The original documents are located in Box 4, folder "China, Republic of (4)" of the Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK FUNERAL TRIP KEY POINTS



- A. In conversations with the following, I used the talking points provided by the Secretary of State.
 - 1. KOREAN PRIME MINISTER KIM. Wednesday, April 16.
 - -- Explained why strong measures necessary to correct Communist activities at home.

 Drew parallel with these activities and Mao's method used in takeover of China.
 - -- Communists use every possible means to divide our two nations.
 - -- Now trying to infiltrate religious circles.
 - -- Want to weed out Communists very early.
 - -- Because of Vietnam some raise questions
 about US commitments. Korean Government
 feels it has full commitment and is taking
 measures to reassure people no reason for
 doubt of US.
 - -- Korea can take care of herself. Trying to maintain stability and develop. Trying not to become burden to US.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY GUIDELINES

NARA, DATE M/20/01

-TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

- 2. SOUTH VIETNAM SENATE PRESIDENT LAM AND AMBASSADOR

 TO REPUBLIC OF CHINA (President Thieu's brother).

 Wednesday, April 16.
 - -- If Congress and President would tell North
 Vietnamese to stop they would.
 - -- Morale is key factor. President Ford's speech had very positive effect. Congressional approval of aid would be a sustaining factor. If Congress only talks about taking out 6,000 Americans it has very negative influence.
 - -- President Thieu might consider stepping down
 if he were sure it would ensure real assistance
 and support from Congress.
- 3. PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO. Thursday, April 17.
 - -- Four basic principles.
 - -- No matter how much world situation changes, ROC belongs to camp of democratic nations headed by US.
 - -- Policy is and will remain totally
 Anti-Communist.
 - -- Cooperation and solidarity among people living on Taiwan.

-TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

- -- Continue economic construction so all can enjoy better standard of living.
- -- One of last things President Chiang said was that Government and people of US are the best friends of our people. This is guiding principle.
- -- Chiang has told US visitors ROC does not expect substantial US support. Do not want American boys involved. Counseled US against involvement in Vietnam. War in Asia must be fought by Asians themselves.
- -- All ROC expects from US is moral and spiritual support.
- -- Both PRC and Russia are enemies. Won't play one against another.
- -- Invited President Ford and Vice President to visit Taiwan.

4. FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA OF JAPAN. Thursday, April 17.

-- In US reassessment of policies in Asia, should not take any actions very rapidly.

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

- B. In addition to the above, I met with a number of other foreigners in Taiwan.
 - -- Former Prime Ministers Kishi and Sato of Japan.
 - -- Saudi Arabians, Cambodians.
- C. Schedule and reporting telegrams attached.



ADMIRAL GAYLER - CINCPAC - HAWAII. Sunday, April 13. Vietnam

- -- South Vietnam has only 2 weeks to a month.
- -- Situation not reversible by aid.
- -- We should evacuate now. We should at least start getting women and children out.
- -- Perhaps could take people out on planes bringing in food, aid, and ammunition.
- -- We should not be deceived by ease of Cambodian operation. Extraction from Vietnam will be a major military operation. We should start reducing numbers now.





AGIMAI GODY

COPY OF 15 COPIES

Department of State

TELEGRAIN

SECKET

N00655

PAGE 21 1707522

CONTROL: 41370 RECD: 17 APR 75 4:09AM

14-19 ACTION NOUS-09

INFO OCT-01 /001 W

050859

O 170748Z APR 75
FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO SECSTATE
INFO AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

FROM JUN HOWE

TAGS: UVIP (HOCKEFELLER, NELSON A.)

E.O.: 11652: GDS

1. FOLLOWING ARE SUBSTANTIVE HIGHLIGHTS OF APRIL 17

MEETING BETWEEN VICE PRESIDENT ROCKEFELLER AND

PREMIER CHIANG CHING-NUU. DETAILED MEMORANDUM OF

CONVERSATION WILL BE PREPARED LATER.

2. THE PREMIER WAS OBVIOUSLY GRATIFIED WITH THE

PRESIDENT'S SELECTION OF THE VICE PRESIDENT TO HEAD

THE U.S. DELEGATION TO HIS FATHER'S FUNERAL. HE

EXPRESSED WARM THANKS FUR THE PRESIDENT'S CON
COLENCE STATEMENT AND HIS MESSAGE OF CONDULENCE TO

HIM ON THE OCCASION OF HIS FATHER'S DEATH. HE

PAGE 2 RUEADHW 2210 SECRET
CHARACTERIZED THE VICE PRESIDENT'S ATTENDANCE AS
INDICATIVE OF CONTINUED FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO
COUNTRIES. HE NOTED THAT IT WAS VERY TOUCHING TO
HAVE FRIENDS SUCH AS THE UNITED STATES.

THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT THE FRIENDSHIP BETHEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WAS DEEP AND LASTING AND THAT IT WOULD CONTINUE. THIS FRIENDSHIP WOULD REMAIN UNAFFECTED BY PRESIDENT CHIANG'S DEATH. THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO VALUE ITS FRIENDLY AND ECONOMIC TIES TO THE ROC.

2. THE PHEMIER RELATED FOUR BASIC PRINCIPLES WHICH WOULD GUIDE HOC POLICIES. HE SAID THESE PRINCIPLES SECRET

GG 4/20/01





Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 1707532

HAD BEEN REPEATEDLY STRESSED TO HIM BY HIS FATHER DURING THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS. THE ROC WOULD STEADFASTLY ADHERE TO THEM, THESE PRINCIPLES ARE:

- (1) NO MATTER HOW MUCH THE WORLD SITUATION CHANGES, THE ROC WOULD CONTINUE TO BELONG TO THE CAMP OF DEMOCRATIC NATIONS MEADED BY THE U.S.
- (2) THE ROC. HOULD MAINTAIN A CONSISTENTLY ANTI-
- PAGE 3 RUEADWH 2210 5 E C R E T

 COMMUNIST POLICY UNTIL FINAL VICTORY WAS

 ACHIEVED.
 - (3) THE RUC WOULD STRIVE TO ACHIEVE COOPERATION AND SOLIDARITY BETWEEN THE PEOPLES LIVING ON TAIMAN.
 - (4) THE HOC WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS ON WITH ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE LIVING STANDARD OF THE PLOPLE

5. THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT TAIWAN WAS FORTUNATE THAT A STRONG LEADERSHIP WAS INHERITING PRESIDENT'S MANTLE. HE TOLD HOW IMPRESSED WE ALL WERE WITH THE ECONOMIC MIRACLE THAT HAD OCCURRED ON TAIWAN.

6. THE PREMIER RETURNED TO THE QUESTION OF ROC RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. HE REFERRED TO HIS PATHER'S REPEATED ADMONITIONS TO HIM OVER THE YEARS THAT REGARDLESS OF THE PROBLEMS AND UNCERTAINTIES OF THE WORLD SITUATION, THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE U.S. WERE THE BEST OF FRIENDS OF THE ROC AND ITS PEOPLE. ACCURDING TO THE PREMIER, SHORTLY

PAGE 4 RUEADWW 2210 SECRET
BEFURE HE DIED THE PRESIDENT AGAIN REAFFIRMED THIS
SENTIMENT. THE PREMIER NOTED THAT HE REGARDS
HIS FATHER'S ADMONITION AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE
7. THE PREMIER RECOUNTED THAT IN MEETING OFFICIAL
AMERICAN VISITORS OVER THE YEARS. PREGIDENT CHIANG
SECRET





Department of State

TELEGRAIN

SECUET

PAGE 03 170753Z

HAD CONSISTENILY ADVISED AGAINST THE USE OF AMERICAN THE PRESIDENT MADE CLEAR TO TROOPS IN VIETNAM. THESE VISITORS THAT THE ROC DUES NOT EXPECT SUB-STANTIAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S. ALL IT DESIRED WAS AMERICAN SPINITUAL AND MORAL SUPPORT. THE PREMIER REITERATED THAT THE HUC CONTINUES ONLY TO SEEK AMERICAN MORAL AND SPIRITUAL SUPPORT. AGAIN PUTTING IT IN TERMS OF A PRINCIPLE ESTABLISHED BY THE LATE PRESIDENT, AND ONE THAT WOULD BE UNFAILINGLY ADHERED TO BY HIM, THE PREMIER STATED THAT THE ROC VIEWS BOTH MOSCOW AND PEKING AS ENEMIES AND HUULD NUT HAVE ANY DEALINGS WITH ONE IN ORDER TO PLAY IT OFF AGAINST THE OTHER . THE PREMIER AGAIN STRESSED THIS WOULD REMAIN A GUIDING PRINCIPLE FOR THE ROC.

