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REDACTED
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mohammed Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt
Isma'il Fahmy, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs

DATE AND TIME:
Monday, October 27, 1975
12:00 - 12:50 p.m.

PLACE:
The Oval Office
The White House

The President: I am delighted to have you here, Mr. President. I felt that our meetings at Salzburg were personally and substantively the most constructive meetings I have had since I have been President. This is a good opportunity to show our two peoples what our good relations can do. Your visit here I am sure will be an enduring basis for our relations in the future.

President Sadat: I must thank you for the efforts that you made after our meeting at Salzburg. Without these efforts, we could not have achieved this Sinai agreement. I must congratulate you. For the first time, the Israelis hear logic and firmness. It is for the benefit of the Israelis as well as of my [Arab] colleagues -- even if neither of them understand it now. Let me thank you for your help. Henry's tireless efforts have been marvelous. I look forward to when you visit us, Mr. President. Let the whole Arab world see our relationship.

The President: I look forward to it.
President Sadat: As we have agreed in Salzburg, it is a long road ahead of us.

The President: You must work with us on the timing. But I can assure you I will be as firm in the future as I have been in the past. There is no sense in taking a number of little steps when we can take a big step. That agreement was a terrible strain. We might as well take a broader view.

President Sadat: By your efforts you have made it easier for us to take the final step.

[The President explained the American political situation. He discussed the senselessness of the Turkish aid cut-off. He pointed out that NATO is in good shape.]

President Sadat: Giscard, whom I just met in Paris, has severe flu.

For this visit, I have nothing special. But I would like to raise two points: First is economic help. We would hope that you can change our short-term loans into long-term loans. The economic situation in Egypt appears to be in bad shape, but the combination of reopening the Suez Canal and recovering the oil will give us $700 million. We hope to have your help. The other point is armament.

[Dr. Kissinger explained the parliamentary situation in the Congress. The thrust was that no formal sale of arms to Egypt could probably be made until March of 1976.]

President Sadat: The backbone of our air force is the MIG-17. The Russians have said it is now obsolete. The most agreeable plane to us is the F-5E, which the Saudis and Iran have. I would like to request one squadron of these. We would also want the TOW missile.

Dr. Kissinger: You should know that the embargo on arms sales is about to be lifted from Germany.

After the agreement is fulfilled, then we can talk about it.

President Sadat: The Suez is moving along marvelously.
Asad would not get anything from the USSR undermining the agreement.

President Sadat: I do not think that Syria will go to war. They are doing this mostly for domestic reasons to show how tough they are.

Maybe Lebanon is the cause.

The President: What about Lebanon?

President Sadat: I have been reluctant to speak publicly on this because both sides are to blame. The army is weak. The PLO is a state within a state. Saiqa, in the guise of the PLO, is decisive and mischievous. Armaments and money are pouring into Lebanon from all sides. I see no outlet. What do you think, Ismail?

Fahmy: It needs a big mediation.

Dr. Kissinger: By whom?

Fahmy: I have no clear idea.

President Sadat: Maybe the Secretary General of the Arab League. The PLO is a state within a state. Please make sure, Mr. President, that the Israelis do not intervene. Nobody in the Arab world will believe that there is no coordination.

The joint Egyptian-Syrian command no longer exists. The Syrians have not asked Gamasy to replace Marshal Ismail as head of the Joint Command.
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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford
Mohammed Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab
Republic of Egypt
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Ismail Fahmy, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Arab Republic of Egypt

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, October 28, 1975
10:40 - 11:50 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

President Ford: I want to fill the void. The question is how quickly
we can do it. But we will do so.

The next question is how can we work together on a common strategy
for the Middle East?

President Sadat: To start with, the main item is the Palestinians.
They are very greatly influenced by the Soviets. During March, the
Soviets tried to turn the Palestinians. They could at that time be
thwarted. Now the danger is great again. I recommend that the United
States begin a dialogue with Arafat -- openly.

President Ford: Your thought is that we begin unofficial but public talks?
When do you think it should be done?

President Sadat: It should be done after the disengagement agreement
is completed.
FonMin Fahmy: All you hear from the Palestinians is an attempt to get attention.

During the UN you should get in touch with some of them there.

President Sadat: Regarding the Jordanians. King Hussein is a nice man, but the Prime Minister is unreliable. His present course is full of contradictions between Jordan and Syria and the PLO. Hussein will listen to the advice of the United States. Therefore, the U.S. should make clear to Jordan the suicidal nature of that course.

President Ford: Does Asad understand the suicidal nature of that course?

President Sadat: He understands that in a crisis he has no capability and he doubts that he has Soviet support. Syria is trying to arrange a visit of King Husayn to Moscow. Asad is moderate. He wants to be in touch with the United States. Henry should stay in touch with him.

FonMin Fahmy: You must contact the Palestinians informally and split off the Jordanians. Syria is now dealing with Iraq. But that is another house of cards. Syria will not be subordinate to Iraq or vice versa.

President Sadat: There are 15,000 Russians in Syria. If the U.S. can keep in touch with all the parties, it would be a good step.

UNDOF renewal? Asad has already said that he would renew. I believe Israel can destroy Syria in one hour.

President Ford: Why did Asad join?

President Sadat: Because I forced him to do it.

President Ford: Will there be a joint move in Lebanon?

President Sadat: Everybody is too busy to get involved.