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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

TIME AND DATE:
July 18, 1975
9:07 - 10:12 a.m.

PLACE:
The Oval Office
The White House

SUBJECTS:
Middle East, Angola; Soviet Grain; SALT;
President's Trip

[There was discussion of the new Israeli lines in Sinai]

Kissinger: We will send Eilts back Saturday. This won't help us with Sadat. It's not a big concession after all our table-pounding. He could quit his talk and take it, or tell us to go to hell. If he says no, maybe we should go for an overall settlement.

President: I agree.

Kissinger: The only value of this is it gets us a settlement and a year and a half.

President: If Sadat says no, there is no reason to force more concessions from Israel for an interim, is there?

Kissinger: If you give them an ultimatum, they will do it, but you will pay for it in a confrontation.
My assessment of Israel's situation is that for us to start a showdown for a few changes... It's better to brawl over a failure.

President: Sadat might buy it; he may want something more. He must understand we can't make a major effort for changes.

Kissinger: We will make an effort, but not a massive one.

President: We will do what we can; if that is not enough we will tell Sadat we will go comprehensive.

Kissinger: That's my judgment. [To Scowcroft:] What do you think?

Scowcroft: I agree.

Kissinger: The reason I reluctantly came to an interim agreement is that if you get it, plus a SALT agreement and one or two others, you'll be in good shape in foreign policy.

[The President took a phone call from Rhodes.]

Kissinger: O.K. We will proceed on this basis.

President: I have decided on Angola. I think we should go.

Kissinger: You will have to certify it.

President: I am willing to do it.

Kissinger: We'll send Vance to Mobutu and ask him to come up with a program. It may be too late because Luanda is lost. Unless we can seize it back, it is pretty hopeless. We'll have a resignation from Davis, then I'll clean out the AF bureau.

President: But if we do nothing, we will lose Southern Africa. I think we have an understandable position.

I think we can defend it to the public. I won't let someone in Foggy Bottom deter me.

Kissinger: In six years I have been on the tough side. But I push detente in order to be able to be tough. If we were publicly tough, the Soviet Union would
have no incentive. Now, so long as they think we are pushing detente, they
will keep their heads down.

Call the Agencies and give them the decision.

President: On grain. I promised 14, but only 10 now and phase in
the rest. Isn't that the best?

Kissinger: Yes. Phasing is best. We need to find better ways of using our
food for good behavior. We are in a classic monopoly position in grain.
We should use it. Butz should check and dole it out.

On SALT, I will present the Soviet position and the changes and the
areas of problems. If you could say the backbiting must stop and you can't
make a decision when the leaks are that we are being taken to the cleaners.
Also you want a SALT agreement this year -- before the election year. So
you want their cooperation. Maybe Defense could give you a paper.

On the trip. The Poles want you to go to Gdansk. We turned it down.

We do have a problem about Asad. We did promise that the next time
you came to Europe you would see him. The one thing Asad could get out of
all this is seeing you.

We could ask Sadat. If he blows the deal, we wouldn't want to see him.

You could leave a day early, go to Vienna, then to Germany, or to
Germany and then to Vienna.

President: I will leave a day early if we need to.

Kissinger: You will see Karamanlis, Demirel, Trudeau, Giscard and
Wilson at Helsinki.
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