PAGE 5 RUEADWW 2210 SECRET

9. THE PREMIER EXTENDED AN INVITATION TO BUTH
PRESIDENT FORD AND VICE PRESIDENT ROCKEFELLER TO
VISIT TAIWAN AT THEIR CONVENIENCE. THE VICE
PRESIDENT SAID HE WOULD TRANSMIT THIS KIND
INVITATION TO PRESIDENT FORD. ON THE SUBJECT OF
VISITS. THE VICE PRESIDENT TOLD THE PREMIER THAT
THERE WERE NO AGREEMENTS OR COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN
WITH RESPECT TO THE PRESIDENT'S FORTHCOMING VISIT
TO THE PRC.

UNGER

EQT

TARALO POERALO PA

SECHET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



Washington, D.C. 20520

April 29, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Sales of Military Equipment to the Republic of China

The Republic of China (ROC) is seeking US approval for the extension of two of its military co-production projects: F5E aircraft and T-53 aircraft engines. We also have a long outstanding ROC request to purchase the Harpoon anti-ship missile. Decisions are required on responses to these requests. For commercial reasons, the F5E is the most urgent of the ROC requests, because the ROC must inform Northrop of its intentions by May 1 or forfeit most of a million dollar deposit.

The ROC already has approval for the co-production with the Northrop Company of 100 F5E's. This program will be completed in November 1977. It now seeks approval to produce an additional 20 aircraft. These would be the first installment of a planned-for production of an additional 100 F5's: 75 F5E's and 25 F5F's, a two-seat version capable of both training and combat missions. Although we are supporting the construction of the first 100 aircraft with FMS credit, the ROC has not asked for further assistance, and we do not recommend it.

An additional 20 F5E's would increase ROC Air Force strength by mid-1978 to an estimated 272 combat aircraft, including 120 F5E's, 71 of the older F5A's and F5B's and 81 F-104's and F-100's which are rapidly approaching the end of their projected service life.

SECRET GDS 4/20/01



The T-53 engines are being co-produced by the ROC and the Avco Lycoming Company for use in the ROC's UH-1H helicopter. A total of 80 engines will be completed by June, 1976. Avco Lycoming has now asked for an export license to produce an additional 43 engines, which would be used in an ROC-designed basic trainer aircraft.

These are new requests. We are still holding a ROC request of May, 1974 to purchase the Harpoon anti-ship missile which is stimulated by concern over the increasing threat to its Navy posed by the PRC's growing strength in high speed patrol boats armed with Styx missiles. The ROC wants to mount Harpoon on patrol boats which it intends to purchase. Harpoon is not yet in the US Navy inventory and earliest delivery to the ROC would be mid-1977 at best. The ROC has not been specific about the number it wants, but has requested approval of a sale in principle.

Our Embassy in Taipei supports all three of these requests. It particularly sees strong military and political justifications for the additional F5E's and Harpoon. USLO has specifically expressed serious reservations about the additional F5E's, arguing that the PRC will view approval as another US "transfusion" to the ROC and as slippage in the implementation of the Shanghai Communique.

We regard the question of additional F5E's as the most important. In view of the overwhelming size of the PRC air force and the critical importance of maintaining control of the air in defending Taiwan, there is a valid military requirement for this modest augmentation of ROC air strength. Largely through our educational efforts, the ROC, which continues to view its security in predominantly military terms, assigns highest priority to maintaining a credible air defense. Our refusal to meet a request in this vital area would be interpreted by the ROC as evidence of a new and far more restrictive policy on weapons supply, with dangerous implication for its security. ROC worries about its diplomatic relationship with the US would be accompanied by fear that it would also be cut off from access to US arms. If the cumulative



effect of negative US decisions on arms supply were to generate such alarm in Taipei, the ROC could be prompted into actions which would complicate our course with the PRC. On the other hand, approval of this request would demonstrate to the ROC our continued interest in Taiwan's security, regardless of the question of our formal ties with it. The ROC would hope that a favorable decision on 20 additional F5E's would portend US approval of further F5E's, but we could caution against such an inference.

There is little question that US agreement to more F5E's for the ROC would upset Peking, and we would have to be prepared to hold firm and defend our action as consistent with normalization. The PRC has not made a major issue over the original F5E project, and it is familiar with the limited capabilities of this aircraft. We believe that Peking would not react immediately and vigorously to an additional 20 aircraft. To improve chances of this, we would stipulate that the ROC not publicize the decision. Over the longer run, in reaction to this type of activity the PRC might press us to adopt more restrictive practices on the supply of military equipment to the ROC.

We believe that to balance an affirmative decision on more F5E's, we should not approve the ROC requests for the Harpoon missile or for additional production of T-53 engines. While the ROC has a valid military requirement for an anti-ship missile, it is not limited to a US source of supply. Taipei has already obtained a small number of the Israeli "Gabriel" missile for testing purposes, and the Italian "Ottomat" is also available. of these are more comparable to the Styx than the Harpoon, which is considerably more sophisticated, versatile and has a much greater range. As for the T-53 engines for use in the ROC trainer, this is not a vital defense need, and a turn-down here would have the added benefit of avoiding the appearance of helping the ROC develop an independent aircraft production capability.

We therefore recommend that the request for 20 more F5E aircraft be approved and that those for Harpoon missiles and additional T-53 engines be disapproved. In the case of Harpoon, we believe that we should continue to remain silent, since the ROC probably already appreciates that our silence to date is a face-saving turn-down.



The Department of Defense strongly supports approval of the 20 additional F5E aircraft. It does not concur in the disapproval of the additional T-53 engines or Harpoon. In view of this difference of opinion, we believe it best to defer a decision on the latter two matters.

George S. Springsteen Executive Secretary

				1/	'09
		DOC	RECD	G NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
SC	CURRESPONDENCE PROFILE	MO D	A MO DA HR	150281	4 Koule
		70	7720	EEEDENGE.	CURCLE AS ADDRODDIATE
NO	TO: PRES FROM: KISSINGER, H _			REFERENCE:	UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
PT	KISSINGER COLBY, W			R	LOU NO FORN NODIS
CRI	SCOWCROFTSCHLESINGER, J				C EYES ONLY EXDIS
DESCRI	DAVIS ST EX SEC	>>	×		s CODEWORD
2/25	Post				TS SENSITIVE
<	Loh I H. h.L.	1	d	1-4	KART
E/CL	SUBJECT: 19 11 100	2+	Tymps	my 10	/ CC V
U	Offerm Al Co-Knock	200	Tim 11	soresta	
SOUR	Children of Children	9		Acres	
S	Carried (Asserting to the Control of			//	
	INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION	REC	ACTION REQUI	RED	
	ACTION INFO ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT	FOR	MEMO FOR HAP	K)
LV	STAFF SECRETARY		MEMO FOR PRE	ES)
ASGM	FAR EAST LOTHER		REPLY FOR		()
Z	SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	/	APPROPRIATE	ACTION	()
0	MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA	0	уемо	то)
ACT	EUROPE / CANADA	19	RECOMMENDAT	TIONS)
AL	LATIN AMERICA		JOINT MEMO		
BUTION/INITIAL	UNITED NATIONS		REFER TO	FOR:	()
3	ECONOMIC		ANY ACTION N	ECESSARY?)
0	SCIENTIFIC)
TOS	PROGRAM ANALYSIS	//	DUE DATE:	3/8	
02	NSC PLANNING		COMMENTS: (IN	CLUDING SPECIAL INST	RUCTIONS)
DIST	CONGRESSIONAL				
-	OCEANS POLICY	1			
	INTELLIGENCE SOLOMON	/			
-	DATE FROM TO S	CLIDA	SECUENT ACTIO	N REQUIRED (OR TA	AKEN): CY TO
	AND	/ 3082	SEGUENT ACTIO	A /	()
	(1/3)		(00 00 1	6.1.0 p	and land
	1 Char		Sity.	The state of	e egge
S					Q
0					
AC					
10/					
E					
ROUTING/ACTION			1		
	de	1	/lead	IS HE	an
SUBSEQUENT		1-	-0 /	3 9	- 00
EQ	angle	a	1	ant (aux
UBS	P	1		/.	1. 1.
S	Tuc	100	men	nec o	rerais.
			FOE	30	
œ	DISPATCH		10	6 50	AND THE COMMENTS AND THE
INSTR	CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:		10	3	MICROFILM & FILE ROMTS:
=	NOTIFY & DATE	BY_	12	D M/F	· NOV 2 1975
DISP	SPECIAL DISPOSITION:		100	/	1101
0			10	CRT	ID/AR SA SF
S	CROSS REF W/			OPEN	HP NS
NSC	SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:	OLDER	1-	CLOS	SE WH EP
Ma					(PA) DY
				(NBC-74 533-14	(21)

