MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Bipartisan Congressional Leadership (list attached)
Leslie A. Janka (note taker)

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, May 12, 1976
8:10 - 9:05 a.m.

PLACE: The Cabinet Room
The White House

SUBJECT: Report on Secretary Kissinger's Trip to Africa

The President: Thank you all for coming today. I thought it would be useful to have this meeting to provide you a briefing on Secretary Kissinger's recent trip to Africa and what our policy seeks to accomplish there.

Following the Angolan tragedy the situation in Southern Africa began to accelerate to the point of potential disaster for the moderate African States. They were beginning to get very apprehensive, while the radical states became increasingly active in fomenting violence in that region.

We thought that something had to be done and that we should come up with some proposals to attempt to stabilize the situation. Our first efforts were designed to thwart the Soviets and the Cubans because it was our belief that if we didn't do something, all of the area would soon be ripe for Soviet picking.

I know there was some criticism at the timing of the Secretary's trip, but it was my assessment that we couldn't hold foreign policy in limbo every four years. The United States cannot tell the world it will let things drift for six months during our elections, and I am willing to proceed with what needs to be done and take the lumps if necessary.
The Speaker: I took a trip to the eastern part of the Arab world during the Easter recess. Mr. President, I was shocked in my talks with the heads of those governments saying that the United States is losing face as a free people around the world. They all wanted to know if they can still count on the United States to defend freedom.

The President: Mr. Speaker, we get many of the same reports. The people of the world know we have the capability to defend freedom but they are wondering about our willingness to do so and whether we will be with them in their struggles to maintain their independence.

At my request, Secretary Kissinger went to Africa and I would like to turn to him now for a report on what he did there.

Secretary Kissinger: The timing of the trip was based upon the considerations the President has mentioned and the additional fact that the beginning of a war against Rhodesia had already begun, the heads of the African states were meeting in June, Nyerere, the leader of a critical group of African nations, was going to Europe in April-May, and the UNCTAD was meeting in May.

Tanzania is politically the most influential country in this region right now. Our intelligence estimates showed increasing danger of massive foreign intervention if the radical threats continued. We also recognize that the United States as well as Europe gets a very large percentage of its raw materials from Africa. The rest of Africa was rapidly moving in the direction of Angola. The moderate governments were moving toward the radical states and the radicals were moving increasingly toward violence.

It was the President's judgment, as well as that of all of our experts, that Africa was in a stage of rapid disintegration. I might add that this was also the judgment of our key allies, particularly Britain and France. All of them felt that it was essential that the United States play a more active role to avert the increasing danger there. This is why the President decided my trip was necessary at this time.

Our dominant objective was to have African problems settled by the Africans themselves and that the continent not become a place of great power conflict. We wanted to avoid a situation where open conflict would break out with the United States supporting the side of the racist regimes, with the Soviets supporting the other side.

Our second objective was that we wanted to build a platform the moderates could stand on to avoid violence and racial war.

There were three themes that we wanted to stress throughout my trip:

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
We favor political evolution to majority rule by negotiation, not by violence, and this meant negotiation among the Africans.

The United States, with other industrial nations, would be willing to cooperate with the programs of moderate African governments for economic development.

The United States wants no special role for itself, but we seek African solutions to African problems free from all outside intervention. We wanted to see Africa isolated from outside intervention.

Let me now give you a brief summary country-by-country retracing my travels through Africa.

**Kenya:** Here we have a civilian government in power. We find in Africa that the civilian governments tend to be more moderate, while the military regimes tend to be more radical. Kenya is a very pro-West country, but it is under great pressure from its pro-Soviet neighbors, Uganda, Somalia and Tanzania.

**Tanzania:** There is strong Chinese influence here and a growing Soviet presence. Tanzania is the intellectual leader of Southern Africa and as such is the key to the future of the area and whether that future will be violent or not.

**Zambia:** This country used to stand as a strong example of moderation, but after Angola it shifted to open advocacy of armed struggle.

