

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to  
the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Friday, February 6, 1976  
9:25 - 10:16 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

Kissinger: [on the Chinese announcement of the Nixon visit:] It showed my instincts were right, but I am out of training-- my timing was wrong.

President: He called and talked first about several other topics.

Kissinger: It is a third-rate thing to do but I think we should not show pique. State will play it that way. I talked with Brent about what to say to Nixon.

President: I'm glad his health was such that he could go. Since he would see physical as well as personnel changes.

Kissinger: I met with the Harlow group yesterday. They thought Reagan may come after foreign policy and say you don't pay enough attention to China. That from a guy I had to hold hands with for months before the China opening! You might want to talk with Harlow. They think our mistake is when we are attacked on foreign policy the White House is defensive and guts half of the changes.

President: Stu Spencer sent me a note that Reagan is starting to criticize foreign policy. He said we gave away ABM. They think I should focus on foreign policy at the University of New Hampshire.

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CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (B) 3  
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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/20/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review of 11/04  
BY John NARA. DATE 6/19/04

Kissinger: I think you should be positive.

President: I plan to be. Your San Francisco speech was great and I plan to use part of it.

I want to talk about SALT. I am completely dedicated to a SALT agreement. I am upset with Fred Ikle. He wandered all over the place the other day and I couldn't figure it out. Can I have it in writing?

Kissinger: They think you and I will make an agreement, so they are making their positions and having a free ride.

President: I don't think I can just have an NSC meeting and make my decision. That is not enough ground work. I want to get Don [Rumsfeld] and George Brown in privately and tell them they must do a little more each time. They haven't figured out what a mess we will be in without an agreement.

[Discussion of cruise missiles and nuclear vs. conventional]

Kissinger: I believe you should get these groups to come up with one option you can support. If we have four options and you choose mine, the stories will be out that you overrode the military.

President: I want to see what we could lose from SALT I and loss of the prohibited items in SALT II if it fails.

Scowcroft: I think Henry is right. They think you will be the responsible one so they can have a full inch and demagogue.

President: What if I said I had given up and have them go back to draw up what to do now?

Kissinger: That's not bad. Brent, what do you think?

Scowcroft: I hadn't thought of that. What I would do is make them put in writing that they do not want a SALT agreement if it contains blank, whatever the sticking point is.


President: I like that concept.

Kissinger: On Angola, I think we should keep the pressure on and make clear if there is anything else, with Cuba, for example, we should go after Cuba. I think the public is beginning to understand and support us.

President: I agree. I think we are winning. Can we do anything but words on Angola?

Kissinger: I think it is gone. But I wouldn't publicly state that we wouldn't ask for more. Keep threatening and say we would have succeeded had the Congress not stopped us.

P/R 6 Feb 76



K It showed my instinct was right, but I  
amount of timing - my timing was wrong.

P He called & talked 1st about several other  
topics.

K It is a real rate thing to do but I think we  
should not plan for it. State will play it that way.  
I talked w/ Brent about what to do w/ Nixon.

P He'd like to see how he could go. See  
he would see physical as well as personal  
changes

K I met w/ c Harlowe yesterday. They think  
Reagan may come after FP & say you don't  
pay enough attention to China. That from a guy  
I had to hold hands w/ for months before a  
China giving. You might want to talk w/ Harlowe.  
They think our mistake is when we attacked  
an FP & WH is dependent on parts of a  
change.

P Stu Spence sent me a note that Reagan is  
starting to criticize FP. He said we gave away  
ABM. They think I should promote FP at VJND.

K I think you should be positive.

P I plan to do. From SF special was great & I plan  
to use part of it.

I want to talk about Salt. I am completely  
dedicated to a Salt agreement. I am upset w/  
Hill. He examined all areas & place & other day  
and I couldn't figure it out. Can I show it  
in writing.

K They think you & I will make an agreement



- \* Impact of ~~the~~ loss of chips we pointed so far in Satt II
- \* Send P chart on bill negotiability
- \* Various goals

So they are making their partners & having a full title.

P I don't think I can just have on NSC notes & make my decision. That was my groundwork I want to get Dan & Brown in privately & tell them they want a little more each time. Tony haven't figured out what a mess we will be in w/o an agreement.

(Discussion of Car & me - in conclusion)

- K I believe you should put these groups & course up w/ our options you can support. You have 4 options & you choose mine, & there will be out that you exercise military.
- P I want to see what we could lose from Satt I and loss of a prohibited item in Satt II if it fails.
- S I think R is right. They think you will do a negotiable and they can have a full title & chrysalis. I ~~do~~
- P What if I said I had given up & have them go back to show up what to do now
- K ~~Just had~~ but what do you think
- S I had not thought of that. What I would do is make their partners realize that they ~~can~~ do not want a Satt agreement if it contains ~~the~~ (collaboration & striking point is)
- P I like that concept

→ Don't give pass crew. Try

\* If you don't have salt I, see what he wants  
51 by Fish + 210 by OAT T). We gave up ~~with~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~idea~~  
to get this.

K On Angola, I think we should keep a pressure  
on and make clear if there is anything else,  
w/ Cuba, for example, we should go after Cuba.  
I think a public is beginning to understand  
and support us.

P I agree. I think we are winning. Can we  
do anything but work on Angola?

R I think it is good, but I wouldn't publicly  
state we wouldn't see for more. Keep threatening  
and say we would have succeeded had Cuba  
not stopped us.