	j → €	940	1		DOG	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIA	L ACTION O
CORRESPO	NDENCE P	ROFILE			MO 1	9 5 20 /2	750345	4	
		1	my	201 -	1	RE	FERENCE:	CIRCLE AS	APPROPRIATE
TO: PRES		FRO	M: KISSING	ER, H		s/s		UNCLAS LO	G IN/OUT
KISSIN	GER		COLBY,	W		OTHER_		LOU NO	FORN NOD
scowc	ROETS +		SCHLES	INGER, J	_			C EY	ES ONLY EXD
DAVIS	()	1	ST EX/S	E.C.	//	/			DEWORD
	1	2 //			1/	, 0	1		NSITIVE
	1. 0		/	1	/	1/ /	XX	1/	
UBJECT	al	der.	Joy	#	Our	HI	g w	1 6	my
111		1	1-1	- //	1	7 ///	-111	Th.	-
Kne	la	011	re	10	all	inte	1 07	Cra.	ul
71)	+0-	2 7	1//	110	1970	-1		
111	and	10	01	61	/	//0	20		
INTER	NAL ROUTING	AND DISTRI			REC	ACTION REQUIRE	ED		
		W.C.D.C.E.T	ACTION	INFO	CY FOR	MEMO FOR HAK			
	S TO HAK/SCO	WCROFT	SAUTE SAN		-	1			
STAFF SECRE)							
FAR EAST	Cony	u			1	REPLY FOR			(
SUB-SAHARAN	AFRICA /						CTION		
MID EAST / NO	D. AFRICA / S	O. ASIA				мемо т	0		(
EUROPE / CA	NADA					RECOMMENDATIO	ONS		(
ATIN AMERIC	CA		4			JOINT MEMO			(
JNITED NATIO						REFER TO	FOR:		(
CONOMIC						ANY ACTION NE	CESSARY?		(
CIENTIFIC						CONCURRENCE.			(
PROGRAM ANA	AI VEIS					DUE DATE:			
NSC PLANNIN						COMMENTS: (INCL	UDING SPECIAL INST	RUCTIONS)	
CONGRESSION									
OCEANS POLI									
INTELLIGENC	E								
			1						
//			S		/ SUB	SEQUENT ACTION	REQUIRED (OR TA	KEN):	CYTO
DATE	FROM	ТО	1 1			//	//		
DATE	FROM	1./	1	/	0	/	/ 4	- 72	
DATE	FROM	cup	4x	la	C	her	(5	- 2è	
DATE	FROM	cuf	4 X	Ja	Color	her	(5	- 20	
5/30	FROM	Mari	3 C	No	led Yed	by di	Croft	- 20	
5/57	FROM	Mari	5 C	No	led Yed	by \$1	Crost	- 20	
5/57	FROM	Mari	3 C	No	l Hed	by \$1	Croft	- 20	
5/57	FROM	Mari	3 C	No	led fed	by \$1	Croft	- 20	
5/57	FROM	Mari	30	No	Led	by \$1	Croft	- 20	
5/52	FROM	Mari	3 C	No	Led Yed	by \$1	Croft	- 20	
5/52	FROM	Mari	5 C	No	Led Yed	by \$1	Croft	- 20	
5/52	FROM	Mari	5 C	No	Yed	by \$1	Croft	- 20	
5/52	FROM	Mari	5 C	No	Led Yed	by \$1	Croft	- 20	
5/52	FROM	Mari	3 C	No	Led Yed	by \$1	Croft	- 20	
5/52	FROM	Mari	3 C	No	Yed	by \$1	Croft	- 2e	1
5/52	FROM	Mari	30	No	Yed	by \$1	Croft	10:	ORO CORO
5/52	FROM	Mari	30	No	Yed	by \$1	Croft	10:	1
5/52	FROM	Mari	30	No	Yed	by \$1	Croft	(ALO A)	BRAR
5/52	FROM	Mari	30	No	Led Yed	by di	Croft	(ALO A)	BRAR
5/52	FROM	Mari	30	No	Led Yed	by di	Croft	10:	BRAR
5/30	FROM	Mari	30	No	Yed	by di	Croft	(ALO A)	BRAR
5/30 DISPATCH_		Maci	3 C	No	Yed	by di		(ALO A)	(A)
DISPATCH	E ABOVE PLU	NACI:				by di		MICROFILM &	FILE ROMTS:
DISPATCH—CY ROMTS: SE	E ABOVE PLU	Maci				by di	M/F	MICROFILM & I	Salar
DISPATCH—CY ROMTS: SE	E ABOVE PLU	NACI:				by di	M/F	MICROFILM & I	FILE ROMTS:
DISPATCH— CY ROMTS: SE NOTIFY— SPECIAL DISP	E ABOVE PLU	NACI:				by di	M/F	MICROFILM & I	FILE ROMTS: SY 5 SA SF
DISPATCH—CY ROMTS: SE	E ABOVE PLU	NACI:				by di	M/F	MICROFILM & I	FILE ROMTS: SY HP NS
DISPATCH— CY ROMTS: SE NOTIFY— SPECIAL DISP	E ABOVE PLU	NACI.					M/F	MICROFILM & I	FILE ROMTS: SY 5 SA SF

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET GDS

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Your Meeting with Our Ambassador to the Republic of China, Leonard Unger,

on May 20, 1975 at 3:00 p.m.

You have agreed to meet with Ambassador Unger on May 20, 1975 at 3:00 p.m. to review our policy toward the ROC and our normalization process with Peking.

Background

Dick Solomon, Jack Froebe, and I met with Ambassador Unger on May 16. Unger made the following points about the evolution of our relations with Taiwan:

- -- Premier Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK) on May 3 gave Unger a memorandum (attached at Tab A), which CCK asked Unger to transmit to the President.
- This memorandum is essentially an ROC effort to use the fall of Indochina and the resulting U.S. policy assessment to regain some of the ground the ROC has lost in recent years.
- The memorandum, in which CCK repeats the views he expressed to the Vice President and to Unger earlier, asserts that Taiwan is indispensible to the security of Japan and to the U.S. position in Asia generally, arguing that Taiwan is an essential link in the off-island defense chain. The memorandum thus would have the U.S. reverse the basic policy goal stated in the Shanghai Communique. It also exudes ROC satisfaction with the President's recent public attention to Taiwan.
- -- Ambassador Unger believes he should be authorized to deliver an oral reply to CCK, and will give us his suggestions on the substance of a reply.

SECRET 2

-- We must continue the gradual approach to the attenuation of our relations with Taipei, in order to avoid an ROC resort to alternatives of desperation -- such as the Soviet option or a formal declaration of Taiwan's independence from the mainland. The ROC is resigned to U.S. normalization of relations with Peking, but can digest just so many particulars in this process at any one time.

