MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
President Ford
Valery Giscard d'Estaing, President of the French Republic
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Jean Sauvagnargues, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:
Monday, May 17, 1976
11:05 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.

PLACE:
The Oval Office

SUBJECTS:
European Communists; African Fund; Rambouillet II; Nuclear Non-proliferation

[During and after the press photo session, there was small talk about the President's campaign speaking.]

President Ford: We are delighted to have you here and I am delighted that you have brought Mrs. Giscard with you. I am especially looking forward to [the light and sound show at] Mt. Vernon. Mrs. Ford has long been an advocate of it and has wanted the Capitol to do it.

Kissinger: The most impressive one I have seen is a French one at the Temple of Karnak at Luxor.

President Giscard: I think this visit is an important one for emotional reasons. I think the reaffirmation of the spirit of liberty and democracy is especially significant now. We need to instill a sense of confidence in our people. Our press stories about this trip have been very good in this respect. There has in recent decades been a general neglect

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CLASSIFIED BY: Brent Scowcroft
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of thought given to these things. I hope we can help in this respect
and help to promote understanding of present realities.

Take the problem of communism in Western Europe. People
write of France and Italy as similar yet that is not at all true.
Communism in Italy is and has been a large party and the threat is
real. In France, it is about twenty percent; it is not a real threat,
and it is declining if we proceed properly.

President Ford: We are now subject to the same misperceptions.
My opponent is contributing to that misinterpretation with his irrespon-
sibility. [Some discussion of the campaigns, Republican and Democratic.]

The Democratic convention may be a brutal one, because Carter
may not have a majority.

President Giscard: Your elections are interesting. Your campaigns
are more to the right, so the left moves more to the center. The right
refuses to move to the center, so the general tendency is a shift of the
whole spectrum to the center-right.

Kissinger: And after the elections, the spectrum will move back left
and we will have more trouble with the defense budget.

President Ford: We have had the best year ever on defense budgets.

President Giscard: What has happened in the past few months? You are
being criticized for a lack of decision in foreign policy when that is what
has been imposed on you.

President Ford: We put on a massive effort on the defense budget, and
the political campaign has also helped.

Kissinger: It is interesting that in January Carter advocated a 5% cut.
I think it is a combination of Angola, the intelligence investigation,
Vietnam, and so on, with Angola being a crucial element.

President Ford: I think if Angola took place today we would have a
different result. Congressional attitudes are changing. There is a
better understanding developing. Our treaty with Spain is not encountering
real difficulty. We are still having problems with the Greek-Turkish impasse over Cyprus. Overall support for NATO is healthier than for some time. I think that is a reflection of our relationships and our own bilateral relations with Germany and Great Britain. Italy is a problem.

President Giscard: The Christian Democrats may lose, because of their corruption. But the Church is active now for the first time and there are other factors, so it is hard to predict. Communists in government will create real problems in Europe. Schmidt publicly has been a little ambiguous on this.

Kissinger: I think it is because of what the Christian Democrats would say about a Socialist-Communist alliance. They would be attempting to turn it against the SPD for the election.

President Giscard: Yes. We have had discussions with the Germans. They have been giving advice to everyone about how to do things -- because of their economic success. We sent word to them and Schmidt said he may have overdone it a bit because of the campaign.

If there are Communists in government in Italy, there will be problems in the economy. They will have to modify the structure of their economy. I think we should make our views known about the risks and our concerns, but with respect for the Italians' right to free choice.

The Italians may have to take measures which will destroy the European Community. They will have to cut imports and we can't have them cutting imports and competing with us in the market. So there will be protectionist moves.

Kissinger: Would you say this before the election?

President Giscard: I have started saying it already, but not to influence the Italian vote. They are like the French and will vote for domestic reasons. I don't think we can affect the voters, but we should point out some of the consequences. What we say about the fact of Communist participation in NATO, is fairly obvious and is broadly perceived. There should be no objection to that.
Kissinger: If they come in, we will be under strong domestic pressure to get along. That would be a precedent for Spain, Portugal, etc. We would have to make some adjustments in our relations.

President Ford: The liberals will press, but the conservatives will support firm action.

Kissinger: The United States, over the long run, will not stay in Europe if several European powers bring Communists in.

President Giscard: Our attitude, I think, will be similar -- no support. We should not look as if we were trying to crush the Italian Government, but find a line of no support. We will try to cooperate with Germany to stay on the same line. That will be difficult because of Brandt, who will be soft. Schmidt will thus be put in a difficult position. If, for example, we have another Rambouillet meeting and don't invite them.

President Ford: On the general issue of North-South relations, we approve your statement in Nairobi and your reception of Secretary Kissinger last week.

President Giscard: We were pleased with Secretary Kissinger's assessment of Africa. It is of course possible to do nothing, but people are expecting action and the Africans have felt "obliged" to ask for Soviet support. Most of them are not Communists and they would be gratified by large Western support for development. They get support but through such complicated channels that it has no political impact. Like the World Bank. What we should do is to join in a few countries in a Marshall Plan with a clear political commitment. It would not have an explicit political meaning so as not to divide Africa, but it would be apparent through the groupings. The problem will be the British. They have domestic problems and their attitude toward Africa is complex.

