File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

E.O. 12954 8 050 ecc 3/30/05 MR 05-09 #4 . DE Mercuis 3/13/04

NARA Data 5/16/04

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

**PARTICIPANTS:** 

President Ford Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs

del

DATE AND TIME:	Friday, July 16, 1976 11:00 a.m 12:29 p.m.
SUBJECTS:	Offset; African Aid; SALT; CSCE; Southern Africa; Greece and Turkey; Saudi Arabia

[Discussion of latest economic indicators.]

<u>Schmidt</u>: I think the aides of the two Secretaries of State have worked out some drafts which seem satisfactory with the exception of a couple of bracketed items. I suggest we conclude this today so the bureaucrats don't get at it and stretch it out three more months.

<u>Kissinger</u>: I think we can reach agreement but I think we should run it by Simon.

Schmidt: Could we each have a copy of the draft?

The President: While we are waiting for that, here is an up-to-date on the Olympics. Canada has releated to the extent of permitting the Taiwanese to use their flag and their national anthem but they can't use a placard calling themselves the Republic of China. The Chinese thus far haven't accepted it.

P. FORD IBRA

SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS

CLASSIFIED BYBrent ScowcroftEXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATIONSCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652EXEMPTION CATEGORY5(b) (1, 3)AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

# SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS

# African Aid

<u>Schmidt</u>: We discussed yesterday afternoon, Henry and I, the concept of economic support for Africa. I support the plan for aid to African moderates; I just don't know how to finance it.

Kissinger: We discussed yesterday the problems of giving aid only on technical considerations without political considerations. We are reviewing for the US these bits and pieces of programs to see if they shouldn't be put together.

<u>Schmidt</u>: We were thinking about, again, a meeting of the Shultz group to conceptualize these problems.

The President: What figure was Giscard thinking of?

Schmidt: One billion over three years, divided into shares among us.

[Humorous discussion on Bavaria, HAK, etc.]

[The language of the notes on offset and consultation is negotiated.] The consultation notes will be kept by the two of us, and shown only to Defense Ministers and Chairman of the JCS.

Kissinger: We may have a Case Act problem.

The President: It would leak if the Congress got it.

Schmidt: That is more a problem for you than us.

We would not propose revealing to anyone, but if you decided that a Congressional Committee has to get it, we would be compelled to do likewise. [The offset press statement was agreed.]

#### SALT

If we have a moment, could we mention SALT again? Would you foresee that there is a chance for a new published agreement by the time of the election, or would you only get a few steps further along?

The President: That depends on which option I choose. If I select a variant of an earlier proposal, no. If I talk another option, maybe.

# SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

# SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

Schmidt: And what would it mean to your campaign?

The President: If I take the one option, I think it would be good. I may be accused of doing it for political purposes, but I think it would be beneficial.

<u>Schmidt</u>: My questioning stems from a feeling that movement in MBFR will depend on SALT. It is my feeling that there is no movement likely before 1977.

Kissinger: No way.

<u>Schmidt</u>: It involves a dispute with France, which I would rather not have before my election.

Kissinger: We couldn't even get a SALT agreement before your elections.

<u>Schmidt</u>: Can I say to the press we talked SALT and MBFR but it is not for me to discuss details?

The President: Our problems are mostly internal.

Schmidt: I understand that.

#### CSCE

On the 1977 Belgrade meeting. There are people who seem to want to upgrade it -- to make it at the level of Foreign Minister or Head of State. What is your position?

The President: We have a complicating development here. The Congress has established a CSCE Review Commission. I haven't really thought much about it. Henry --

<u>Kissinger:</u> I am inclined to keep it at the lower levels, but I haven't thought it out.

The President: I don't like the idea of East-West summits every two years, but some of the smaller countries are pushing it -- and they feel left out.



SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS

### SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

<u>Kissinger</u>: If it is a summit, the President would have to criticize Brezhnev for non-performance. That is not good.

<u>Schmidt</u>: We need to have some way to make them feel engaged. Perhaps at the official level we could have a meeting in Geneva to give instruction to the Belgrade delegation -- like the meetings we had prior to CSCE.

Kissinger: I expect the Belgrade meeting to be rather nasty.

<u>Schmidt</u>: I think Helsinki has helped the Communist parties stand up to the Soviet Union in the recent conference.

# Southern Africa

Kissinger: On South Africa. We have had good response from the confrontation states. The chief question is whether or not the guerrilla fighting can be stopped.

<u>Schmidt</u>: Vorster is a decent man but he is not looking far enough into the future.

Kissinger: But suppose he came to you for advice? What would you say?

Schmidt: Apartheid has to break down.

<u>Kissinger</u>: Continuation of the present system is not possible, but neither is straight majority rule.

The President: How long does he have?

<u>Kissinger</u>: He has two years if the situation is stonewalled; maybe five years or more if Rhodesia and Namibia work out.

The President: One question I have for you: How about Greece and Turkey?

<u>Schmidt</u>: If the US does not ratify the Turkish base agreement, things could get out of hand. The two parties in the coalition in Turkey are leading to a situation where nothing can be done. Makarios is getting into the position of being the opposition leader in Greece. I think Karamanlis is a decent man, but Makarios is a real problem.

# SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

### SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

<u>Kissinger</u>: The Greek-Americans listen to Makarios, not to Karamanlis.

