MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: 
President Ford
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: 
Friday, March 19, 1976
9:22 - 10:25 a.m.

PLACE: 
The Oval Office

Kissinger: On the C-130's, Sadat wants to go the FMS route, Max Fisher says the Jewish Community won't fight it on the Hill if we will agree not to do anything else this year. If we can find some way to do it without humiliating Sadat....

The President: That is fine.

Kissinger: You came out well by being firm with them. I had Begin in yesterday. I really gave him hell. I thought it would actually help the government to beat up on him.

And I think you should meet with the Klutznick group. You don't have to ask for their support, but just explain your policy.

The President: Let's do it.

Kissinger: On the Nixon report [from China] I didn't find anything new in it. I had hoped he would write down each word so we could get any nuances.

The President: What are we going to do with it?

Scowcroft: We are sending it back. We have gotten some press queries already and we need to get it out of here so we can respond to questions.

CLASSIFIED BY: Henry A. Kissinger
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AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.
Kissinger: We could say it was a very interesting and useful report.

I am worried about the Soviet approach. If we piss on everything, we will lose the whole policy. If they think you are no better than anyone else they can do a lot to harrass you. I think we should look for ways to reimpose our commitment to detente. We must show them Angola was unacceptable, but in retrospect I think the public postponement of the joint commissions was a mistake. Don's approach yesterday was nonsense.

The President: It didn't make sense.

Kissinger: I am assuming that even if you don't want an agreement you don't want to break off the talks.

The President: I would prefer an agreement, because I think that is in the national interest.

Kissinger: One way to go would be to improve our last proposal, or pick out some of the more attractive aspects of the Soviet January proposal. Or to put together the best proposal we can, based on our old options, with reductions, but make it a final proposal not subject to negotiation.

The President: I like that approach. Especially I think reductions are very attractive. What is our timing?

Kissinger: I think we should do it in a leisurely way. After the meeting next Wednesday, you could say you want to think about it some more, until after the Wisconsin primary maybe. Then get them in and give them instructions to improve the last offer and also to look at Option II again. I don't think you can let the process run free like the last time. I think you are in better shape now because in January the chiefs were positioning themselves against a Jackson victory or against the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The President: Is there an advantage in offering alternates -- like extending the dates on the latest one and give them a modification on our earlier one?

Kissinger: I wouldn't give them two. On the reduction proposal I would do it as a more or less final offer. If we use the latest one, I would just change the date to 1983.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
The President: Brent, will you write down these options over the weekend so I can study them.

Kissinger: But I wouldn't be that specific next Wednesday. I wouldn't go further than to say you want to work for an agreement but you want to think more about how to go about it.

[There is some discussion of speeches and the political situation, and about Connally and the Secretary's Dallas speech.]
K: One idea, Seidel wants to FMS, Fiesler says c Jams wouldn't pay it even if we will use with 24 anything else this year. If we can pay same way to do it w/a Lancaster Seidel.

P: That is fine.

K: You can expect very well very long fms of them. I had begun in yesterday, I would get him fast. I think it would be actually likely a good to beat upon him.

And I think you should meet w/Klotz and group. You don't have to ask for their support, but just explain your policy.

P: Let's do it.

K: On the history report, I didn't find anything ever in it, I had hoped he would explain to a world yes we could get any measure.

P: What are you going to do with it?

K: It's going to back. We have gotten them a pretty good amount of money need to get it up to here to we can respond to position.

I'm married about that opponent. If we just

on that thing we will have a whole policy. If they think you are so taken from explanation, the basic

plan can do a lot to evolve, enhance you. I think

we should look for way to improve your current that line. We want that than you have was

inexpensive but in next to an fms public

judgement so it becomes very important.

P: It's about time you

K: If an agreement that even if I am not want
an agreement you didn't want to break the talks

P agreed my agreement because I didn't think it was a good idea.

K One way would be to merge our last proposal, or put out some of your arguments against it. Do we want to try to sort out a last proposal or can, based on our past options, al/robust or still sell as last proposal.

P I like the approach, especially if we start to narrow our options.

K I think we should do it. Let's try. After a week, we can try to get more of your ideas. We have a week to go, and we need to look at our options.

I didn't think you could let a proposal fail like this. I think we can let a proposal fail like this. I think, in the end, people are strong in establishing this framework.

P By chance, we can advantage in being at the same time.

K I wonder if you could. We could do it together and find out.

P But I would, maybe, make just changes a week to F.

K But I wonder if you could. We could

K But I wonder if you could. We could
-Dwight D. Eisenhower - speech continuation

It wouldn't be fair to the ones who are going to work
from an argument that they would not have to go.
(Speech on political discussions
removal, Dallas speech)