Kissinger: President Giscard has asked me to raise it with Crosland.

President Ford: We have been distressed at the scattered approach thus far. Joining, as you suggest, to cooperate together is far superior to doing it each on his own.

Kissinger: Have you had a response?
President Giscard: Yes, it is enthusiastic. The difficult point is the British. They are being a bit difficult, and upset because we didn't notify them in advance. The next issue is the matter of timing.

President Ford: Henry, you will see the British this week.

Kissinger: I would think if the President [Giscard] would call for a conference, it could be managed -- perhaps July or early August. We need to get moving to show activity and retard the move toward radicalism there.

President Giscard: It is not enough just to coordinate over aid. We must have a special fund which can move quickly. I am thinking it must be about 2 billion a year or 1 1/2 billion. Certainly more than 1/2 billion.

President Ford: Except for the right wing, the reaction to Henry's trip has been very positive.

Sauvagnargues: In the Marshall Plan, we had a committee including the recipients. That would look less patronizing.

Kissinger: Who would be invited?

President Giscard: The Francophone countries in the west, Kenya, Zambia, Zaire.

Kissinger: How about Nigeria? If we have just moderates and it succeeds, it will attract the others, whereas if we start out with the radicals they may try to scuttle it.

President Giscard: Nigeria doesn't belong to a group and doesn't really need the help.

Kissinger: Tanzania is a problem. He was a real help in restricting help to the Rhodesian rebels. But this is a detail we can work out. The concept is brilliant.

President Giscard: Perhaps we would have a preliminary conference in July. Then a joint conference of donors and recipients.
Kissinger: If it was an exploratory conference, you could select the participants without too much trouble. Given the situation in Africa, a certain speed is essential.

I have no fixed view on Tanzania. But if we could get Zambia as the representative of the confrontationists...

President Giscard: [Story about Nyerere.] We must have a device to keep some countries out.

Kissinger: Mozambique won't be a problem. Nigeria and Tanzania may be.

President Giscard: It is important to have countries who would be enthusiastic. It can be expanded later as the situation changes.

What are the topics you want to discuss tomorrow?

President Ford: One subject I want to bring up is on nuclear cooperation. [Describes the nuclear testing.]

Kissinger: But please don't approach the Pentagon until we give the word.

President Ford: I also wanted to tell you that the American reaction to Rambouillet I was highly positive. We discussed there the possibility of a follow-up meeting. As you know, George Shultz has taken soundings for another meeting in late June or July. There have been economic developments and many developments in Europe that we should discuss. I think it would be very helpful and I would hope for your support.

President Giscard: I have no objections in principle. I think we can discuss it in more detail tomorrow. I think it is important to have results if we have a meeting. It is not apparent to me what results we could announce. We can't have Italy the only subject. We could discuss the recovery which is underway, and measures against inflation. But I am not sure if those are dramatic enough for a meeting.

One other point is nuclear dissemination. I don't want France to discriminate against other countries yet. We are not interested in being the vehicle of nuclear dissemination.
The Shah has been at us on reprocessing plants.

Kissinger: The first thing is what you and the President believe. The second is what the Congress might do. And if, heaven forbid, Carter were to get in, there might be sharp changes if we have not before set out some guidelines.

President Ford: Let's discuss this more tomorrow. We could also discuss trade. As you know I have been under great domestic pressure. I said at Rambouillet I that I would resist, and I have. [He described shoes, steel, etc.] Any ideas you have I would welcome.

President Giscard: We should discuss Lebanon also.

Kissinger: There is one point there I want to make. We are afraid Frangieh is using your sending your special emissary as an excuse for not resigning.

President Giscard: That is not at all our intention. He is to see Sarkis. We will clarify this.

President Ford: One other point is on the computer you requested. We have an internal problem with IBM that we must sort out, but I have made the decision.

President Giscard: If we are asked about the treatment of the Concorde in the United States. I will say that it has been fairly handled.
(Sewer talk about Pentagon, Washington, D.C., press photos)

P. Dying with too much to learn, we all

Die in order. Pray to God to be

There for them to learn an example of
theirs. We are united in grief and in
time experience over time seemed

I am French. I am here. Temple of Karnak

We have

I think this is an important word. What

I think the propaganda is necessary. We will

think of the importance of people.

Can we think of this in terms of him

to my goal in this report? This has

in itself doesn't mean a great number of

that question is that they, I hope

that we can say, that in this... is an

united. I present realism. The same

in France, with the Fr. and the same

that not at all the same in Italy.

It is the same in France. The threat to

are some subject to some must explains

My orient is involving to that accommodation

undeguing in this report.

(see discussion for campaign - Rogers

We have to be united in order to

The Mass cannot be a burden

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MNO, 1/24/64, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, CIRC. 1964, 3/10/64
BY WILLIAM H. NARA, DATE 3/10/64
C. From attraction to activity, from companies on exit to exit, the pilot moves more to center. The right issues from center to center, so the grid becomes a grid of which spectrum to an exit center right.

And again, attraction, a spectrum will move back right to move near center of grid budget.

