REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . Memorandum of Conversation
DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . Meeting of Ford, Kissinger, Rumsfeld
CREATION DATE . . . . . . 04/15/1976
VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 036600194
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. MEMORANDA OF CONVERSATIONS
BOX NUMBER . . . . . . . . . 19
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . . . April 15, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger, Rumsfeld
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . . 10/29/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . WHM

Partially declassified copy
in open file
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Richard Cheney, Assistant to the President

DATE & TIME: Thursday, April 15, 1976
9:31 - 10:19 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

President: I have decided to make a major defense and foreign policy speech before the DAR next Wednesday. Hartmann has done a redraft. It is tough -- it takes on Reagan. Will you all look at it today so I can have it in final form by Saturday? It is a little tough on the Soviet Union but says we will negotiate.

Kissinger: The problem with the Soviet Union is that detente is really right. Second, you will have to deal with them after November. It really isn't so that they are being irresponsible -- except in Angola. And politically, if it is Humphrey and they [the Soviets] decide that Humphrey is preferable, they can be troublesome.

President: I don't think it really does that. [He describes what is in the speech.]

Kissinger: Schlesinger is now saying the way we play detente is like the cold war.

President: Reagan, you notice, is not now saying that we are behind strategically. He is now emphasizing the conventional needs.
Rumsfeld: We need to avoid wild swings from euphoria to an all-out cold war with the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: We are signing today with the Greeks the principles of a base agreement, similar to what we did with the Turks. The price is $700 million. Their units will return to NATO. The exchange of letters will be released today.

[To Rumsfeld:] In your meeting he will want to concentrate on the Aegean and Cyprus.

[There is discussion of the return of Nireks to NATO and the impact of 'special arrangements' on Italy and possible Communists in the government.]

Rumsfeld: I think the Europeans think that Communists in government is just a matter of preference to us. It is just that. There is no way you can have an integrated command system with governments which have a cabinet system where classified information can't be segregated.

Kissinger: Yes. We should say that Communists in government would have an inevitable consequence.

Rumsfeld: That's right. That is also the single biggest help for the Christian Democrats in Italy.

Scowcroft: But if we are to talk this way, we must all know that we will carry it out if it happens.

Rumsfeld: The Minuteman III line decision is a touchy one in the way we explain it. We could have put the money in the budget or not -- you decided not to. We should answer that our decision is based on the rate of progress in SALT. We are merely keeping our options open.

President: Let's announce it from here. Get a statement along those lines.

Kissinger: I am going to Arizona and will appear with Goldwater.

Cheney: That is one of our toughest states. They are Birchers.
Kissinger: I thought I would take Reagan on on the optimism-pessimism issue, but not by name. Say you are realistic, it is tough, but we can make it if we work at it.

President: I am giving a Texas press interview and will get at the Panama Canal. I thought I would say that in '64 there were riots and people were killed and we are working to avoid that and protect our interests. Hit Reagan on irresponsibility.

Rumsfeld: I don't like it. It looks like any time Americans get killed, we cave in.

Kissinger: I would say it, not just an issue between us and Panama. You have an obligation to explore whether we can reach an agreement which will preserve our interests over the expected useful life of the Canal and preserve our relationships with Panama and with Latin America. We don't want to return to the climate of '64 and destroy our Latin American relationships. It may not be possible to arrive at such an agreement but it would be irresponsible not to try. You can't sacrifice our interests in the open use and defense of the Canal and any agreement must be submitted to the Congress.

Rumsfeld: I like that better.

President: Okay. I just have to get myself off the hook of using the word "never" and I also want to demonstrate that Reagan is irresponsible or doesn't understand the issues.
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