MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, October 7, 1975
9:40 - 10:18 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

Kissinger: Perhaps we could get the 200-mile bill effective January 1, 1976. Then we could use the leverage in the negotiation.

The President: You felt the emotion in the room.

Kissinger: But they are wrong. On the deep seabed, if we don't establish some order we will have in 15 years a struggle like the competition for territory during the colonial period.

The President: I better read into this.

Kissinger: We could establish a regime which would organize it, give us 95% of what we want, and give the LDC's some residual. Without it, we could grab what we want but we would have a whole world against us.

And that Case is nothing more than a Jewish agent. Why is he -- the chief bleeding heart -- against the Third World? Because of Israel.

I talked with Coleman I am going to give him a letter supporting the Concorde on foreign policy grounds. But a bill may pass on which you may face a veto.
The President: Does he have a leg to stand on, scientifically?

Kissinger: There is one claim that the SST could cause 200 more cases of skin cancer.

The President: You know I was chief supporter of our SST. That was a serious mistake.

[Senator Church calls the President].

Kissinger: If we ban the landing of the Concorde, we will have a blow-up with the French and the British.

The President: My disposition would be to veto it.

Kissinger: You don't have to face it now at all.

On the grain deal, we can get it any time we want. The key is whether we keep it linked with oil. I think if we hold tough, we will get an oil deal. The Soviets must have the grain. If we don't we will be lambasted by Jackson for giving up our agricultural power.

The President: I think we should keep them linked. How long do you think it would take?

Kissinger: I think within a week.

The President: Let's do it. Send Chuck [Robinson] instructions.

Kissinger: There is another chicken-shit issue on which the Pentagon is dug in -- cruise missiles on the seabeds.

The President: Didn't we agree on this earlier?

Kissinger: You agreed with them at Helsinki.

The President: How would they [the Pentagon] even use it? Do they have a program to do it?

Scowcroft: No, it is not that they have it in mind. They just don't want to limit them in any way until we resolve the cruise missile issue overall.

Kissinger: That gets me to Schlesinger. NATO has asked that we don't agree to anything on cruise missiles without consultation. There is an article in The Economist on the virtues of cruise missiles. This is Schlesinger's campaign.

The President: I'll be damned. How does Haig stand?

Kissinger: I doubt if he's heard of it.

The President: Let's get Haig on board on it.

Kissinger: I am getting him back here to talk about Yugoslavia contingency plans with the British and French.

I talked to Dobrynin. He said maybe we could arrange something on cruise missiles, but on Backfire, they are adamant. He also thinks Schlesinger is so dominant now that any agreement would come under very heavy fire here.

The Syrians have violently attacked the agreement -- I think largely because of the publication of these agreements.

The President: The realistic situation is that Congress is not going to get anywhere near what we have recommended.

Kissinger: We are closer to an agreement in '77 than ever. But I must say the Jews are trying to undermine your Administration.

The President: I agree. They could twist a Democrat around.

Kissinger: Any any Democrat would take two years to figure it all out.

I think we can still manage the Syrians. Asad will subside after three or four months, but the damage done is great.

The Economic Summit is 15-17 November.

And you can spend Sunday and Monday morning with Sadat.

The President: Sure.
Kissinger: And we have to get Rabin here.

The President: Who would be going with us to Europe? Simon?

I have to be in Atlanta the evening of 14 November.

Kissinger: You could see Asad the evening of 17 November and morning of 18 November.

The President: Where would we meet?

Kissinger: Geneva or Vienna.
K Perhaps we could get the 200 men, both staff and
19 Nov 75. Then we could have a business in
the night.
P
K your fields out in the
K But they are long. On the other hand, if
we don't start soon after we will lose in
17 days a struggle like losing a colonial period
not much into this
K We could perhaps a regime that would
organize it, get us 75% of what we want,
give the NDC's some revenue. If it, on
world scale without we want, but we could have
a world world against us. And that there
is nothing more than a Jewish agent. Why
is he a Jewish building against a
82nd World? Because of I
I talked my Coleman. I am going to find him a
little supporting council on FP grounds. But
P Doctors a little string pass on on which you
very face was set.
P Does he then a day to stand on, auditor
K there is one chance that SST would come
very more cases of them women
P your show I would a Jewish seaport gone
SST. That was a much scuttle
Church calls P
K again from a lunatic. I.e. Coleman will
there be thing with FP P
P My objections would go to vote it.
R: You don't have to face it now at all.
Our roads clear, we can get it any time
we want. The day is whether we buy it
before it's sold. I think if we had bought
we will get more later. The seas cannot have
rooms. If we don't, we will be limited
by factors by giving up ourрагares.
P: I think we should buy them limited. How
long do you think it would take?
R: I think it would be a week.
I: Let's do it. Don't dangle hesitation.
P: This is another Franklin that relates on which
we can equip our own large, strong, essential on a
large scale.
P: Did we agree on this earlier?
R: You agreed at Hrenkot.
P: How would they work once it?
Do they have a
program, a bill?
S: No, it is not that they have it in mind. They
cannot agree to disburse any of my money until
we resolve it in one way or another.
P: Let's write, and ask convictions.
R: That gets me to subsidies. We have a deal about
we should agree to anything on this. We believe
there is another Franklin that relates on which
this is Schlesinger's connection.
P: It's in a number. How does that
stand?
R: Schmidt of his head of it.
P: Let's get Haroon involved in it.

K: Getting him back and talking and urging
continuing phase of the C.I.A.
I talked to Bob, and I think we could
arrange something on on MS's but on Barzai's,
they are aghast, but the absolute S. H. is
bi-clavans, not that any agreement would come
under any secrecy here.
The S. H. have written a agreement is
this lengthy because the publication of these agree
ments.
P: The situation is that EPA is not going to
put any more issue what we have recommended.
K: We are close to an agreement on 22 them
year. But there's no point in trying to
undermine your dynamic.
P: I agree. They could twist a demand around
K: Any demands would take x you to x years if you do
not.
I think we can still manage a Syria deal
with outside effort. 3 or 4 men, but a damage is
great.
The main reason is 15-17 hrs.
And you can spend Sunday & Monday morning
with Salat.
P: Same.
K: And we have to get Action here.
P: What would It take? I gather it would
need a State Dinner.
Robin 12-13 Dec.

P. Who will be going with the Enos? Sams?

9 have to be in Atlanta around Dec 14. Am

P. You could get a head start out Jan 1 + training

of 16 days.

P. Where would we meet?

K. commissioner.