**Botswana:** I did not visit Botswana but I met with its foreign minister in Nairobi. It is a very moderate government which wants to be with the United States.

**Mozambique:** I did not visit here either but we find that it has a very radical government, with lots of Chinese and Soviet influence. If the Cubans come into the Rhodesian conflict, it will be through Mozambique.

**Zaire:** Zaire is as large as Western Europe with vast uncalculated resources. It finds itself surrounded by neighbors heavily armed by the Soviet Union. We consider Zaire to be one of the key countries in Africa. Its leaders are really not too interested in Southern African matters except as they increase radical influence on its borders.

**Liberia:** This is not a country the United States can be proud of. It has no major political problems and it is strongly on our side. While it is virtually a ward of the United States, it was the most backward country economically that we visited, and this was particularly noticed by the press on this trip.
Senegal: Senegal is totally pro-Western and has been desperate in the post-Angolan aftermath in seeking a role for the moderate states.

In terms of policy considerations, I would make the following points:

--- The armed struggle has started. It actually started two months ago. It was our estimate that this struggle would rapidly escalate and could lead to the introduction of foreign troops.

--- The United States can support, on the basis of its own traditions, an evolution to majority rule but only by peaceful means.

--- In return for our stating these principles and objectives, the four Southern African states agreed that they would only act together; they would not permit foreign arms shipments to Rhodesia and promised to deal directly with the liberation movement; they would not call for outside forces; and they would negotiate a settlement if at all possible.

In this dialogue we pointed out that Southern Africa would have a major role to play. The four African states agreed and welcomed this aspect of our policy. The policy we have pursued, along with Great Britain, regarding Rhodesia will not accelerate conflict there. We believe we have given it a chance to slow down and have provided a chance for moderate leaders to resist Soviet intervention along with time for the Rhodesian leaders to work out their problems.

It was our assessment that within a year we would be facing a great race war, with the United States supporting the White minority, while all the other countries lined up against us supported by the Soviets and the Chinese. Now we are viewed as the one country that can achieve moderate solutions, but this can be done only if the United States plays its role seriously and with some dedication. The moderate governments have welcomed our role. It was interesting to note that during my trip the Nigerian and Ugandan radios which were filled with violent propaganda at the outset stopped attacking me by the end of the visit. Nevertheless, the Soviet radio blasted me at every point.

In thinking about Africa, it is important to keep in mind that we are dealing with 46 sovereign states, many of them still in a post-colonial stage without a national tradition. Most of them are extremely vulnerable and in need of a sense of direction. There are only two states with which we have any major military assistance role, that is, Kenya and Zaire. The latter is a very rich country and could be the keystone to political and economic progress in Africa.

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
For the rest of Africa what is needed is a sense of direction and a sense of confidence in the United States. Therefore, we put forward a number of economic proposals. One of these which received considerable attention was a proposal for a $7.5 billion redevelopment program for the Sahel.

I was not proposing a U.S. program or even a major contribution to one. What I was emphasizing was a major redevelopment program rather than the amalgam of relief programs we are now operating in this region. I described what a well thought-out international consortium could do. We did not put any dollar figure on these programs; the reports stemmed from an offhand comment I made to the press following my presentation. What is essential is that we stop these 46 separate bilateral programs and support instead major multinational programs which will help these countries handle the problems they find unmanageable in themselves. In doing so we hope to help them move away from confrontation with the West by giving the moderate countries something to stand on vis-a-vis their radical neighbors. We want major programs where the industrial nations can work together rather than piddling their aid programs out among various bilateral programs.

I stopped to see French President Giscard in Paris. He made a major proposal yesterday for coordinated industrial donor efforts toward Africa. The President has endorsed this concept, which unfortunately, perhaps because it is so good, has been ignored by the American media. Some moderate Arab governments would also want to help in this program since they are equally concerned with the radical threats in Africa. They are particularly worried about the threat in Somalia and Ethiopia.

