MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Friday, February 13, 1976
11:20 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

Decisions on Moscow Signal

There is some merit in the claim that some of the radiation is caused by
us, so we are turning off our equipment. In response, we expect them to
turn off their radiation. In addition, we expect action to reduce the radia­
tion emanating from their installations in the U.S.

Kissinger: I have just glanced at Don's memo. I see the differences as
being: he wants a general statement on the grey areas. I think that is a
mistake. He also wants to conclude the deferred negotiation by October
1977. I think that is not possible. I would like to work it like SALT I
-- a permanent agreement on ABM and the Interim Agreement on offen­
sive weapons.

I would propose deferral to October 1981. We would say no increase in
Backfire production and would defer deployment of cruise missiles. I
have no objection to beginning the negotiations right away.

We and they have to decide what to do about detente. Are we going to be
restrained in third areas and settle this? If so, you would tell him there
are no bargaining issues in this.

Brent Scowcroft
The President: I think we should go with a date which is about when we are ready for deployment -- but I wouldn't sell it that way.

Kissinger: Yes. I would say that eight years are too long because we don't know what will happen on cruise missiles, just as they don't. But we are willing to try four years, which represents a unilateral restraint on us.

The President: We shouldn't set a date before we would be ready to break out if need be.

Rumsfeld: I think we really need to face up to the grey area problem.

Kissinger: I agree on the substance, but I just wouldn't face up to it now. I am afraid if we discuss all grey area systems, they will bring up FBS and the British and French nuclear systems.

Rumsfeld: I agree with that, so we don't disagree. Ultimately, though, we have to deal with systems which are peripheral and central.

We would describe the protocol as dealing with systems which are difficult and which are different in character.

Kissinger: That is a constructive way to do it. But we have to realize that for the Soviet Union, putting Backfire into any negotiation will be a massive problem.

You can say, though that they can claim it's a refinement of the Vladivostok Agreement -- because SLCM's clearly aren't in that Agreement.

Our negotiating position by 1980-81 should be strong -- they can't do much to accelerate Backfire and we can break out on cruise missiles.

The President: Let's start with 1980, but let me see the deployment data.


SALT

I have just returned from Darmstadt. I seek
a Darmstadt solution. I want a good solution
in any case. I think that a mistake.

I also want a launch by early August.
I think that not possible. I would like
not to make it like SALT. I think agreement
without agreement.

I must figure to launch by Aug 5th. We
would say no. I mean before election.

We are prepared to live or die. I mean that
to say we may fight away.

[Handwritten note with DECLASSIFIED stamp]
P. I think we should go up a little which is
what we have, not really big upcost -
but I wasn't sure if that was
R. Yes, I wouldn't say that I get too hyped because
we don't know what will happen in this-
just as they don't, but one thing, which
regards to a weekend activity for us
P. Can someone sit down before we would be
ready to check out if need be
R. I think we really need to find up the preb and
fatten.
P. Do you think we should just find up the preb and
and maybe
R. Do you mean... what I just mentioned
feather. It now I feel if we choose all
people now systems they will bring up the
for more systems
P. You can call that, so we don't get laced up.
Ultimately the we have all analog systems which
are problematic central.
We can't describe just the behavior of systems
or made are different which are different in nature.
R. That's a constructive way to do it. But we have to
realize that for SDL, finding the defects is
any unexpected in a seamless part.
You can say that they can claim
a difference of 1.2% - cause SDL is clearly
and it installed.

Our way at present by 80% would be
always. They won't be much advantage
the defect we can best correct this
I held staff 2/30, but let me see.m ethnique

We trust what we (written out Company

Annel's answer: 500)

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