I see this half year even an exit budget.

B. What has happened in past four months? You are being unfolded for the first division on CP section that is what has been agreed on you.

C. We put a massive document exit budget, a potential maneuver in center budget.

D. I think that in 1983, the market's a little bit tight. I think it's significant that Angola is still consistent, CN, etc., at Angola becomes a real problem.

E. A little bit of Angola to take place today, we would have a different view. But attitudes are changing. There is a better understanding of the need for Angola to invest in oil, gas, etc.

F. We are still living, just of C-Tanguay and Cooper. Overall support for Nable's leadership for some time. But that a felt thing over time.

G. All of these relationships and a potential vision of the exit budget is a fact.

H. The exit budget for 1983, because of the current. But a Church's not here for 10 years, there are times where it has to pull it. Church in past month, Smith and Jane in Feb. Schmidt publicly has been a little
I think it because 80s would say

G: Yes, I think we have had dozens of
discussions. They have been going on
since 1979, 1980. They are about how to
handle the crisis of democracy. We
cannot solve it. We cannot solve it.

G: And we have to think about the
situation in Italy, there will be an
election. They will have to make a
decision. They will have to make a
decision. I think we should discuss some
ideas on numbers, but in a short
time, think about the situation in Italy.

K: Would you say this before the
election?

K: There should already, but we have
not seen it. They are like 80s will write
for democracy. I don't think we can
afford to lose a vote, but we should print
not something wrong. What we say
about what, but we are looking for
numbers. So, in a short time, we
should be very specific to that.
President for Spain. But we must have  
make some adjustments in our relations.

P. The trade will pass, but a revolution will  
inspire for another.

K. The U.S. can buy more, with not big in Exea 
of them second. Can fines bring Irak.

G. Our attitude 99th will be marvelous - no  
support. We shall not back as we were trying  
to blow it. And, but just a hint if not  
support. We shall try to try our  
man's blank. That will be difficult. Because  
there will be 88th. We shall find  
this out in the fashion. If for example  
where another now may just  
not much.

P. One good source of N.S. Writing, an appeal  
our statement in 99th + you might  
99th, lastness.

G. The main pleasure of K. entrance of Africa. It  
is of course, possible to nothing, but  
people are expecting action + a engines, brea-  
fest. "shocked" to offer for him support. Most  
of them are not interested. They can't be justified  
by large Western support for African, they  
accept support, but there is an implosion. Instead  
it's his own political reject. I will back, the  
outside impudence is to join in a few  
long-term goals to maintain the political content but on explicit political meaning  
us not to divide Africa, but it should be  
acceptable in the present. The fear will  
the F.R. They have the tendency to allow  
outside nations. Africa is complex.
K. G. has asked me to write of Canada.

P. I can show him battle at a strategic approach thus far. Joining with your support to any further as far as it can be done. Is your plan a success?

K. Am I more of a success?

G. Yes, it is nothing. back with suit a bit.

P. One bit a bit, a support to increase doesn't satisfy them in advance. This vast area is a matter of time.

K. Again will see the end of the week.

I. I will think if P (C) would call for a draft, it could be arranged for. Perhaps I will do it any way. We need to get moving to their activity to extend as well as can do.

G. It is not very fast to work our aid. But must not give up need which can be very quickly. I think it must be about 1 bit per 10. 1 bit per 10. 1 bit per 10.

P. Except for a right, variation to K take two

Sam. In whatever plan, no need to waste much money. That would look less farrowing.

K. The would be involved.

G. The American country in a west, Honga, Toan, Zain.

K. How about Union? If we have just another.

P. It can work as will with others, unless if we think out of which they may try to recognize.

G. Union doesn't belong to a great or almost wholly need to help.

K. Tang, until is a pole. We may a real half in identity.
July 17 1970

We have a lot of work to do. This concept is without a doubt a major problem. We should consider it carefully.

1. Plan a preliminary survey in July. Then a full survey of areas sensitive to environmental changes could be conducted.

2. If it were possible to conduct a preliminary survey, you would select a specific area to study, then a site in Oregon.

3. The site should be selected based on current data and information.

4. (Stronger in years). We must have a device to keep pace with changes.

5. The conditions in a few years will determine the system.

6. It is important to have accurate information about the weather. It can be analyzed later or not.

7. What are the factors determining the systems?

8. One subject element to bring up is an issue every.

9. (December - some material testing)

10. Both plans had apparent potential in our view.

11. S. Smith mentioned his own ideas. We must have a better understanding of the work. We feel the importance of the site in later years. The data have been very difficult to analyze. I would hope for support.

12. (Longer off our minds) I think it requires more detailed discussion. I think it is important to have results of the work.
The girl has been at it as an exercise for me.

This is what I meant about getting up earlier. Tomorrow we must all have some quiet, alone time. I said it to him. I cannot resist it. I love it. (Besides, they, still, etc.)

Any letters you have, I would welcome.

Our child does not seem to mind.

Our friend, the woman, has a house in there. She is having trouble with it. We will visit.

Our other friend is one of those who are regarded

We were sent a notice to stop the work. But I have much to do.

I have one week to finish the work in the US. I must try to do it then.