

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
MR # 09-46, #12  
state div 11/2/09; OSD div 11/4/09  
By dal NARA, Date 12/3/09

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Friday, September 12, 1975  
9:15 a. m.

PLACE: The Oval Office  
The White House

Kissinger: I don't think the mission should go. I think the Greeks would resent it. But I can ask Bitsios.

President: Why don't you do that? I think McCrary wants to help.

Kissinger: It could blow the roof off in Turkey also. Brademas knows exactly what he is doing when he asked for a delay in the vote until October 12.

[Buchen comes in to ask if Congressman Pike should be notified that we are refusing classified material in view of his Committee's unauthorized disclosure of four words.]

[George Meany calls. Marsh and Friedersdorf come in. The President asks Meany to try to get Madden to give a rule to bring the Turkish aid vote to the floor next Wednesday.]



Buchen: We didn't ask for the materials back. He would laugh at us.

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(b) (1, 3)  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

President: I think we should be tough. Ask for the materials back. It is okay to notify Pike, but don't bargain with him.

[Buchen, Marsh and Friedersdorf leave.]

Kissinger: We have a Butz problem. He told Patolichev's people we were anxious to sell more grain, and today the Department of Agriculture announced we would move forward with more sales. This kills our leverage with the Soviets.

President: We better get Butz under control.

Kissinger: Brent, will you call him and tell him to shut up.

We have a massive Defense problem on SALT. At the NSC Meeting, Schlesinger said 2500/1500, but he would look at lower limits. Brent saw a JCS paper going to 600 on SLCM's. That would break the back of the negotiations, I think. I thought we were making progress and I told you so. The Verification Panel Working Group developed nine options, most of which had SLCM's at 600. I said in the meeting, could we reduce the options to three or four for you. That was the end of the discussion. Brown said none of them were very good.

He insisted on 2500/1500 and that we be free for non-nuclears. They earlier had allowed 100 Backfire; now they fell off that. They brought up a chicken-shit objection about how long we give the Soviets to get to 2400. I asked Brown if he had analyzed the option of no agreement. He said no, because the Soviets needed an agreement and would have to give in. I adjourned the meeting.

The NSC system can't operate if we can't discuss the issues. I got Clements in afterwards and he said Schlesinger laid down the law. He said we had the Soviets by the short hairs, and they had to come along. Schlesinger is an awful man. If you overrule him, he will go right to Jackson.

President: He is obsessed with getting rid of Clements.

Kissinger: He is obsessed with jealousy of me.

President: That too. I am amazed at him. The Defense budget is not having that easy a time on the Hill.



Kissinger: Brezhnev couldn't possibly accept such a position. The military would kill him.

[There was a short discussion about Harry Byrd.]

I fear that if you go into the NSC and override Defense, they will hurt you.

Scowcroft: [I discussed my conversation with Wickham -- Brezhnev's need for an agreement.]

Kissinger: [Discussion of various aspects of the cruise missiles.]

They said cruise missiles could replace the aircraft carriers.

President: I can't imagine Hollaway could buy that.

Kissinger: Their whole position is inconsistent and illogical.

President: What do we do?

Kissinger: I would call in Schlesinger and Brown and Brent, without me. I would say you want a SALT agreement, you want a more reasonable position out of them, and you don't want to have to overrule them at an NSC meeting.

I see no way the Soviet Union can accept the DOD position.

We maybe could agree on ALCM and SLCM and then match Backfire with tactical cruise missiles. Backfire until recently was never a big deal. If it is exempted, we will catch hell, but there is no way they will count all Backfire.

For Defense to scream about the Backfire and yet claim the right to keep FBS with cruise missiles on them is inconceivable. If Schlesinger can cripple the NSC system this way, you are naked in front of him, because you never know what he will hit you with next.

I think the only real choice you have is to scare him to death and make him come in with a defensible proposal.



President: All he is saying is we ought to force the Soviet Union to do something we don't think they'll do, without being prepared to deal with that alternative.

Don [Rumsfeld] said Nitze brought a paper in on mobiles.

Kissinger: All the right-wingers said we accepted a violation on SS-9 [19]. We didn't state any penalty for this, and we made a unilateral statement on mobiles, which they now want to renege on.

The whole DOD position enhances the Soviet posture.

President: I want to be well prepared to talk to Schlesinger. I want a SALT agreement and I am shocked at what you say happened.

