MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:
Thursday, January 8, 1976
9:23 - 10:30 a.m.

PLACE:
The Oval Office
The White House

The President: I read and reread the papers on the Iranian oil deal. Don't we have authority under the new energy bill to buy the oil?

Scowcroft: Yes, we do. But there is a philosophical objection to doing that.

The President: My inclination is favorable, but I want to talk to Zarb. I will see him at 3:00.

[Some discussion of storage versus auction.]

Henry, where do we stand?

Kissinger: I asked Dobrynin for a delay in my trip by a few days. He thought it would be impossible, but he is checking. But there is another question -- could I go with this uproar on Angola? The conservative will scream that we are protesting Angola and still toady up to them. If I don't go, the liberals will scream that we are jeopardizing everything for Angola when we shouldn't be there in the first place.

The OAU meeting probably won't be decisive, unless it is negative.
Rumsfeld: Henry has a good point. It is not just the seeming contradiction between our concern on Angola and going to the Soviet Union. There are so many people who will say what the hell is going on.

Kissinger: If I didn't go, I would have to say that under these conditions it would create the wrong impressions, that we want SALT and will submit our proposals at Geneva and continue working with the Soviet Union. My people think that if we postpone again now we won't get SALT this year.

Rumsfeld: I don't think we should assume we couldn't get a deal later.

The President: My feeling is SALT II is in the best interests of the United States and the world. Second, I have the feeling that if we don't continue to move constructively, we won't get one in 1976. Won't your cancellation preclude us moving in a constructive way? What else could we do?

Kissinger: A cancellation wouldn't really calm the conservatives until Reagan was disposed of. The liberals will scream that we are paying for Angola twice, but they may pressure you to negotiate SALT.

Rumsfeld: That is not bad.

[Discussion of timing, Congressional ratification, etc. Kissinger argued against Option IV, unless put in Geneva. Rumsfeld said the JCS aren't in concrete and we should discuss the essence of the difference between III and IV.]

Rumsfeld: Both for your decision making process you should see the essence of the difference between III and IV. George Brown's judgment is to present IV, then go with G or pieces of III, then let you decide on a fallback.

The President: [Discussed procedure at the NSC meeting]. I would like a military assessment of the difference between these options and no agreement.

Kissinger: Jim [Schlesinger] was really willing at the last NSC meeting to let Backfire run free.

I think on the negotiation we should look at the best reasonable outcome. If you start with Backfire, since they have said a million times they wouldn't do it, they know there must be a fallback.
P: I read & realized a dilemma with the US. But the only authority with the energy & will to try S: Yes, But there is a political reason to that. P: Any combination is feasible but I want to talk to Z & maybe I will see him at 2 p.m. (Some excuse of change in another)

Henry

K: I asked Deputy for a reply. He said something about the checking but there is another action. Shall I go to say from an expert? The Congress will start criticizing anyone & will look up to them. If I don't, it will look up to you. They are going to give the thing for anyone who wants to give it but there is no set plan.

A: No reply yet so I won't be decisive, unless it's my fault.

R: K has a good point. It isn't just in the US. The Congress may question anyone who wants to go & give it away.

K: If I didn't & I would have to pay. Could it be that scenario? Is it a long conversation that we won't be able to make it or am I talking about a continuing everything?

My people think if we postpone we won't be able to make it. We want to set a date. We're looking for 30th July for the meeting & we won't be able to have it. I have feeling if we don't continue & work constructively we won't get anywhere. Don't you agree that we need to be constructive & work in a constructive way? What else will we do?

K: Can't wouldn't really couldn't & can't continue. To be prepared for 30th July for the meeting & continue...
Hybrid-Organism design: good options, what are they?

**Summary of last session: R & S agreed:**

- Paying for service twice, but they may pressure you to repay debt
- R: That isn't fair.

*Discussion of timing, contract specifications:
- R argued against Option IV, unless put in place by
- C: R said: "We can start in concrete & we should choose a scenario if there is a tie between IV & V."
- Both for your decision making process, you should have a scenario if there is a tie between IV & V.
- C: Your judgment is to present IV, then go to:
- R: Or scenario of IV, then let your decision fall on...
- P: Decision process rate on.
- R: I would like a mid-measurement of step but then options in agreement.
- K: Join and really relatively at least the NSC ratio to kickstand from here.

I think in most we should look at a best reasonable outcome. If you start as/ before, since they showed records, multiple times the mistake, did they know that must be a fall back.