

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Senator Robert C. Byrd
Senator Sam Nunn
Senator James B. Pearson
Representative John B. Anderson
Representative John Slack

The President
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Lt. General, USAF, Deputy
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
William Kendall, Deputy Assistant to the
President for Legislative Affairs
Robert Wolthuis, Staff Assistant to Mr. Friedersdorf
George Bush, Chief of the United States Liaison
Office in Peking
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member,
National Security Council



DATE, TIME,
AND PLACE:

September 8, 1975; 4: 45 - 5: 10 p.m.
The Oval Office

SUBJECT:

Congressional Report to the President Following
a Trip to the People's Republic of China

The meeting began with the President welcoming the delegation into the Oval Office. He remarked that he had just been through a series of meetings in the Cabinet Room, including a just-concluded session with a Chinese trade delegation, hence he was glad to shift to the Oval Office.

The President indicated he would like to hear the delegation's impressions of China. There was some commentary about trip reports. Senator Pearson remarked that he had read most of the reports of the previous Congressional delegations which had visited the PRC before he went to China, including the one written by Representatives Hale Boggs and Mr. Ford when they visited China in 1972. Senator Pearson remarked that the Boggs/Ford report was among the best he had read.

The President: On our trip we went up to Liaoning Province, Manchuria. Hale and I went to their big steel plant at Anshan. That is also a rice

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NSC MEMO, 11/24/75, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 2/10/04
BY JA, NARA, DATE 4/2/04

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~~TOP SECRET~~ NO. 3 (9)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. ROSSIGNOL

growing area. Hale was interested in their agriculture. No official [American] visitors had ever been to that area before our trip. We were up there when [hurricane] Agnes hit here. We read about all the hell it did. It was a great trip.

Representative Anderson: Mr. President, let me say it was an honor to have been named head of this delegation. My colleagues from the House and Senate were a pleasure to work with. I can say that I don't think we did any damage to Sino-American relations, although I don't think we broke much new ground either.

I won't take your time to describe the various communes and factories that we visited, although some of my colleagues might like to mention some of the more interesting things we saw.

My impressions: There is no question in my mind that the Chinese take a dim view of our detente with the Soviet Union. Some of the most trenchant remarks by the Foreign Minister ...

The President: Ch'iao Kuan-hua.

Representative Anderson: He characterized detente as a fraud. This is offset by their obsessive fear of the Soviet Union. They talked about a million men on the 7,200 kilometer border, and Russian efforts to subvert minority groups along the frontier. At the same time, they are interested in cultivating good relations with this country.

They did not press us on Taiwan. The Foreign Minister indicated that we did not have a normal relationship, and there can't be one until ...

(Secretary Kissinger entered the room and greeted the Congressmen.)

Representative Anderson: There can't be a normal relationship because of Taiwan. But he went on to say that our relations are "normal." This seems like a contradiction in terms.

Before we entered the country we had seen various stories of factional strife carried in the Western press. When we had our meeting with their Vice Premier, I asked him whether these stories were true. His answer was that those reports were false. He said he was the Chief of Staff of the Army



and would know if they were true. George (Bush) of course had a different interpretation of the situation ...

The President: They just said everything was sweetness and light?

Representative Anderson: But despite our differences, which are great, they are anxious to continue to have good relations with the United States.

We did ask about their plans for economic development, for investment and trade, and got a long dissertation on the need for self-reliance. They are interested, of course, in acquiring technology from abroad, but trade will come slowly, eventually. There has been no great movement in two-way trade. George tells me it will be down 50% this year. But it was a very useful trip.

The President: Is George behaving himself out there?

Ambassador Bush: You can't do anything else out there but behave! (Laughter)

Representative Anderson: The only discordant note in our discussion with Teng Hsiao-p'ing was when he raised the issue of our cancelling the tour of the Chinese art troupe. He said that because we wouldn't let their people sing a song about liberating Taiwan the United States was not a free society. He asked George about the situation. George said in very diplomatic fashion that he wished the issue could have been resolved by compromise as had been the case of the dispute over the Philadelphia Orchestra. Teng said he fully accepted George's comment. So you can see what a fine job he is doing out there.

Senator Byrd: Mr. President, let me also say it was a privilege to make this trip. We had a very congenial group. We were pleased that Geoge Bush could sit in on our various meetings. Let me also say that Bill Kendall, Oscar Armstrong, the doctor, and Terry Howe did a lot of good work for the delegation.

