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WASHINGTON—With barely two months remaining before the hoped-for December meeting with Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Ford Admin‐
istration is seriously, perhaps hopelessly, divided over strategic arms control policy—the key issue in the summit.

According to informed sources, the arms control proposal now before the Joint Chiefs of Staff was opposed fervently by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, especially by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The target of Pentagon opposition, which only in recent days has begun to surface publicly, is Secretary of Defense Henry A. Kissinger, who placed the
proposal on the agenda last week in a 10-long meeting with President Ford and Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger.

Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. William C. Westmoreland reportedly has been appalled at the Joint Chiefs’ opposition, and even the Defense
Department opposition to his proposal was discussed at a National Security Council meeting, Sept. 11.

So intense were the objections that consensus was deemed impossible; a vote on the question was scheduled for the early to mid-De‐
cember, probably in Europe.

But last three later, according to this account, Kissinger offered the proposal to President Ford’s senior military aides.

The same existing the normal tension within the group are two weapons systems that have been developed as the result of the Vladivostok
talks: The Soviet Backfire, a bomber with a 15,000-mile range; and the “B” version of the high‐
ly advanced supersonic plane that can be launched from a light or heavy bomber. The supersonic plane can be launched from a submarine and travel 1,500 miles on a radar-evading ground-hugging trajectory within 1,000 miles of a target; its warhead can be either nuclear or conventional.

The Vladivostok agreement set an overall limit of 2,450 strategic warheads, but the delivery systems on each side.

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control conference meeting, which is expected to mark the end of the 1972 strategic arms

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The nation now relies entirely on its ability to retaliate with devastating force against any attacker, and against an attack... strategic air backfires as heavy bombers, in headwining Gromyko. Fully haloed, they are to be a valuable "balancing chip" in future arms control alone were the objective. Under this formula, which sources believe formed the basis for Kissinger's approach to the arms-talks deadlock, the Russians dropped an agreed number of Backfires would be permitted, above the ceiling, as a substitution for the long-range bomber. The omission is expected to FETCH a &;resulting in a similar number of strategic missile launches as in the Vigilance agreement does not base-count any back-up launchers in the U.S. Air Force would be getting a free ride on a similar number of strategic missile launches.

One reason for the impasse is that the side-exercise reached last summer by Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin as an official record of the VADMRANN agreement does not include an upper number of any back-up launchers. The omission is expected to FETCH a &;resulting in a similar number of strategic missile launches as in the Vigilance agreement does not base-count any back-up launchers in the U.S. Air Force would be getting a free ride on a similar number of strategic missile launches.

U.S. officials insist privately that only ballistic missiles could have been agreed on, since cruise missiles were never discussed at VADMRANN. But the Russians have argued for half a year that the omission erodes their claim that cruise missiles were included. President Nixon repeatedly said within the Administration has scrutinized quietly for months and weeks to have reached a new arms control with the Interim SALT, agreeing last month and Kissinger's subsequent proposal to Gromyko.

One longtime observer of the National Security bureaucracy recalled recently that in his view the "passions and new fervor in the six-year war between Kissinger and Dobrynin" has escalated to a level unprecedented in recent memory. Kissinger, conversant in public, is reported to have updated with special concern after Kissinger's appearance at a recent dressy dinner before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Defense officials, characterizing the current open line of talks as the most "dramatic" since Kissinger's departure, within days the American Security Council, a loosely based conservative group, had issued a "dramatic" statement urging a.

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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

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DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . 06/16/2004

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GC
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, October 14, 1975
3:10-3:40 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

President: Are things moving in the right direction?

Haig: We have fundamental problems with the Europeans. We shouldn’t kid ourselves.

President: I see the Dutch are continuing ASW.

Haig: Yes. The Brits are good; the Germans are doing better. Even the French are talking with us more.

There are some disturbing elements. We are getting mixed signals out of Washington.

President: I’d like to hear about that.

Haig: It comes down simply to Henry being the pushover and Schlesinger the tough guy. There is traditionally some competition between Defense and State, but it is especially dangerous now.

President: What did Schlesinger do about cruise missiles?
Haig: I get this only through the back door. I wasn't with him. There is a new picture being presented of cruise missiles. I think there is some utility but we shouldn't be carried away.

The other problem is the US attitude toward the existing nuclear weapons capability in Europe. Whenever there is some tinkering with them, it raises the same spectre we had in the 60's. Especially with the Germans it's a disaster. In the 60's there was no option except the French one of getting out. Today there is a third force, in competition with the US across the board.

President: Did he go past the MBFR proposal?

