MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, October 9, 1975
9:30 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

[There was initial discussion of the 200-mile sea bill with Max Friedersdorf and John Marsh. It was agreed to move for a January 1, 1977 trigger if it is in no danger of being defeated. Secretary Kissinger gave good defense of the Aldrich position, but all agreed that a delayed trigger would be the best we could do.]

Kissinger: Do you have a press conference tonight?

President: At eight o'clock.

Kissinger: This Moynihan thing. We could live with his comment on Amin, but the OAU linkage is bad and your endorsement doesn't help. Would you do something tonight in your press conference to set it straight?

President: Of course. Would you get me something?

Kissinger: I met with the Los Angeles Times group. They think our foreign policy is in good shape. Even detente -- only the word is bad. If the Democrats attack your foreign policy, they are hitting your strong point,
Scowcroft: On Moynihan, you may not get a question. There is some merit in having Ron clarify it.

President: Get me some words, and I'll talk with Ron.

Kissinger: On the economic summit, the French are still trying to exclude Canada. All the others agree.

President: Can I send a message to Giscard?

Kissinger: That's a good thing to do. I think he'll concede, but even if he doesn't, we will be in good shape with the Canadians. We could tell Schmidt you are doing so and ask his support.

President: Fine. Let's do it. We definitely should have Canada.

[N.B. A hotline message was sent to Giscard -- who turned it down again.]

Kissinger: On the grain deal, the Soviets told us they couldn't buy a 15% discount. It would destroy them with the East Europeans, the Third World and OPEC. The negotiations on this have been a disaster. Butz has talked every day with his guy on an open line. Then....

[The Vice President calls.]

Yesterday he pulled Bell out on the grounds that the grain part was completed.

President: He mentioned that yesterday. I said I didn't think the delegation was coming home.

Kissinger: It puts us in a tough position all around. We can't reopen the grain deal, and there's lots of farmer pressure on us to move on the grain.

We have some options for disguising a discount which we can try on them. But if they reject it, you will have to decide whether to break the linkage. There are problems either way. In principle, I favor being tough. So does Simon. But if it fails, then it will hurt detente and get the farmers on your neck.

President: How is the grain deal?
Kissinger: It is a great grain deal. We could wait until Saturday and see if they will buy our oil offer.

President: How about initialling on Saturday? That would be good politically.

Kissinger: Then we could wait 30 days. If after that we don't have it, I think you have to go ahead on the grain.

President: I agree. Will you take care of it?

Kissinger: On Lebanon, we have nothing to propose. The danger is that if the Syrians go in, the Israelis certainly will.

On Angola, things are not going too badly. We are blackmailing the Portuguese and they are leaving arms behind for Roberto and Savimbi, as well as MPLA. It is better than before.

Scowcroft: Sonnenfeldt wanted to know: If things disintegrate, is the thing Secretary Kissinger discussed with Callaghan still active?

Kissinger: We would have to do something if a civil war eventuated in Portugal. We cannot afford to lose.
A quick estimation of 200 mile sea kill w/ Umx & March. It agrees to ours for a 1 40mm trigger of it in so during the day. In fact, if good condition & aline position but not agreed a delayed trigger would be a last we could do.

K: You have a press wire tonight?
P: At 8.00
K: This Magnesium thing. We will limit it to the comment on Anzio, but the UK linkage is bad and again an agreement doesn't help. Would you do something tonight in some press way to let it through?
P: Of course. Will you get some something?
K: I met with Times group. They think our FP win good shape. Even Berlin - only wire is bad. If they decide they FP, they hitting your story point.

S: Our impression, you may not get a question.
Same script in Henry then changed
P: Got one same weeks a DC talk with Rom
K: Our idea is that, the FP are still trying to get me counts. All others agree.
P: Can I call Washington?
K: Good thing to do. At least hold councils, most wire if the council, are like in separate stages of conditions. We could show Schmidt go doing to take him any part.
P: For Vito's St. C. we definitely would him Commander.
K. On the grey cloud, I was told we they couldn't
have the discount - it would cost them
us. If it was a grey cloud, we wouldn't have
the discount. But you have to look
every day if there's grey or an open blue. Then
(VP calls)

Yesterday he pulled Bell out the ground - grey was
too big.

P. He said that yesterday, I said I didn't think
every day was going to be grey.

K. It is not grey or rain - it's going all around.

P. It is not grey.

K. It is not grey or rain - it's going all around.

P. We have some options for changing a discount
which we can try on. But if they reject it,
we will have to check it with other.

K. There are ports within very a big place
for those things, South America. But if it fails,
hose, it will cost a lot.

P. You're going to do it.

K. It's not good in a grey cloud. We can't wait
til Saturday to see if they will try our offer.

P. Change about initially on Saturday. That would
be good yesterday.

K. Then we could wait a little. If after that we don't
have it, I think grey, some large ships are in a
grey.

P. James, would you take care of it.
K: Cell division

K: [Handwritten notes and diagrams are present, but the content is not legible due to the quality of the image.]