If we have a chance to develop this program over a 3 to 6 month period, I think we will find that we have halted the slide toward radicalism and violence in Southern Africa. We will in effect have given the racist regimes time to work out their problems with the Blacks and thereby avoid a blood bath. We will have also prevented Soviet intervention and given moderate African states a chance to solve their own problems. These proposals can represent an opportunity to tie the Western world together in a positive program and thereby be something that the United States does not have to attempt all alone.

The President: Thank you, Henry. I think it ought to be pointed out that Libya and Algeria are in the forefront of supporting violent solutions and radical governments.

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct. Along with the moderate Arab states, the African moderates have no platform to stand on so that they could back up the United States. Both the Iranians and Arabs want to back our UNCTAD proposals.

As we saw it, the war in Southern Africa was going to intensify. The OAU meeting scheduled for June would have been totally run by the radicals.
These were the deadlines we were facing as we considered my trip. If we work with some conviction, we can move away from intervention and violence and ultimate domination of Southern Africa by radical states.

The President: The point I want to emphasize is that the moderate Arab states want to support our approach. This is a policy that the United States has always stood for:

- majority rule
- protection of minority rights
- nondomination by outside forces

I was particularly pleased that Senators Ribicoff and Javits went to Kenya with Secretary Kissinger to indicate the support and understanding of the Congress.

Representative O'Neill: Is it correct to say that we have never had an African policy?

Secretary Kissinger: I would think that too strong, but I would not deny that we have had problems developing a coherent policy for 46 countries.

The President: Always before we were faced with dealing with countries in differing stages of colonialism and independence and a constantly fluid situation.

Representative John Anderson: I am trying to put some thought to the various programs we are proposing for Africa. What sort of coordinating mechanism do you envision existing? I would also like to know more about your proposal for a Resource Bank.

Secretary Kissinger: You have identified one of the key problems of all the various African aid programs. We have tried to give the Africans the idea of working toward regional development programs. President Giscard has proposed the formation of both a donor group of countries and a recipient group of countries. He wants to select the most moderate African governments as members of the recipient group. The French proposal thus gives us an opportunity to group countries together for rational planning, for as you know many of the boundaries in Africa today have no basis in geography or history, but simply represent the lines drawn during the colonial struggle.

Yesterday, the President ordered an NSC study to determine the scope of the programs needed and possible U.S. responses.

With regard to the international Resources Bank, what we put forward in the UNCTAD meetings was designed to counter a proposal by 112 countries.
that would have created a super OPEC for commodities with strong demands for indexation and so forth. Instead, we set forth a forward-looking program compatible with our free enterprise system. We recognized that the major problem today is that private capital is reluctant to invest in resource development because of the lack of security for such investments. What we are proposing is not really a bank but it is rather an insurance scheme to protect investments. The United States will not put up any cash, but rather guarantees. The bank can thus create and guarantee better conditions for investment. We rejected the idea of an integrated commodity approach but we did indicate a willingness to deal on a case-by-case basis on the subjects of buffer stocks, transfer of technology, and so forth. The Soviets and Chinese are blasting away at our proposal but the countries we have to work with are welcoming our suggestions.

Senator Curtis: How do we protect ourselves from putting the ball in the Soviet court, whereby we would maneuver ourselves into a U.S.-Soviet confrontation that the American people will not support and thereby find our entire policy discredited before the world?

Secretary Kissinger: That is exactly the position we were in after Angola and were trying to avoid facing again. We saw a confrontation developing in Rhodesia. If we decided to fight such Soviet intervention, we would inevitably be supporting the White regimes. If we didn't fight, we would be seen as caving into the Cubans. Our goal, therefore, was to organize the Africans into supporting the non-use of foreign troops.

We may still face this problem in a few months or a year. It all depends on how decisively we move.

Senator Curtis: Is Cuba fronting for the USSR?

Secretary Kissinger: The Cubans are surrogates for the Soviets. It is my hope that we can reduce or eliminate the Cuban presence in Africa. We must realize that no African government is interested in supporting the United States against the Soviets. Therefore, we are trying to develop the possibility of Africans solving their own African problems. What we want to do is to maneuver the Soviets into a position where Africans see the Russians as impeding African progress.

