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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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State Dept. Review 3/10/04
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By dal NARA Date 6/28/05

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:

Thursday, July 17, 1975
9:55 - 10:40 a.m.

PLACE:

The Oval Office
The White House

SUBJECTS:

Frank Lindsay; Angola; Zaire, Middle East

Kissinger: [Re PFIAB] I know Frank Lindsay extremely well and he is outstanding. But all the pressures on him will be in a direction not favorable to you. His wife's brother is Rev. Coffin of Yale. Whenever the chips are down, these guys go with their social pressures. If he had a full-time job here away from his social environment, he would be fine. His wife is not as bad as Coffin, but . . .

Up there they are on the right of the liberal group. I asked Moynihan what Harvard wanted from us and he said "failure."

President: I knew Brent had reservations but didn't know the full story.

Kissinger: On Angola. I favor action. If the U.S. does nothing when the Soviet-supported group gains dominance, I think all the movements will draw the conclusions that they must accommodate to the Soviet Union and China. I think reluctantly we must do something. But you must know that we have massive problems within the State Department. They are passionately opposed and it will leak.

President: How about Davis?

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Kissinger: He will resign and take some with him.

President: After what you and I did for him.

Kissinger: I also have a problem with the Ambassador to Tanzania. He participated in giving the ransom for the students. I would like to recall and retire him. But you have to know there would be a major blow-up -- mostly blamed on me.

Has [REDACTED] gone to Kaunda?

Scowcroft: No. He felt that he should wait for approval.

Kissinger: That is a disgrace.

[Describes the State paper of objections.]

There isn't one African leader who doesn't govern by physical domination, except maybe Nigeria.

President: Does the paper recommend arms?

Kissinger: We should send Vance [REDACTED] Then we should have Mobutu and Kaunda get together and work it out.

Without us, Neto will win. And the argument is, it doesn't matter.

President: What are the odds if we do it?


Kissinger: We will know better when we see the Mobutu plan.

I will send you the Nat Davis paper.

You have a Zaire economic aid package from Lynn. We would like to give a \$20 million economic package for Zaire. Lynn objects because there is no economic justification. He is right, but the political considerations override. [REDACTED]

President: I am not sure if we are opposing the Soviets, we are not right.

Kissinger: But those who rant against the Soviets won't follow through on it.



Here is the letter from President Nixon asking for toughness on Israel. [He hands him the letter.]

I am seeing Dinitz now. I agree with your view on the telephone last night. If we can't arrange an Egyptian backdown, we are in trouble.

You should know that in the Midwest the idea of having Americans on the ground is not popular. I think you should insist on a Congressional vote.

President: You are right, but I think we should stick with the offer so we can get something from Israel -- which has to be more than is being offered now -- and so we can say we have gone farther than we should have.

Kissinger: On the CSCE trip, I don't think a London airport stop is right. If they ask for it, okay, but otherwise forget it unless we can spend a day there.

Asad is a bigger problem. He needs the prestige, but it will make Israel mad and Egypt unhappy.

President: How about in connection with the China trip?

[There was some discussion]

I will leave on Friday if required.

Kissinger: I would worry about doing it before the CSCE. Asad would be going around telling his version and you would have to explain to Brezhnev what happened.