These people (the Chinese) are determined to be self-reliant, self-contained, self-sufficient. They did not give us a snow job. They were frank, charming, gracious -- and very tough.

I do not think we need to expect to sell them a 100 million automobiles or refrigerators. Technology -- they are interested in some. There will

be some cultural exchanges. There could be, I think, some useful exchanges in the medical area. I think we are on the road toward improved contacts in this area.

As one who opposed the admission of Red China to the United Nations, I must say I went there somewhat antagonistic. I came back impressed. They are a hard working people. They appear to have solved their food problem and appear to give their people a basic level of health care.

But they are paranoid about the Soviet Union. They don't see the U.S. as a threat, or establishing hegemony in their area. Their military posture is defensive, but they emphasize they will support oppressed people around the world. They want us to pay more attention to the Soviets. I foresee a future of mutual interest between ourselves and the Chinese in opposing the nuclear and naval threat of the Soviet Union.

When Mao and Chou En-lai leave the scene, there will not be one person to follow in their footsteps -- there will be millions.

They are not a threat to our way of life. We have much in common: countering the Soviet Union.

Senator Pearson: On the issue of Taiwan, we agreed beforehand not to bring the subject up. They did not -- other than the one reference to the song issue.

Before we left, Secretary Kissinger met with us and made a comment about the need for common security on the Korean Peninsula. He made a very powerful impression on us on this point, and so we raised this with the Chinese. They indicated they will support efforts for the peaceful reunification of Korea and said if there is any resort to military action it would come from the South.

I got the impression that the power of the military has gone down since 1971.

We had a marvelous time. The only problem has been that since we've gotten back my wife has been giving all the interviews and getting all the publicity. (Laughter)

The President: When we were there we never seemed to meet the chairmen of any of their so-called revolutionary committees -- we always met the vice chairmen. We concluded that all the chairmen were military men and they did not want us to meet the military.

Senator Nunn: Mr. President, let me say it was an honor to have made this trip. You have to experience China to really understand it. Robert and John did a great job as leaders of the group.

The Chinese do not like developments in Portugal. They do not recognize the Communist movement there; they see it as controlled by the Soviet Union. They are not in favor of what is going on there.

I asked a number of questions about the border [with the Soviet Union]. I asked to be taken there. While that did not happen, hopefully it will make it easier for some future visitor to do so. In describing the Soviet military threat along the border, they said that first of all it was a threat to Japan, secondly a threat to the United States, and only last a threat to China. They bend over backwards not to appear afraid of the Soviet Union. They would say, "Let them come in and we will absorb them. We will give them territory; let them come in!" This sounded very much like Chiang Kai-shek's strategy for dealing with the Japanese.

I asked them whether they could assist us in the problem of our MIAs in Vietnam. The Vice Premier said he would do all that he could, but then went on to say that they would not interfere with the internal affairs of another nation. I view this statement as having a bit of a positive element in it.

I asked the people from the Institute [hosting the delegation], having heard about all the things going well for China, what might go wrong. The only thing that they would say is that they must be alert regarding education and indoctrination of the young people. They seem to have the same problems as we have here in our country: the young people are forgetting the problems that the country faced before so-called "liberation."

Representative Slack: It was my impression that they [the Chinese] have reached a certain plateau. Now they have to offer their people something more. It is always human nature to want something more.

One observation: It appeared to me that on every opportunity they had they would say they could not thank the United States and Russia enough for having educated them on the value of a policy of self-reliance.

Senator Byrd: Mr. President, let me just add one small footnote. Those people are building tunnels in every city. They would say that if the Russians invade Peking they had better be prepared to fight for 20 or 30 years. Their attitude is that if the Russians start a war, China will just let them in and then close the door on them.

On Diego Garcia, their position was that they were against the establishment of any foreign bases, but that they are realistic. They hope that Japan will continue to have good relations with the United States. They said that Japan should have as its number one friend the U.S.

They don't seem to anticipate great, spectacular moves with us. I believe our relations with China will develop slowly. If you visit there and there is no resolution of the Taiwan problem, they indicated that would be okay. Our policy, it seems to me, should be one of making efforts to improve our relations but not to appear in a hurry or eager. Things will develop slowly, but they ought to come.

