER                   7
FOLDER TITLE                 Japan - MIG-25 Incident (3)
DATE WITHDRAWN               09/04/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST        GG

REDACTED
6H/12.
PROBLEMS CAUSED BY TERMINATION OF DIRECT US INVOLVEMENT

- Exploitation would proceed at slower pace
JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER DESIRES END TO DIRECT US INVOLVEMENT IN FOXBAT EXPLOITATION

TAKEO MIKI
Prime Minister
Age: 69

SOURCE: US Embassy (Tokyo)