MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Fred C. Ble, Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Monday, February 16, 1976
10:10 - 10:20 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

President: I wanted to bring you up to date about a decision I made over the weekend. It will be delivered to Dobrynin this morning. It is deferral, under the concept of buying time for Backfire and cruise missiles. We picked January '79 as the best time before our deployment of cruise missiles and which will still keep some restraint on Backfire. I thought it best to include ALCMs in the treaty. For other cruise missiles, their deployment is banned over 600 kilometers. On "nuclear-armed," I thought it best to defer that to Geneva in order not to overload the Soviets at the moment.

Don is in agreement and I will talk to George [Brown] this afternoon. I think it is the best we can do under the circumstances. I don't think it has much chance.

Ble: We don't want to get into competition on intercontinental cruise missiles. I think it can easily be defended and supported. I have a couple of minor nitpicks I can tell Brent.

Kissinger: Don has a couple of points here.
I told the President I far prefer Option II. I am most worried about the date.

President: This is not my preferred way to go, but I think it is manageable, and as long as we have everyone on board we have something we can move forward with.
MEETING WITH DIRECTOR IKLE

Monday, February 16, 1976
10:00 a.m. (15 minutes)
The Oval Office

From: Brent Scowcroft

I. PURPOSE

To review our SALT position.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Background: Director Ikle in his memorandum to you following the NSC meeting favored the deferral option, which he believes has a good chance of acceptance, by the Soviets and which could be successfully defended in Washington. His comments on the Option were:
-- to make it symmetrical, in that there should be no acceleration of either Backfire or our cruise missile deployment plans (i.e., an interim period through late 1979 or early 1980);
-- avoid an obligation to continue a ban on cruise missile deployment after the interim period;
-- avoid a ban on cruise missile on other aircraft, by making the definition "nuclear-armed," and keep the 600 km limit subject to review.
III. TALKING POINTS

1. I have decided to adopt the deferral option as our basic position in replying to the Brezhnev proposal.

2. I have reviewed comments by Defense, State and ACDA, and I believe that this is the preferable position at this time. It permits us to go forward with our basic agreement and to gain some time to give more consideration to the Backfire as well as to cruise missiles.

3. I have chosen an interim period through January 1979 -- this is long enough to provide an incentive for the Soviets, but does not freeze our program.

4. As an additional incentive for the Soviets, I have decided that the ACLM on bombers counting as MIRVs should be wrapped up now; it will guarantee this program in our defense budgets and permit us to proceed on planning for deployments on the B-52.

5. On the ranges of cruise missiles, we will be restricted to testing below 2500 km during the interim period, and from deployments on seabased and land-based over 600 km -- both ranges can be reviewed later, and neither will be unduly restrictive.

6. On the nuclear armed definition, I have decided to withhold it for discussion in Geneva because it will otherwise overload the proposal for the Soviets.

7. I think we have a solid basis in this approach, but we now need to put an end to the bickering. I want a unified Administration in support of this position -- which everyone has now recommended. Our job now is to sell it to the Soviets, and then to the Congress.

Attachments

Tab A - Note to the Soviets
Tab B - Ikle Memorandum
The United States proposes that the two sides proceed in the following manner:

1. The U.S. and USSR agree to consolidate, and sign as soon as possible, the areas of agreement in a SALT II Treaty and defer the Backfire and certain "intermediate range" cruise missile issues for an agreed interim period, during which negotiations on these issues would continue.

2. In addition to those provisions already settled or still under discussion in Geneva, the treaty would also include provisions (a) to ban deployment of cruise missiles with a range over 600 km from all aircraft except those heavy bombers that are counted in the ceiling of 2,400; (b) to ban testing or production of air-launched cruise missiles with a range greater than 2,500 km; (c) to consider each heavy bomber equipped with a cruise missile with a range over 600 and up to 2,500 km as a MIRVed launcher and therefore to be counted against the ceiling of 1,320 MIRVed vehicles; and (d) at a time to be agreed upon, to review the range threshold limits on cruise missiles.