- -- The situation in Taipei is not so brittle as to give the Secretary and the President no leeway in their Peking talks. Taipei could adjust to a reversal in the relationship -- a switch of the Embassy and the Liaison Office -- so long as Taipei had some credible assurance on the island's security. (The State ROC Country Director, Burt Levin, interjected, however, that the PRC would never tolerate any official ROC presence in Washington after such a switch.) The ROC, before Indochina's fall, expected the worst from the President's Peking trip -- a reversal in our representation -- but now is hopeful that this may not be in the cards for this trip at least.
- -- He (Ambassador Unger) should be authorized to begin as soon as possible consultations with CCK on what is likely to result from the President's PRC visit, in order to get the difficult adjustment process underway. Unger recognizes, however, that such consultations will not be possible until rather late in the game.
- -- On the U.S. military presence on Taiwan, the 327th Air Division can be disestablished in the first quarter of FY 76.
- -- Unger said that he would find it useful to continue MAAG and TDC up to the point of diplomatic derecognition -- rather than to have MAAG and TDC amalgamated. If MAAG were to continue this way, Unger would expect a reduction in the rank of the heads of these two organizations. Another alternative which Unger suggested would be the merger of MAAG into the DAO.

I believe that you should use this meeting with Ambassador Unger to reaffirm existing guidance on China policy, particularly since he will not see the Secretary and since we should have some differences with the EA Bureau, where some people would have us attenuate our relationship with Taipei faster than we believe the ROC can adjust. I will plan to sit in on the meeting.

Suggested Talking Points

-- I am interested in your appraisal of the ROC's reaction to the fall of Indochina.

SECRET_

-- Understandably, the ROC is probing our policy to see if we might slow the process of normalization with Peking and what influence they (the ROC) might have on us in this respect. I note that Premier Chiang Ching-kuo has sent us a memorandum on the question of our general China policy. How do you suggest that we reply?

- -- I want to affirm that the normalization of our relations with Peking will stay on course, although we are not yet sure whether there might be some adjustments in the pace as a result of the setback in Indochina.
- -- We are now only beginning to chart what we might try to accomplish during the President's trip to Peking later this year. I understand well your desire to begin to prepare the ROC for any major new steps that might result. By the very nature of the process, however, this will be difficult. Nevertheless, we are sensitive to the need, and will authorize consultations as early as possible, even though this may be considerably later than might be desirable in terms of the ROC's adjustment.
- -- What is your assessment of the ROC's estimate as to what is likely to transpire during the President's Peking visit, and what the limits of the ROC's toleration are?
- -- The Taiwan NSSM covering both our future military presence in Taiwan and our future military assistance to Taiwan is now in its final stages, and we hope to get out comprehensive guidance in the near future.
- -- What is your assessment of the political impact of President Chiang's death? In particular, has it brought on a certain psychological letdown, particularly among mainlanders, which although anticipated all along nevertheless could not really be experienced and dealt with until the event actually occurred?

CEARLO POR A CORD



Department of Stare

HORAN

-KENNEUT

RATLIFF

OAKLEY

STEARMAN

CECOCE	2166
	2100

PAGE 01 TAIPEI 02415

Marin Andrews

62 ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 150-00

R 030439Z MAY 75 FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI TO SECSTATE WASHOC 5053

SPET TAIPEI 2415

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1 TAGS: PFOR, TW, TH, RP, CH SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEN

REF: TAIPEI 2255 1. I CALLED UN FONMIN SHEN CHANG-HUAN AT HIS REQUEST,

MAY 3. REFERRING TO MY RECENT CONVERSATION WITH PREMIER CHIANG AT TZU HU (REFTEL), SHEN SAID PREMIER HAD ASKED THAT ESSENCE OF VIEWS PREMIER HAD EXPRESSED ON THAT OCCASION AS WELL AS IN TALK WITH VICE PRESIDENT ROCKEFELLER ON APRIL 16, BE PRESENTED IN BRIEF PAPER AND REQUESTED THAT IT BE TRANSMITTED BY ME TO PRESIDENT FORD WHEN I RETURNED TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATIONS.

PAPER WHICH SHEN READ AND HANDED ME COPY IS QUOTED BELOW: REGIN QUOTE THE TRAUMATIC EVENTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN INDO-CHINA RECENTLY CANNOT BUT HAVE TREMENDOUS IMPACT ON VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD, PARTICULERLY IN THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC REGION. THE LEADERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AGREE WITH PRESIDENT FORD THAT TO INDULGE IN RECRIMINATION AND IN APPORTIONING BLAMES IS NOT PRODUCTIVE. ON THE OTHER HAND, MANY LESSONS MUST BE DRAWN FROM THIS TRAGEDY TO PREVENT HISTORY FROM REPEATING ITSELF.

MILITARILY. THE INDO-CHINA CHAPTER MAY HAVE NOW COME TO A CLOSE, HOWEVER, A "NEW AGENDA" AS APTLY CALLED BY PRESIDENT FORD SHOULD BE METICULOUSLY DISCUSSED, PLANNED DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5. STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES,

... NARA, DATE 4/30/01 NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE WITHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TAIPEI 02415

AND PREPARED TO DEAL WITH OTHER PROBABLE AND POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL CRIES THAT ARE SURELY FORTHCOMING.

IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT MANY COUNTRIES IN THIS AREA, ESPECIALLY THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES, HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY NERVOUS, WHICH MIGHT EVEN LEAD TO PANIC. IN THE VIEW OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES SHOULD BE GIVEN TOP PRIORITY OF THE U.S. "NEW CHSTANUIBLE THAT MANY COUNTRIES IN THIS

AND AND THE PHILIPPINES, HAVE BECUME WHILE ATTENDING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA, EQUAL IMPORTANCE L. IN OF NORTHEAST ASIA CANNOT BE GAINSAID. THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS COGNIZANT THAT THE U.S. ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO JAPAN FOR ITS INDUSTRIAL AND ECONOMIC PROWESS. BUT THE PROTECTION OF JAPAN HINGES UN THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA-WHICH ARE VITAL AND INDISPENSABLE FLANKS TO JAPAN . SHOULD FITHER OF THE FLANKS PALL INTO THE HANDS OF AN ADVERSARY OF THE U.S., IT WOULD RENUER JAPAN MILITARILY VULNERABLE AND CREATE UNFATHOMABLE CONFUSION AND ARGELYT DIVISION IN ITS DOMESTIC POLITICS. JAPAN'S INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITY WOULD THEN BECOME ASSETS TO AMERICA'S ENEMIES. CONFIDENTIALLY, A NUMBER OF JAPAN'S LEADING ELDERLY STATESMEN HAVE EXPRESSED THE FEARS OF SUCH A CALE HISEATH MADLE LONGUSTON AND NIGHTMARE. TITE JAPATES LAUUSTRIAL

IT IS BELIEVED THAT A STRONG CHAIN STRETCHING FROM. INOREA, JAPAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE PHILIPPINES, INDONESIA DOWN TO AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND WOULD FORM A RELIABLE AND CREDIBLE FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE FOR THE U.S. DIPLOMATICALLY AND MILITARILY.

AS PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KOUTTOWN ICL PRESIDENT NELSON ROCKEFELLER. THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS UNEQUIVOCALLY DEDICATED TO THE FOLLOWING POLICY DECISIONS:

. UNRELENTING STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISM AND COMMUNIST REGIMES NO MATTER WHERE THEY ARE AND DETERMINED TO DEFEND THE SECURITY OF TAIHAN, PESCADORES, QUEMOY AND MATSU! Server J. . BEELSISS:

FIRM ALIGNMENT WITH THE FREE WORLD, PARTICULARLY

MORELESTING STRUBBLE AGAINST LOOMUNISH AND PROMOTOT PER MES MU STATTER WHERE INDER AND DEFENHINED TO DEFEND THE SECURITY OF THIMAN, PROLADUKES, - DUENDY AND MATSU;



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE U3 TAIPEI 02415 050026Z

TO U.S.;

3. FURTHER PROMOTION OF INTERNAL POLITICAL SOLIDARITY;

A. REDOUBLED EFFORTS FOR THE CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF THE PEOPLE.

BY SO DOING, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA WILL BE ABLE TO PLAY A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE NEW ERA.

