MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Secretary of State Kissinger
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Friday, November 21, 1975
9:30 a.m.

PLACE: Oval Office

The President: The UN took the vote just on behalf of the Greek Cypriots. What does that do?

Kissinger: It makes it tougher. I talked to Denktash. They don't trust Makarios. Wayne Hays ought to do us some good.

The President: The Christian Science Monitor says Makarios is the problem.

Kissinger: We will get the Mao books over here today. I would read it for atmosphere, not specifics. The atmosphere for the advance is very good.

We have stared them down. What they respect is firmness.

There is a difference between me and my people. They believe we should make some progress on Taiwan. I am having the scope paper on that redone.

The President: That is right. We aren't in a position to do anything this time.

Kissinger: We had an effusive reply from Brezhnev -- only three days after we sent our letter.

The President: That is very forth coming -- damned good.

Kissinger: I think we should get another Vladivostok agreement on cruise missiles and Backfire. Then we could work out an agreement and Brezhnev could come by April. That would keep the Middle East quite. We need to have an NSC meeting, or maybe a principals-only Verification Panel meeting.
The President: I would have Clements attend also, not just Rumsfeld.

Kissinger: If we get the total reduced to 2300, it would take the Soviets out of cruise missiles. We would be permitted 200 on SLCMs as an offset to Backfire. We would count ALCMs over 600 as MIRV and ban them on other than heavy bombers.

They have about 1450 ICBM and about 900 SLBMs. They will be squeezed out of cruise missiles. We would need a side letter from Brezhnev putting a ceiling on Backfire. You don't have to commit yourself now. Brezhnev wouldn't invite me without a willingness to negotiate.

Without Congress, we would have the Soviet--Chinese triangle working again. I think we should tell the Chinese I am going to Moscow. The Soviet angle is what keeps the Chinese under control.

The President: When we hung tough on the Peking visit, it obviously worked.

Kissinger/President: [Discussion of Manila; Tokyo; Hawaii. Mrs. Ford is staying over in Hawaii.]

Kissinger: They want to give a private dinner for you. It would be Teng, Brent, tell Solomon not to hint that it might be Mao. That is physically impossible.

I am meeting with the Church Committee. I hear we want a confrontation. I plan to be tough.

The President: I think you should be very firm. The country is not behind the Committees.

Kissinger: The assassination report looks complete but it is very sloppy and biased.

[Discussion of the Schneider affair]

The President: There is one thing. Marsh is going to talk to Brent. Pike says there is a secret agreement on SALT I. Something about a cable from Alex Johnson.

Kissinger: That must be this same crap about the 70 missiles. All we did is to get Dobrynin to confirm what I had already said in a press conference and in instructions to the bureaucracy.
The other thing was the 54 Titans. We agreed that if we got rid of the Titans we wouldn't replace them with submarines. That was in our defense budget. There are no other secret agreements.

The President: Pike is grasping at straws, now that he is declining.

Kissinger: I will destroy him on this one. We must avoid a contempt action while we are in China.

The President: Gravel was very good on the Law of the Sea the other day.

Scowcroft: He was, and his statistics are more recent than Stephens's -- It negates Stephens's argument that time is running out.

Kissinger: Gravel was terrible on Vietnam, but he has recently been very sound.
The U.N. is built on inchoate Greek concepts, which are not specific. The U.N. is ill-equipped to handle the complexities of modern warfare. We need a clear and decisive plan.

CSM says Make sure in a pile.

We will get a kick out of this. We should read atmosphere, not specifics. The atmosphere is very good. We have to work them down. What they want is firmness. There's a 1/4 of our people. They'd like us to work on their program in Taiwan. A warm, a super pile on that subject.

That is right. We have to do a job to do anything this time.

We need an offensive fight from both only today, otherwise.

I think we should get another U.N. agreement on armistice. Then we can work out an agreement. They could come by last. That would have U.N. support. We need to have an NCC study, maybe a regional only. U.S. might.

I would ask Clements to retell the story just told.

If we get total reliance on 100% world, that does one of our. The problem is in 1962 we are opposed the Both. Can't the C's come on 1962 is more than heavy involvement.
They have about 1,500 D-34s & about 900 SBDs. They will be arranged in sets of 884 SBMs. We would reach closer to them by putting a city in Beaufort. Some don't have to commit any heavy ships. They would not invite me to join them to fight.

I think we should talk it over against.

If they use, we would have a 50-50 chance of winning again. The same angle with the Japanese fleet & TMF under control.

P. When we hear them, they can be holding until it turns dark.

K-P (Discussion of Manchuria, Tokyo, Ammori, Duro, F. Staying here in Hawaii.)

K. They want to have a private dinner for you. I think it would be Thursday. Tell Solomon to let it be then. It might be nice. I'm very much afraid.

J. As you write, I hear all sorts of confusion. I think it's tough.

P. I think you should be very firm. The army is not behind the navy.

K. The army report looks complete but it is very sloppy & brush.

(Disposition of Schneider)

P. There is one thing. Marshall is going to talk to Prime. He says there is a secret agreement on South.

Something about a cable from Allen Johnson.

The meeting is this evening. They are trying to see me. I'm going to 70 miles.

Jeff and I still need to talk. I want to get on a plane with it. I had a few days & in Los Angeles & in New York.
Dear [Name],

Are you in Egypt yet? I heard you said something about leaving around Friday. What's up with that? Did you decide to stay or leave?

I'm glad you're finally here. It's been a long time since we last talked.

The other thing you mentioned was the [Venezuela?]. I forgot about that. We didn't really talk about it then.

That was in our old budget. It's not on our new schedule.

Ps. Don't be too考え方を読むと、私は理解できます。K: I didn't read him on Thursday. It was curt. A: avoid a contingency action while we're in China. Also, they span.

P: Grendel was very good on the 28th. The other day.

S: His way, and the statistics are more useful than Stephens' - it negates Stephens argument that time is running out.

K: Grendel was thick on VN, but it has hardly even been covered.