

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford  
Thomas S. Gates, Chief-Designate of  
U. S. Liaison Office in Peking  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Friday, March 19, 1976  
10:10 - 10-25 a. m.

[A press session takes place first for the public announcement. Then the press leaves.]

The President: The Ambassador issue is complicated. I can only grant it for six months.

Gates: That would be fine. I gather it was in part because you plan some movement and want to signal the Chinese.

Kissinger: They will interpret it that way.

Scowcroft: It will be a sign of the importance we ascribe to them.

The President: We do have to begin some movement, perhaps in 1977. But we do have to bite the bullet sometime after the election.

Kissinger: They are cold, pragmatic bastards. The President is right -- we will have to move after the election. I would like to give Tom a letter either to Mao or Hua. Then we could have a verbatim report of what they say, to see if there are nuances of change. Nixon didn't record enough detail to be helpful.

Gates: Hua may not have the confidence to make a policy statement.

Kissinger: Even if he reads it, it would be good. And I will give a lunch for you and invite the Chinese and put myself squarely behind you. I could also have Bush and Bruce there.

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

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BY ML NARA DATE 6/17/04

P / Gates / K ✓

19 Mar 76

(<sup>session</sup> discussion for statements)

- P The Ambassador's ~~issue~~ is complicated - I can only grant it for 6 mos
- G That would be fine. I gather it was in part because you place some movement & want to signal a Chinese
- K They will interpret it that way.
- S It will be a sign of a negotiation we describe to them.
- P We do have to begin some movement perhaps in 77. But we do have to wait a <sup>little</sup> ~~while~~ <sup>while</sup> sometime after election.
- K They are cold, pragmatic bastards. The P is right - we will have to move after election. I would like to give Tom a letter either to Hanoi or Hanoi. Then we could have a resolution report of what they say to see if there are any nuances of change. Nixon didn't record every detail to be helpful.
- G Hanoi may not have a confidence to make a policy statement.
- K Even if he reads it, it will be good. And I will put a launch for you + secrets a Chinese ~~and~~ and put myself squarely behind you. I could also have Bush + Bina there.

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E.O. 13526, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/03, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 3/12/04  
BY            DATE 4/17/04