IT IS THE FERVENT HOPE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA THAT PRESIDENT FORD WILL EXERCISE HIS FARSIGHTED AND STEADFAST STATESMANSHIP WHIC WILL HELP OVERCOME ANY DIFFICULTIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. IN THE LIGHT OF PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUD'S BASIC POLICY DIRECTION, PRESIDENT FORD AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CAN ALWAYS COUNT UPON THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AS A LOYAL ALLY AND PARTNER.

PRESIDENT FORU HAS REPEATEDLY OFFERED HIS ASSURANCES THAT WHAT TRANSPIRED IN INDU-CHINA SHOULD NOT IMPAIR THE CREDIBILITY OF THE U.S. IN ITS FULFILLMENT OF COMMITMENTS TO THE OTHER ALLIES AND FRIENDS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC.

THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS GRATIFISOBOTH THE WARM SENTIMENTS EXPRESSED BY PRESIDENT FORD TOWARDS THIS COUNTRY IN HIS RECENT APPEARANCE AT THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER EDITORS! ASSOCIATION IN NEW YORK, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD REPEAT SUCH REASSURANCES WHENEVER THE SAME ARE PUBLICLY GIVEN TO OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE REGION.

FREQUENT AND FRANK CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE MOST BENEFICIAL FOR BOTH COUNTRIES.

FOR THE TASK OF STABILIZING THAILAND, THE PHILIPPINES AND OTHER SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES THE STRENGTHENING OF

THE TIES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND NATIONS IN NORTHEAST ASIA



SECOES



Lepartment of State

0500262 PAGE 04 TAIPET 02415

COULD ALSO SERVE AS A CREDIBLE TOKEN OF THE U.S. INTENTION AND DETERMINATION, SO THAT THE WAVERING AND NERVOUS COUNTRIES IN THIS AREA HOULD NOT BE DRAWN INTO THE ORBIT OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS. END QUOTE

- I TOLD SHEN THAT EXPRESSION OF ROC VIEWS AS PRESENTED IN PAPER HOULD BE HELPFUL IN CURRENT WASHINGTON REASSESSMENT OF OUR POLICIES AND THAT I WOULD MAKE A PARTICULAR POINT OF BRINGING TO ATTENTION OF OUR POLICY MAKERS. I EXPECTED THIS REASSESSMENT WOULD RESULT IN POLICY FOUNDED ON BASIC, LONG-TERM INTERESTS, AND THAT, IN THIS CONNECTION, I FELT SURE THAT OUR PEOPLE WOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE VERY MUCH IN MIND THE MEANS OF WHICH A MODUS VIVENDI COULD BE WORKED OUT WITH MATNLAND CHINA IN ORDER TO BETTER ASSURE PEACE AND STABILITY IN EAST ASIA AND ALSO TO SEEK SOLUTIONS TO SOME WORLD PROBLEMS IN WHICH MAINLAND CHINA MUST PLAY A HOLE. I TOLD SHEN THAT WE WECD VERY WELL AWARE OF ROC VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT AND ITS ESSENTIAL INTEREST IN OUR DEVELOPING RELATIONS WITH THE PRC. SHEN INDICATED HIS UNDERSTANDING, BUT WONDERED IF THE HIGH PRICE WE WOULD HAVE TO PAY FOR FURTHERING DETENTE WITH THE COMMUNISTS WOULD SE WORTH THE CLEAR DISADVANTAGES. HE POINTED UP THE "NONTRUSTWORTHINESS" OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS, E.G., INDOCHINA, CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES, ETC., AS CONTRASTED WITH THE CLEAR, UNAMBIGUOUS POLICIES OF THE ROC WHICH WERE STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE U.S.
- 4. OUR CONVERSATION CONTINUED OVER A RATHER BROAD RANGE OF SUBJECTS WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SEPTELS.
- 5. REGARDING PREMIER'S REQUEST THAT PAPER QUUTED PARA 2, ABOVE BE TRANSMITTED TO PRESIDENT FORD, I WILL WISH TO DISCUSS THIS DURING MY CONSULTATION WASHINGTON. UNGER



INTERNAL NSC ROUTING CLIFT DAVIS ELLIOTT FROEBE HORAN HORMATS GRANGER LODAL LOW OAKLEY OBER SMYSER SOLOMON STEARMAN JANKA DARGIS SKANCKE FARRAR OTHER ADMIN

(TURN THIS TAB UP TO MOVE BACK TO THE SECRETARIAT) General.

I've told Bud that MAK said OK to go ahead.

Hamil Ments The faller.



ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE

Henry.

Here is the whole padrage on the F-5 to-production for Taiwan The F-5 portion is at the paper chip.

We ned a response Today (Sunday) on the

la-pudnetion essert.

oktogs - Syme

Go - Propula

Almsd

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

URGENT ACTION
May 27, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM:

W. R. SMYSER RICHARD H. SOLOMON

CLINTON E. GRANGER

SUBJECT:

Co-Production of 50 F-5E's by the

Republic of China

We have separately sent the Secretary the Taiwan NSSM, which deals with further arms deliveries to the Republic of China and, inter alia, with the question of co-production of another 20 F-5E's.

It now turns out that a decision on the 20 F-5E's must be made in the next two days, because the ROC must inform Northrop of its intent by June 1 or forfeit most of a \$1 million deposit. We would appreciate your raising this with the Secretary within the next day or two and letting us have a cable reply by Friday, May 30, so that we can advise the ROC in time.

As our memorandum on the NSSM indicated, the ROC would not require any U.S. aid to produce the additional 20 aircraft, and we would not recommend giving it. It would, however, regard this as the first installment of its plan to produce an additional 100 F-5's to replace obsolescing aircraft. Our embassy in Taipei strongly recommends approving the additional F-5E's; USLO expresses serious reservations. State and DOD favor approval. We believe it would be consistent with Option 3 in the lower range, which is our general recommendation on providing military equipment to the ROC.

All of us recommend urgent approval, which would be consistent with the bureaucracy recommendations in the NSSM and also consistent with what we believe should be our general position on assistance to the ROC.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you urgently discuss the co-production of an additional 20 F-5E's with the Secretary to obtain his approval in time to notify the ROC (and Northrop) by the end of this week.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS



CUNFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY

WHA Ø77
OO WTE 12
DE WTE 2937 15 Ø 1839
O 3 Ø 184 ØZ MAY 75
FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOHAK Ø 6 Ø//
TO GOMPERT/RODMAN
ZEM
CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY WH5 Ø 997

TOR: 18552

TOHAK Ø6Ø

MAY 30. 1975

TO:

GOMPERT/RODMAN

FROM:

BUD MCFARLANE

TODAY IS THE LAST DAY FOR DECISION ON CO-PRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL F-5'S IN TAIWAN IF ROC IS TO AVOID DEFAULTING WITH ITS MILLION DOLLAR DEPOSIT. (SMYSER PACKAGE ON THIS SUBJECT, 3641, DATED MAY 27 IS WITH THE GENERAL.) PLEASE ADVISE.

WARM REGARDS.

0097 2937 (Alfached)

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY 15 , NARA, DATE 4/20/01

CONFIDENTIAL

EYES ONLY



	St
C CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE	DOC RECD ENG NBR INITIAL ACTION O
TO: PRES FROM: KISSINGER, H KISSINGER COLBY, W SCOWCROFT SCHLESINGER, J DAVIS ST EX SEC SUBJECT: MARCH COCC	REFERENCE: CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE S/S UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT OTHER LOU NO FORN NODIS C EYES ONLY EXDIS S CODEWORD TS SENSITIVE A Lected On O Machine Ton
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION ACTION INFO ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT STAFF SECRETARY FAR EAST SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA EUROPE / CANADA LATIN AMERICA UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC SCIENTIFIC PROGRAM ANALYSIS NSC PLANNING CONGRESSIONAL OCEANS POLICY INTELLIGENCE	REC
DATE FROM TO S DATE FROM TO S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN): CUSTON Taken Per Bruan Merchant FORD A A A A A A A A A A A A A
DISPATCH & DATE & DATE & DATE CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: & DATE & DATE CROSS REF W//	CRT ID: SA SF
SUSPENSE RY ATTACHED:	FOLDER:

IMMEDIATE

то нак 9/

TO:

GOMPERT/RODMAN

FOR:

SCOWCROFT

FROM:

MC FARLANE

Attached is a Smyser/Solomon paper containing instructions for Ambassador Unger for use in his call on CCK which is to take place on Tuesday or Wednesday of this week. I have attached the original State draft at Tab D.

