

Ed

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Fred C. Ikle, Director, U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, January 28, 1976
2:18 - 2:50 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

President: How have you been?

Ikle: Busy, as it should be.

President: We got some encouraging news from Henry's trip, certainly better than we had before. What do you think?

Ikle: We have analyzed it. I am seriously concerned. We are heading in a direction which could be disastrous. It could destroy the symmetry achieved at Vladivostok by eliminating Backfire and restricting cruise missiles to 370 miles. I think it would severely restrict our future negotiations on tactical systems. We don't want a Backfire-type bomber. I don't know whether cruise missiles are good or not, but they are good for bargaining.

It will have a bad impact on our allies and the Chinese. The Soviets will have thousands of IRBMs and Backfires and we have no counter-weight in our allies view.

Then there is the verification issue and its impact on SALT II and the future.


SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/8/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, 5/27/94

BY llh, NARA, DATE 6/27/94



CLASSIFIED BY BRENT SCOWCROFT
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1, 3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

The Soviets have IRBMs and cruise missiles. How do we handle these?

This is a pessimistic analysis, but there are ways out. We can verify on intercontinental cruise missiles because of their volume, and reassure the Soviets on that point.

On the others, we have to have limitations which are self-balancing. Some of this may require going back on what we have offered in the negotiation. But the Soviets tend to take out the raisins and leave the cake.

President: So do we. These are complex issues. There is one thing which concerns me. What are our alternatives? Will we get the programs through the Congress?

Ikle: I don't think we can let Backfire run free with its capability while there are restrictions on systems which are tactical and can hardly hit the USSR.

Scowcroft: You would be in a position then of arguing no SALT agreement, because they wouldn't let cruise missiles run free.

Ikle: We could maybe offer not to test or build cruise missiles unless Backfire numbers go above a certain point.

Scowcroft: That is possible.

President: Don't forget what we got which is good -- penetration for B-52s, heavy missile definition, MIRV verification, etc.

Ikle: Yes. I think we just have to make sure we don't give up things which we can trade.

President: I keep coming back to the fact of our alternatives and that I think a good SALT agreement is in our interest. You have a full input into the system and we will have an NSC meeting next week. I am intrigued with the idea we could go through research and development on intercontinental cruise missiles to protect our options there.

Ikle: That would protect us against a breakout.

P/ Dkle ✓

28 Jan 76 2:15 - 2:30 pm

P How have you been

I Busy, as it should be

P We got some encouraging news from the trip, certainly better than we had hoped. What description

I We have analyzed it. I seriously considered + heading in direction which would be transition. It would destroy security or threat of VLS by eliminating Backfire + ~~and~~ extracting CMs to 320 mi. I think it would severely restrict our future input on Tac. systems. We don't want a Backfire hit bomber. Don't know whether ex's are good or not but good for bargaining.

Bad project on our allies + PC. Suss will have 1000's of ICBM's + Backfires + we have no counterweight in our allies' arsenals.

Then there is a computer issue + its impact on SWT II + future.

Suss have ICBM's & CM's. How do we handle these?

This is pessimistic analysis, but there are ways out. We can verify in ICBM's - because of orbit, + measure Suss on that point.

On others, we know to have limitations which are self balancing. Some of this may require going back on what we have offered in a report, but a Suss tend to take out a course + have a call.

P So do we. These are complex issues. There is one thing which concerns me. What are our alternatives? Will we get a program through Congress.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY ld NARA DATE 4/7/04



I I don't think we can let Barksdale run free w/ its cap. while there are restrictions on systems which are ~~tactical~~ ^{tactical (per Barks)} can hardly hit the USSR.

S You would be in a position then of arguing no Salt agreement because they wouldn't let ~~the~~ CN's run free

I We could maybe offer not to test or build CN's unless Barksdale #'s go ~~to~~ above a certain point.

S That possible

P Don't forget what we got which is good - penetration for B-52's, heavy missile def, MIRV competition, etc.

I Yes. I think we just have to make sure we don't give up things which we can trade.

P I keep coming back to just ~~that~~ of our alternatives and that I think a good Salt agreement is in our interest. You have ~~cert~~ ^{full} right into a system and we will have an ~~SC~~ ^{SC} ~~upt~~ ^{upt} work done ~~integrated~~ w/ ~~idea~~ ^{idea} we could go there R+D ~~on~~ ^{at} ICCM to protect our options there.

I That would protect us against a breakout.

