MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
Vice President Rockefeller
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Members (see attached list)

DATE AND TIME: August 7, 1975; 1:00 p.m. (luncheon)
PLACE: Department of State

Anderson: Did you talk to Costa Gomes?

Kissinger: I did, but it's a waste of time. It's a sign of weakness for us to go to the Soviets. Their contribution is relatively minor and if we can't counter the money they're putting in, we are in bad shape.

If we had done in Portugal what we did in Chile we would come out the same way.

Gray: But what can we do?

Kissinger: Support the moderate parties, try to get newspapers going outside Communist control.

Cherne: How about giving arms to the Socialists?

Kissinger: We have almost no information

Anderson:  

Foster: Would we have any European support?
Kissinger: The Brits, the French, and lately the Germans. The Socialist parties are doing a little.

The armed forces are very primitive in their political thought. They have been 20 years in Africa. Take Angola. If we let Angola go, it will be apparent that it doesn't pay to side with the United States. Having the Chinese involved doesn't help. In areas contiguous to the Soviet Union they are anti-Soviet; in other areas they are anti-U.S. Here we are taking some risks.

Foster: Where are we in SALT? What flexibility? Where are we going?

Kissinger: On verification they have accepted our position. They are willing to define missile size and they agree to limits on silo dimension. The big hang-ups are on Cruise Missiles and Backfire. It is not obvious why the B-1 should have Cruise Missiles.

Foster: The B-1 with Cruise Missiles does make sense because if you can keep them close to the ground it does complicate the defense.

Kissinger: But Cruise Missiles would give us about 11,000 free warheads.

Foster: That is a negotiating problem.

Kissinger: Of course they want Backfire free, which is equally absurd.

Foster: Backfire is part of the noise level. I would give it to them.

How about mobiles?

Kissinger: They are willing to ban them, and DOD doesn't want to.

Cherne: Why?

Kissinger: I don't know their motives -- only that they offered.
I think it's better, from the verification aspect, to ban rather than count mobiles.

For actual diplomatic employment, strategic forces -- the Minuteman -- are worthless. We move divisions, aircraft carriers, and B-52's to some effect in a crisis.

Teller: I am not sure about your comment that there is a peace movement coming up and we can't sustain the momentum of a race. I think we should move now to fill the gap.

Kissinger: I don't disagree. But we have swung between intransigence and acquiescence. What we need is a policy we can sustain over the years. We need a policy so that if we get into a crisis the American people will know we have done everything possible. Then we can be tougher in a crisis.

[There was a short SIOP discussion.]

Foster: On SALT, the numbers are not so important. What worries me is the 1000 Minuteman which are targetable. That is destabilizing. Aren't we better off having the highest proportion possible non-targetable?

Kissinger: We haven't accepted the Soviet proposal. We don't know for sure what they are up to.

Anderson: For two years we have disagreed with the strategic NIE.

Kissinger: The most useful thing you can tell the President is what is wrong with the NIE and how it can be remedied. How to remedy the process and the situation which exists.

Anderson: We also want to talk about Baker's concern.

Kissinger: Where is the hang-up?

Baker: 

Kissinger: Why don't we force them?
Baker: It's not so simple.

[Discussion about grain]

Baker: We now have a corner on the grain market, if we control it. We have the Soviets right where we want them, if we use it.

Foster: 

Baker: It's not that easy, though we are developing a plan.
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