MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Friday, October 17, 1975
9:30 - 10:47 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

SUBJECTS: China; Middle East; Sadat Visit

Kissinger: Cy Sulzburger would like very much to see you.

The President: Okay. Brent, will you set it up with Ron [Nessen]?

Kissinger: On Law of the Seas, I know what your political problems are, but let me leave a memo with you. Trudeau is under some pressure but has resisted. Others are just waiting to establish territorial seas. If the Soviets say it is illegal and send ships in anyway, what will you do?

The President: There really are problems.

Kissinger: But seeing that Republican leadership meeting, I can't advise you going beyond prudence.

On my China trip [October 19-23], I would propose negotiating the communique of your trip so you don't have to do it. The Shanghai one had three parts: unilateral statements, an anti-hegemony statement, and a bilateral section -- including statements on Taiwan. That language was ingenious.
What can come from your visit? There can’t be complete normalization, although Nixon promised we would do it by 1976. But we can strengthen the anti-hegemony statement. On Taiwan, we have two options: One is to let the PRC state its position including peaceful change, we state our desire for normalization, and we note their view and our desire to work for a solution on the principle of one China. My staff likes this -- I don’t. They will reject it and then we will need a fallback. If they do, there will be pressure for full normalization because they will have approved peaceful change. The second option is to restate the Shanghai Communique but instead of saying "the US does not challenge this position," we would affirm the one-China idea. That is unilateral and can be withdrawn. It would reduce our ability to recognize an independent Taiwan, but we could do that only in the context of a massive confrontation with the PRC anyway.

The President: Which formulation is better here politically?
Kissinger: I think mine is.
Scowcroft: I think there is no question about it.
Kissinger: The first option is the unanimous position of my advisors, but I don’t support it. Once you accept it, we will be under pressure to move because they have accepted peaceful change. We’ll have all the liberals on us.

The President: What would the Japanese say if the Chinese tried to take over Taiwan?
Kissinger: They want us to protect Taiwan while they trade with Taiwan. The present situation where we protect Taiwan is best for everyone.

The President: What will we be doing for 4-1/2 days in China?
Kissinger: They move at a leisurely pace. They will want to hear at length from you about the world situation -- there is no substitute for that. They will expect a long session on the Soviet Union, Europe, Asia. If you get there Monday, they will give a dinner Monday night; on the following evenings there will be one cultural show, a reciprocal dinner, and then one evening free.
The President: How about Chou's health?

Kissinger: He may be on his last legs. You will meet with Mao.

Soochow is nice; Hangchow is also. They will certainly want you to go to Shanghai.

The President: The first trip of Nixon was a tremendous extravaganza. There was massive television coverage. I think it would be good to do something different. What is there which is dramatic? See if you can find something different.

Kissinger: Why don't I suggest to them that you would like something Nixon didn't do? Sian is the first capital and there is excavating there.

Scowcroft: That might attract the television.

Kissinger: Asad said he would consider our demarche on Lebanon but said no one had asked him to go in.

The President: Have we approached Israel?

Kissinger: They gave us a waffling answer. I will insist on a firm answer from Dinitz today.

There is an issue on Israeli military equipment. I think we shouldn't hold up these things that were approved prior to the reappraisal.

The President: Okay.

Kissinger: Our reports are the Japanese Emperor's visit was a total success.

The President: That was my impression.

Kissinger: Morocco is threatening a massive march on Spanish Sahara. The ICJ gave an opinion which said sovereignty had been decided between Morocco and Mauritania. That basically is what Hassan wanted.

The President: What is likely to happen?

Kissinger: Spain is leaning to independence. That is what Algeria would like. I will talk to the Moroccan Ambassador today.
The President: What is Sadat doing?

Kissinger: He arrives and overnights at Williamsburg. He comes here on the 27th. Then to New York for the UN. Then Florida and Chicago.

The President: I heard Connally is doing something for Sadat. How about sending Nelson on the whole trip with him?

