

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Monday, May 10, 1976  
9:25 - 10:20 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

Kissinger: I see no reason to check our statement with Giscard. He might even want to change it.

President: What is he going to say?

Kissinger: He will say we can't let the radicals take over in Africa. So he calls on the West to help the moderates and he calls on the moderates to organize to receive it. Houphouet-Boigny is ready to respond with a call for a moderate African organization.

President: Does he mention a sum? It looks good to me.

Kissinger: Not that he has said. But we are giving aid anyway. But right now we are using band-aids. We need to analyze what it takes to get Zaire on its feet. If we could make a couple of countries showcases, we would be doing great. It won't take all that much -- \$100 million for Zaire. If we put in what we are doing in Egypt...

At the NSC I think you should accelerate the NSSM and ask to see what it would take to do the job. Then I would send Clements over there with a general. There are only two countries asking for military aid -- Zaire and Kenya.

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~



~~SECRET~~ - XGDS (3)  
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/14/08, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, *std. review 3/12/04*  
BY *llh*, NARA. DATE *1/26/04*

President: How was Kaunda?

Kissinger: He was great. He embraced me with tears in his eyes and said now we had some standard to repair to. Now the moderates would back a moderate course in Africa.

I need to talk to the Wall Street Journal people and straighten them out.

President: I wish you would. Business needs it.

Kissinger: Much of it is Schlesinger. What a coward.

Let me explain Somalia. One can't even fire an Ambassador now without him testifying before the Congress. The oil price thing is pure crap. We have always supported lower prices.

On Akins' idea of military aid, the Saudis offered only \$15 million and there is \$180 million of Soviet equipment there. Then Somalia is the enemy of three territories we support, and we would have had to aid them as well. Somalia probably wouldn't have accepted. But that is no excuse for not asking them. I think we can defend ourselves on it, but it was a disgrace the way it was handled at State.

President: I am glad to hear this explanation. I couldn't figure out what happened.

Kissinger: You wanted a PNE signing ceremony.

President: I think it would be good before Michigan.

Kissinger: It will be tight, but I will call Dobrynin.

President: Lebanon looks better.

Kissinger: There still is a security problem. Giscard says he may send French troops in.

President: That would be better than Syrians.

Kissinger: That's right. I authorized Dean Brown to send a message to Arafat. [He describes it. See Tab A] You can disavow it if you want.

President: No, that sounds good. Will Asad renew UNDOF?

Kissinger: I think he will do it in the end. I think after November we can move swiftly. For you to veto the Security Assistance Authorization and have the Jews begging for a chance to work it out rather than beating you to death about it. . . . I tell you, they are worried. That was apparent also from my speech last night. We really have them off balance and I think we should keep it that way. After November I think we can move very quickly to a settlement. Things are really looking right.

President: I am speaking Thursday before the American Jewish Committee. What should the thrust be?

Kissinger: I would keep them scared a bit. Don't be too objective. Don't let them think you are over-eager. They should be deeply worried and hope you would be more flexible.

President: Will you or Brent give me an outline?

What can we do for the Authorization bill?

Scowcroft: It appears as if we can perhaps get a two-year authorization, and, in the process, get some or most of the restrictive amendments removed. I will have a paper for you this afternoon.

Kissinger: Shall I call Taft Schreiber?

President: I think it would be extremely helpful.

What should I tell Meloy?

Kissinger: That he should continue Brown's work at a slightly lower key.

President: Does he know about the Arafat message?

Kissinger: No. He shouldn't monkey with that. Asad said he didn't care if we talked to Arafat or not.

After November, we can really move on the Middle East.

[Ambassador Meloy was then brought in.]

P/K

10 May 76



K I see no reason to check our statement to General. He might even want to change it.

P What is he going to say?

K He will say we can't let radicals take over. So he calls on West & help moderate & moderate to organize & recruit. Humphrey. Boigny is ready to expand w/a call for a moderate African regime.

P Does he mention a sum? It looks good to me

K Not that he has said - But arguing and arguing. But right now we are using billions. We need to analyze what it takes to get Zaire on its feet. If we could make a couple of countries showcase, we would be doing great. It won't take all that much - 100 mil for Zaire. If we put in what we are in Egypt.

At a NSC I think you should celebrate - ~~NSC~~ <sup>NSS</sup> and ask to see what it would take to do it. Then I would send Clements over there w/a general. There are only 2 countries asking for help out - Zaire & Kenya

P How was Kamuda

K He was great. He embraced some tears in his eyes & said now we had some standard to repair to. Now a moderate would be a moderate course in Africa. I need to talk to WST people & straighten them out.

P I wish you would. Business needs it.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Dec 23/12/04

BY llh, NARA, DATE 1/26/04





last night. We really have them off.  
balance & I think we should keep it  
that way. After that, I think we can  
move very quickly to a settlement. Things  
are really looking right.

P I am speaking Thursday before AJC.  
What should the thrust be?

K I would keep them scared a bit. Don't be  
too explicit. Don't let them think you  
are over eager. They should be highly  
worried & hope you would be more  
flexible.

P Will you or Brent give me an outline?

\* What can we do for a draft bill?

S It appears as if we can perhaps get a 2-  
yr antih. and, in a process, get some  
or most of a restrictive antih. removed.  
I will have a page for you this afternoon.

K Should I call Capt. Scribner

P I think it would be extremely helpful.  
What should I tell Underly

K That he should ~~not~~ continue Bureau work  
at a slightly lower key.

P Does he know about a draft too?

K No. He shouldn't monkey w/ that. Dad said he  
didn't care if we talked to Araft or not.

After that, we can really move on a ME -  
and

