

Scowcroft file

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Senator Hugh Scott (R. -Pa.)
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, July 28, 1976
10:26 a.m. - 10:54 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

[General Scowcroft joined the meeting when it was already in progress.]

Scott: I spent two delightful weeks in China.

Let me give you these Chinese stamps. [Discussion of the effect of Reagan choosing Schweiker on the other Pennsylvania delegates.]

I have written a letter to you with the transcript of my talks with Chang Chun-chiao. It is clear to us that the radicals -- Chang Chun-chiao, Wang Hung-wen, etc. -- are in control of the propaganda machine and the security forces. The word is the same no matter who you talk to: "We must fight the right wing" -- attacks on Teng -- "liberate Taiwan." Chiao Kuan-hua is more of an old friend and tempered it a bit, but they went through the Taiwan thing. But Chang Chun-chiao was tough: Taiwan could only be liberated by force -- through the PLA, and with local forces rising in support.

I made the point that U.S. foreign policy would be constant to China regardless of the election result, but they kept repeating the Taiwan line. It was rather chilling. On Hong Kong they said it was different. There were treaty relations and they would move at an appropriate time and it was an internal matter but it was different.

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BY MA, NARA DATE 7/29/04



They said we had the wrong impression of the timeframe on Taiwan -- it would be soon.

My hunch is this is a campaign to get the jump on the moderates when Mao dies.

Chou's name was never mentioned.

The use of the PLA was sometimes sprinkled with references to the Japanese formula. The inference was maybe there would be no violence if we agreed to the Japanese formula.

The President: They said they wouldn't move before the election. Did they give you a time?

Scott: They said Chou En-lai had given an open time, and that was not correct. They clearly implied 1977 was the year of decision. But remember, they wanted all this to get to you.

The President: How about their attitude to the Soviet Union?

Scott: Still as bitter as ever. And they now used the Soviet Union by name, whereas in 1972 when I was there, they made only indirect references. They even took us into the tunnels under Dairen. The tunnels are equipped with supplies and for defense.

They told me war was inevitable and they had to be prepared.


The President: It is interesting that Teng Hsiao-ping talked aggressively against the Soviet Union and the successors do the same. Did you see Hua Kuo-feng?

Scott: There was one curious exception. In Suchow, no one went into the internal dialogue. I hope your intelligence people will look into that.

Kissinger: We should look into it. That is one of their largest provinces. That cannot be a coincidence. What did they say?

Scott: There were no attacks on Taiwan, or the right wing, or Teng. Just stories about the fruit crops, etc.

The President: Fraser, the Australian Prime Minister, last night pushed his thesis that we must do more to get the Chinese on our side.



Kissinger: That can't be. We can support the anti-Soviet policies and pursue parallel policies, but they don't operate on emotion.

Scott: I think we should use some kind of influence with Taiwan. There is no movement at all on their part to promote reconciliation. I am not sure there can't be a peaceful resolution to it.

The President: Do you have to report to the Senate? I would soften it somewhat.

Kissinger: If you stress their insistence on a military solution, that is a two-edged sword. The right wingers might say, "Okay, forget it."

They clearly are trying to tell us that we don't have unlimited time. But they don't have the capability to take Taiwan over in the next few years.

Scott: I agree with all that. But I think Taiwan could do something to make the situation less intractable.

The President: In your report I would minimize the change to a more aggressive viewpoint.

Scott: I could say they insisted on discussing Taiwan and they wanted movement.

[Secretary Kissinger leaves]

Barnett was very helpful. I think if he separates himself from association with me and writes for Foreign Affairs, it is okay. He will probably stress that their patience is wearing thin.

The President: Can you control him?

Scott: I will do my best.

✓ P/Senator Scott
28 July 76

10:26-10:54

(Meeting in progress)

S I spent 2 delightful weeks in China.
(Gives P some Chinese stamps)

(Discussion of effect of Schmeckel on P's delegation)

I have written a letter to you w/ a transcript
of my talk w/ Chong. It clear to us that
C radicals - Chiang, Wang, etc - are
in control of propaganda machine & a
security force. The word is a sense
no matter who you talk to we must
fight a right wing, ^{attach to} ^{liberate}
Tianan. China is more of an old friend &
loathed it a bit, but they want there
a Tianan thing. But Chong was tough -
Tianan could only be liberated by force.
There a PLA & local forces rising in
support.

I made a point that US FP would be
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result, but they kept repeating a Tianan
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truth relations & they would move at an
appropriate time & it was internal matter but
it was dif.

They said we had wrong impression
of Tianan from on Tianan - it would
be soon

My hunch is this is a compromise to



get a grip on moderate when was
also.

Chairman was never mentioned.

Use of H.A. was sometimes sprinkled w/
references to Jay formula. The inference
was maybe no evidence of any yield to
Jay formula.

P They said they wouldn't move before election.
Did they give you a time?

S They said China had given an open time -
that was not correct. They clearly implied
1917 was a year of decision. But remember,
they wanted all this to get to you.


P How about S U

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used S U by name, whereas in 72 they
made only indirect references. They
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Darius. The tunnels are equipped w/telex
and fa defense.

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against S U & successes also some.
Did you see Hwa.

There was one curious exception. In
Szechwan is an event into a internal
dialogue. I hope your intelligence
people will look into that.



- K We should look into it. That is one of their largest provinces. That cannot be considered. What did they say
- S In attacks on Taiwan, right wing, Teng, just starts about a fruit crop, etc.
- P Fraser last night pushed his thesis that we must do more to get PRC on our side
- K That can't be. We can support the anti-Soviet policies + promote // policies, but they don't operate on emotion
- S I think we should ~~put~~ ^{use} more kind of influence w/ Taiwan. There is no movement at all on their part to promote communication. I not sure there can't be a peaceful resolution to it.
- P Do you have to report to a Senate? I would soften it somewhat.
- K If you stress a insistence on a mil. solution, that is 2-edged sword. The right-wingers might say, OK, forget it. They clearly are trying to tell us that we don't have unlimited time. But they don't have a cop. to take Taiwan over except four years.
- S I agree w/ all that. But I think Taiwan could do something to make a set less intractable.
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(AAK license)

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P Can you control him?

S Sure