Warm regards,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

6/2

General Scowcroft -

Additionally, the Secretary said when he handed me this that he did not want to be driven by the Desks like this!

jane



5/29/75

E.O. 12956, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11124/96, STATE DEPT. GUIDELMES
NY (314)
NARA, DATE \$1/20/6)

Sandle Mining

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SEGRET/SENSITIVE

XGDS (3)

ACTION

May 29, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

RICHARD H. SOLOMON Rus (r- wu)

SUBJECT:

Proposed Presidential Reply to the Republic of China Premier Chiang Ching-kuo

At Tab A is a draft State cable to Ambassador Unger in Taipei which contains a proposed message from the President to Premier Chiang Ching-kuo. The message, which Ambassador Unger would deliver orally to Chiang Ching-kuo, responds to two recent messages from the Premier to the President:

-- A memorandum (Tab B) which Chiang Ching-kuo transmitted to Ambassador Unger on May 3. That memorandum summarizes the views he had expressed to the Vice President on April 16 and to the Ambassador earlier. Essentially, Chiang Ching-kuo seizes on the fall of Indochina to suggest that the U.S. once again incorporate Taiwan into its island defense chain in the Western Pacific, arguing that Taiwan and South Korea are indispensible to the security of Japan, which in turn is the cornerstone of U.S. strategy in Asia. Chiang Ching-kuo also reaffirms the Republic of China's commitment to a cooperative relationship with the U.S., and thanks the President for his statement on the Republic of China made before the American Society of Newspaper Editors last month.

(Tab C)

-- A follow-on letter of May 7,/ in which Chiang Ching-kuo thanks the President for his reaffirmation of U.S. commitments to the Republic of China and repeats the substance of the May 3 memorandum.

The draft oral message expresses appreciation to Chiang Ching-kuo for his two messages, and for the Premier's expression of intent to continue close cooperation with the U.S. It pledges the U.S. to reciprocate this spirit of close cooperation, and at the same time reaffirms the U.S. intent to continue its normalization of relations with Peking. Finally, it endorses Chiang Ching-kuo's suggestion that we continue the frank consultations between our two governments.

> DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 NSC MEMO. 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

ECRET/SENSITIVE

XGDS(3)

The draft at Tab A incorporates several changes that we have made in the State draft. We especially call your attention to the first of these changes, the addition of paragraph 5, which we regard as particularly important and which you may or may not wish to confirm.

-- Paragraph 5 has been added by Smyser and Froebe. They believe that the cumulative effect of the Vice President's visit to Taipei, the President's reaffirmation of our commitment to the ROC in the wake of Indochina, and the Vice President's meeting of May 29 with Ambassador Shen may mislead the ROC leadership to believe that we are pulling back from our normalization process with Peking. This could relax the pressure on the ROC to continue its gradual political and psychological adjustment toward a new relationship with us. Paragraph 5's reference to the search for new modalities, followed by paragraph 6's reaffirmation that U.S. normalization with Peking will go forward, is designed to maintain a steady pressure on the ROC for gradual adjustment toward a new relationship with the U.S. -- at the same that we preserve the ROC's necessary minimum confidence in us by implicitly reaffirming our basic commitment.

Solomon, Lord, and Gleysteen, however, believe that paragraph 5 would not be helpful. They hold that at a time when future developments in our relations with Peking are uncertain it would be unwise to stimulate the ROC with a signal that might provoke them to take defensive action via their friends in Congress or through other means.

- -- In paragraph 2, after the phrase "It is particularly useful at this time" we removed the phrase in the State cable "when the situation in East Asia is being carefully assessed, together with consideration of future courses of action,". We believe this suggestion of an "agonizing reappraisal" of U.S.-Asian policy could have a needlessly unsettling effect and is pointless since we are not making such a reappraisal.
- -- In paragraph 6, we dropped a second sentence from the State cable which read "He also notes the smooth transition that has been made to the new leadership in the ROC following upon the sad passing of President Chiang and he wishes the Premier and his government the best of success in their important undertakings." We believe this carries a slightly patronizing air. Instead, we have substituted a reiteration of our standard compliments for the ROC's economic progress and a reaffirmation of our belief that it will continue in the period following President Chiang's death.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the draft State cable at Tab A as revised:

APPROVE	DISAPPROVE

	То	exclude	paragraph	5.
--	----	---------	-----------	----

-- To include paragraph 5.

APPROVE	DISAPPROVE	



IMMEDIATE

TO:

TAIPEI

FROM:

SECSTATE

SUBJECT: Premier Chiang's Message to President Ford

REF: TAIPEI 2415

- 1. Upon his return to Taipei, Ambassador Unger is authorized to make a presentation along the following lines to Premier Chiang as a response to his message to President Ford which was subject of reftel and also to his follow-on letter to the President of May 7.
- 2. President Ford thanks Premier Chiang for his message conveyed through Ambassador Unger, and also for his subsequent letter of May 7. It is particularly useful at this time to have the pertinent views of the Republic of China. In this connection, the President has also noted the views which the Premier conveyed earlier to Vice President Rockefeller and which are recalled in the Premier's current message.
- 3. The President has noted with appreciation the declarations of the Republic of China of its commitment to play a positive and constructive role in the new era ahead. The United States also pledges itself to such a role, and to continue in this spirit the close cooperation between the U.S. and the ROC.

SECRET GDS

4/20/01

SECRET 2

4. As Premier Chiang is aware from President Ford's earlier statements, the President firmly believes that the U.S. must remain strong and must be in a position to carry out its commitments if peace is to be maintained in Asia and the Pacific.

- 5. Developments in East Asia over the past several years, many of which have affected our two countries, have made it clear to all that the political and military relationships and confrontations of the 1950s and 1960s have changed and are continuing to evolve. This fluidity in the international environment has created a situation where we all must re-examine arrangements and policies; but this in no way affects our concern for and commitment to the security and well-being of our old allies and friends.
- 6. The Premier is aware of the efforts of the U.S. to reduce the tensions in East Asia. In particular, the U.S. desires to develop and enlarge communication with the PRC in order to seek peaceful and equitable solutions to outstanding problems where this is possible, and to reduce the dangers of confrontation and conflict. These policies do not ignore the differences, some of them profound, which lie between the United States and the PRC, but they are based on the belief that peaceful resolution of those differences is in all of our interests.
- 7. With the foregoing in mind, President Ford endorses the desirability of frank discussions and has made this reply to the Premier's message in that spirit. He again wishes to express his profound

SECRET 3

admiration for the progress that the Republic of China has made, and to express his hope and conviction that this progress will continue under the leadership of the Premier and of the government of the Republic of China.





epartment of State

SECRET

1	S C		1		1			5	GHAM.	
3	A SECOND		1 4	1	- %	And the same			MARIAN	-
2 "										
							wy Francis			

2166

TAIPEI 02415 050026Z

62 ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 150-00

R 039439Z MAY 75 FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5053

SECRET TAIPEI 2415

EXDIS

E.O. 116521 XGDS-1 TAGS: PFOR, TW, TH, RP, CH SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEN

REF: TAIPEI 2255

FILLIOTT HORAN KENNEUT LOW OBER RATLIFF OAKLEY STEARMAN

1. I CALLED UN FONMIN SHEN CHANG-HUAN AT HIS REQUEST, MAY 3. REFERRING TO MY RECENT CONVERSATION WITH PREMIER CHIANG AT TZU HU (REFTEL), SHEN SAID PREMIER HAD ASKED THAT ESSENCE OF VIEWS PREMIER HAD EXPRESSED ON THAT OCCASION AS WELL AS IN TALK WITH VICE PRESIDENT ROCKEFELLER ON APRIL 16, SE PRESENTED IN BRIEF PAPER AND REQUESTED THAT IT BE TRANSMITTED BY ME TO PRESIDENT FORD WHEN I RETURNED TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATIONS.

