MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs

TIME AND DATE: Tuesday, January 27, 1976
9:25 - 10:15 a.m.

PLACE: Oval Office

[Discussion of Angola letter to Speaker of the House.]

[Discussion of Marianias vote and call to Stennis.]  

[Discussion on holding arrival ceremony for Rabin outside in rainy weather.]

Kissinger: We had that veto in the UN of the Middle East resolution. We

did the right thing.

President: The interesting thing is that they barely had enough votes.

Kissinger: That’s right.

President: [Calls Stennis]

He is leaning against but will do what he can. His problem is

Puerto Rico before World War II voted the wrong way at the national
political convention!

Kissinger: Lew Wasserman said the only one who could beat you was

Kennedy. He said how you should use spots and saturate the media for
three days. He is concerned about the Jews. He says the present course
in Israel will lead to massive anti-Semitism here and the power of the
institutional Jews must be broken.
I had a session with Harlow and Timmons and Korologos about my problems on the Hill and what to do about it. They said the number one issue was the perception that we are not together. It is contradictory -- on substance we are together but I may be too dominant, but on selling we aren't together.

President: That is a curious thing. I...

Kissinger: You might want to talk to Harlow, for what it's worth.

President: I will -- this week. We ought to do whatever we can. Golly -- you and Betty are the most popular in the country. I am lagging behind.

Kissinger: Did you see the Evans and Novak article that Rumsfeld is joining Simon on Iranian oil?

[Some discussion.]

On Rabin -- it is a delicate situation. We stuck with them on the veto but we are running out.

The Israelis blocked any possibility of progress with Jordan program and that led to Rabat. They have blocked any progress with Syria and so Syria is turning to the PLO. Israel can't just continue to stall. They say they want to talk to Hussein but they have been doing it for eight years. Talking to him won't help unless they give him a major proposal.

If they were a big government they would make a big offer -- retreat a few miles from the border on all the fronts in exchange for non-belligerency. You could sell this one on a Middle East trip -- if you still plan one.

President: I definitely do, depending on the primaries. Should we agree to Geneva without knowing what Israel will do?

Kissinger: They are totally cynical on Geneva. They're for it because they know nothing will happen. The first item of business will be the PLO and they'll bring about an immediate stalemate.

[Discussion of the Moynihan meeting.]

I wouldn't mention the settlements except maybe at dinner.
I would tell him if there is a war we will use it for making a final settlement.

[Discussion of military equipment.]

I think you have to tell him we have to move and just talking to Jordan won't do it.

He wants a tour d'horizon today. I would listen and I'll take him on at breakfast tomorrow if there is to be a blow-up, and then you can reinforce it at tomorrow's meeting. I would be very firm with him that he can't continue this kind of relationship and that you won't play electoral politics with foreign policy.

President: I notice Jordan is going to the Soviets to buy helicopters. What the Congress is doing to us.... The mess we had on HAWK missiles.
Jan 27th, 1976

Interesting thing that they barely had enough

K: That right.

P: (calls Stefan)

The tension against that will be exerted because The first is that substantially less or will retard any

way at which that... summarize.

K: Here Amasr... will only be increased

and you... Kennedy. He said... you-

would not expect (written Feb 3 days). The

removal that... will lead to... summary. The power of institutional Jews

must be broken.

I had a discussion with Harold Synopsis, etc., about

my paper on Still & want to do about it. They

think... you never come so... that we

meet together. It is... so basic. We

are together not to... to do... to

sell... we want together.

P: That is a curious thing.

K: You might want to talk to Harold about it.

P: I... with him. We ought to... together.

K: But... you... but the... in country. Iran buy... behind.

P: Will you see E & K on Randolph going down on Iran oil?

(Some discussion)

On Ronin: It is... but... We speak of

them as... but...
The I informed Jordan prop. & told & Robert Lay about the "deal" from which Jordan got 70% of his 78% & & Bids me try to sell. They say try & say to sell but try to sell to Dornin & try to sell it for $500. I cannot & have to kiss. They say try & say to sell to Dornin & try to sell it for $500 or to a major syndicate. If they come a little wind they would make a big offer - without a few months form taking them. Exchange for more telling. I don't tell who we are or why if you still plan.

P. I don't know what I said.

Q. They are totally against me & me. (Explain why they are against me)

R. (Description of Jordanian meeting)

I went that meeting & mentioned a lot of my ideas.

S. I don't tell him if there is a way we will use it for something & find settlement.

T. (Description of wind & grip)

U. Think you have to talk him the same thing and just telling Jordan won't do it.

V. We need two or three of us to bring Jordan. Jordan's better if you'll talk him on at breakfast of these & be a bit later & you can replace at night. I would be in favor of him that he can't continue this kind of relation that you can't play allowed parties of foreign policy.

P. I write Jordan very B.S.U. for help. What a long way doing 0. You are Sick as a funk with words.