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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Saturday, October 25, 1975
9:30 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

Kissinger: If you go to China straight from Anchorage.... The Japanese
want you to stop through Haneda.

The Japanese are beside themselves about the Emperor's trip -- and
yours. There is a magazine of the Emperor's visit and all the copies
are sold out and are collectors' items. I have never seen anything like it.

But to get to Peking by 3:00, you have to leave Anchorage by 9:00. It
makes a terribly long day of it.

President: What do you suggest?

Kissinger: I don't know what, except to postpone the banquet the first
night. I just think it is hard on you.

President: The physical part doesn't bother me. I just think that with
the other changes it doesn't look good. Betty can do it.

Kissinger: Well, we'll ask them to have the banquet end by 9:30 and
start the next day not before 11:00.
President: What is our obligation?

Kissinger: 

President: I think we have to give the material to Levi.

Kissinger: [There was discussion about the Speaker.]

[The Secretary hands the President a summary/analysis of his conversation with Mao.]

President: How is Mao's health?

Kissinger: When you see him you think he is finished; he can hardly articulate. He speaks a few words of English but it is impossible to understand. The interpreter has to guess at the words until he nods -- or he writes out the words. Mao's theme is our weakness. We are the "swallow before the storm." We are ineffectual. What we say is not reliable. He thinks we won't use nuclear weapons in Europe and would suffer another Dunkirk. He says we can no longer stand on Chinese shoulders to reach the Soviet Union. "China must be self-reliant." It is sort of admirable. These are the same people of the Long March.

I said we had a common opponent. He said he likes Schlesinger's view of the Soviet Union better than mine. They wanted Schlesinger to visit. That would drive the Soviet Union wild. But I said we could have military exchanges to see what we could do. He said, "No. After the war starts we will talk, not before the war." They want to do the same as Stalin did in World War II -- be sure that a war starts in the West so both will be exhausted by the time China has to get in.

I guarantee you that if we do go into confrontation with the Soviet Union, they will attack us and the Soviet Union and draw the Third World
around them. Good relations with the Soviet Union are the best for our Chinese relations -- and vice versa. One weakness is the problem -- they see us in trouble with SALT and detente. That plays into their hands. They can't understand the Congress -- what the Congress did on Turkey, Hawk missiles, etc.

I think you can't take any guff from them, and you have to be cooler than Nixon in your toast.

[Discussion of schedule.]

Kissinger: I don't think you should not just go to China. People will say what did you go for? Then they will have you by the balls in terms of making it look worthwhile. The best thing you can do is something in contrast with Nixon: Don't stay long, don't go to another city. Any other city visit, even if it's different from where Nixon went, will look like a repeat to the American people.

When I saw the communique my first reaction was to cancel your trip. Bush's reaction was the same. But when we thought about it, we changed our minds. It would lose us all our leverage with the Soviet Union. It would upset the Japanese. It would give the Chinese a chance to invite all the Democratic candidates over to say you screwed up the Chinese policy.

President: How about adding India?

Kissinger: No. That's too big a shock. Manila and Djakarta is just a jab at them. India and Pakistan would add two days minimum. Manila/Djakarta bolsters our friends, and you'll get a big reception in Manila.

President: I agree. Manila will please the Conservatives. I think you are probably right. Let me think it over just a bit and I'll let you know.

[He hands the President the U. S. draft press statement of the China trip.]

President: It sounds all right. This sentence about peaceful settlement of Taiwan by the Chinese themselves -- this is what we have said before, isn't it?

Kissinger: Yes. The conservatives will like it; the PRC won't like it much.
President: How is George Bush doing?

Kissinger: Magnificently. I am very, very impressed with him. I was not enthusiastic about his appointment, but he has grown into the job and I think he will one day be a considerable national leader. He is a big cut above Moynihan -- who is turning into a disaster. To call Brazil a fascist dictatorship [because of its vote on the anti-Zionism resolution]...

President: When did he do that?

Kissinger: He is going wild about the Israeli issues.

President: I agree with you about George. He is a fine man.

Kissinger: [Reads parts from the analysis of the Mao conversation.]

President: What is going to happen when Mao dies?

Kissinger: There is no way anyone can know that. He is on the verge of becoming a vegetable, but he has the uncanny ability to go right to the heart of things. No small talk, in the sense that everything has meaning.

President: I called Trudeau when I had to cancel. He spoke highly of our efforts for him at the economic summit.

Did you see the options for getting to Paris?

Scowcroft: I did but Henry hasn't.

President: I think the best way is to stop here and change planes.

Kissinger: Whatever is more convenient for you. There's no reason to stop unless you want to.

President: [Reads the schedule]. I want only a small group. No Hartmann or speechwriters.

Kissinger: I will take Sonnenfeldt.

[Some discussion of arrangements].
Kissinger: We should be the dominant people there. The economic people want to be tough. I think we should lead. I think we should rise above the economic details and show that the democracies can master their future.

President: I agree. I told Greenspan I want to be familiar with the economies of all the countries besides ours.

Kissinger: You can come out of this as a great world leader. You should unify the West, rising above the economic bickering.

President: Our economic news this week is far better than we expected.

Kissinger: I am speaking at Pittsburgh on the 12th and will outline what you will be doing.

President: Good idea. We didn't get out in front on the CSCE and it hurt us at first.

Kissinger: The Israelis are giving us a hard time about the Rabin visit. They don't want to come in November. December is bad because it will be just after you get back from China. The next time is the end of January. Let's face it -- they want to push it off until you get into the primaries so you can't squeeze them on Syria. You would get back from your trip about 4:00 a.m. on the 8th. If they come on the 9th or 10th I could stay until noon on the 10th.
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