MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Secretary General Joseph M. A. H. Luns, NATO
Chief de Cabinet S. I. P. Van Campen
Miss E. Borgman Brown, Personal Assistant to Secretary General
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: Wednesday, September 10, 1975
3:00 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

Luns: I am extremely grateful that you would see me on such short notice. I know I come uninvited.

President: Thank you for coming. I know you are here to be helpful on Turkish aid. Let me bring you up to date. John Rhodes asked me to call the Speaker to try to get a rule. I did and he said okay, but Morgan and Zablocki had asked for holding it up. I called Doc and he said he didn't want it brought up until the NATO Parliamentary group came back.

Kissinger: But they are not leaving until Thursday. We could get it beforehand. If they vote on the 29th or 30th, we are probably okay, but Demirel will be under pressure to do something.

President: If we could get a rule this week, then we could hold it, or maybe program it next Wednesday or Thursday.

Luns: The Turks approached me Sunday and I decided to go on Wednesday.
You should know that the Sinai agreement has made a tremendous impression on your allies and neutrals in Europe. It is very significant, because all of us realize what would be the case if it failed. It also improves the image of the United States as a country that is not seeking hegemony but peace. The Soviet Union is appearing as an example of bad humor, and ill grace. It is a tremendous boost for your government. I hope your people see it the same way.

President: In general here it is the same. Ecevit's comments were favorable. We expect about 75 votes in the Senate. In the House, the situation is different because of the opposition to all aid.

Luns: The embargo is becoming an obsession to your allies. It is weakening that corner of NATO and is counterproductive to a Cyprus solution. The Greeks won't accept concessions for fear that it will induce the U.S. to lift the embargo.

Kissinger: My impression is that we are six months from a Cyprus settlement whenever the sides get down to bargaining. Neither the Greeks nor the Turks will concede in advance.

President: Can't we compress the settlement time, if we get the vote?

Kissinger: We can't move before October 12, but then Demirel should want a quick solution so he can have elections next summer.

President: I worry that if we lift it and there is no movement for months, the hotheads might attack. I met with Makarios at Helsinki. I told him we were fed up and going to walk away. He said, "Oh, no."

Luns: Your allies wonder if they do something which displeases the Congress if action against them will take place. The Greek delegate no longer defends the embargo. But they can't publicly say they want the embargo lifted.

The Greek representative came to me and said the NATO countries were taking steps to bypass Greece -- in overflights, etc. I had to set the record straight. I said last September we were ready to negotiate. I told them they had taken unilateral action in violation of agreements.
President: And a lot of our Greek-American friends forgot how it all started in July 1974 [with the coup in Cyprus launched by the Greek junta].

Kissinger: We didn't want to make a legal finding that Turkey was within its rights, though we could have.

President: I think if we were to vote today, we would win. We will maximize our efforts. When you talk with the people, don't let them off the hook.

Luns: The visit of Nimitz to Germany went swimmingly. Two years ago there would have been riots and demonstrations.

I am extremely happy that on such short notice I could come here, because NATO could not find a way to make itself felt.

Kissinger: The more you can talk on the Hill, the better it is. If the embargo is removed and when the Cyprus negotiations get going, we can make progress on the Aegean.
I am extremely gratified that you would see me on such short notice. I am aware of the circumstances.

I know there are here to be dealt with. I think that we have not yet had a chance to come to a complete agreement on the issue. I think that Mr. Kissinger had asked for something specific. I could see that he wanted it brought up to NATO level for some reason.

I didn't think we would get anything, but we will. It will depend on the political situation. If it goes as we hope, then Daniel will be more or less in line with it too.

I can understand how this would make it seem that we will take it, or we will present it, right now. I think the approach now is to bring it up to the NATO level for something.

I have said that it would not make sense, then we will take it or we will present it. I think it would be more sensible if it were a matter of weeks or months. I think it would be more sensible if it were a matter of weeks or months. It would be more sensible if it were a matter of weeks or months. It would be more sensible if it were a matter of weeks or months.

I think it is for us as a country not to do any more but to keep going as best we can, and for the time being, to hope for your support. Hope your support will come in some way.

I am going to go further. I am sure I will continue the same way.
to us and

The meeting is being in Assen on June
28th. It is uncertain that Enrico will
accept a letter of prece to wire & ask to
ship a message.

I hope a wire will arrive by now.

There is a settlement between the two
parties. I will send you the details on
arriving.

If Enrico arrives before Oct 12, but then the
Dutch should not proceed further.

I write this letter from Calcutta. I feel that
writing letters is quite tiring. The next
letter will be from Ceylon.

1. Your advice makes me think of some
actions I can do against Germany

The only action is to send a message
that your advice is appreciated.

The German government that said Nato
will not take action to stop peace
activities. They have no intention of
agreeing.
It all started in July 4.

We didn't want to make big plans. I felt like we didn't have the right. We ended there.

A friend of mine had a great idea. We would meet.

We would take our effect, when you talk as people don't stick to one book.

The original idea was running astray.

Two years ago, this would have been worth noting. I wasn't really happy about such short notice. I could write here because were would not find a way to write itself off.

The scenario can't be the same. There's no end and we can make progress on this.