

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford  
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: January 8, 1976

PLACE: The Oval Office

Kissinger: We have had a message from the Soviets which is mildly encouraging. [Hands message to the President.]

The President: What does it really mean?

Kissinger: Our position is basically hopeless in Angola. We have done miraculously at the OAU at Addis Ababa, considering we have nothing to offer compared to the Soviet Union.

The President: I would say we are doing pretty well.

Kissinger: It is unbelievable that Diggs would go there and attack us that way -- when his specific proposal is in fact ours.

The President: He is a lightweight and listens to the wrong people.

Kissinger: What could this mean. . . . We will ask them: Are we correct that if we remove the South Africans, they will move with us to eliminate all foreign presence?

The President: How long would that take?

Kissinger: It also raises the question of my trip.

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NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 3/11/04  
BY                     , NARA DATE 6/4/04



The President: You have negotiated under adverse criticism before. I think you should go. If you don't, SALT II is probably down the drain and we may lose attempts at solving Angola.

Kissinger: Reagan may come after you. I am being accused of being too tough on the Soviet Union and too soft at the same time.

Moynihan is a disaster. His opening comments at the Security Council debate would have been disastrous. [He described the comments.]

The President: The arguments against your going are political and those for your going are substantive, and I think we should go with substance.

Kissinger: I think you should decide on SALT and make a decision at the NSC meeting tomorrow.

The President: I think Option III is what we should really work from. But I want to get as much support from Defense as possible. I have been thinking if you could get something between III and IV to give Dobrynin.... Obviously they won't buy it, but then you could go there and put Option III on the table.

Kissinger: They will accept everything except surface ships and counting Backfire. We have given them some options on Backfire -- like counting all the ones they build after the date of a treaty -- and they have rejected them.

The President: I would like to get Defense off our back.

Kissinger: We won't get Option III easily. I can't go to Moscow without the full support of Defense. They must be told that. [There is discussion of how to deal with Backfire, etc.]

The President: How would you deal with it?

Kissinger: I could tell Dobrynin this is as far as we can go now, but I would have flexibility in Moscow. [There is more discussion about counting surface ships, Backfire, etc.]

Scowcroft: If you start with Option III, I am convinced you will have leaks that the JCS was overruled.



Kissinger: But if we go with Option IV, I will be accused of not negotiating hard enough for Option IV. But we can go with counting Backfire after 1977, and count cruise missiles on surface ships as MIRV's. If that fails, go to Option III, with a separate protocol on Backfire and surface ships, with a reduction to 2,300 for five years or an eight-year agreement with higher numbers.

The President: This at least gives you the argument that we tried a preferred position.

Kissinger: It is a two-edged sword -- they could also claim we shouldn't have fallen off.

The President: Let's go that way. Give me a paper for the NSC tomorrow.

Kissinger: I have some personnel issues.

Ingersoll is leaving. I also need to get rid of McCloskey. I was thinking of Rogers. The problem is he is a Democrat and supported McGovern. But he is turned off on the Democrats now. He would do a superb job.

I am thinking of sending Sisco to Moscow. He is putting too much light between him and me. I would put Habib in there. If Sisco insists on staying, I guess I would have to keep him, but I would try to make Moscow attractive. But Rogers has really done great at the Latin American Bureau. What do you think, Brent?

Scowcroft: I disagree with him philosophically. Robinson is outstanding, but I agree he would be tough to replace.

President: Politically it would be better to wait until after the Florida primary. I agree with Brent that Robinson is great, but then I don't know Rogers well.

Kissinger: I would like to think about all these a bit before we move.

President: What would you do to replace McCloskey?

Kissinger: I was thinking of Abshire.

President: Good idea.

Scowcroft: He might do it. He is hinting for a job.



Kissinger: We have to move on the PRC.

President: I have talked to Scott. He wants it. I am worried about the Gulf deal, but he says he is clear.

Kissinger: It doesn't need confirming. Why don't I talk to him? He would be a great appointment. We have to do something about Graham Martin. Helms will have to leave.

President: That is a damned outrage. I read about it.



