MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The Cabinet

DATE AND TIME: Monday, August 30, 1976
10:41 a.m. - 12:28 p.m.

PLACE: Cabinet Room

President: (Introductory comments)

Henry, why don't you tell us about Korea and South Africa?

Kissinger: Let me describe the DMZ and the Joint Security Area.

North Korea has four guard posts on our side of the line. We have none on their side. At the meetings, our troops sometimes go into their part of the zone, but rarely, especially compared to the number of times they are in our area.

(Described the tree pruning incident and sequence) They said the incident was "regretful" -- which is the farthest they had ever gone. We said that that statement was a positive sign but it was not enough -- it had to insure the security of our forces. They have proposed that each side be restricted to its side of the line. The practical effect of that is they dismantle four guard posts and we do nothing.

The ROK is now talking tougher -- in direct proportion to the reduction in the likelihood of conflict. We must either wrap this up, be willing to use force, or they will see we are bluffing and hit us in the face again.

President: I want you all to know we were prepared to take other military actions had the need developed. It is my opinion, we should wrap it up now.

How about Africa?

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BY: N.F. DATE: 4/10/67
Kissinger: There is a guerrilla war now going on in Rhodesia. There is the beginning of one in South-West Africa and the UN resolution that South African occupation there is illegal.

On Rhodesia, the guerrilla war is supported by all the surrounding states. In April, the confrontation states agreed not to let outside powers into the guerrilla war. This is to keep the Communists out. It is our and South Africa's judgment that if there is no resolution, it is inevitable that the whites will be wiped out -- it is just a matter of how long. The eventual outcome is foreordained.

If Rhodesia falls because of the Soviet/Cuban intervention, there will be an acceleration toward them and there will be a race war in South Africa. So, it is very important whether the changes in Rhodesia and South-West Africa come about through American help or through Soviet/Cuban assistance -- it is decisive for Africa. This is the judgment of all the countries involved -- including South Africa. If nothing is done, South Africa may be forced to help the whites in Rhodesia, and then we will have Angola once again, but this time the whites against the blacks.

(Describes the prospects in Namibia) In Rhodesia we have to get South African support and that of the four confrontation states -- including shutting down the guerrilla war if there is a settlement. I don't want to go into the details of the negotiations, but we do have a chance -- a better one in Namibia than in Rhodesia.

I realize we don't need more African turmoil in a campaign, but if it doesn't come off now, we are faced with an increasingly brutal war, with the eventual loss of Rhodesia and a race war against South Africa.

Bush: We clearly agree with Secretary Kissinger's view. The trend is inexorable if nothing is done. The black guerrilla leaders are divided but united on the principle that a white Rhodesia is anathema. We had an earlier estimate of six months; now we think it is more like a year to 18 months.

Kissinger: South Africa thinks the year can be cut down if the other side has foreign officers and even more if they have foreign troops. To do it, the moderates have to get Machel on board and then get the guerrillas together. And there is a powerful predisposition to let nature take its course -- with the tragic results I have indicated.

Bush: We can't say how many Cubans are there, but there are some in Mozambique. But we just don't yet have precise data.
President: Let me just make one overall observation. We have a tough campaign ahead. I said we were ready to do more in Korea, if necessary, despite the embarrassment of having it come right after my acceptance speech. If we needed to, we could have done it. Also here, it is right and we are going to do it. We will take whatever political consequences there are, although I think in the long run they will be good.

This is true across the board. Don't just make recommendations based on the campaign. Tell me what is right to do.

(Kleppe on National Parks improvement)

(Marsh on Congressional activities)

(Greenspan on the Economy)
Commit Urgh 28 Apr 76

P (Personal remark)

They will not go public on this. Kwa is in quite a strong position there.

K (Describes DM 2 and SSA)

NK has 4 grand posts on their side. We have only 1. If they move in there, we have nowhere to go. We could put our people there but not much else. We have to ensure security of police. The police must be in a position to protect us. The grand post is their protection and they demand it.

K also mentioned that he is having problems with the police. He is not sure whether they will return. He says they will return if we give them a face again.

P I must agree with Sec. He did not want to talk about any action that need delay. He says we should act now.

K There is a grand post in Rhedima. There is a report from SWA and UN that SA occupation is illegal.

On Rhedima, a grand post is supported by the surrounding tribes. In April, a grand post was agreed on to 160 on December 6th. This is a grand post.

K The SA government has to decide if we will return. We know that the blow will be wiped out.
a meeting from here. The initiative here is far advanced.
If Khodasar falls because of US/Canada intensity, there will be an escalation. Furthermore, this will be a face on for SA.
So, it is very important whether a change in Khodasar will make the US and S/S Sudan support. It is decisive for Nigeria. This is a judgment of SA and S/S. If nothing is lost, SA may be forced to help the white man and will have an opportunity to be against this time, white against blacks.
(African perspective in Yenbia)
In Khodasar we have to put SA support that if it is a constant state. I think it is a guerrilla. I don't think there is a solution for now. But we do have a chance; better in Yenbia than Khodasar.
But if we don't yield, more gone in turn in a campaign. But if it doesn't come off now, we can have more of a brutal war, with mutual death of Khodasar and a war war against SA.
(Bush) We already agreed with US, having the town is important if nothing is done. The black guerrilla leader are divided but united that a white Khodasar is conditionally. We had an earlier set of events; now we think it more like a year 1815.
In SA, this is a year it can be not done of foreign affairs and more than of foreign rule. To do it to understand how to get Khodasar brought to host then put the guerrillas together, And this
I received previous. A bit more into the course. The thing about it I have mentioned.

First, it isn't true for my ambition, but they are seen in your programme, and not just but yet have peculiar date.

I left my focus on our own decision.

We have a long campaign ahead. I said we were ready to die with a clear conscience, despite our statements. I got my exception.

If we couldn't, we would have done. Also said, it is right and we are going to do it. We'll take whatever pet campaigns that are, the I think sir long run they will be good.

This is true across board. But just make sure, based on a campaign, I'll need what is right to do.

(Klippe on North Parks importance)

(March on Long activities)

(Respanse on Economy)