Kissinger: It would flatter Sadat out of his mind.

The President: Let's look into that. Rockefeller is a bit upset anyway.

Kissinger: Okay, but don't saddle me with him. I have Schlesinger. Seriously, you could also send him on a trip to Southeast Asia -- Australia, New Zealand.

The President: Good. But let's send him with Sadat.

Kissinger: The Turks I think will come around. Demirel wants to improve US-Turkish relations. Kubisch is here with a message from Karamanlis.
K. Can you bring an additional team member to our meeting?

P: OK, great, we'll plan it together.

K: Are you familiar with our product line?

P: Yes, I've seen some features, but I'm not sure what all it can do. I've heard there's a lot of potential, but I'm not too sure.

K: We're just interested in testing this technology, but we're not sure what would work.

P: Three reality check points:

1. But then that supports leadership, so I would advise you to follow through.

On China: I would propose Nogent's company as a candidate. The Chinese have had 3 parts: circulated statements, anti-spying statement, and related victim-indictment statement.

On Taiwan: That company was indicted.

What can we do here? Can't be complete normalization, they be promised at my 10. That's where things can come-

Statements. On Taiwan, we have some options:

1. Let the state do policy-change things to allow for normalization, we will then allow a

2. Conclusion to enable for solution on principle.

On China, my staff has the idea that they will accept it if there will make feedback. If they do, they will have feedback on full normalization. They will have agreement to keep things.

c) Restore a Chinese democratic but instead of just saying does not challenge, but support one China (I'm talking of). That is challenging.
be still, dummy. It would reduce our ability to
shape an urgent Taiwan, but we could do
it only in context of massive confrontation of

K

Which formulation is better, free politically?

K

I think there is no question about it.

K

The 1st option is the most
popular of my advisers, but I don't support it.

K

Once you accept it, we will be under pressure to
abandon because they have accepted peaceful change.

K

When you say if the TPKF (Taiwan Prosperity)

K

They want both. First, they want to speak

K

The present act where we protest Taiwan is best for

K

What will we be doing for 4½ days in China?

K

They mean at least 3 days. They will want to

K

If you want to be there for 6 months, you could sit in

K

That's very nice. I hope you don't work too hard.

K

How about your health?

K

Maybe we will see you later. You will not hear from

K

Somewhere in time, somewhere in place. They will

K

Tell them we want you to go to Shanghi.

K

The 1st trip of Minchin was a Taiwan visit instigated

K

The 1st trip of Minchin was a Taiwan visit instigated

K

I think it would be good
I'd something else. What is there which is
observable? Only if you can find something else.

K: Why don't I suggest you would like something

Nelson? I don't. Someone was a bit arrogant and thus

so irritating then.

S: That suggests interest.

K: And it suggests it would make the one demonstrate

between two suits one had asked him to pain?

P: I can tell you.

K: They were in a wriggling consensus. I will get a

girl someone from party today. There is one

wisdom on that. Anyway, I think we shouldn't tell

together things apparent now to unspecified.

P: But,

K: Can suggest to each morning suit in a total

process.

P: That may exaggerate.

K: Increased inoesatation a iteration without

Sp. Suhana. The E: T gone on grain which

and twenty characters had been divided but because

of menstruation that means what Nelson wouldn't.

Y: What could happen.

K: Spain is learning to cajole. That is what Agnes

meant when I called him American Sub. today.

P: What else is Salut doing?

K: (Disappointed)

P: I heard Commonly their meeting for Salut. Have

about finding Nelson on a Wednesday within?

K: Yes. He should flatter to Salut out of his mind.
P. but look into Carl. Rockefeller is as hot spot anyway.

K. OK, but let's make one within 3 hours.

Schenagers. Sorry, you can't be there.

Jim on a trip to SEA, Auckland, NZ.

P. Good. But let's send him to SF instead.

W. The Taurus I think will come around.

Don't write to anyone US-T relations.

N. which is live 1/2 way from here.