MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: Thursday - September 18, 1975
3:30 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

President: I am pleased to see the progress on the [US-Soviet] grain deal.

Kissinger: It is substantially done, if Seldman, Greenspan and Lynn can keep quiet. The Soviets want five million plus an option for three. Robinson prefers six firm -- which is probably better. It gives better leverage.

President: Can I say something in Oklahoma? "Encouraging progress is being made;" "substantial regular sales on a five-year basis;"

Kissinger: Another question is whether this year's extra purchase should be part of the five years.

President: I would rather it didn't.

Kissinger: I agree.

We have a real mess in Jordan for which I must assume responsibility. It is a gooddamn mess. I thought they had cleared the letter you signed [to Case] with the King, but the King now rejected the letter. It has let the Congress and the Israelis off the hook, and we are on it. The sale is approved now and the King takes the view that you can go ahead despite his rejection. That would jump up to bite you though. I have asked the King if he stands by the one paragraph and would sign a contract with standard conditions.
It is just like Soviet MFN.

Another way would be to withdraw the LOA and resubmit it without the special letter. Maybe that is what we should do.

President: Let us see how the King reacts, but okay if we prepare the Hill carefully.

Kissinger: On Gromyko, I would lay the groundwork. Say our two countries, whatever the problems are, have the responsibility for world peace. There have been ups and downs and some problems here which have hurt and which are essentially unassociated with US-Soviet relations. If we could have a summit with a SALT agreement, a Threshold Test Ban and some other things, we would solidify detente.

President: And the grain deal.

Kissinger: On the oil, I didn't finish. They are proposing 12 million tons. Perhaps it will go to 25 if we will sell them modern drilling equipment.

President: What about the price?

Kissinger: They are refusing a discount now, but Chuck thinks he can get 10-15 percent.

This is the way Gromyko would like to proceed. He is very formal. He said Brezhnev wants to come December 15. On SALT, they have heard 2500 ALCM and 1000 SLCM. I would stick with all that. Don't mention Backfire or the difference between nuclear and conventional.

On Schlesinger's proposal: The Backfire proposal gives us an opening. On the other he has given us something except for nuclear versus conventional. If Jim will move 300 to 600 -- because the Soviets haven't ever heard 300 -- we might try his idea of 100 between 600 and 1500.

The ALCM proposal, by limiting the number of bombers which carry them, we can do it. We can just ignore the nuclear versus conventional and let it surface in Geneva. We may get by with it but it may cause an explosion. I am worried about this issue, because potentially the Soviets could flood us with cruise missiles and we have no defense against them.
President: Where do we stand on when we start the next round?


President: Can't we do what we can now and take up what is left in 1977?

Kissinger: I don't want you to get into a brawl with Brezhnev on it. Since they have conventional cruise missiles, they may welcome this ambiguity.

President: If we postpone the conventional cruise missile to 1977, wouldn't Defense be satisfied?

Kissinger: Sure.

President: Then we would have a better idea of where we are going.

Kissinger: Then I will turn Schlesinger's ideas into a specific proposal.

President: Should we reverse on the land mobiles?

Kissinger: I would let that ride for a few weeks.

President: Can we move on MBFR?

Kissinger: Ask him, but don't appear eager.

On the Middle East, he will unload on you, but don't let him nail you. I think we can agree to start a discussion for Geneva.

President: Didn't we keep them generally informed?

Kissinger: No. He will ask for a commitment that we will make no move without them. You can say it will depend on the parties but we will commit ourselves to keep them informed. Tell him we are willing to cooperate and are willing to discuss the Geneva Conference. Say if the two parties come to us, it is tough to refuse.

I would begin with the Brezhnev visit -- after your opening statement.
P. Damn. Place one pan on a griddle.
K. It is substantially clear, if we can rely. Simon, 
\textit{Contraev} a hung on Can sleep quiet. 
\textit{Gos.} want 2 sick place. Paper. \textit{K.} reason 
purpose b. frame. which 2 probably better gives 
\textit{Letter} warranty.
P. Can I buy something in Oklahoma.
\textit{Contraev} jogy is abseem 
\textit{intention} direction sales in a way like.
K. Another question is whether this reduce often 
purchase should be justified 2 yes.
P. I would rather it didn't
K. Because
\textit{We have a doctor's in paper} that I
don't remember. It's a God damn
\textit{wrong}. I think they had a
\textit{cleaned} letter
\textit{you} signed off a 
\textit{kind} letter, but the 
\textit{wrong} letter.
\textit{It} has 
\textit{made} a change here 
\textit{we} can do it.
The sale is approved now. \textit{King} takes view 
\textit{that you can do} whatever with a rejection, \textit{that 
would prove up}. \textit{It's} against the standard condition. \textit{It is 
just like} 
\textit{sentence}
\textit{anything} would be written for and check it 
\textit{it} is a signed letter, \textit{make} sure that in \textit{what} 
\textit{should do}.
P. \textit{Let there be King cute, but ok if we pay} 
\textit{carefully}
If I understand, I would reply: (Sigh)

2 I think I don't have a full sense of the full plan. There have been some issues with some parts being within their trust. Another concern mentioned is US Juan relation. I think I need to see the full data set against the full data set before.

P: And again that?

If I understand, I didn't panic. They figured it out. Perhaps will go 15 if we will tell them more on this group.

P: More?

If I understand, I don't know but Chuck thinks he can get 10-15.

This is very complex and didn't work. This is very fresh. Said there we don't want 25.

On Sun, they have heard 25s. Also, these small small ideas. I will stick by all that. But maybe... 

But if I get some a core

On the Schlesinger: The Schlesinger proposal gives us an opening. The other idea is two given no something, every so every so. If given such a much 61-64 - some core, 

These two could be 65-70s - two might by

But idea of 620-650 - both 650-620.

The idea of 650-620 - both 650. 

The idea of 650-620. We can just imagine a new one or just let it stay.
in Cambridge. We may get by with it but it
may cause an explosion, damn certain.
About this world, have a potential in Eur
and flood us with atomic missiles in here
we’ll offense against them.

P: Where do we stand on when we start a system?

K: 1937

P: But do we do what we can now & take advantage of
what

K: I don’t want you to get into kind of buying on it. Since
they have war & etc, they may well buy this merchandise
P: If we get gone over war in 1937, couldn’t they buy
this?

K: Sure.

P: Then we would have better idea what war

K: Then I will turn these ideas into less

P: Should we prepare on land warfare?

K: I would let that ride for few weeks

P: Can we move on MB?

K: All right, but don’t agree yet.

On MB, he will understand you. But don’t
sit in wastage. I think we can agree to make
short discussion in the evening.

P: Did we keep them really informed?

K: No. We will ask them in some way, but
you can say it will depend on a question. We
will help them inform. Tell them we
I want to sharpen my writing. I have a book that I want to write. I will begin this week. I want to write about my experiences. I want to write a memoir.