

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 2.4

OSD 22, 11/1/05
MR 04-79, #8, 02/22/11/23/04

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

del NARA Date 11/26/04

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Saturday, July 19, 1975
9:45 a. m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

President: I thought it would be helpful if we got together informally to talk SALT. Henry had an interesting meeting with Gromyko and I am going to Helsinki for three days. I will see Brezhnev on this as well as other matters. Gromyko's attitude indicates that we may be able to get an agreement this year. If we can, with proper safeguards, get one this year, I think it is preferable to do it this year, out of the election heat. Brezhnev has his Party Conference in February, and he will be under pressure not to go there with a failure.

I got a bathtub plug for my birthday, "to stop the leaks in the White House." I would hope--especially in this area--that we could stop the leaks. These things are very harmful as far as the government is concerned, and are negative in any negotiation with our allies and opponents. The White House is as bad as the other places, but I want all the agencies to tighten up.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(B)(1,3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp to Det.



Schlesinger: There is no way to stop it. Most of these leaks come from the Hill. 90% of Bradsher, and all of Szulc came from Jackson. They just leak. DOD does in the technical areas like verification, but the Hill just leaks.

President: Let me mention one other item. I have approved the program in Angola. We should do more. We should have done more in Portugal. I notice now that the Soviet Union is openly backing the Communists. I think we probably most do more. I know some of the departments don't agree. Henry has a problem.

Schlesinger: I think it is important to do enough to succeed. Failing is worse than indifference. Losing gives the impression that if the U.S. backs you, you are a loser.

Kissinger: I agree with Jim. We gain nothing by getting a program and then losing. [He describes the program briefly.]

We don't need a decision until we get the Vance report.


President: I agree we must do enough to succeed.

Kissinger: In May when I met with Gromyko in Vienna, I went through the U.S. position, with no new presentation. The only new idea was that of the complexes, which had informal agreement here. I told him the ball was in their court. We didn't insist on our positions, but they had to make some response. One problem is that Gromyko is not a negotiator on SALT. He can convey it only. Only Brezhnev is the negotiator, so we get more from the President's talks with Brezhnev than through me or Alex.

This meeting I just listened while Gromyko responded point by point through our proposals. Neither side has put these through the Geneva channels. Only Alex knows anything of this.

Gromyko put these forward as a package which he says is not separable.

On MIRV, they have accepted our counting rule: that any missile that has been tested as MIRV'd will be counted as MIRV'd. So all SS-17's, 18's, and 19's will be counted as MIRV'd. The same will apply to SLBM.



Schlesinger: There will have to be some other line on that. Like when a sub comes in for retrofit.

Kissinger: Yes, something like that. And any single-warhead missile will be distinguishable. So they accepted our position 100 percent on verification.

On cruise missiles--on bombers--anything of under 600-km range are free. Over 600-km range are counted. Cruise missiles of over 600-km range on surface ships, transport aircraft and subs are banned.

Land-based cruise missiles of intercontinental range (5500 kilometers) are banned. Missiles of range less than that are unrestricted.

On silo dimensions, the Interim Agreement is vague. It says the dimensions can't be increased more than 15%. The Soviets claim that means 15% in each direction; we say it means 15% in only one direction. Gromyko got this one totally screwed up, but what he said was that silo dimensions could be changed only once and then not more than 32% in volume and maybe in silo diameter not more than 15% -- though he screwed up on this. As Dobrynin interpreted this, you can't go more than 15% in any direction and the volume change can't be more than 32%.

Schlesinger: Silo dimension is primarily a political issue. The Soviet Union is now in a position to increase throw weight by increasing specific impulse. Putting SS-17 fuel in an SS-19 would make a helluva missile.


President: What would that be for us?

Brown: We can increase three to four times without changing silo dimensions. With a 32% increase, it would be at least six times.

President: If we used that, would our throw weight match theirs?

Schlesinger: No, but it would allow us to silence the argument. Easily we could go to six million pounds.

Kissinger: On light versus heavy missiles, we made a unilateral statement in '72.



Schlesinger: Which they rejected.

Kissinger: Now they are willing to accept the definition that launching weight won't be more than that of the heaviest light missiles. That's not the best for us, because we would prefer throw weight, so they couldn't increase by improving efficiency, but it is a step forward.

Schlesinger: It is, but primarily for SALT III, not II.

Kissinger: If it refers to missiles on each side, it is unacceptable because that would restrict us to Minuteman III. But Dobrynin accepted an interpretation that the weight applied equally to both sides.

On the deadline for implementing 2400: They now have about 2600 systems. They agreed to come down to 2400 within 12 months of the signing of this agreement.

They are ready to begin reduction talks by 1977.

Mobile missiles: They want to ban land-based mobiles; they accept mobiles on bombers if they are counted; on other aircraft they are banned.