Get Delby ready.  
Talk to SA - tell  
them what going on.

PIR

Jan 26

Ramos Amador

- Archive - Indge  
SOTU  
- Affairs

(January - Day before NSC mtg  
(Maybe 8 Jan?))

R We have had a msg from Sors which is  
initially encouraging. (Hamb to P).

P What does it really mean?

R Our position is basically hopeless in Angola. We  
have done miraculously at Addis, considering we  
have nothing to offer compared to the SC.

P I would say we doing pretty well.

R It is unbelievable that Diggs would go there + attack  
us that way - when his specific proposal is in fact  
awful.

P He is a lightning bolt + listens to a whole wrong  
people.

R What this could mean - we will say <sup>we</sup> for me  
correct, if we remove SA, they will work w/ us  
to eliminate all foreign presence

P How long would that take?

R It also raises question of my trip

P You have not got under adverse circumstances before.  
I think you should go. If you don't, Salt II is  
prob down a drain + we may lose attempts  
at solving Angola.

R Reagan may come after you. I am being accused  
of being too tough on SC in Angola + too soft at same  
time. Unimaginable is a disaster. His going comments  
at SC debate would have been disastrous. (Disaster)

P The arguments against you going are political  
and those for you going are substantive and I think  
we should go ~~to~~ w/ substance.

R I think you should decide on Salt + make  
decision at NSC tomorrow

P I think Option III is what we should really  
work from. But I want to get as much support  
from Del as possible. I been thinking if you

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could get something bet III & IV to give Def.  
Obviously they want buy it but then you could  
go there & put III on a table.

K They will accept everything except surface  
ships & counting Backfire. We have given  
them some options on Backfire - like counting  
after date of treaty - & they have rejected them.

P I would like to get Def. off our back.

K We won't get III easily. I can't go to Moscow  
w/o full support of Def. They must be told that.  
(Discussion of how to deal w/ Backfire) etc.

P How would you deal w/ it?

K I could tell Def. this is as far as we can  
go now, but I would have flex. in Moscow.  
(True discussion about counting surface ships  
Backfire, etc)

S If you start w/ III, I assumed you would have  
led to a JCS was overridable

K But if we go w/ IV, I will be accused of not  
negot hard enough for IV.

But we can go w/ counting Backfire after 21,  
& count surface ships as MIRV. If that fails  
go to III w/ separate protocol on Backfire  
& SS w/ reduction to 2300 for 5 yrs, or 8 yr  
agreement w/ higher #s

P Thus at least give your argument that we tried  
a preferred path

K It's a 2 edged sword - they could also claim we  
shouldn't have fallen off

P Lets go that way. Give me a paper for NSC  
Tomorrow.

K I have some personal issues. Ingersoll is  
leaving. I need to get rid of W. Clatsky &



David Switzer - if one of Locky goes to

Switzer, or how to find a place for him -

Green Building - agent?

Thinking of Rogers. But is he is a Dinos + suggested  
Mr. Green. But he is turned off on a Dinos now.

He would do a very good job.

I thinking of Sisca's Museum. He putting too much  
light bet him + me. I would put that Habick  
there. If Sisca insists on staying, I guess I would  
have to help him, but I would try to make Museum  
attractive.

But Rogers has really done great at L.A. Museum.  
What do you think, Bert?

S I disagree w/ him philosophically. Robinson is  
outstanding, but I agree he would be tough to  
replace.

P Politically it would be better to wait til after  
Florida primary. I agree w/ Bert Robinson is  
great, but then I don't know Rogers well.

K I would like to think about all those a bit before we  
move.

P ~~How~~ What would you do to replace Mr. Locky

K I was thinking of Abshire

P Good idea.

S He might do it. He is hunting for a job.

K We have to move on PRC

P I have talked to Scott. He wants it. We need about  
a half deal, but say he clear

K Doesn't need convincing. Why don't I talk to him  
would be great appointment

We have to be saying about ~~Abshire~~ Graham  
within. He must will have to leave.

P That is a damned outrage. I read about it.

