

Scowcroft

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, July 23, 1975
10:30 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

SUBJECTS: SALT; Panama; Soviet grain sales; Middle
East negotiation

President: If you can tell Mel [Laird] the movement we've got
(on SALT). We need to get Mel on our side. If Mel thinks he is
on the inside, we can get him with us.

Kissinger: Okay. I can do that.

On Panama. We have basically three options: Break off the talks;
improve the land and waters; and keep the negotiations going. The
latter is the only one which makes sense. It will take discipline
in the Departments. We can send Bunker back. DOD wants 25
and 40 years; that's okay, though we will have to give to 20. The
Snyder Amendment is useful because it pressures Torrijos. If
we can get a conceptual agreement by February...we now have
agreement in principle. The President of Colombia said he (and
two others) would march arm-in-arm into the Zone if things broke off.

President: We can't break it off. What does a conceptual agreement
mean?

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AUTHORITY Sec Review 9/9/04; State v: sit 3/10/04
BY da NLF, DATE 4/17/07

Kissinger: 25 and 40 years or 20 and 40 years. It is less than a treaty but more than agreement in principle. Either side could clearly back off.

There are other tactical details. Torrijos' coming here I think probably is a bad idea. If I go there they have an incentive for riots. You must know that Schlesinger is almost hoping for a confrontation.

There's a switch for Australia. They won't come now.

President: Let's go with the French.

Kissinger: Schlesinger in his meeting started out saying there is nothing new in the Soviet proposal. Colby on the other hand thinks it is a great advance.

President: I hope he'll say that.

Kissinger: Schlesinger I think we can get to a 600 kilometer SLCM limitation if we give him ALCM of 2500 or maybe 2000.

President: How about land mobiles?

Kissinger: He wants them banned. But he'll give in. I would propose a Verification Panel meeting Thursday and an NSC meeting on Friday in the morning. We have three parts: there are those which are acceptable, those that are unacceptable and those requiring further study.

President: Nobody wants a mobile missile in their area. No way.

Scott said Dobrynin sidled up to him to ask what we want. I said to tell him we can't give on Backfire.

Kissinger: That's a good message to give, although we will have to compromise on them. They can't afford to count 350 of them.

Dobrynin will come in for five minutes to tell you they bought 10.2 million tons and want 10 more. I would say we are sympathetic but come back to us later on with the other 10.

Tell him we will give him something on SALT Friday. We appreciate the give on verification. We will make some concessions but we expect them to also make some concessions.

[There was discussion of the Egyptian map.]

Kissinger: I would like to tell Dinitz that you are impatient and that if it's not wrapped up in August we will give up on it.

We have a massive problem with Hussein. [The Secretary read the cable from Amman in which Hussein rejected any compromise on the number of Hawks.]

P/R 23 July 75 ✓

P If you can tell Will a movement wire got. We need to get back on our side. If Will thinks he is on a inside, we can get him w/ us.

K OK, I can do that.

On Panama. We have basically 3 options. Break off; seized land + control; keep negotiations going. The latter is a only one which makes sense. Will take chair in Sept. We can send Bremer back. BOB wants 25/40. That is -K, that we will have to give to 20. The Snyder card is useful since it pressures Touriga. If we can get conceptual agreement by Feb. We now have agreement in principle. The Pres of Columbia(?) said he (& 2 others) would march on in our into a zone if things broke off.

P We can't break off. What does a conceptual agreement mean.

K 25/40 yes, it's less than a treaty but more than an agreement in principle. Either side could clearly back off. There are other critical details. Touriga coming here, I think just a bad idea. If I go there they have incentive for riots - you must have Schles almost hope for a confrontation.

Switch for construction. They want land now

P lets go w/ K and

K Schles has only started out saying nothing in our proposal. Colby on other hand thinks it's a great advance

P I hope hell say that.

K Schles would I think we can get to a GCM for Schles. I'm sure if we give him AHCN of 25000 or maybe 2000

P How about land mistakes

K Wants them banned. Best bill gives in. I would propose VP Thomas & KIC Fin. & m.

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AUTHORITY per EAC Review 9/9/04; state visit 3/10/04

BY NLF, DATE 4/13/07

OK Salt papers for hand mtg.

We had 3 parts: those which are acceptable, un-acceptable, those requiring further study.

P. Nobody wants a mobile missile in their area. No way.

Scott said Doby settled up to him to ask what we want. I said to tell him we can't give on Backfire.

K. Good way to give tho we will have to compromise on those. They can't expect to count 350 of them.

Doby will come in for 5 mins. Tell you they got 10, 2 + want 10 more. I would say we negotiate but ~~but~~ come back to us later on a lower 10.

Tell him we will give him something on Salt Fin. We agree a general verif. We will make some concessions but we expect them to do.

(Discusses E may)

K. I would like to tell Doby you are impatient and if not wrapped up in Aug we will give upon it.

We have a massive prob w/ Hrussein (reads cable).