They say the Backfire is not a strategic bomber. If we look at it carefully we will see it isn't. My judgment is that in a package we can get some mobification of that if we don't insist on counting on every one.

[He recapped the list.]

This at least shows they have done some serious work and it is now up to us to get a response.

President: Can we get this into the proper hands to get a position?

Kissinger: If this gets into ACDA, we might as well give it to the New York Times. I thought if we can agree on the direction we want to go and then put it into the Verification Panel....if we could get a preliminary notion from Jim and George and then put it into the system. I could also give it to Ikle if you want. Perhaps Jim, George, Brent and I could meet Tuesday morning to see where we stand. If we agree, we would go through the system.



President: Then we could decide whether to go through the NSC or not? Jim?

Schlesinger: I think we would have to have some staff look at this. Then I think it would give you protection to have a formal NSC meeting.

I can give you some substantive comments if we have time. I am more concerned with the substance than the verification. The 2400 is key to me. That is why I am concerned with the Backfire. [He gives the President a Backfire paper]. At high altitudes, it has B-1 capabilities. I need to look at the cruise missile carefully. I am not so worried about the SLCM as I am about the ALCM.

Kissinger: We might be able to work something out combining range with a number limitation -- in other words, 2000 km but with only six aircraft.


Brown: I read somewhere that you had discussed a figure of 2400 kilometers.

Kissinger: They never talked specific range numbers. I have never separated SLBM and ALCM's in talking with them. If we will separate them out, I think we could get more on ALCM for a SLCM ban.

The two areas unsolved are cruise missiles and Backfire. I agree we can't accept Backfire free, if only for cosmetics. Maybe we can tie the Backfire and cruise missiles together. I don't think they will count all Backfire. You, George, will have to see what range you need -- obviously the shorter the range the easier it would be.

President: How many Backfire do they have?

Schlesinger: They plan to have 400 by 1985, but they could have more. There are a number of combinations. I would maintain a tough position at CSCE but maybe we could allow these on naval aviation, if they tear down their present ones and count these in the long-range aviation.



Kissinger: If you could give the President your ideas. Brezhnev is the only one who can negotiate. We don't need a final position now, but we will get more flexibility in the President's meeting with Brezhnev than through any other channel.

Schlesinger: Their cruise missile proposal ratifies their cruise missile programs and bans ours. They have lots of them under 600 kilometers. Most of our cities are on the coast. We must realize there are asymmetries. The ALCM area is a problem. That is an asymmetry in our favor.

It is not in our advantage to ban mobiles. It is in their advantage. We have to think of the vulnerability of ICBM and submarines.

Kissinger: I think they made the proposal as a concession to us.

President: I remember the proposal for the railroad Minuteman. [There was some discussion of that].

Schlesinger: We would put them on government lands in the West.

President: If we can't get Sanguine, how can we get agreement on mobiles?


Schlesinger: I don't think we get anything from a ban on mobiles. We need to go on R&D and this is the only way to get it through Congress.

Kissinger: This need not be raised at Helsinki. We have to solve it sometime but I don't think it is a real issue with the Soviets.

The real issues are cruise missiles and Backfire and I think they should be tied together. They are worried about SLCMs, for example.

President: Can we put together some general guidelines which would be useful in a package decision?

[The meeting ended.]



①

✓ P/K/Schlesinger/Berman

19 July 75

(send copy to Jan [unclear] when typed) Done

P I think would be helpful if we got together uniformly to take Scott - K had interesting entry w/ Graham 2 going to Helsinki for 3 days. I would see they are there as well as other than routine. Graham stated indicate we may be able to get an agreement this year. If we can, w/ proper requirements, get another year, I think it preferable to do it this year, out of a election that. Buz also has his party conference Feb, + he will be under pressure not to go there w/ a partner. I got a booklet plug for my book "A story - links in a WH". I would hope - esp in this area - that we could story - links. These things are very helpful as far as a just is concerned + are negotiable in our negot w/ our allies + opponents. WH is bad as others, but I want all agencies to tighten up.


See the way to stop it. Most of these links came from Hill. 80% of Broderick, all of ~~Stacy~~ Sybil came from Jackson. They just look. DOD does use techniques like computer, but it will just look.

P One other item. I have opposed plug in Angola. We should do more. We should have done more in Portugal. I think now SC is really backing a horse. I think we ought to put most of more. I have some of a dept don't agree - K has prob.

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY Gen. Reg. 04-79 #83 05-28 #12

BY WJ NARA, DATE 8/17/09



Sd I think it important to do ~~not~~ to succeed.
Failing is worse than making being your impression
if US backs you, you are loser.

K I agree w/ Jim. We gain nothing by getting
prog & then being ~~the~~ (Decide what we
plan to do).

We don't need a decision til next Nov
next.