The President: I recall an interesting six-hour meeting we had with Chou En-lai. We had a late night dinner, and Chou graciously suggested to Lindy and Betty that they could leave if they were tired. This was so that we could have a chance to talk. We went on until 3:00 a.m. talking back and forth through an interpreter. We talked about the favorable prospects for the SALT I agreement. They discounted it. I asked Chou whether the Soviet Union as a result of SALT I would reduce their defense budget. Chou, before my remark had been interpreted, said, "Never, never, never," and to emphasize his point pounded one fist into the other.

Representative Anderson: The interpreter I had never volunteered any information on any subject, but on that subject, the prospect of concluding another SALT agreement, he really pumped me for all that he could get. They are intensely interested in that situation.

Secretary Kissinger: They do not like any agreement that we make with the Soviets. They want an irreconcilable conflict between ourselves and the Russians. Our job is to keep them both off balance. We don't want the Soviets to swallow them, as that would upset the world balance. But basically they want an irreconcilable conflict between the Russians and ourselves, this is their secret dream. They scream about every agreement we try to reach with the Soviets, but then move with us after we do.

The President: I remember a visit to a jeep factory. This was almost a tinker toy operation. They were producing vehicles basically on our own design, with a standard shift. They let me take one out on the road for a mile or so. It seemed to work pretty well, although it was far less sophisticated an operation than we have in Detroit.

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Senator Byrd: I will put my money on the long run development of China rather than the Soviet Union.

The President: I was certainly impressed with the degree of individual effort and discipline.

Secretary Kissinger: In 20 years, if they keep developing the way they have, they could be a pretty scary outfit.

The President: Where did you go?

Senator Byrd: Peking, Sian, Kweilin.

Senator Nunn: There seemed to be more soldiers near the border area.

Representative Anderson: George and I went up atop the old Shanghai Mansions building to look out over the Whang Pu River. When we were up there we saw these fellows in white coats and trousers lying on a roof. One of the interpreters seemed embarrassed that we had noticed them. It turns out that they were the waiters in the hotel who are in the militia doing a kind of dry run target practice. If the Russians attack them there will be a lot of Chinese for them to contend with.

The President: What did you fly in?

Representative Anderson: A Trident, one of the British jets that they bought some years ago.

The President: When we were there we flew in an old chugger of an aircraft, I think an early British model. It was nicely appointed, but not very up to date. What kind was it? I think a Viscount.

Well, I really appreciate your coming in to share your impressions of the country.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

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September 12, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: Richard H. Solomon *RHS*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of the President's Conversation with a Returning Congressional Delegation from the People's Republic of China

On September 8, 1975 at 4:45 p.m., the President met with a delegation of Congressmen who had just returned from a tour of the People's Republic of China. At Tab I is a memorandum of conversation covering that meeting.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward the memorandum of conversation at Tab I for the President's files.

Approve *RS* Disapprove _____

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY *lh* NARA DATE *3/10/04*



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		NBR		INITIAL ACTION O	
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	250655		

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: Solomon KISSINGER, H REFERENCE: _____ CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE

KISSINGER _____ COLBY, W _____ S/S _____ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT

SCOWCROFT X _____ SCHLESINGER, J _____ OTHER _____ LOU NO FORN MODIS

DAVIS _____ ST EX SEC _____ S C EYES ONLY EXDIS

TS CODEWORD SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: Memo of Pres mtg w/ returning congressional delegation for PRC on Sept 8 1975

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION		REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO	
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT			MEMO FOR HAK (_____)
STAFF SECRETARY			MEMO FOR PRES (_____)
FAR EAST <u>Solomon</u>			REPLY FOR (_____)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			APPROPRIATE ACTION (_____)
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA			MEMO _____ TO _____ (_____)
EUROPE / CANADA			RECOMMENDATIONS (_____)
LATIN AMERICA			JOINT MEMO (_____)
UNITED NATIONS			REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ (_____)
ECONOMIC			ANY ACTION NECESSARY? (_____)
SCIENTIFIC			CONCURRENCE (_____)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			DUE DATE: _____
NSC PLANNING			COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL			
OCEANS POLICY			
INTELLIGENCE			

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
9/12		Supt X	X	Decision (9/20)	Jackson ✓
9/22		NSC/C	C	Scroft approved recon	

NSC/5 DISP INSTR

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