

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8

MR 01-101, #20, OSD, 3/2/04, SA, 11/27/01

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

del NARA Date 7/19/04

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, January 8, 1976
9:23 - 10:30 a. m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

The President: I read and reread the papers on the Iranian oil deal. Don't we have authority under the new energy bill to buy the oil?

Scowcroft: Yes, we do. But there is a philosophical objection to doing that.

The President: My inclination is favorable, but I want to talk to Zarb. I will see him at 3:00.

[Some discussion of storage versus auction.]

Henry, where do we stand?

Kissinger: I asked Dobrynin for a delay in my trip by a few days. He thought it would be impossible, but he is checking. But there is another question -- could I go with this uproar on Angola? The conservative will scream that we are protesting Angola and still toady up to them. If I don't go, the liberals will scream that we are jeopardizing everything for Angola when we shouldn't be there in the first place.

The OAU meeting probably won't be decisive, unless it is negative.

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~~SECRET~~ - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

Rumsfeld: Henry has a good point. It is not just the seeming contradiction between our concern on Angola and going to the Soviet Union. There are so many people who will say what the hell is going on.

Kissinger: If I didn't go, I would have to say that under these conditions it would create the wrong impressions, that we want SALT and will submit our proposals at Geneva and continue working with the Soviet Union. My people think that if we postpone again now we won't get SALT this year.

Rumsfeld: I don't think we should assume we couldn't get a deal later.

The President: My feeling is SALT II is in the best interests of the United States and the world. Second, I have the feeling that if we don't continue to move constructively, we won't get one in 1976. Won't your cancellation preclude us moving in a constructive way? What else could we do?

Kissinger: A cancellation wouldn't really calm the conservatives until Reagan was disposed of. The liberals will scream that we are paying for Angola twice, but they may pressure you to negotiate SALT.

Rumsfeld: That is not bad.

[Discussion of timing, Congressional ratification, etc. Kissinger argued against Option IV, unless put in Geneva. Rumsfeld said the JCS aren't in concrete and we should discuss the essence of the difference between III and IV.]

Rumsfeld: Both for your decision making process you should see the essence of the difference between III and IV. George Brown's judgment is to present IV, then go with G or pieces of III, then let you decide on a fallback.

The President: [Discussed procedure at the NSC meeting]. I would like a military assessment of the difference between these options and no agreement.

Kissinger: Jim [Schlesinger] was really willing at the last NSC meeting to let Backfire run free.

I think on the negotiation we should look at the best reasonable outcome. If you start with Backfire, since they have said a million times they wouldn't do it, they know there must be a fallback.



✓ P/K/R

9:23 - 10:30

8 Jan 76 ✓

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P I read & reread a Truman oil deal. Don't we have authority under energy bill to buy

S. Yes, But there is a photo. objection to that.

P. My inclination is favorable but I want to talk to Zerk. I will see him at 3:00

(Some lesson of storage vs auction)

Henry

K I asked Deby for a blog. He's that impossible but he's checking. But there is another question - should I go w/ this exposure on Angola? The Conservatives will scream and protesting Angola & still work up to them. If I don't, a Liberal will scream and propagandize everything for Angola when we shouldn't be there in 1st place.

OAU mtg probably won't be decisive, unless it is my other

R K has a good point. It's not just ^{summing} a contra bet. Some concern on Angola & going to a S.U. There are so many people who will say what's hell ~~is going on~~ is going on.

K If I didn't I would have to say under these conditions it would create a wrong impression, that we want Salt & will submit our proposals at Geneva & continue working w/ S.U.

Any people think if we postpone now we won't

R P I don't think we should assume we wouldn't get a deal later this year.

My feeling is Salt II is in best interests of US & world. 2nd, I have feeling if we don't continue to move constructively, we won't get one in 76. Wait your case prelude is really in a emotive way, what else could we do?

K Casey wouldn't really call on Conservatives - till Reagan dep'd. The liberals will scream and

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MAOI-101, #20, OSD 11, 8/2/04, et ltr 11/2/01

del NARA Date 8/11/04



Global - arguments depending on salt options, where are they?

** Summary of last 2 sessions R + S - parallel to,

paying for Angola twice, but they may pressure you to reject Salt

R That not bad.

* (Discussion of timing, Corg ratification, etc)
(Discussion got over onto Salt options)
(K argued against Option II, unless put in Geneva)

(R said a JCS asset in concrete + we should discuss a essence of a big bet III & IV.

R Both for your decision making process you should see a essence of a big bet III & IV. Brown judgment is to present III, then go w/ G or pieces of III, then let your decision fall back

P (Discuss procedure at mtg). I would like a final assessment of big bet three options + no agreement.

K Give into really nothing at last ~~NSC~~ NSC mtg to let Baphire move forward.

I think on report we should look at a best reasonable outcome. If you start w/ Baphire, since they have said a million times they wouldn't do it, they know there must be a fall back.