P I agree we must do our best to succeed

K In my w/G, I want them a US position,
w/ no new presentation. Only new idea was
that of envelopes, which had informal agreement
then. I told him ball was in their court. We
didn't insist on our position, but had to know
some exposure. One prob is G is not a negot
on SALT. He can convey it only. Only Bez is
negot, even get more from P-Bez, talks than
them me or Alex.

The only I feel historical wrt G is vizard
point by point then on proposals. Whether will
be put those then a letter chain. Only
Alex knows anything of this.

G put those forward as package which he says is
not separable.

Our ~~requirements~~ then MPR they have accepted our
counting rule - ~~all 17, 18, 19~~ any missiles
tested as Minir will be counted as Minir.
So all 17, 18, 19 will be counted as Minir.
Same will apply to SLBM.



Sch There will have to be something like on that.
Like ~~something~~ where a lot more in for
retrofit.

K Yes. Something like that. And any single
workload will be distinguished. So they accepted
one portion 100% on wing

Over cruise missile - on bombers, anything
under 600 km air free. Over 600 are
controlled. Over 600 on surface ship, transport
& subs are banned.

Land based missile ⁱⁿ international
range (5500) are banned. Less than that are
unrestricted.

Sch dimensions: Interim agreement says - says
dimensions can't be increased more than 15%.
S U claims that means in each direction - we say
only one direction. George got this area totally
screwed up but what he said was ~~the~~ dimension
could be changed only once & then not more than
3 2/3% in volume & ^{major} ~~the~~ character not more than
15% - tho he screwed up on this. ~~As~~ As Dolegin
interprets this, you can't go more than 15% in
any direction & volume change not more than 5%.

Sch ~~right~~ Submissions primarily a political
issue. S U now in position to increase TW by
increasing specific targets. Putting 17 fuel
in 19 would make better missiles

P what that is for us?

B We can increase 3-4 times w/o changing



subdivisions. US/32% increase, would be
at least 6 times.

F If we used that, would an T-28 unstable air
Sch W, but it would allow us to make a request
exactly we could go to 6 mil #.

K light/heavy missiles. We made improved
statement in 12 which 6

Sch which they rejected.

R How they willing to accept if that limiting
weight would be more than that of heavy light
missile. Not best for us, because we would
prefer T-28, so they couldn't increase by improving
efficiency, but it a step forward.

Sch It is, but primarily for S-300, not II

K If it applied to missiles on each side, it
unacceptable cause that would restrict us to max III.
But ^{Do} accepted an interpretation that it applied
i weight applied equally to both sides.

Deadline for implementation, 2400: They now have
about 2600 systems. They agreed to come
down to 2400 upon 12 mos of signing of this
agreement.

They were ready to begin reduction talks by
1977.

While missiles: They want to have land based
mobiles, they accept mobiles or brackets if
counted, or other accept they banned.

Backfire not a start brackets. If we look at
it carefully we will see it isn't. They



4
judgment is in a package we can get some
modification of that if we don't insist on writing
on my own.

(Recapped the bot)

Third draft shows they have done some serious
work. It would say to us to get a response

P Can we get this into paper hands to get a position -

K If this gets into A.C.A., we might as well get
it to NYT. I think if we can agree on this then
we want to go to them put it into U.P. If we can't
get behind within four or five days & then
put it into a separate. I could also give it to the

if you want. Perhaps Jim George should & I could
meet Tom's aim to see where we stand. If

xx

we agree, we could go through a system


P Then we could decide whether to go through NSC
or not? Jim?

Sh I think we would have to have some staff look at
this. Then I think it would give you
protection to ^{have} ~~have~~ an NSC formal meeting.

Some substantive comments if we have time.

Start → I have reviewed w/c substance than a circumstantial
Tom's 2400 is key to me. That's why I reviewed
w/c Backfire (Spec P or Backfire paper). At high
alt it has ~~some~~ B-1 capabilities. I need to look
at cruise missile carefully. I want to avoid
about SHCM or I am about ALCM.

K We might have to work something out
working some w/c # limitation - ~~like~~ eg -



2000 km but w/only 6/a ft.

B I read somewhere you had discussed a figure of 2400 km.

H They were talked specific range #'s. I have never separated SHAN & AHEM in talking w/ them. If we will separate them out, I think we could get more on AHEM for a SHAN km.

The 2 miss involved are cruise missiles + backfire. I agree we can't accept Backfire just, if only for cosmetics. Maybe we can tie backfire & cruise missiles together. I don't think they will count all backfire. You George will have to see what range you need - obviously a shorter range class it would be.

P How many backfire.

Sh They plan 400 by 1985, but could have more. There are a # of variations. I would enter a tough position at CSCF but maybe we could allow these on unconditional, if they have done their present work + count these in IRA.

H You could give P ~~more~~ your ideas. Buz is the only one who can ~~see~~ report. We don't need a final position now, but will get more info in P/Buz early than through any other channel.

Sh Cruise missile ratios their cruise missile prop + have ones; They have lots of them