3. On this basis the treaty would also include an agreement on the provisions for the verification of the deployment of MIRVed missiles, along the lines tentatively agreed in high level discussions, and, as well, agreement on the distinction between heavy and non-heavy ICBM's and the definition of a heavy missile.
4. As a part of resolving the issues of the Backfire bomber and sea- and land-based cruise missiles, the two sides would agree that their common intention is to reduce strategic armaments below the 2,400 ceiling agreed at Vladivostok.

5. The U.S. and USSR would also conclude an interim agreement for the period beginning with the signature of the new treaty until January 1, 1979, to include the following mutual constraints: (a) during the interim period no sea-based or land-based cruise missiles would be tested to a range greater than 2,500 km; (b) during this period no sea-based or land-based cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 km would be operationally deployed on surface ships, on submarines, or on land; (c) the Soviet side would provide assurances that during this period the rate of production of the Soviet Backfire bomber would not be accelerated beyond the current and agreed rate, that the operational capabilities would not be improved, and, through other assurances to be agreed, that the Backfire bomber would not be deployed or operated in an intercontinental mode; (d) both sides would agree that their common objective would be to reach a mutually acceptable definitive solution to the problems of intermediate range sea- and land-based cruise missiles and the Backfire bomber as soon as possible. Negotiations to this end should begin immediately following the signing of the treaty based on
Vladivostok; (e) negotiations on the resolution of the issues covered by the interim agreement would not replace the commitment, as currently reflected in the draft treaty being negotiated in Geneva, to conduct further negotiations beginning in 1977 for a more comprehensive agreement.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: SALT

The following points may help to clarify my remarks at yesterday's NSC meeting:

-- If you should decide to choose the Deferral Option, it seems to me the chances of Soviet acceptance would be quite good, since it gives the Russians nearly all they are still asking for—except limits on SLCMs on ships and subs, neither of which were ever mentioned at Vladivostok.

-- There is perhaps a risk that we might lose the MIRV counting rule. But we could live with that by making the 1320 MIRV ceiling contingent on verification arrangements (to be worked out in the SCC, for example). The MIRV ceiling won't be reached until the early 1980's, and the verification of MIRVed SLBMs is hard to finalize now in any event, since we know so little about them.

-- A few key conditions seem essential for the Deferral Option to succeed:

1. The interim restraint on our SLCMs should be symmetrically balanced with Backfire restraint. That is to say, no acceleration in Backfire deployment over the specified current rate (i.e., two per month) versus no acceleration in our SLCM program...
(i.e. no deployment of SLCMs until late 1979 or early 1980—the current IOC). Higher Backfire figures or a longer delay in SLCM deployment would make the deal asymmetric.

2. We must avoid any obligation beyond the interim period to ban or limit SLCM deployments over 600 Km. Otherwise, our bargaining leverage for future arms control in these grey areas would be lost. That is to say, we must avoid creating a negotiating history on SLCM limits that would be hard to reverse later on.

3. The ban on ALCMs above 600 Km on aircraft other than heavy bombers might become a one-sided provision because of its unverifiability. Limiting the provision to nuclear armed ALCMs—which was my understanding of the consensus at yesterday’s meeting—will help to keep this a less unbalanced provision. In addition, we should make the 600 Km limits subject to review (e.g. at the end of the interim period), to be continued only if verifiable.

With these provisions, I regard this option as one we can defend successfully and thus complete the accomplishment of Vladivostok.

Fred C. Ikle
P. Jay and I are going up to talk about decision tomorrow. It will be decided by this evening. It is a difficult matter, we think, and a matter of longer-term strategy for our allies. We think the best way forward is in the security agreement, which we think is in their interest. For other CMS, it is better to align with us in that. For other CMS, it is better to align with us. We are not sure it is a sustainable way.

Don is in agreement, and I will take advantage of this option. I think it is best to make a decision. I don't think it is much change.

I. We should want to get into competition on CMS. I think it is not in everyone's interest. It's a couple of win-win situations. I am still not sure.

K. Show has a couple of points to make.