MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Fred C. Ikle, Director, U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, January 28, 1976
2:18 - 2:50 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

President: How have you been?

Ikle: Busy, as it should be.

President: We got some encouraging news from Henry's trip, certainly
better than we had before. What do you think?

Ikle: We have analyzed it. I am seriously concerned. We are heading
in a direction which could be disastrous. It could destroy the symmetry
achieved at Vladivostok by eliminating Backfire and restricting cruise
missiles to 370 miles. I think it would severely restrict our future
negotiations on tactical systems. We don't want a Backfire-type bomber.
I don't know whether cruise missiles are good or not, but they are good
for bargaining.

It will have a bad impact on our allies and the Chinese. The Soviets
will have thousands of IRBMs and Backfires and we have no counter-
weight in our allies view.

Then there is the verification issue and its impact on SALT II and
the future.
The Soviets have IRBMs and cruise missiles. How do we handle these?

This is a pessimistic analysis, but there are ways out. We can verify on intercontinental cruise missiles because of their volume, and reassure the Soviets on that point.

On the others, we have to have limitations which are self-balancing. Some of this may require going back on what we have offered in the negotiation. But the Soviets tend to take out the raisins and leave the cake.

President: So do we. These are complex issues. There is one thing which concerns me. What are our alternatives? Will we get the programs through the Congress?

Ike: I don't think we can let Backfire run free with its capability while there are restrictions on systems which are tactical and can hardly hit the USSR.

Scowcroft: You would be in a position then of arguing no SALT agreement, because they wouldn't let cruise missiles run free.

Ike: We could maybe offer not to test or build cruise missiles unless Backfire numbers go above a certain point.

Scowcroft: That is possible.

President: Don't forget what we got which is good -- penetration for B-52s, heavy missile definition, MIRV verification, etc.

Ike: Yes, I think we just have to make sure we don't give up things which we can trade.

President: I keep coming back to the fact of our alternatives and that I think a good SALT agreement is in our interest. You have a full input into the system and we will have an NSC meeting next week. I am intrigued with the idea we could go through research and development on intercontinental cruise missiles to protect our options there.

Ike: That would protect us against a breakout.
P/ Hel 28 Jan 76 3:15 - 3:13 pm

P: How are you doing
I: Busy, see it should be
P: We got some encouraging news from Kowg, certainly better than the Kubas. What about

I: We have some good details. I recently passed

P: A letter in the mail which said they had

I: I could deliver directly to Hid. It would eliminate backfires in the area.

P: Right, we don't want a backfire in the
distance. I don't know whether it's one good

I: It wouldn't be good for the economy

P: It's urgent. I need some advice. Can we

I: You have some documents, I'm sure. I don't

P: This is for me? Well I think we should

I: We can bring in the ICC's - because of

P: Because of what? There's been a difference

I: On others, we have to have a difference

P: I'm not sure if you have - or if we have

I: I had a letter in a letter, but it's too late to talk

P: So it's what? That's not complex. There is

I: Something which concerns me. What are our

P: Alternatives? Well we get a program there

I: Every.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11:4AM, State Dept. Guidelines
By: __________ NARA Date: 4/4/65
I don't think we can let B-52's run free with CE's and restrictions on systems under our control can hardly hit a CE's.

S: I would think in a position of being in a sort of agreement because they would not even use free.

I: We could maybe offer not to build an MIRV under the B-52's go fixed or a certain point.

S: That possible.

P: Don't forget what we got which is good: you can have the B-52's, heavy missiles, MIRV's, counterpart, etc.

I: Yes. I think we just have to make sure we don't give up things even if we can.

P: I have coming back to just a point of our eliminating one that I think a good S： our agreement or in even without.

You know our strategy into a system and you will have and C system which does not just if we did we would go then K'0 can't do that even to put in some strategy.

I: That would protect us against a breakout.