PAPER WHICH SHEN READ AND HANDED ME COPY IS QUOTED BELOW: REGIN QUOTE THE TRAUMATIC EYENTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN INDO-CHINA RECENTLY CANNOT BUT HAVE TREMENDOUS IMPACT ON VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD, PARTICULARLY IN THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC REGION. THE LEADERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AGREE WITH PRESIDENT FORD THAT TO INDULGE IN RECRIMINATION AND IN APPORTIONING BLAMES IS NOT PRODUCTIVE. ON THE OTHER HAND, MANY LESSONS MUST BE DRAWN FROM THIS TRAGEDY TO PREVENT HISTORY FROM REPEATING ITSELF.

MILITARILY, THE INDO-CHINA CHAPTER MAY HAVE NOW COME TO A CLOSE, HOWEVER, A "NEW AGENDA" AS APTLY CALLED BY PRESIDENT FORD SHOULD BE METICULOUSLY DISCUSSED, PLANNED

> DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES, State V

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State TELEGRAM

DECHET

祖是也然例识

PAGE 02 TAIPEI 02415 050026Z

AND PREPARED TO DEAL WITH OTHER PROBABLE AND POSSIBLE-INTERNATIONAL CRIES THAT ARE SURELY FORTHCOMING.

TT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT MANY COUNTRIES IN THIS AREA, ESPECIALLY THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES, HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY NERVOUS, WHICH MIGHT EVEN LEAD TO PANIC. IN THE VIEW OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES SHOULD BE GIVEN TOP PRIORITY OF THE U.S. "NEW AGENDA". THAT MANY COUNTRIES IN THIS AGENDA". THAT MANY COUNTRIES IN THIS HAVE BECOME WHILE ATTENDING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA, EQUAL IMPORTANCE.

OF NORTHEAST ASIA CANNOT BE GAINSAID. THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS COGNIZANT THAT THE U.S. ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO JAPAN FOR ITS INDUSTRIAL AND ECONOMIC PROWESS. BUT THE PROTECTION OF JAPAN HINGES UN THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA WHICH ARE VITAL AND INDISPENSABLE FLANKS TO JAPAN SHOULD EITHER OF THE FLANKS FALL INTO THE HANDS OF AN ADVERSARY OF THE U.S., IT WOULD RENUER JAPAN MILITAKILY - SEL FUL INE VULNERABLE AND CREATE UNFATHOMABLE CONFUSION AND TARGETTY DIVISION IN ITS DOMESTIC POLITICS. JAPAN'S INDUSTRIAL "LC" CAPABILITY WOULD THEN BECOME ASSETS TO AMERICA'S ENEMIES. CONFIDENTIALLY, A NUMBER OF JAPAN'S LEADING BARY ELDERLY STATESMEN HAVE EXPRESSED THE FEARS OF SUCH A SECTE DISPATATIONABLE CONFUSION AND NIGHTMARE. US TITES JAPATES INCUSTRIAL

IT IS BELIEVED THAT A STRONG CHAIN STRETCHING FROM.
INDREA, JAPAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE PHILIPPINES,
INDONESIA DOWN TO AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND WOULD FORM A
RELIABLE AND CREDIBLE FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE FOR THE U.S.
DIPLOMATICALLY AND MILITARILY.

AS PREMIER CHIANG CHINE ROUTE OF CHINA IS UNEQUIVOCALLY DEDICATED TO THE FOLLOWING POLICY DECISIONS:

OMMUNIST REGIMES NO MATTER WHERE THEY ARE AND DETERMINED TO DEFEND THE SECURITY OF TAIWAN, PESCADORES, QUEMOY AND MATSU;

2. FIRM ALIGNMENT WITH THE FREE WORLD, PARTICULARLY

TO UPPERD THE SECURITY SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 TAIPEI 02415 050026Z

TO U.S.;

3. FURTHER PROMOTION OF INTERNAL POLITICAL SOLIDARITY;

4. REDOUBLED EFFORTS FOR THE CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF THE PEOPLE.
BY SO DOING, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA WILL BE ABLE TO PLAY A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE NEW ERA.

THAT PRESIDENT FORD WILL EXERCISE HIS FARSIGHTED AND STEADFAST STATESMANSHIP WHIC WILL HELP OVERCOME ANY DIFFICULTIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. IN THE LIGHT OF PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO'S BASIC POLICY DIRECTION, PRESIDENT FORD AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CAN ALWAYS COUNT UPON THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AS A LOYAL ALLY AND PARTNER.

PRESIDENT FORU HAS REPEATEDLY OFFERED HIS ASSURANCES THAT WHAT TRANSPIRED IN INDU-CHINA SHOULD NOT IMPAIR THE CREDIBILITY OF THE U.S. IN ITS FULFILLMENT OF COMMITMENTS TO THE OTHER ALLIES AND FRIENDS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC.

THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS GRATIFISOBOTH THE WARM SENTIMENTS EXPRESSED BY PRESIDENT FORD TOWARDS THIS COUNTRY IN HIS RECENT APPEARANCE AT THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER EDITORS' ASSOCIATION IN NEW YORK. THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD REPEAT SUCH REASSURANCES WHENEVER THE SAME ARE PUBLICLY GIVEN TO OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE REGION.

FREQUENT AND FRANK CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE MOST BENEFICIAL FOR BOTH COUNTRIES.

FOR THE TASK OF STABILIZING THAILAND, THE PHILIPPINES AND OTHER SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES THE STRENGTHENING OF

THE TIES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND NATIONS IN NORTHEAST ASIA



OFCORT



Department of State

PAGE 04 TAIPEI 02415 050026Z

COULD ALSO SERVE AS A CREDIBLE TOKEN OF THE U.S. INTENTION AND DETERMINATION, SO THAT THE WAVERING AND NERVOUS COUNTRIES IN THIS AREA WOULD NOT BE DRAWN INTO THE ORBIT OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS. END QUOTE

- I TOLD SHEN THAT EXPRESSION OF ROC VIEWS AS PRESENTED IN PAPER WOULD BE HELPFUL IN CURRENT WASHINGTON REASSESSMENT OF OUR POLICIES AND THAT I WOULD MAKE A PARTICULAR POINT OF BRINGING TO ATTENTION OF OUR POLICY MAKERS. I EXPECTED THIS REASSESSMENT WOULD RESULT IN POLICY FOUNDED ON BASIC, LONG-TERM INTERESTS, AND THAT, IN THIS CONNECTION, I FELT SURE THAT OUR PEOPLE WOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE YERY MUCH IN MIND THE MEANS OF WHICH A MODUS VIVENDI COULD BE WORKED OUT WITH MAINLAND CHINA IN ORDER TO BETTER ASSURE PEACE AND STABILITY IN EAST ASIA AND ALSO TO SEEK SOLUTIONS TO SOME WORLD PROBLEMS IN WHICH MAINLAND CHINA MUST PLAY A ROLE. I TOLD SHEN THAT WE WECD VERY WELL AWARE OF ROC VILWS ON THIS SUBJECT AND ITS ESSENTIAL INTEREST IN OUR DEVELOPING RELATIONS WITH THE PRC. SHEN INDICATED HIS UNDERSTANDING, BUT WONDERED IF THE HIGH PRICE WE WOULD HAVE TO PAY FOR FURTHERING DETENTE WITH THE COMMUNISTS WOULD BE WORTH THE CLEAR DISADVANTAGES. HE POINTED UP THE "NONTRUSTWORTHINESS" OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS, E.G., INDOCHINA, CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES, ETC., AS CONTRASTED WITH THE CLEAR, UNAMBIGUOUS POLICIES OF THE ROC WHICH WERE STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE U.S.
- 4. OUR CONVERSATION CONTINUED OVER A RATHER BROAD RANGE OF SUBJECTS WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SEPTELS.
- 5. REGARDING PREMIER'S REQUEST THAT PAPER QUUTED PARA 2, ABOVE BE TRANSMITTED TO PRESIDENT FORD, I WILL WISH TO DISCUSS THIS DURING MY CONSULTATION WASHINGTON. UNGER





OFFICE OF THE PREMIER REPUBLIC OF CHINA -

May 7, 1975

Dear Mr. President:

In consequence of the traumatic events in Indo-China, many countries in this area, especially Thailand and the Philippines, have become increasingly wavering. It is most gratifying and assuring that you made a timely statement at the press conference on May 6, that it is your aim to tie more closely together South Korea with the U.S., to reaffirm your commitments to the Republic of China, to work more closely with Indonesia, with the Philippines and with other Pacific nations.

