MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense

Middle East Ambassadors:
Hermann F. Eilts, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt
Richard W. Murphy, U.S. Ambassador to Syria
Thomas R. Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to Jordan
William G. Porter, U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

DATE AND TIME:
Wednesday, January 7, 1976
10:23 - 10:48 a.m.

PLACE:
The Oval Office

[Kissinger: I have talked with the President and Don about you and Allon. The President saw Allon's remarks on television saying he was coming to undo the mistake that was made. I will tell him our vote was serious and if they continue to talk repudiation, we will lay out the whole history. We will have an NSC meeting next week. All of us here, Mr. President, think it would be a mistake to have a brawl with Israel over a Security Council meeting. They think we can survive a veto next week with the Arabs if we have a program of action. But if we just stonewall, we will have an explosion before the end of the year. I think it is important they hear from you.

The President: We seem to be having one of our periodic crises with our friends, the Israelis. We did our damnedest to work on the Security Council meeting already in progress.]
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[The Ambassadors and Sisco and Atherton joined the Kissinger-Rumsfeld meeting already in progress.]

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The President: We seem to be having one of our periodic crises with our friends, the Israelis. We did our damnest to work on the Security Council

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resolution to make it acceptable and still get UNDOF extended. We worked hard and it burns the hell out of me that Israel takes this action. Condemning us as Allon did is frankly a damned lie, but I won't say that. For them to come here to apply that pressure won't work -- at least on me. We probably will have to veto; is that right?

Kissinger: Most of the draft resolutions are easily vetoable. If the Arabs are smart, though, they could give us one helluva problem by using our own language on the "legitimate interests of the Palestinians." They could be tough to explain to the Arabs, because we have used it in documents with the Soviets.

The President: It is an old legislative problem--whether to get the worst possible language so we can vote against it, or to work for a marginally acceptable one.

Kissinger: The Syrian draft is an easy one to throw up our hands at. We won't participate in any modification of the language, unless it is within reach of being acceptable. I might go up to make the explanatory statement on our vote.

Scowcroft: You may not be here then.

The President: It sounds difficult to lay out a firm scenario now.

Kissinger: We are not looking for trouble with Israel on this issue. The strain and turmoil it would cause wouldn't be worth it. I think the best idea is for us to put forward nothing. If someone does put forward a modest resolution, we can look at it.

But all the Arabs -- especially Egypt -- have asked us to avoid a veto. But I think they'll swallow it if we could show some movement.

The President: Like a unilateral movement of two -to-three kilometers on the Golan.

Kissinger: I think we can get through the year is we go through the process of convening Geneva -- with the preparatory conference and other preparatory work, we could use up the year.

Eilts: Sadat is looking for something which he can point to as progress. He really wants you to come -- he will ask for a date.
The President: [Explained the primary schedule.]

At the UN, if we have to veto it would be better if Henry could make the statement.

Kissinger: Let's see if we can make the vote come either before or after my trip.

The President: [looks at primary schedule]: It looks like April would be the best time.

We will be very firm with the Israelis. That is how we got Sinai II. I think they are trying to exploit the situation in '76.
I have talked to Mr. Don about you & Alvin. I am sorry to hear that. I will talk in our next meeting. I hope they continue to talk together. I am afraid they have not a certain leading - but the meeting could start at any time. They are the ones who have decided to start work. I do not think it will be a match to have a lawyer in the group. They think we can continue on a better week if we have a guy of action. But if we just sit around, we will have no progress this week. I think it is very important for you to come to the meeting. We are very anxious to hear your plans. We did understand the need for a SC meeting, to make it acceptable to the other side but UNAF accepted it without objections. We would have it known to be a bill out of me that I have this action. Fortunately, as excellent deal is finally a done deal, but I must say that. For them to come here to apply that pressure won't work - at least now. We just have to work, as that right.

I think if collaboration are hard to maintain, if we are wound up, they could give us an ultimatum and then put by much easier, then, a veto. They could make it sound less at least hard to maintain. Otherwise, it would be tough to explain to the others, cause we have started to think in another way.

It is very important that we can vote against a bill for an amount of money. Otherwise, it is very easy to change or change our minds. We cannot participate in...
I am not going to make any additional statement from here.

We will look for something for this case. The claim that this would cause isn't worth it. I think it's better to just proceed with it. If someone does feel forced to do it, we can look at it.

But all in all, as you said, we need a rule. And I think they'll understand if we

with them some moment.

It's a much better moment of it is human error.

I think we can get them again. If we get them a process of ensuring that we can have a jury. If we can have a process which we can point to a jury, he really wants to know to range—be will vote for a date.

(Explained both process.)

At VK, if we have to vote it would be better if we could make a statement.

But the idea is even more like a letter before or after this trip.

(About giving a letter) doesn't like April would be a last time.

We would be very from W.I. That is, some and get from. I think they are trying to explain that on 76.