<u>Schmidt</u>: Karamanlis is an honest, decent person. Once he is destroyed, things are out of hand in Greece.

Now the Greeks can accept a Cyprus solution only if they get something on the Aegean. On Cyprus, time is running against the Greeks; on the Aegean, probably against the Turks.

Demirel is inviting Communist leaders to Ankara this summer. He is moving toward neutralism and Islam.

# Saudi Arabia

I am deeply impressed by the moderation of Fahd. But I think the King is naive. We are going to send an economic advisor to them, at their request. They said they need someone who can give them some advice.

[Walking out the door] Mr. President, I want formally to thank you for inviting me here and allowing us to participate so intimately in your bicentennial. It is an expression of the closeness of our relations and our meetings have fully confirmed that again for me.



### SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

are insinted P/Schmidt  $\checkmark$ 11 00 am - 12 pm 16 Juny 76 (2ª sfe ming) 5 get (Discours of lathat even unharters) 5 & think a aido of 2 Sacyo have worked out Terry drofts while seen satio in/astrepta= go employ brachetad stons, I suggest un conclude this triling so a homemore don't get at it & statch it out 3 more worths. & Ethick we can rench agreement bot 2thick con the el reas it by Simon S contrare such have a enjuge choose? P while we are waiting for that, have is update on a Degraphics. Described Candela alenting to extend of primiting flag & another but not plucard + non-acceptioner (thus par) by Roc), S We downed - potenday of mining a compt of Rever support for african los 2 suggest calm pr say and & aprim mounts - 2 fast don't former to forme it K cire drawned yesterday a probo of giving one into on tech. consederation w/o portreid ensitentres We one mining for US These lists + prices of peop & ever of they chaldn't be put logetter. S We were thinking about, again, a mityge Shuttz group to corruptionings this find. P what figure was ariund thinking of S Our lathin over 3 yes, chindred with shows ing the. (Human diquession on Barania, ARKeta) (The jurtes on offset & consultation and is - myothothed.) The enceltation with will be ligt by Uhin of JLS AUTHORITY for mk 05-09, HA\_\_\_\_\_ BY\_\_\_\_\_NARA, DATE 8/17/09\_\_\_\_

K We may have a Gast act purt. PS= think It nould like if a Comport it S. That mar a port for for you than us. (around We would not propose revealing & any one, but if your clearly Cong houte has to get it, are would be competted (agreent an whore of offset purs stationer) S of an huma moment, could use mention Solt ayon. world you pressy the is a choice for a now published agreement by electrin is any get a few stops forther aling. 1 That depends on which optim & shope, of Delet a innant fan earlin jupport, wo. yourther option, mayo S and what will at mean to your comparing. P & a good one option, I think it would be good. I may be a cursed of dring it for got purpose but & think it would be beneficial. S. Ting questing ston from fulling that more--mint in NBFR will eyend and art, It my fuling that there is no mount likely Inne (9/7 K he man, S. It motives a digenter w/ Frome, which I K me emlibert men get a Sart a grannet topise your epitron S can I say to a pus in Turked Sait & Milly hit P & Om puts an mosty mitund 5 Jamenstond that. One (57) Belgewell mity. Then an perphisme ream to month my grade it. I to mote it

at level of Fan or head of State. What is your portrin. Pure hould impliating deligent hou. Con, has with a case CSEE unin curson. Ihount withthy undahnt it. (V eng -K 2 on minud & hup it at lower lunds, but allowing that it arts i thet it out, P 2 don't topic i due of E-w sommits any 2 gras, but some of a smaller committee are porching ittion full best out. K If it a somet, c P would have contring Buly for won performence. This tost good. S was need to theme some comptor worker them filed engayed. Puhops at cofficial level we could have a notion in anna to give motion to the to c Bayesde duligation - title c inty first CJ(F\_ K I gg I c Belgrade mity to be rather nost. S Ithing A clampi has helped a constgarting to stand up to a SU in a recent comp. Kon S. aprin. We now had gard report for c Renperation states. Et chief grastim is whether a not - generallas, in he stopped. S Parston is a decent man but have not broking fair empirite fortime. K But suppose he come to you for aline. What S aparthing has to bush Am. K Knitmintin of a present sight might with pessible. Port weither is thought might might full. P Flow long does he have ?

K Zages if the situation is stormalled; maybe 5 year mue of Rhodepect Unamba cerebont POur question, & mahart G-T. S & N's dup not why a grument, this mild get mit & humb Tere 2 parties Coosentria frances leading De sit where worthing can taken be deres. \* makanios is getting into portion of long copportion leader in and Strick Kara is a decent many but makaning is a and put. The ank-ano, lister to makering, not Kara. Rava is an hmist, dunt person. Once his destroyed, chings arout of hand in Crea. How & Cruch's can arright & your polntion only if they get something an aleyen . To yours, trine to winning agonant a Ganks; on algum, put aponital Tents. Demail is monthing Const leaders to Unkara this June, Ho. He is moving mond wenterhim + Isla I am dreply mpussed by a Understring Fahel. But I think a King no maine. We are yoing to send an ever a dreak to them at their request, They sind they were amend and com give them some achine. ( adking ant a dreed. Un. P. & most formally to thank you for menting me have t -Itming eroto porticipate to entirath Sepression pote allaboutes from relations and an intes have failly confermed that aponin /os under