The President: If we hadn't undertaken these initiatives, we would have seen more problems like we saw in the U.N. yesterday, where the Africans were pushing for the admission of Angola to the United Nations and we would have been forced to veto.

Secretary Kissinger: What we achieved, and it was a direct result of my trip to Africa, was that we got the moderate Africans in the UN to put off the vote so we would not have to use the veto.
Chairman Morgan: What happened to Nigeria which was supposed to be the showcase for Africa?

Secretary Kissinger: Nigeria is the most populous state and perhaps the richest in resources due to its oil. But Nigeria has been going in a bad direction due to its own domestic instability. Soviet influence is very strong in Nigeria, as is that of Algeria and Libya due to the Moslem population in the North. We think, for example, the Nigerians were behind the Ghanaian cancellation of my visit.

The President: Thank you all for coming. I think we've made considerable progress, but we are a long way from out of the woods in Africa.
PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Secretary of State

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Clements

HOUSE

Carl Albert
Tip O'Neill
John Rhodes
Jack McFall
Bob Michel
Phil Burton
John Anderson
Doc Morgan
Bill Broomfield

SENATE

Hugh Scott
Bob Griffin
Carl Curtis
Frank Moss
John Sparkman
Cliff Case
Mike Mansfield

STAFF

Bob Hartmann
Jack Marsh
Dick Cheney

Rog Morton
Alan Greenspan
Bill Seidman
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Baroody
Ron Nessen
Phil Buchen
Max Friedersdorf
Jim Cannon
Jim Lynn

Doug Bennett
Bill Kendall
Charlie Leppert
Tom Loeffler
Joe Jenckes
Pat Rowland
Bob Wolthuis
Russ Rourke

Les Janta
Jim Connor

REGRETS

The Vice President
Sen. Robert Byrd
Sen Eastland
MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: LES JANKA
SUBJECT: Meeting with Bipartisan Leadership
       Wednesday, May 12, 1976

Attached for your review is a Memorandum of Conversation drawn 
from my notes of the President's meeting with the Bipartisan Leader­
ship which was held on Wednesday, May 12, 1976.

RECOMMENDATION
That you review and approve the Memcon at Tab A.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE
**NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO</th>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>S/SE</th>
<th>UNCLASS LOG IN/OUT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRES</td>
<td>SECSTATE</td>
<td></td>
<td>NO FORM MODS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SCOWCROFT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>EEVS ONLY EXODS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SCOWCROFT**

**SUBJECT:** Review status of Bipartisan Leadership

**Wednesday, May 12, 1976**

**INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASY/CSC/CROFT/DSM</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>CONCOURSE</th>
<th>COORD.</th>
<th>AO</th>
<th>DENOTE</th>
<th>SP</th>
<th>RAS</th>
<th>PGP</th>
<th>FOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STAFF SECRETARY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONGRESSIONAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUR/CA/NA/OCEAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR EAST/PACIFIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTELLIGENCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATIN AMERICA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MID EAST/NORTH AFRICA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC PLANNING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROGRAM ANALYTICS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCIENTIFIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB-RH/BIPARTISAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ACTION REQUIRED**

- MEMO TO SCOWCROFT
- MEMO TO PRES
- MEMO TO STAFF SECRETARY
- REPLY FOR
- APPROPRIATE ACTION
- MEMO TO
- RECOMMENDATIONS
- JOINT MEMO
- REFER TO
- ANY ACTION NECESSARY
- CONCURRENCE
- DUE DATE
- COMPLIANCE INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

**DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION AGENDA**

**SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>ACTOR</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED OR TAKEN:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5/14</td>
<td>SCOWCROFT</td>
<td>DAVIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/17</td>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>C.</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 memos approved down</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DISPATCH**

NOTIFY

**SPECIAL DISPOSITION**

**SPECIAL INDEXING**

**HSC 5 DISP INSTR**

**U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE -- Washington, D.C. -- 1976**