MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

PRESIDENT FORD
Republican Congressional Leadership
[List of Participants attached.]
Secretary of State Kissinger
Secretary of the Treasury Simon
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President

DATE AND TIME:

Wednesday, December 10, 1975
8:00 - 9:30 a.m.

PLACE:

Cabinet Room

SUBJECT:

The President's Trip to China, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

The President: I went to China because I felt it was important to build on the relationship that was started in 1972 and that was advanced by Congressional visits, among other things.

I found Mao Tse-tung much stronger than I expected. I expected mental acuity but not physical vitality. I was impressed by Teng's mental vigor.

I was surprised by the vigor of their anti-Sovietism. They encourage us to oppose Soviet advances anywhere -- in the Middle East, in Africa. They strongly oppose the Soviet Union in every area. There are many areas we got into where we don't agree. But it was an extremely worthwhile visit -- with the Mao meeting, three meetings with Teng and three dinners.

We went next to Indonesia. It was important to go there in the aftermath of Vietnam to show we were still an Asian power. I was impressed with Suharto who is trying to keep the country together and maintain a viable government and uphold the cause of anti-communism there.

I was extremely impressed with President Marcos. We discussed two major areas: revision of base rights and the economic situation. They did suffer some with the Trade Bill. They are excellent allies. He did do some things...
that are not the most democratic but the country is stronger as a result.
We can count on his strength in the area.

I went to Alaska on the way out. The Pipeline is a tremendously impressive project.

Henry, do you want to add something?

Kissinger: I can't add a great deal to what you have said, Mr. President. The newspapers have a tendency to ask what specific advances were made in China. But that is the wrong question. Necessity has brought us together. If five years ago, someone had said an American Secretary of State could say on Chinese soil that our relations are good and improving and we are pursuing parallel policies around the world, we would have thought him crazy. Of course this was done with the Chinese blessing. It wasn't in a communiqué.

They are cold-blooded pragmatists and this is a marriage of convenience. Their comments about European Communist parties were uniformly anti-Soviet.

The press keeps asking about Taiwan. This is not the major issue in our relations. As they said, the major issue for us is the international situation.

They are one of our best NATO allies. In fact, our relations with them are better than with some of our allies. They have told the Japanese they want their relations with us to be at the top of their Japanese priority.

Their tough toast is standard fare -- they gave the same toast for Schmidt and Sauvagnargues as well. Let's face it -- for them a tough anti-detente America solves all their problems for them. What is best for us is better relations with each than they have with each other.

What they want is for us to maintain the international equilibrium. All we have to fear is if they decide our internal weakness prevents our acting with strength; then they will turn on us.

Indochina and the Philippines are the pillar of ASEAN. They are vital for us as we manage a shift from an Indochinese policy to a broader-based Asian policy. It can only be done at the Presidential level. These two countries have strong central authority.

And in China, only the President can convey the necessary impressions and the dialogue necessary with this great power. It was important for the Chinese "Central Kingdom" syndrome for us to go to Southeast Asia so they don't see us as going just there and home -- that we have other important interests in the area.
Senator Griffin: What about Chou En-lai? Is he still there? And what about Korea? What is their view?

Kissinger: Chou has dropped out of sight. He is never referred to, and Teng is obviously referred to as the central authority. They did trot out Madame Chou to greet the President, as a gesture of the importance of the visit. Also Madame Mao.

On Korea. They were badly burned in Indochina and I think they have no great interest in a unified Korea on their northern border. They didn't stress Korea. They just said their position was clear, but they will certainly urge restraint.

Senator Young: How about Taiwan?

Kissinger: We will be reducing our military strength there to housekeeping and intelligence. In Thailand, we are doing our best to support them. Interestingly enough, the Chinese are telling the Thai to leave our bases alone, and they are trying to build in Cambodia and Laos to contain Hanoi and the Soviet Union. We needn't get involved in that balancing competition there, but we should facilitate it with Thailand.

Rhodes: How about the Brezhnev speech in Warsaw?

Kissinger: I have only just seen the press reports. I would prefer not to comment off the cuff.

Cedarberg: Why didn't your Hawaii speech get better coverage? It was great.

The President: I don't know. Maybe the press was just too tired by that point. Those last three days were maybe too much -- not for us but for the press.

[The discussion then turned to the Tax Bill]
PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Administrator of FCA

HOUSE
John Rhodes
Bob Michel
Sam Devine
Jack Edwards
Barber Conable
Lou Frey
Jimmy Quillen
Guy Vander Jagt
Al Cederberg
Bill Broomfield
Herm Schneebeli
Bud Brown

SENATE
Hugh Scott
Bob Griffin
Carl Curtis
Bob Stafford
John Tower
Ted Stevens
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Phil Buchen
Max Friedersdorf
Bill Baroody
Jim Cannon
Jim Lynn
Alan Greenspan
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Saidman
Vern Loen
Bill Rendall
Bill Greener
Pat O'Donnell
Charles Leppert
Tom Loefller
Bob Wolthus
Russ Rourke

SECRET
M.C. John Anderson - out of town
President Johnson's letter
10 Dec 65

P. I want to China immense felt important to build on relationship started in 72 &
...the 24...er...stagnant than I expected...er...depressed a unity but not physical. I
same was impressed by F.B.I. spiritual unity...Jesu personality of their anti-
Americanism. They are very...a...oppose our absence every where...inadequate...et...are
only aware of...get in to Chinese at least agree...with...It was extremely
unpredictable...with this...I was...is of F.B.I. 3...not like...to...we...not to
Fight...to...try to...try to keep a country together...ruin/will fail with instead put...will
not mean that...They did try to...these are...they do...not...are...will...something to
Philosophy but...unity as there amongs...well...to...in a...would...there is that...carefully...This

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY for release is HIN
BY NLF, DATE 11/1/66
They are our friends but not a part of our relations. We are just speaking our opinions. They have a few. They want their relations with us as a type of their identity.

Their tough time is getting past. They want to be involved. The U.S. needs all their support. It's a tough and difficult time. U.S. wants all their support. What is best for us is different. There is a list of each item they have with each other.

What they want is for us to understand their situation. All we have to fear is if they change our relations with others. Understand that we are eating off of them. Then they will turn on us.

Jan 11. We had a picket of Odem. They attacked me. I left them. I walked away. They continued. This is how the law is. It can end with one. They have continued to walk. It's hard. I have been thinking about it. I have been thinking about it. This is just for the future. It was important for them to continue being great because they had to go to San Antonio. This is why they went. They went on Friday. They went to San Antonio.
Griffin: What about Ghana and Korea?

K. Ghana has changed of late. We do not
require a cover to cover its apparent lack of
independence. If they did not have
Ghana to justify a base as a gesture of
importance they would have none.
In Korea, they were luckily buried in type.
Choosing them because we thought without any
favorable base in their western borders. They
didn't fit our criteria, but their position was
clue, but they would certainly impress someone
here about Taiwan.

K. We would try to maintain our
strength there,
to Ionian and Thailand, as we
are doing our best to support them. Interestingly,
we would be doing that now. They
are trying to build in Cambodia has to
Consign mean in S.W. We couldn't get involved
in that because everything there, but we
shall facilitate it by weakening it.

Hope to hear back in Warren.
It's been quite clear from press reports, I would
put you in the company of a few.

Saddening why didn't your Hawaii speech get better range before
I didn't know anyone from you went to bed by
that point. The last day was thought to end;
not far, but far past

(Deception Island to Falkland)