Kissinger: We would be killed by both the Hawks and the Doves on the cruise missile conventional/nuclear issue. The Doves will say we let cruise missiles run free, and the Hawks will say that the Soviets will say all their cruise missiles are conventional when they are nuclear.

President: Give me a good paper to study. It is damned discouraging.



Call Bertz - shut up, Potolichew says we are in all grain -

✓ P/R 12 Sept 75

K I don't think a mission should go. I think  
C. Gexho would want it. But I can ask  
Boris.

P why don't you do that? I think Mr Gray  
wants to help

K It could blow a cog off in Turkey also.  
Boris knows exactly what he doing when  
he asks for delay in vote til Oct 12.

(Buchen comes in to ask if Pike should  
be notified we are referring classified  
material) Max's max come in.

(Many calls. P. asks <sup>Wimpy</sup> him to try to get  
Madden to give a note to bring Turk vote  
to floor next week)

Buchen we didn't ask for a materials book. He would  
bring that up.

P I think we should be tough. Ask for materials  
back. Okay to notify Pike but don't bring in as/for  
(Chabon, Max, Max leave)

K we have a Bertz job. He told Potolichew's people  
we were anxious to sell more grain + today USDA  
announced we could move forward w/ more sales. This  
kills our leverage w/c Sub.

P We better get Bertz under control  
Bertz, will you call him and tell him to shut up.

K We have a massive Defense job on Salt.  
at a NSC mtg, Sch's said 2500/1500 but  
he would look at lower limits. Brent saw  
a JCS paper going to 600 on SKM's. That  
would break a back of negot & drive. I  
that we were making prog & I told you so.



what has going forward about our current situation.

The UP was changed & options, most of which had SLC's at 600. I said in a meeting could we reduce options to 3 or 4 for year. That was end of discussion. Brown said none of them were any good - insisted on 2500/1500 & fee for non-moves. They eventually had about 1000 Bankers, & fell off that. They brought up a C.S. objection about how long to give SV to get 2500. I asked Brown if he had analyzed option of no agreement. He said no because SV needed an agreement & would have to give in. I apologized to party - NSC system can't operate if we can't discuss. I got Clements in afterwards & he said Seble's laid down a law - said we had SV by 5 H of the had to come.

Seble is an awful man.

If you overrule Seble's law, he will go right to father.

P He obsessed w/ getting rid of Clements

K He obsessed w/ getting rid of me.

P That too. I annoyed at him. The Def budget is not having that easy a time on a hill.

K They couldn't possibly accept such a position. The military would kill him.

(Small discussion about Harry Byrd)

I fear if you go in to NSC & overall Def., they will hurt you.

S (I discussed my view w/ William Byrd w/ for agreement)



R (Discussion of various aspects of E 11100)

26 Tony said CMS could replace a ft carrier.

P Can't imagine Holloman could buy that.

R Their whole position is inconsistent & illogical

P What do we do.

R I would call in Schick <sup>+ Burt, w/o me.</sup> & I would say you want a Salt agreement, you want a more reasonable portion out of them & you don't want to have to overrule them at an NSC mtg.

I see no way CSU can accept a DoD position.

CS - maybe could agree on AECM & SLEM & then match backfire w/ Tac CMS. But ~~that~~ backfire tax severity was never a big deal. If it is exempted, we will catch hell, but no way they will count out backfire.

For Dep. to know what backfire & get down F&S w/ CMS on them is unacceptable.

If Schick can cripple a NSC system this way you are making in part of him, because you never know what he will hit you w/ next.

I think the only real choice you have is to count him to death & make him come in w/ a dly. proposal

P All he is saying is we ought to force CSU to do something we don't think he will do, w/o being prepared to deal w/ that alternative.



\* \* See Selby & Beaman Mar 14, 1968

P Don said Nitzge brought a paper in on microbes

R All the right-wingies said we accepted a resolution on SS-9 (9). We didn't ~~have~~ <sup>state</sup> any penalty for this, & we made unrelated statement on microbes, which they now want to renege on.

The whole <sup>DOJ</sup> position is basically a ~~SO~~ pattern

P I want to be well prepared to talk to Schles. I want a Salt agreement: & I am shocked at what you say happened.

R We want to be killed by both hands & deal on a CIA conventional/nuclear issue. Doers will <sup>we let</sup> say, "I'm a sure fire, and banks that I shall say at <sup>this</sup> ~~the~~ are errors where they are nuclear.

P Give me a good paper to study. It's almost discouraging.

Analyzing DOJ pattern