Haig: The 1000 we can do. But there is this drumfire of drawdowns of more weapons, artillery, nuclear aircraft, etcetera.

The Germans have turned very anti-MBFR -- at least at the level below Schmidt.

President: Has the MBFR proposal been put forward?

Scowcroft: No, it's being discussed in NATO still.

Haig: The Germans are fighting it, and raising all sorts of questions.

President: Is there a sense of urgency in NATO to get Turkey moving now that the embargo is lifted?

Haig: Yes, there is, but it is a question of tactics. Sancar said he expected everyone to pour in on him to make concessions and that would be a disaster. He said he would move, but at his own pace.

President: We may not have that kind of time. In a month we will have the aid bill before Congress and Brademas and Sarbanes will be right in there. We have at best three months.

Haig: They can pull a lot of troops out right away. On territory, they will probably agree with about 29%. I think Greece will come back into NATO if the Cyprus thing is taken care of.
That really is the essence of the situation. I don't know what the answer is to the mixed signals, but they hurt you.

President: [Mentioned the Technical Panel report on strategic systems.] It is a difficult problem with Him. If I fired him, at worst we could have another Zumwalt running around--though now that Zumwalt has clear political ambitions I think he has discredited himself.

Haig: No one pays attention to him now.

President: What is the reaction in Europe to Helsinki?

Haig: It's a mixed bag. Your tough speech gave them something to rally behind, so basically, though it's rhetoric, the Europeans are okay.

President: How about Portugal?

Haig: I am more concerned that we paint ourselves into a Chile corner. But I think basically the situation is moving right. With the refugees coming back, the conservatives' strength should grow. But we are out of the woods.

President: How about Azevedo?

Haig: He is an opportunist. He's tough and able. The fact he is turning right shows that is the way he thinks the wind is blowing.

I think we must be patient. I'm getting their military people to visit NATO to see how professional outfits should operate. I am basically optimistic.
P: Can they swing in a night like this?
N: We have fundamental support in the network, and we shouldn't lack resolve.

P: Are our debts mounting?
N: Yes. The debts are good, and Germany does better.

P: Can we afford to cut back?
N: The cuts are too big, but they are getting a little more routine. We're setting a new bar for work.

P: I'd like to hear about that.

N: Come down strongly on kitchen waste, and let's do it. This is the biggest, most urgent task that we have. So that it is very tough. But I think it is possible.

P: About all labor at about 75.

N: I got this only this year. I'm not with him. This is a man in pictures seen on a TV. I think there is some utility, but we shouldn't discard it.

P: There's a great deal of US attitude toward labor. It's a big issue. Where is the tone? Is there thinking about them that contains in some quarters a certain level of criticism or concern? Is there a different tone and approach to them? I'm 75 and still in a 2nd phase, in revolution of view of average trash.

P: Did you post a MB ref? partial

N: These are we care for, but they so the dream face of democracy in more eyes, with some conflict.
The Germans have trained very well - NATO - at least before [unreadable].

The NFR proposal was fully revised by the USA and
still on NATO.

The Americans are fighting its current collaborations
and support of questions.

I think everyone in NATO is getting Turkey
running now in a much more difficult.

Yes, but it is a question of Turkey. I think
will be appointed everyone to join in on him to
solve the problems. NATO should have a discussion. He said
we would move but at the same pace.

This may not have that kind of time. In
months we will have a cold war before long.

Balkans, Scandinavia will be right in one
area at least 3 times.

They can pull a lot of troops out right away. In
Turkey they will just move about 1,000. I
think Greece will have both into NATO if a
reasonable thing is taken care.

That really is a scenario of a set. I don't
know what the answer is to a varied set.

They don't, you.

(formula - I think would go on the system)

It is a different joining at least we
would have another consensus running around.

That I think now that he was pushed
consolation. I think he has discussed himself

We are going to mention a time now.
P. What is a reaction to habit?
H. It is a mixed bag. Some things just form from
something already behind us. Basically, the
idea is adaptive, the Eus and not.

P. How about Pat?
H. I am more concerned that our foundation
with a child reader. But I think basically we
are doing something right. We are using book
and create, and I think that's great. But we are not
out of the woods.

P. How about Agnes? In general.
H. As a word-writing opportunity. First, it is turning
right, and that's okay. He tries and is
moving.

I think we must be patient. Everyone
needs to learn how to do things.
In this third grade, I see many
improvements.

P. How about Jeff?
H. I am not sure. It needs to be.
In this grade, it needs to be done.
And we need to see
improvements.