In order to deal with the probable and possible international crises that are surely forthcoming, a 'new agenda' as you aptly called should be meticulously planned and prepared.

In my view, Thailand and the Philippines should be given top priority in the agenda. However, while attending to Southeast Asia, equal importance of Northeast Asia cannot be gainsaid. We are cognizant that the U.S. attaches great importance to Japan. But the protection of Japan hinges on the security and stability of the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China which are vital and indispensable flanks to Japan. Should either of the flanks fall into the hands of an adversary of the U.S., it would render Japan militarily vulnerable and create unfathomable confusion and division in its domestic politics. Japan's industrial capability would then become assets to America's enemies. A number of Japan's leading elder statesmen have expressed to me their fears of such a nightmare.

I believe that the strengthening of the ties between the U.S. and nations in Northcast Asia in general and the Republic of China in particular could well serve as a credible token of the U.S. intention and determination. A strong chain stretching-

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES, STATE DEPT, NARA, DATE 4/2001

from Korea, Japan, the Republic of China, the Philippines, Indonesia down to Australia and New Zealand would form a reliable and credible first line of defense for the U.S. diplomatically and militarily.

As I have mentioned to Vice President Rockefeller during his recent trip to Taipei that the Republic of China is dedicated to the following policy:

- (1) Unrelenting struggle against communism and communist regimes and determined to defend the security of Taiwan, Pescadores, Quemoy and Matsu;
- (2) Firm alignment with the free world, particularly the U.S.;
- (3) Further promotion of internal political solidarity; and
- (4) Redoubled efforts for the continuing development of the economic well-being of the people.

By so doing, we shall continue to play a positive and constructive role in the new era.

In view of the above, Mr. President, the U.S. Government can always count on the Republic of China as a loyal ally and partner.

I shall be grateful for your consideration of my views which are presented with all sincerity and frankness that I command.

With best wishes for your continued success and personal well-being.

Sincerely yours,

Chiang Ching-kuo

His Excellency
President Gerald R. Ford
The White House
Washington, D.C.

EA/ROC: AMB. L UNGER 5/19/75 EXT 22012 EA: WHGLEYSTEEN

Z/Z S/P - MR. LORD NSC - MR. SMYSER

NSC - MR. SOLOMON

ROUTINE

TAIPEI

*E.O. 11652: E-ZQDX

·TAGS: PFOR TCH

SUBJECT:

PREMIER CHIANG'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FORD

REF: TAIPEI 2415

UPON HIS RETURN TO TAIPEL, AMBASSADOR UNGER IS AUTHORIZED TO SPEAK ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES TO PREMIER CHIANG AS A RESPONSE TO HIS MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT FORD WHICH WAS SUBJECT OF REFTEL:

PRES. FORD THANKS PREMIER CHIANG FOR HIS MESSAGE CONVEYED THROUGH AMB. UNGER. IT IS PARTICULARLY USEFUL AT THIS TIME WHEN THE SITUATION IN EAST ASIA IS BEING CAREFULLY ASSESSED, TOGETHER WILL CONSIDERA-TION OF FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION, TO HAVE THE PERFUNENT VIEWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA. IN THIS CONNECTION. THE PRESIDENT HAS ALSO NOTED THE VIEWS WHICH THE PREMIER EARLIER CONVEYED TO VP ROCKEFELLER AND WHICH ARE RECALLED IN THE PREMIER'S CURRENT MESSAGE.

IN PARTICULAR THE PRESIDENT HAS NOTED THE DECLARATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA OF ITS COMMITMENT TO PLAY A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE THE UNITED STATES ALSO PLEDGES ITSELF NEW ERA AHEAD.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES , NARA, DATE 4/20101 GLEYFIL UNCI

LORD (/ 2/2

SOLOTH: NE YIZ

FORM DS 322A (OCR)

-SECRET-

2

TO CONTINUING IN THIS SPIRIT THE CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE US AND THE ROC-

- 4- AS PREMIER CHIANG IS AWARE FROM PRESIDENT FORD'S EARLIER STATEMENTS. THE PRESIDENT FIRMLY BELIEVES THAT THE US MUST REMAIN STRONG AND MUST BE IN A POSITION TO CARRY OUT ITS COMMITMENTS IF PEACE IS TO BE MAINTAINED IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC.
- 5. AT THE SAME TIME THE PREMIER IS AWARE OF THE EFFORTS OF THE US TO REDUCE THE TENSIONS IN EAST ASIA. IN PARTICULAR THE US DESIRES TO DEVELOP AND ENLARGE COMMUNICATION WITH THE PRC IN ORDER TO SEEK PEACEFUL AND EQUITABLE SOLUTIONS TO OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS WHERE THIS IS POSSIBLE AND REDUCE THE DANGERS OF CONFRONTATION AND CONFLICT. THE US DOES NOT HIDE THE DIFFERENCES. SOME OF THEM PROFOUND, WHICH LIE BETWEEN US AND THE PRC BUT IT IS PERSUADED THAT THE PEACE OF THE WORLD AND OF EAST ASIA DEMANDS THAT CONTINUING EFFORTS BE MADE BY THE US TO FIND PEACEFUL RESOLUTIONS FOR SUCH DIFFERENCES.
- 6- WITH ALL OF THE FOREGOING IN MIND, PRES, FORD ENDORSES THE DESIRABILITY OF FRANK DISCUSSIONS AND HAS MADE THIS REPLY TO THE PREMIER'S MESSAGE IN THAT SPIRIT. HE ALSO NOTES THE SMOOTH TRANSITION THAT HAS BEEN MADE TO THE NEW LEADERSHIP IN THE ROC FOLLOWING UPON THE SAD PASSING OF PRESIDENT CHIANG AND HE WISHES THE PREMIER AND HIS GOVERNMENT THE BEST OF SUCCESS IN THEIR IMPORTANT UNDERTAKINGS.

44



NSC	CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE	0	МО		R INITIAL	ACTION O AS
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION	TO: PRES KISSINGER SCOWCROFT DAVIS SUBJECT: MSALARE SUBJECT:	COLEY W SCHLESING ST EX SEC	esly	reference: s/s OTHER To Premer M VS &	LOU NO F	ORN NODIS
-	INTERNAL ROUTING AND DIST		INFO CY FOR	MEMO FOR PRES		
SGM	STAFF SECRETARY			REPLY FOR		
×	SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			APPROPRIATE ACTION		
101	MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA			мемото)
AC	EUROPE / CANADA			RECOMMENDATIONS		
A	LATIN AMERICA			JOINT MEMO)
E	UNITED NATIONS			REFER TO	FOR:(_)
ONZINITI	ECONOMIC			ANY ACTION NECESSARY?		
0	SCIENTIFIC . '			CONCURRENCE		,
RIBUTI	PROGRAM ANALYSIS			DUE DATE:		
STR	NSC PLANNING CONGRESSIONAL			COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL	. INSTRUCTIONS)	
Sia	OCEANS POLICY					
	INTELLIGENCE					
	- DATE FROM TO	5	. sua	SEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CYTO
	5/28 - HW	YD	01	- (6/10)		
	701 111	12	eusu	- 1101	1	
IONS	6/9/13 - Smys		FURT	HER ACTION	SEE AL	KNOTE
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS	7/16/15	""5	EE 75	504822 FOR!	Action	
COUTIN	1		1/6			
UENT !					150	10
JBSEQ					ALD &	2
35					1830	3
			Nage Mag			
Name of Street					当 是2000年2000	AFFER WAS
INSTR	CY ROMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:				MICROFILM & FIL	E ROMES:
X	NOTIFY & DATE		BY		W+ 018 19/2 V	
DISP	SPECIAL DISPOSITION:		01	6	OF	
2					CRT ID:	SA SF
.5	CROSS REF W/				OPEN	HP NS
NSC/S	SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES		FOLDER		CLOSE HOC	WH EP
-					10	PA DY