MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Amb. R. F. Botha, Ambassador of Republic of South Africa
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: Thursday - April 15, 1976
10:39 - 11:07 a.m.

PLACE: General Scowcroft's Office
The White House

Kissinger: [Described why he couldn't meet at the State Department.] I just wanted to explain where I stand. The issue is not oppression of the majority by the minority -- really. But we must deal with the realities. If we don't get the Cubans out of Africa, we will have a real race war and the Soviets will get in. So I've got to get into a position where I can get the Cubans out but protect myself domestically.

I differentiate between South Africa and Rhodesia, with Namibia in between.

I want to get Black Africa into the position of the Arabs before 1973 -- knowing that they can't get anywhere with the Soviets and have to come to us. But to do this I must be very tough on Rhodesia. I need a platform from which to resist the Soviets and Cubans.

I get the impression your government would understand that.

Botha: We are in a difficult position but I can tell you privately the Prime Minister feels let down by Smith.
Kissinger: To me South Africa is very different so long at least as I am here. Namibia, I just don't know. It is a wholly artificial entity.

Botha: We are making progress but we need time.

Kissinger: How much time?

Botha: It is hard to press it but I would guess three years for a constitution. We have no interest in keeping that territory.

Kissinger: It wouldn't bother me if you did. I have no sentimental illusion about African countries. My intention will be to focus my attacks on Rhodesia. I am not proud of it but I need a platform to work with Zambia and Zaire.

Botha: We understand. We are building platforms ourselves. We are responsible for the meetings with Smith. [Describes the bridge meeting.]

Kissinger: I am not trying to lecture you at all. But since our disgrace in Angola -- and I appreciate your role -- we have to move now more rapidly.

Botha: If I could make one point. You do what you need to with respect to Rhodesia, but can you make a sharp distinction between South Africa and Rhodesia?

Kissinger: I may have to come out for majority rule in Southern Africa.

Botha: But that lumps us with Rhodesia and Namibia.

Kissinger: You will note the distinction in my speeches. I am being pressured to see SWAPO.

Botha: You could be saddling the wrong horse. They are just one bunch and they knock each other off all the time. I think you run the danger of having all the rest against you if you approach any one group.

We have a substantial program of economic assistance in Africa. It is what really counts there. If you would do something to help in economic development, I think that will do more than anything else.
Kissinger: That we will be doing.

I would like you to keep in touch with Brent and we will meet when I return. But please hold this to your Prime Minister alone.

Botha: Of course. One thing: A Cuban invasion of Rhodesia would cause insurmountable problems for us.

Kissinger: If that should happen, I assure you we will act. But to be able to do that, we must position ourselves with respect to majority rule and dissuade Smith as well that he can't solve his problems by encouraging a Cuban invasion.

Botha: That is very reassuring to us. We agree that Smith is beyond recovery.
J. K. Bolton

Restrict copy
To this side of
that - hold

(Commits only to indictment

I'm not sure what to explain when I'm asked. The issue
is not oppression of majority by minority - really,
but we cannot deal with mediators. I guess that we
just put a break on a quick resolution; we need a real
resolution. So let's just get

with a position where I can get it all out but

stay myself characteristically.

I hope that Ssh. & Shukri, us/Warbie in

Laughter.

I want to get Black Africa in to putting a voice -

but that can't put anymore of a bone. But to do

something. This is an event in extraordinary on Rhoasia.

I just put a voice for... for... because the structure that

is a one in the position, but I can ill you

probably. PM just let down by Smith.

To me Ssh. is very big, so long at Nelson

Lance, Warbie, I just don't know. It is

worldwide suitable reality.

B are a many good. Bad must time.

K. How much time

B Hand & press it but I would press 3 yes for a

consultation. We have no interest in helping that

situation.

K. Just need to let me in if you decide. I have no

participation whatever about African - worse countries.

Get resolution will be to focus any attacks on

Rhodesia. Just provide that I will do what
K work at London & Paris.

B. We understand. to one building platforms available.

We are close for a unity of Smith (Discrete 2

budget unity).
I was not trying to disprove you at all. But since we disagree on Gonzalo's happenings in Africa, we have to argue on some empathy.

B. If I could make one point, I'd say what you called to my regret to Chahine, that on your visit to the Shami Arabi, SA and Chahine

K. I may have to come out for greater rule in Southern Africa.

But that, you see, is with Chahine and Chahine.

I have the distinct impression that I should present to the Shah's.

I wonder if you could be relaying this every hour. They have got one branch, they branch in the other.

And I wonder if you could be relaying this every day. If you cannot, you cannot.

We have a wide range of discourses in China. It is what really counts here. If you could do something to help in some intellect, I think that would be more than anything else.

I think you will be busy.

I wonder if you have ever had a visit from the Shah of Iran.

B. Of course, this thing, the Shami Arabi of Chahine, would cause immense trouble to you.

K. If that should happen, I know you will not want it, but to do that, we must not consider any respect to countermand, but be made Smith, and the need that doesn't set him part of undermining Chahine.
6. That is my reasoning for us. We agree that Smith is beyond helping.